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Abstract
After an introductory chapter, chapter 2 reviews and assesses the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on TFP growth. A detailed review of the economic and historical literature on productivity 
growth in Indonesian manufacturing follows. This allows constructing a new methodology for the 
estimation of aggregate TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing, using a panel dataset of 
establishments over the period 1975-95. New estimates are presented and compared with historical 
evidence.
Chapter 3 further emphasises the issue of establishments' heterogeneity by presenting a meticulous 
review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on industrial demography.
Chapter 4 investigates further the heterogeneity of manufacturing establishments in terms of 
productivity, and size. It offers a comprehensive demographic study of manufacturing 
establishments over the 21-year period, focusing on productivity and size differentials, as well as on 
establishments' entry and exit. In a second part, relaxing the representative plant hypothesis and 
taking establishments' turnover effect into account, I present several decompositions of aggregate 
TFP growth into incumbents' contribution and the contribution of entrants and exiters.
Chapter 5 draws on this literature and tests econometrically the different hypotheses aiming at an 
explanation of establishments' productivity heterogeneity. Hypotheses are tailored to the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector through a careful reference to the economic history of the sector. 
Chapter 6 offers three detailed historical and economic industry studies, aiming at the discovery of 
central factors and processes explaining the evolution of the manufacturing sector in terms of 
productivity change and establishments' demography. It also tests econometrically hypotheses 
regarding the main factors explaining survival and exit of establishments.
Chapter 7 recalls the results of the reestimation of aggregate TFP growth using a new 
methodology, and brings together the main outcomes of the subsequent chapters, thereby offering 
an explanation of aggregate TFP growth with detailed microeconomic mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
The study of productivity has been a long standing topic both in the economics and economic 
history literatures. This interest is mainly motivated by the attempt to explain the tremendous 
economic growth experienced by all world economies since industrialisation. The mainstream 
literature indeed points at two main sources of economic growth. The first source is the increase in 
the use of production factors, leading to an increase in output -  this is the extensive component of 
economic growth. The second source is the increase in productivity stemming from a improved use 
of factors of production, also called efficiency -  this is the intensive component of economic 
growth. While there are obvious limits to extensive growth, i.e. the limited availability of resources 
such as intermediate inputs, labour and capital, intensive growth is in theory only limited by the 
current state of technology, state that is constantly improving. Mainstream economic growth theory 
states that, if technology is internationally available, all countries should catch up with the leader 
country, i.e. grow faster than the leader country to attain a similar GDP per capita level. There are 
however factors that limit the adoption of the latest technologies. These factors are mainly situated 
in the domain of institutional and social capabilities.
The initial works on economic growth and productivity suggested that the process of catch-up 
should lead to a global convergence of GDP per capita levels. However, more and more studies 
point at a global divergence of GDP per capita levels, with possibly localised convergence 
processes. The question is integral part of the wider quest for an explanation of the wealth and 
poverty of nations. In the domain of development economics, the question addressed changed 
from "How do economies grow?" to "Why don't economies grow as fast as they should?".
Asian countries experienced very high rates of economic growth since the 1970s (around 10% 
p.a.), seemed to be catching up with developed countries, and attracted massive foreign 
investments. Paul Krugman in 1994, in his famous article "The Myth of Asia's Miracle", is probably 
one of the first to point at a potential exhaustion of Asian growth, by suggesting that it had mostly 
been of the extensive kind, drawing a parallel with the USSR during the communist era. Numerous 
studies dealing with productivity and productivity growth in Asia were published from this period 
onwards, especially after the 1997 Asian crisis. Indeed, the crisis painfully pointed at potential 
pitfalls in the process of Asian economic growth. In 1995, Young publishes an article titled "The 
Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience", 
suggesting that Total Factor Productivity growth for East Asian countries had been overestimated, 
and that economic growth had mainly been driven by factors accumulation.
Indonesia's productivity growth received particular attention mostly after the 1997 crisis, with a 
series of studies using data on publidy listed companies, assessing various issues linked to
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companies financing structures and corporate governance. The mainstream idea was that 
Indonesian companies had wide access to domestic and foreign capital without necessarily 
presenting transparent accounts, and investors - driven by the euphoria of high returns emerging 
markets supported by strong economic growth, lent money without always monitoring companies' 
performance closely.
Less crisis-focused productivity studies concentrated on the Indonesian manufacturing sector, 
starting as soon as 1990 with Hill's seminal articles "Indonesia's industrial transformation, part 1 
and 2". This coincided with the amelioration of the data on the Indonesian manufacturing sector, 
which now covered all establishments with 20 employees or more from 1975 on, and provided 
series enabling the estimation of Total Factor Productivity.
The very early stages of Indonesian industrialisation probably date back to the end of the 19th 
century. This period corresponds to the last decades of Dutch colonialism, period during which 
colonialists started to develop industries taking advantage of both cheap and abundant natural 
resources (wood, tea, coffee, spices, rubber, tobacco) and labour. In 1940, the Netherlands fall to 
Germany, and the government flees to London. In the mean time, Japan suggests that French 
Indochina and Dutch Indies should join the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Japanese start 
invading the Dutch Indies as soon as 1942, and Sukarno becomes head of the government, but 
under Japanese military control. Independence is first declared in August 1945, but only takes 
effect in 1949 after a long war for Independence. During this period, a large chunk of Indonesian 
manufacturing facilities are destroyed. The Sukarno years, that lasted from 1950 to 1965 did not 
witness any development in manufacturing, rather "it has been argued that Indonesian economy 
underwent 'structural retrogression' between the late 1930s and the early post-independence 
years, in the sense that the share of the labour-intensive or traditional sectors in total output 
increased while that of the modern, capital-intensive sectors declined" (Booth, 1998, p.70). Booth 
(1998) even indicates that "by 1965 the manufacturing sector's share of GDP was lower than in the 
late 1920s" (p. 86). Economic recovery shot up as soon as 1966, and accelerated from 1973 with 
the oil boom, that lasted up to 1980. In 1981, oil prices collapsed, and Indonesia faced a severe 
crisis, from which it recovered as soon as 1984. The consequences of the crisis triggered a series of 
deregulatory measures in the domains of trade, finance, and domestic manufacturing regulation. 
Those measures took effect between 1986 and 1988. A period of investment boom and economic 
growth followed up to the 1997 crisis.
The combination of a real start of manufacturing development in 1973, and availability of reliable 
plant-level data from 1975 onwards, leads to most modern long-term studies on Indonesian 
manufacturing to cover the period 1975 to 1998 (latest available data). From a historical point of 
view, the period is very interesting to study because it is politically uniform -  one ruler, President
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Suharto, it starts off with industrial take-off, coinciding with the start of the oil boom, and it 
encompasses five clear-cut economic sub-periods. The oil boom lasts from 1973 to 1980, 
characterised by rapid growth of output, rapid expansion of the number of plants, and some 
industrial diversification. It is followed by three years of economic crisis from 1981 to 1983, with a 
drop in output or deceleration of output growth depending on sub-sectors. Two years of economic 
recovery - 1984-85, precede three years of deregulatory measures in 1986 to 1989, during which 
economic growth is sluggish. After the implementation of those measures, the economy 
experiences rapid investment and rapid growth from 1989 to mid-1997.1
A series of studies dealing with the estimation of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Total Factor 
Productivity Growth (TFPG) followed the release of the manufacturing census, with results ranging 
from 0.70% p.a. to 1.10% p.a. for the oil boom period, from -4.90% p.a. to 1.10% p.a. for the oil 
crisis and recovery period, and from 2.10% p.a. to 7.90% p.a. for the deregulation and investment 
boom period. Those results tell us at least one story: we do not really know what has been 
productivity growth of the Indonesian manufacturing sector under the Suharto era. The second 
story is that if the range of TFP Growth estimates is roughly correct, then it seems that 
manufacturing output growth (on average 10 to 12% p.a.) has been lower than productivity 
growth: output growth has been mainly extensive.
Chapter 2 starts with the review of the existing theoretical economic literature dealing with 
productivity issues and measurements. In order to shed some new light on productivity 
performance in Indonesian manufacturing in this period, Chapter 2 primarily aims at the discovery 
of the factors explaining the discrepancy of existing TFP Growth estimates. Besides the obvious 
slight differences in dating historical turning points, and the use of different vintages of datasets, it 
appears that disagreements stem principally from the calculation of the capital stock series. The 
second important element of difference regards the estimation of elasticities of output with respect 
to intermediate inputs, labour, and capital, for which the variations can lead to substantial 
variations in aggregate TFP Growth rates. Finally, the different methodologies of aggregation of 
plant-level data into manufacturing data also lead to ample differences in the results. The 
identification of those factors leads to the elaboration of a revised methodology of the estimation of 
TFP and TFPG using plant-level data of the Large 8i Medium Scale Manufacturing Census (called 
Statistik Industr/).
Chapter 2 reviews in details the different methodologies and data that have been used to generate 
a capital stock series using Statistik Industri. All authors base the capital stock series on a 
hypothetical benchmark capital stock estimated for the base year with investment to capital and
1 Due to data consistency and reliability, I have chosen to cut the period in 1995 rather than 1997.
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value added to capital ratios, hypothetical depreciation rates, hypothetical assets' length of life, and 
a series on investment in different types of assets. I argue that these methodologies rely on 
numerous assumptions that can potentially bias the results. I propose instead to use a pre-existing 
capital stock series. This series has the advantage of measuring each plant capital stock as declared 
in the census without relying on hypothetical assumptions. The drawback of the series is that it 
only covers plants for a ten-year period, from 1988 to 1998. The shortcoming is overcome by 
modelling the existing capital stock data with other variables in the dataset - output and 
employment. The model then allows for a "backward prediction" of capital stock data for years 
preceding 1988. It also allows for the estimation of the capital stock of plants reporting no capital 
stock. The generated series are in line with aggregate capital stock growth figures of other 
historical sources.
The second improvement to the estimation of TFP and TFP Growth rates is the revision of 
elasticities of output with respect to intermediate inputs, labour, and capital. Most authors estimate 
TFP and TFPG with a value added production function and two factors of production: labour and 
capital. They use an accounting methodology, i.e. employment and wage data, to calculate the 
share of labour in value added, taken as the elasticity of value added with respect to labour. Under 
the constant returns hypothesis, the elasticities of value added with respect to labour and capital 
add up to unity. Using this methodology, at ca. 0.8, the elasticity of value added with respect to 
capital appears to be well above the international benchmark situated between 0.3 and 0.4. Other 
studies on Indonesian manufacturing point at the potential underreporting of employment figures, 
supporting the view of an overestimated elasticity of value added with respect to capital. I chose to 
use a production function based on gross output, with three factors: intermediate inputs, labour, 
and capital. Using this production function, I estimate elasticities econometrically. My results are in 
line with international benchmarks.
Incorporating both the revision of the capital stock series and the elasticities of output with respect 
to factors of production, I estimate yearly TFP and TFP Growth rates for all plants. I obtain 
aggregate figures for the manufacturing sector using the Divisia Index methodology that weights 
each component of the production function. I use a similar methodology to obtain TFP and TFP 
Growth estimates for each 2-digit industry. At the aggregate level, I show that previous estimates 
might have been overestimated, and find an average TFP Growth rate of 0.78% p.a. over the 
period 1975-95, compared with previous estimates comprised between 2% and 3% p.a.. This 
supports this hypothesis of extensive growth.
Finally, I compare aggregate TFP Growth figures calculated using the Divisia Index methodology 
(weighted average) with the simple average of TFP Growth of plants. I find that simple average
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figures are higher than weighted average results, underlining the productivity spread across plants, 
and already suggesting a potential lower performance of larger plants in terms of TFP Growth.
Chapter 2 constitutes a preliminary chapter providing an accurate measure of productivity and 
productivity growth at the plant level, and already underlines the importance of plant heterogeneity 
both in terms of productivity growth and in terms of size. Chapter 3 gives the latest state of the 
literature with regards to plants heterogeneity and aggregate productivity. The first part shows 
dearly the pitfalls of the usual representative plant hypothesis in the assessment of aggregate 
productivity growth, and exposes the progress done for the accounting of plant heterogeneity, both 
from a theoretical and a methodological point of view. In a second section, Chapter 3 underlines 
the lack of empirical studies dealing with plant heterogeneity and plants demographics in the 
context of developing countries, while acknowledging the fact that the issue has been discussed for 
OECD countries in general, and for the US, Canada, and the UK in particular. It presents the 
methodology and results obtained for the handful of developing countries that have benefited from 
a study of plants' demography, in relation to the aggregate improvement of productivity. Finally, 
Chapter 3 presents the state of the empirical literature on plant and companies heterogeneity for 
the case of Indonesian manufacturing. The last two sections underline the importance of plant 
heterogeneity and plant demography in the study of both aggregate productivity changes and 
industrial dynamics. It also emphasises certain heterogeneity in the outcomes, highlighting the 
necessity of case studies and the importance of the historical and institutional peculiarities of 
countries.
Chapter 4 draws on the two previous chapters and proposes a detailed study of Indonesian 
manufacturing plants demography. While Hill (1990a and b) proposes a fairly detailed review of 
Indonesian manufacturing sector composition and its changes between two sets of benchmark 
years (1963-1974-1985, and 1963-1975-1986), Chapter 4 proposes a yearly demographic study 
focusing on output, employment, Total Factor Productivity and Total Factor Productivity Growth 
over the period 1975-1995. The issues of output and employment distribution across the entire 
large and medium scale manufacturing sector is important from a historical point of view because it 
relates directly to the issue of plant size distribution. Indonesian manufacturing is depicted in the 
economic and political historical literature as dual in terms of plant size. More specifically, the sector 
includes a few large to very large plants accounting for the majority of output and employment, 
and a very large number of small and medium size plants. This size distribution duality is directly 
linked to ownership issues involving different socio-economic groups, and to industrial policy. 
Chapter 4 offers a detailed study of plant size distribution, entry, and exit. The results help getting 
some answers and figures about the dominance of large scale plants, and more importantly, help 
assessing whether this dominance is in the process of strengthening. Complementarily, the study of
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size distribution allows determining the state of the small and medium scale sector, which, 
according to the theoretical literature, should be central to the process of economic growth. Other 
demographic results raise the long-standing question of the state of competition in Indonesian 
manufacturing, and call for further investigation, issue that is dealt with in Chapter 6 when 
assessing the factors explaining plant exit.
Size distribution is complemented by the study of productivity and productivity growth by 
demographic group. In particular, productivity differentials between different size groups are 
examined. This helps further investigating the issue of changes in the size distribution, and shed 
some light onto the economic history of the sector. Indeed, over the period under scrutiny (1975- 
95), but especially in the oil boom period, the state has claimed being supporting the large scale 
sector of the economy for productive reasons. It has also attempted to support small and medium 
scale companies, for, it is argued, political reasons, but those support programs are said to have 
failed. Chapter 4 offers tangible evidence of productivity differential across size groups, with a 
noticeable change over time. Productivity differentials between the cohorts of entrants, incumbents, 
and exiters are also examined in order to formulate hypothesis on the effects of industrial 
demographics on aggregate productivity changes.
The prior descriptive industrial demographic study, focused on size distribution and productivity 
issues, sets the background to a decomposition of aggregate TFP Growth of the manufacturing 
sector, aiming at the determination of demographic influence on productivity changes. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2, using the Divisia Index methodology to aggregate plant productivity 
changes takes to some extent plant heterogeneity into account. However, as argued in Chapter 3, 
this methodology of aggregation excludes the contribution of entry and exit. The first incidence is 
that taking into account entry and exit change Total Factor Productivity Growth figures. Secondly, 
and more interestingly, decomposing aggregate Total Factor Productivity Growth allows highlighting 
some of the mechanisms behind the process of productivity change. The decompositions chosen 
distinguish between three components: intra-plant productivity change for incumbents, market 
share reallocation between incumbents, and the effect of plants' entry and exit. This clearly relaxes 
the representative plant hypothesis, as well as the assumption of a broad technology adopted by all 
plants at the same time.
Outcomes are clearly in line with both the economic history of the sector and results of the previous 
demographic study. Additionally, they shed new light on the causes for low productivity growth 
rates in spite of high output growth rates. In particular, results uncover the existence of two 
productivity growth processes cancelling each other out: while the replacement of low productivity 
exiters by high productivity entrants, as well as the market share reallocation from low to high 
productivity growth incumbents trigger high productivity growth rates, market shares are also
14
reallocated from high to low productivity plants, and incumbents' intra-plant productivity change is 
negative. Interestingly, as entry and exit occurs mostly in the small and medium scale sector of 
manufacturing, the results shows the positive importance of this sector in the process of aggregate 
TFP Growth. The study of the decomposition of aggregate TFP Growth over historical sub-periods 
allows posing some hypothesis regarding the changes in the mechanisms of aggregate productivity 
changes taken in their economic and political environment. These hypotheses are examined in 
Chapter 6.
Chapter 5 investigates the issue of plant heterogeneity and detects factors of different productivity 
levels across plants. The aim is to identify plant characteristics according to their productivity levels. 
It is of course necessary to control for different industries that might display intrinsic productivity 
differences, due to specific technologies of production. Additionally, it has to be demonstrated that 
productivity heterogeneity is not random. Then, the first tangible obvious factor of productivity 
differential suggested by the historical literature on Indonesian manufacturing is plant size. The 
second factor, suggested by the economic literature, is the vintage of the capital stock, that can 
have an effect on productivity via the technology embodied in the capital stock, and via the broad 
institutional environment in the period when operations started. The hypothesis of different capital 
stock vintages also calls for the examination of learning processes. The last hypothesis regards the 
existence of permanent or quasi-permanent differences across companies -  so-called fixed effects. 
The scarce economic literature on the subject suggests that those differences can be of course size, 
but also management and labour quality, as well as belonging to a corporate group. A detailed 
account and analysis of the historical literature suggests that, for the case of Indonesia, further 
explanatory factors could be of significant importance. The first factor is ownership type, 
distinguishing between private domestic, private foreign and public ownership. The second factor 
relates to group membership and patronage (Bapak Angkat), a system of support to small plants 
set up by Indonesian authorities. The third additional factor is participation to the export market. 
Last but not least, I account for industry as well as plant cronyism. The previous chapter has 
underlined a strong difference of regime regarding plant size distribution, plant productivity 
distribution, and aggregate productivity growth before and after 1989. I study plant heterogeneity 
over the entire period (1975-95), but also over the two important sub-periods: 1975-89, covering to 
the oil boom, crisis, recovery, and deregulation periods, and 1990-95, corresponding to the post­
deregulation era and investment boom.
The aim is underlining once again the effective plant heterogeneity and attempting to explain plants 
differences, thereby shedding some light on potential microeconomic mechanisms behind the 
sources of productivity and productivity gains. Beyond this broad question, the chapter aims at 
answering numerous questions raised by the historical literature on Indonesian manufacturing. Why
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would the largest plants be necessarily the most productive, even in industries where the optimal 
size can be relatively small? In those large plants especially, are there too many white collar 
workers -  often family members linked to either ownership or management, and does this affect 
negatively productivity? Is it confirmed that Indonesian companies did not actively renew their 
capital stock, resulting in productivity losses? Does ownership type matter in terms of productive 
performance? In particular, can I confirm that domestic private entrepreneurs' plants are less 
productive? Additionally, can I confirm that plants with foreign ownership are more productive, 
owing to their greater exposition to foreign competition and more advanced technologies? For the 
same reasons, are plants belonging to corporate groups more productive, or do groups protect low 
productivity activities? Does taking part in the corruption process boost or hamper productivity? 
Finally, do the answers to those questions change according to the time period?
The examination of partial correlation coefficients between productivity levels or relative 
productivity (i.e. productivity level relative to the industry average) and potential explanatory 
factors suggested by the historical review helps setting the framework for a more formal 
assessment of plant productivity heterogeneity. The following sections test in turn the random draw 
hypothesis, the capital stock vintage hypothesis, and the fixed effects hypothesis. The first set of 
results shows that the two most important factors explaining plant relative productivity 
heterogeneity are plant size and plant initial level of productivity, the latter underlining the 
importance of initial conditions, but not necessarily those embodied in the age of the capital stock. 
Further investigation shows that the initial productivity level of plants depends largely of the 
average productivity level of the sector, and on plant size. The intensity of management also 
influences productivity levels, but differently across periods, suggesting that services provided by 
management in the first period are not helpful in the second period. Ownership type matters as 
well but only in the first period under scrutiny (1975-89). Available for the second period only 
(1990-95), the group membership and patronage variables have a significant positive impact on 
initial productivity level. This result challenges previous evidence on the effect of support to small 
plants through the patronage scheme. Last but not least, the effect of cronyism is assessed, both at 
the industry and plant levels. Interestingly, as suggested by the historical literature, cronyism does 
matter, but its effects change with the institutional environment in the 1990s. Another interesting 
aspect is the comparison of industry versus plant cronyism. Both are found to have opposite 
effects.
Drawing on Chapters 4 and 5, Chapter 6 offers a study of industrial evolution in Indonesian 
manufacturing. Chapter 4 has indeed underlined the changing nature of plants distributions in 
terms of productivity, but also in terms of size. It has raised the question of the factors contributing 
to this dynamics. While Chapter 4 deals with the effect of entry and exit on aggregate productivity
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change, Chapter 6 offers three case studies with detailed historical evidence on the following 
industries: food, beverages, and tobacco ; textile, garments, and leather ; basic metals. These 
industries differ two by two in their share of output and employment in total manufacturing, in their 
productivity levels, in their rates of productivity change, and in their composition in terms of 
number and size distribution of plants. A closer look at the demographic dynamics of those three 
different industries help informing the different processes behind different industry productivity 
changes. The comparative study of productivity changes in different industries aims at the 
discovery of the most efficient industrial evolutionary process in a specific historical, economic, and 
institutional context. The aim is firstly to contribute to the literature on East-Asian productivity, not 
only by providing new productivity growth estimates, but also by providing new insights on the 
microeconomic mechanisms driving aggregate productivity changes. It aims at explaining part of 
the formation of aggregate productivity growth through evolutionary processes in the context of a 
developing country, drawing on the particular experience of Indonesia taken in its historical 
context. The final aim is to explain the poor Total Factor Productivity Growth of Indonesia in spite 
of the catching-up opportunities.
In a first instance, I propose a comparative study of the three industries: the food, beverages, and 
tobacco industry displays low productivity growth rates, but represents a large chunk of 
manufacturing output and employment, with numerous and size-heterogeneous plants, using 
intensively cheap and abundant labour and natural resources ; the textile, garment, and leather 
industry presents similar characteristics, but displays very high productivity growth rates ; the basic 
metals industry presents totally opposed characteristics, with a small share in total manufacturing 
output and employment, few plants that are generally large, and using capital intensively, but 
displaying high productivity growth rates. This comparative study principally presents the 
decomposition of aggregate productivity growth for each industry: the effect of intra-plant 
productivity growth of incumbents, the effect of market share reallocation between incumbents, 
and the entry-exit effect. The three industries present similar turnover rates in terms of number of 
plants, output, and employment, the critical factor is the quality of this turnover.
The second step determines the relationships that might exist between the different elements of 
aggregate productivity decomposition. Are competitive mechanisms stemming, on one hand from 
entry and exit, and on the other hand from market share reallocation between incumbents, 
complementary or alternative? Within the market share reallocation mechanism, is a reallocation of 
market shares from low to high productivity growth plants necessarily accompanied by a 
reallocation of market shares from high to low productivity level plants? Does a weak to negative 
contribution of intra-plant productivity growth for incumbents necessarily translate into a higher
17
positive effect of entries and exits? Are those potential relationships similar across historical time 
periods?
The third and last step aims at testing a set of factors potentially influencing survival and exit of 
plants, using a Cox proportional hazard function with panel data. This complements the previous 
analysis and investigates the issue of competition in Indonesian manufacturing. Indeed, the 
theoretical literature tends to argue that in a competitive environment, the most important factor 
driving exit is potentially a lower productivity level. The assessment of this hypothesis sheds some 
light on the state of competition in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. But of course, in the 
framework of an uncompetitive environment, additional explanatory variables are added. Firstly, is 
the relative small size of a plant a factor influencing early exit? Secondly, does the ownership type 
matter for survival, in particular, are public plants more likely to survive longer? Thirdly, does 
corporate group membership increase the chances of survival? Fourthly, do the intensity and 
quality of management and quality of labour make any difference? Finally, does corruption increase 
the chances of survival?
This last set of questions allows formulating some hypothesis regarding the microeconomic 
foundations of aggregate TFP Growth in Indonesian manufacturing, and help formulating an 
agenda for further research in the conclusion.
18
2 Total Factor Productivity Growth in Indonesian Manufacturing, 1975- 
1995: Issues in Measurement
2.1 Introduction
Since independence in 1949, large-scale firms and business groups have -  in terms of output - 
dominated the Indonesian industrial structure.2 These large companies face a myriad of small-scale 
companies, with an apparent "missing middle". The empirical economic literature stresses that this 
type of structure is symptomatic of LDCs, and contrasts sharply with structures observed in 
developed countries. So far, only a few papers have attempted to study firms' demography, and its 
link with economic growth for the developing world over the second half of the 20th century. 
Studies include the cases of Israel, Chile, Colombia, Morocco, Taiwan and Korea. As for similar 
papers studying American industrial structure dynamics, works on Israel, and Chile find that 
productivity growth stems mainly from within companies productivity growth rather than from 
companies turnover (i.e. change in industrial structure, reallocation of market shares, etc). It 
contrasts with findings for British, Colombian, Korean, and Taiwanese manufacturing, where up to 
half of productivity growth stems from companies' turnover.
Over the period 1975-96, Indonesia has experienced high economic growth rates - on average 9% 
p.a. - with very distinct phases. It has been characterised by market distortions, and a large-scale- 
firms-dominated manufacturing. It has however implemented deregulatory reforms in the 1980s, 
but went through a severe crisis in 1997. Additionally, the historical and economic literature on 
Asian economic performance has been very controversial, concentrating on the debate over sources 
of growth - "perspiration" versus "inspiration" (Aswicahyono & Hill, 2002). The main question 
arising from this stylised picture of Indonesia is the following: What has been the dynamic 
relationship between the broad institutional environment, industrial structure and economic growth?
The first step toward answering this question - and the aim of this chapter - is to find an accurate 
measure of economic performance for manufacturing over the period 1975-96.
There are various ways of measuring companies' performance using accounting indicators such as 
rate of profit, or market-based measures such as share price. Among other things, the main 
drawback of accounting-based performance measures is the difficulty of disentangling productivity 
from market power. Market-based performance measures face a number of drawbacks as well, and 
are only available for firms listed on the stock market. These constitute only a small fraction of the 
population. By far, the most complete and accurate measure of economic performance is Total 
Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG), i.e. the growth of output not attributable to an increase in the
21 am here only concerned about the formal sector of the economy.
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use of inputs - intermediate inputs, labour, and capital. The first part of this chapter reviews the 
literature on performance measurement and motivates the choice of Total Factor Productivity.
The outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 triggered the publication of numerous papers dealing with 
TFPG measurement for Asia. The debate focused on whether Asian growth had been more 
extensive or intensive, i.e. whether TFPG had been low or high. While the literature mainly focused 
on the four Tigers (Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea), a number of scholars have 
attempted to estimate TFPG for Indonesian manufacturing, at aggregate or up to 2-digit industry 
level. Striking is the large discrepancy observed between their respective results, with gaps up to 6 
percentage points for 1982-85 and 1986-90 periods.
TABLE 1: TFP G row th at the aggregate and the 2-dtgtt level, com parative reeulte
YEAR
Tim m er (1888) 
1875-81
Asw icahyono A H ill (1998) 
1978-81
Asw icahyono (1998) 
1978-80 min max spread
31-Food, beverage* A tobacco 3.70% -0.20% 2.00% -0.20% 3.70% 3.9
32-TextHe, ga rm ent* and leather 08 0% 2.10% 0.70% 0.70% 2.10% M
33-Wood p ro du c t* 12.00% 4.20% -1.80% -1.80% 12.00% 13.8
34-Paper, p r in tin g  A pub lish ing -1.80% -2.50% -1.80% -2.50% -1.80% 0.7
35-Chem ical*, rubber A p lastic -4.90% -2.00% -4.00% -4.90% -2.00% 2.9
36-Non-m etallic m inera ls -1.70% 10.30% 6.60% -1.70% 10.30% 12
37-Basic m etals 3.60% 19.00% 12.50% 3.60% 19.00% 15.4
38-Metal p ro du cts  A m achinery 5.60% 2.70% 1.90% 1.90% 5.60% 3.7
38-Other m anufacturing 2.40% -1.10% N/A -1.10% 2.40% 3.5
Aggregate TFPG 1.00% 0.70% 1.10% 0.70% 1.10% 0.4
Tim m er (1099) Asw icahyono A H ill (1996) Asw icahyono (1998)
YEAR 1982-65 1982-85 1981-83 m in m ax spread
31-Food, beverages A tobacco 3.80% 0.40% -4.10% -4.10% 3.80% 7.9
32-Textile, garm ents and leather 3.50% 3.00% -0.20% -0.20% 3.50% 3.7
33-Wood products •2.40% 5.20% -2.80% -2.80% 5.20% 8
34-Paper, p r in tin g  A pub lish ing 2.50% 4.00% -2.80% -2.80% 4.00% 6.8
35-Chem icals, rubber A p lastic -2.10% -0.40% 0.20% -2.10% 0.20% 2.3
38-Non-metal lie m inerals -8.30% -2.00% -2.10% -8.30% -2.00% 6.3
37-Basic m etals 13.60% 7.40% 0.60% 0.60% 13.60% 13
38-Metal p ro du cts  A m achinery -7.80% -1.00% -0.80% -7.80% •0.80% mm j
38-Other m anufacturing 8.90% 240% N/A 2.40% 8.90% 6.5
Aggregate TFPG 0.10% 1.10% -4 90% -4.90% 1.10% 6
YEAR
Tim m er (1999) 
1988-80
Asw icahyono A Hill (1996) 
1988-91
Asw icahyono (1998) 
1984-88
Asw icahyono (1998) Oseda (1994) O sads (1994) 
198893 1985-90 1987-90 m in max spread
31-Food, beverages A tobacco 5.60% 3.20% 1.30% 5.10% -1.00% 4.00% -1.00% 5.60% 6.6
32-Textile, garm ents and leather 12.40% 2.30% 2.80% 2.40% 7.30% 2.50% 2.30% 12.40% 10.1
33-Wood products 7.90% 2.00% 5.60% 0.00% 3.60% -12.80% -12.80% 7.90% 20.7
34-Paper, p r in tin g  A pu b lish ing 7.50% 6.20% 5.60% 0.00% 13.70% 2.00% 0.00% 13.70% 13.7
35-Chem icals, rubber A p lastic 1.70% 3.40% -0.50% 1.70% -10.70% 0.50% -10.70% 3.40% 14.1
36-Non-m etallic m inerals 7.10% 1.00% 2.10% 1.90% -4.30% 1.50% -4 30% 7.10% 11.4
37-Basic m etals 8.90% -3.00% 5.80% -2.10% 15.00% -3.70% -3.70% 15.00% 18.7
38-Metal p ro du c ts  A machinery 9.90% 0.40% 1.00% 2.10% -3.30% 4.80% -3.30% 9.90% 13.2
38-Other m anufacturing 5.60% 1.90% N/A N/A -1.50% -2.70% -2.70% 5.60% 8.3
Aggregate TFPG 7.90% 2.10% 5.50% 6.00% 3.60% 2.40% 2.10% 7.90% 5.8
I argue that differences stem mainly from the following factors: 
*  The data set used.
s  The elements of the production function using growth accounting methodology, i.e. 
estimation of a capital stock series, and calculation of the elasticity of output with respect to 
labour.3
s  The degree of aggregation and aggregation method for estimation (aggregate 
macroeconomic versus firm level)
In the second section, I present the historical background of the study, underlining the link 
between macroeconomic events, political economy and expected productivity growth. Additionally,
3 There are other issues such as the degree of aggregation of inputs and the issue of deflators but they only have a 
comparatively minor impact. The use of different deflators is discussed later on in this chapter.
20
economic history helps distinguishing relevant sub-periods. The third section discusses data issues 
for the study of productivity in Indonesian manufacturing. The fourth section presents a new 
methodology for estimating a capital stock series using fixed assets data, and discusses the choice 
of elasticity of output with respect to labour. A fifth section displays new TFPG estimates for 1976- 
95. The last section concludes.
2.2 Firms' performances: A discussion of definitions and measurements
Firms' performances can refer to a wide range of topics, covering profits, equity, technological 
development, growth, wages, share of production exported or productivity. Diverse approaches 
may be taken, but each approach should respond to two interrogations. What is the purpose of the 
study? Which are the measurement problems faced by the indicator used?
I here discuss three types of performance indicators, evaluating each time their advantages and 
weaknesses. Indeed, it is necessary to have a broad overview of performance measurements in 
order to choose the most adequate measure. The first part discusses accounting measures, the 
second part discusses market-based performance indicators, the third part presents different 
aspects of total factor productivity.
2.2.1 Accounting measures
Analysis carried out for shareholders and investors may concentrate either on accounting measures 
such as value added and profits, or on market's indicators such as earning per share or Tobin's q. 
Accounting measures may be suitable for some purposes, but face limits. Indeed, these are often 
not internationally comparable, especially in the case of developing countries. They may even not 
be comparable across companies within the same country: for example, a law may enforce 
accounting standards for large firms - usually a requirement for companies listed on the stock 
market, but not for small- and medium-scale companies. The issues of accounting standards 
definition and enforcement, and of transparency and corruption are quite important.
Lerche (1980), in a study on tax efficiency, reports for example that "the Indonesian tax 
administration, except in relation to a handful of larger companies with reliable accounts, appears 
to have surrendered to what seem unsurmountable problems in obtaining meaningful information 
and to have given up individual assessment in many cases. Tax payer information serves at best as 
a basis for a negotiated tax compromise" (p.44).
This problem is not only symptomatic of the oil boom period, but carries on in the 1990s, as Conroy 
and Drake (1990) reports, "this point relates also in part to inadequate professional accounting 
standards and training - in 1988 there were only 390 Certified Public Accountants in the whole 
private sector" (p.35).
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Another major issue faced by accounting indicators is that they do not disentangle productivity from 
market power. Indeed, a firm may have an excellent rate of profit because it minimises costs and 
maximises profit. But it may also be the case that the firm only maximises profits through its 
market power without minimising costs. It is a rather acute problem in Indonesian manufacturing, 
where the dominance of large-scale companies with monopoly powers has been widely 
acknowledged (for example in Robison, 1986 ; Hill, 1990a and b). In the case of Indonesian 
manufacturing, there are even cases where large companies make large profits both because of 
their monopoly power on the market for final goods, but also because of their monopsonic power 
on the market for intermediate inputs. Robison (1986) in particular reports the cases of large 
companies having been granted sole importer licences for intermediate inputs (for example in the 
basic metals sector). Those companies' gains are two-fold: they can reduce input prices because of 
their monopsonic power exerted on suppliers for the Indonesian market -  although this is limited 
by the fact that suppliers are situated outside Indonesia and therefore have several customers ; 
they can increase the price of inputs of competitors, because of their monopoly power conferred by 
the sole importer licence for inputs. In such a context, accounting measures of performance are far 
from reflecting the true efficiency of a company.
2.2.2 Market-based indicators
Market's indicators bring about the issue of financial market perfection and the hypothesis that the 
market prices shares correctly. Indeed, all market indicators of performance include both the share 
price and other accounting measures in their calculation. A few examples of market-based 
performance measures are given:
• Earning per Share (EPS) is the company's earnings (usually profits) divided by the
number of shares available.
• Price Earning Ratio (PER) is the share price divided by the EPS.
• Price-to-Book Value Ratio is the share price divided by the book value of assets.
• Price-to-Cash Flow Ratio is the share price divided by cash flow.
• Price-to-Sales Ratio is the share price divided by company's sales.
Using share price to measure firms' performance does not tackle the issue of market's mispricing, 
volatility and speculation. These issues are particularly acute in the framework of emerging 
markets, as in the case of Indonesia. Using stock prices requires also an adjustment of the 
measures for risk: a stock may perform better only because it is more risky and not only because 
the company has a better value. Fisman (2001) for example shows for the case of Indonesian listed 
companies, that up to a quarter of the valuation of firms could be attributable to political
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connectedness. It is also worth noting that most of the indicators use accounting measures as well, 
introducing additional indeterminacy.
Another widely used performance indicator is Tobin's q, which is the present value of future cash 
flows divided by the replacement cost of intangible assets. This is an interesting indicator, since it 
does not need risk adjustment or normalisation for a comparison across firms (as opposed to stock 
returns or accounting indicators). However, this indicator also requires to work under the 
assumption of capital markets perfection: a firm's market value is supposed to be an unbiased 
estimate of the present value of its cash flows. Tobin's q is then a measure of the contribution of 
the firm's intangible assets to its market value. A firm's intangible assets include its organisational 
capital, reputational capital, monopolistic rents, investments opportunities, etc. Another problem 
then arises with the estimation of the replacement cost of intangible assets, because it implies to 
make assumptions on the schedule of assets replacement, and on the depreciation rate. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to separate the diverse contributions made by -  for instance -  
market power and management efficiency.
These performance indicators are often used in the literature because of their easy availability. In 
spite of their drawbacks, they offer a great deal of information about companies. They have been 
widely used in studies dealing with the causes and effects of the Asian crisis of 1997.
2.2.3 Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a measure of performance
The last category of performance measures regroups all the productivity measures. In the absence 
of reliable capital stock figures for Indonesian plants, most studies dealing with the manufacturing 
sector have chosen to rely on labour productivity figures, usually calculated as the ratio of value 
added per worker. While this measure is useful, it does not give any information on capital 
productivity, and Hill (1990b) suggests that, "as the industrial data base continues to expand, more 
work needs to be done on the two key 'missing variables', capital stock and exports. The former is 
required to generate estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) and capital efficiency and 
utilisation; estimates of labour productivity in a era of extremely rapid capital stock growth area 
most imperfect proxy for TFP" (p. 103). TFP is by far more appropriate to study and compare plant 
efficiency in the context of a dual industrial structure, where large-scale capital intensive plants 
coexist with small- and medium-scale labour intensive plants.
Total Factor Productivity has received a lot of attention at the theoretical level, and has been the 
subject of numerous empirical studies for developing countries, especially since the 1990s. The 
following theoretical discussion is based on Barro (1999), and provides a detailed analysis of growth 
accounting at the macroeconomic level, which may be used in a discussion at the firm level.
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2.2.3.1 Measurement issues 
Standard growth accounting
TFP Growth is defined as technological progress in a broad sense, including organisational and 
management progress. It is the part explaining economic growth, after having taken production 
factors accumulation into account. TFP Growth can be calculated via a neoclassical production 
function, Y = F ^ K ' L ) ,  with A the level of technology, K  the capital stock and L the quantity 
of labour. It is also known as the "Solow residual". After differentiation, it becomes:
with Fk and FL the factor marginal products.
The rate of technological progress (or TFP Growth or Solow's residual) can then be written as:
where sK = RK/Y and sL = cqL/Y  are the respective shares of each factor payment in total 
product ( R is the cost of capital and co is the cost of labour). The classical assumption is that all 
the income associated to Y is attributed to one of the factors K  and L , i.e. returns to scale are 
constant: sK + sL = 1.
Jorgenson and Grichliches (1967) and Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) demonstrate the 
importance of disaggregating K and L into quality classes in order to avoid an overestimation of 
the technical progress. Indeed, such a disaggregation allows accounting for a rise in capital and 
human capital quality, which would otherwise be captured in the TFP Growth rates.
Equation (2) may be directly used to estimate g using time series data, without econometric 
techniques. This methodology -  known as growth accounting - avoids usual econometric 
drawbacks, but relies mainly on the quality and availability of the data. In particular, the 
availability and choice of adequate deflators for output and inputs is central to the reliability of the 
results. The methodology also assumes that factor social marginal products equal observable factor 
prices. This relies again on the assumption of markets' perfection.
An alternative consists in estimating g by regressing the growth rate of output on the growth rates 
of inputs as in equation (1), the intercept is then a measure of g . This procedure avoids the 
assumption that the factor social marginal products equal observable factor prices. However, it may 
suffers from simultaneity problems, because the rate of growth of capital k /K , and the rate of
(1)
(2)
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growth of labour t /L  may vary together with g - technological change may affect factors
accumulation. The econometric estimation of g relies on data quality, since measurement errors
on factors growth affects the estimation of the coefficients. This is especially true for capital 
accumulation, because measured capital stock and capital effectively used in production often differ 
-  capacity utilisation is rarely 100%. This in general leads to an underestimation of the contribution 
of capital growth to economic growth. Finally, the econometric estimation relies on time series data 
and does not allow for variations of factors shares and technological progress over time. Because of 
these drawbacks, growth accounting is in general used.
In order to avoid measurement problems, Hsieh (1998) uses the dual approach to growth 
accounting. This approach states that:
g = Y / Y - s K{ k / K ) -  5l ( L / l ) =  s k R/R + m/w (3)
The left-hand side of the equation is called the primal estimate and the right-hand side of the 
equation is called the dual estimate of TFPG: The usual primal estimate equals the share-weighted 
growth of factor prices. The dual estimate calculation is based on prices rather than quantities. 
Barro (1999) argues that "the intuition for the dual estimate ... is that rising factor prices (for 
factors of given quality) can be sustained only if output is increasing for given inputs. Therefore, 
the appropriately weighted average of the growth of the factor prices measures the extent of TFP 
growth." (p. 123). This is however only true if markets are competitive. If, as in the case of 
Indonesia, markets for output and inputs are not competitive, and if there exist dual markets, this 
methodology cannot be applied.
This method may avoid some measurement problems associated with the measurement of inputs 
quantities. A dual estimation of TFP Growth also offers a comparison opportunity, which can be 
used as a way of verification. The inequality of the two estimates indicates data discrepancy. Hsieh 
(1998) shows this for East Asia in general, and Singapore in particular. He argues that capital 
growth estimations have been overstated in the national statistics, and therefore, the TFP Growth 
has been underestimated. He corrects for this by computing TFP Growth via the dual approach.
2.2.3.2 Increasing returns, multiple types of factors, R&D and TFP Growth
As seen previously, usual growth accounting makes the assumption that sK + sL = 1, assuming
constant returns to scale, and works under perfect competition. The theoretical literature has 
however acknowledged the possibility of the existence of increasing returns to scale. A way to 
account for them, while remaining in a perfect competition framework, is to introduce spillovers in 
the production function. When spillovers are not accounted for, the standard growth accounting 
framework may lead to overestimated TFP Growth rates including these spillover effects.
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The usual specification is given by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
(4)
where 0<  a  < 1 and /? > 0. There are constant returns to scale for the private inputs Kt and
I j  and there are spillovers if J3> 0. These spillovers stem from the economy-wide stock of capital
K . Spillovers from the economy-wide stock of capital K  stem from the accumulation of physical 
or human capital.
The growth accounting specification may be then rewritten as:
The estimation of TFP Growth requires then an econometric approach with the usual problems 
related to simultaneity.
Models with different types of factors, generally allowing for diverse capital and labour qualities, are 
of the following form4:
Each type of factors is weighted by its income share, under the assumption that factors' income 
equals factors' marginal product. This can be used to account for different kinds of capital goods 
and different kinds of labour (skilled and unskilled for example), but may also be used to account 
for a dual economy (Ki and Li for the urban sector and K2 and L2 for the rural sector). This 
specification allows for a shift in factors quality and reduces the overestimation of TFP Growth. 
Indeed, in the standard model, TFP Growth would include the effect of a shift in factors quality.
The new stream of endogenous growth offers as well growth accounting alternatives with regard to 
the issue of Research & Development (R & D), and offers two kinds of model: varieties models, and 
quality-ladders models.
Varieties models applied to technological change, introduced by Romer (1990) and Grossman and 
Helpman (1991, ch. 3), use a Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz formulation for the production function:
where A is an exogenous technology factor, L is labour input, jcy. is the employed quantity of 
intermediate input of type j , N  is the number of varieties of intermediate inputs used, and
4 The example is based on two types of each factor but could be extended to the case of n types of factors.
*  = y/ y - ( a + P'fk /  K ) -  (l - « ) ( l / l ) (5)
y  = f (a , k i , k 2, l , ,l 2) (6)
N
(7)
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0 < a  < 1. Y is gross output. There is technological progress when the number of inputs varieties 
N  increases. This progress is endogenous, because the output Y may either be consumed as end 
product or used as input in the production process.
In this context, TFP Growth is usually computed using the following specification:
with X  = Nx the total quantity of intermediate inputs.
Equation (8) shows that TFP Growth can be separated into two components: exogenous 
technological progress (first term of the right-hand side of the equation), and endogenous 
technological progress stemming from the addition of new varieties of inputs with a weight equal to
part a of the discovery of new intermediates contributes to factors accumulation rather than 
technological progress.
The assumption that each new input variety can be used by each producer can be best suited for 
general purpose technology with a broad application, but does not take industry or firm specific 
technologies into account. Furthermore, the model implies that varieties increases, but does not 
allow for a loss of old varieties as technology progresses. Another limitation is that the measured 
output Y is gross and includes R & D expenses. Finally, the specification does not resolve the issue 
of reverse causation where R & D expenses may be caused by a change in exogenous technological 
progress. In order to avoid this problem, it is possible to use instrumental variables but these are 
not always available. "Possible instruments include measures of government policies toward R&D, 
including research subsidies, legal provisions such as the patent system, and the tax treatment of 
R&D expenditures." (Barro, 1999, p. 132).
Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, ch. 4), introduce another kind of 
endogenous growth model dealing with technological change, the quality-ladder models. A simple 
specification is written as:
where A is the exogenous technological progress, L the labour input, 0 < a  < 1, N  is the fixed 
number of input varieties, q > 1 is the proportionate spacing between rungs on a given quality 
ladder. In this model, endogenous technological progress occurs when inputs jump from a lower to 
a higher quality.
g = Y / Y -  sL {L/l )~  sx{x / x )=A /A  + (1-  a p / N ) (8)
( l -  a ). The remaining part a is included in the left-hand side of the equation by the last term: a
(9)
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TFP Growth is usually computed with the following specification: 
g  = Y / Y -  sL {L /l)~  s ,  { x /X  )=  A/A + ( l -  4 Q lQ ) (8)
with X  = the total spending on intermediate inputs and Q = ^ q Kj0t^  ^  an aggregate
1 Kj M
quality index.
As for the varieties model, technological progress is separated into an exogenous part (first term on 
the right-hand side), and an endogenous part (second term on the right-hand side). It also 
presents the same limitations as the varieties model but allows for lower-quality inputs 
obsolescence, given that an input of lower quality is immediately replaced by an input of the same 
kind but with a higher quality.
This short review of growth accounting -  based on the complete review proposed by Barro (1999) - 
shows that standard growth accounting has been refined in order to account more of the 
complexities of the productivity gains phenomenon. The improvements deal primarily with 
technological progress issues and stem from advancement in endogenous growth research. It 
shows that different kinds of inputs, spillovers and R&D may be introduced in the models. This in 
turn puts a greater emphasis on the role of public policies promoting technological change.
Knack and Keefer (1995), Easterly and Levine (1996), or Rodrik (1997) -  to quote only a few -  add 
to the debate by introducing measures of institutional quality in models of economic growth. For 
the case of East Asia, Rodrik (1997) maintains that output growth is mostly attributable to a rapid 
and substantial capital accumulation, as previously argued by Young (1995) and Rodrik (1995). 
Institutional quality is said to matter in that it affects the investment rate of the economy. 
Meanwhile, it is also shown that technological progress in the region as occurred in a labour-saving 
kind.
Market-based performance definitions are often handy because of data availability at the 
microeconomic level. In the case of Indonesia, they however suffer from major measurement 
errors and biases stemming firstly from the monopolistic nature of some manufacturing industries, 
secondly from the lack of enforcement of accounting standards at the national level, and thirdly 
from the imperfection of the stock market.
TFP Growth estimation, while requiring more computational efforts, has a number of advantages 
over market-based and partial productivity performance measures. Using the appropriate deflators, 
it captures the overall productivity of factors, and, estimated at the plant level, allows comparing 
the productivity of plants with different factor mixes.
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2.3 Historiography
After centuries of Dutch colonial rule and the brief Japanese occupation, Indonesia acceded to 
independence in 1949. However, by the mid-1960s, Indonesia was still among the least developed 
countries of the world.
Suharto came into power In 1965, succeeding to Sukarno, and inherited a poor agricultural country, 
where manufacturing accounted for less than 10% of GDP, against a share of over 40% for 
agriculture. As shown in Robison (1986), the Dutch colonialists controlled medium- and large-scale 
manufacturing, leaving little space for the emergence of Indonesian bourgeoisie and 
entrepreneurship. Most profits were also remitted to the Netherlands, hampering the further 
development of an industrial base in Indonesia. Later on, Japanese occupation -during the second 
world war- led to a substantive destruction of existing assets. President Sukarno took over after 
independence in 1949, and nationalised most of the remaining colonial manufacturing companies, 
but the Sukarno period is often characterised by economic stagnation. After a coup d'Etat in 1965, 
Suharto came into power. The new regime implemented liberal policies and conducted what is said 
to have been a sound macroeconomic management, attracting foreign aid and foreign investment 
(Booth, 1992 ; Hill, 1996b). Rapid growth started as soon as 1968, and was maintained until 1981, 
and slowed down in 1982-83.
During the period 1973-80, oil prices quadrupled, relaxing foreign exchange and government 
revenue constraints. It is generally agreed that Indonesia succeeded better than most other oil 
exporting countries: It conducted sound macroeconomic and exchange rate management, and 
investment in infrastructure and agriculture aimed at balanced development and economic growth. 
Manufacturing sector output grew rapidly at an average annual rate of over 14%. This was 
however a period of increasing regulation, including establishment of trade barriers, creation of 
licensing regimes, and State allocation of capital (Booth, 1992). Although the period presented high 
economic growth rates - comprised between 7% and 10% p.a. - an increasingly complex and 
opaque regulatory system may have hampered efficiency (Booth, 1992 ; Hill, 1996b).
Similarly to many other developing countries, Indonesia followed a state-led industrialisation policy, 
with the development of a large public sector dominated by large-scale companies (Robison, 1986 ; 
Hill, 1990a and b). Large-scale companies are generally state-owned, or at least have state 
participation in their capital. It has been widely documented that a large number of those 
companies, through systematic corruption, were granted monopolies via the preferential allocation 
of import and/or distribution licences (Robison, 1986 ; Hill, 1996a ; Aswicahyono, Hill and Basri, 
2000 ; Basri, 2001). Those companies were also given preferential access to (cheap) capital, 
thereby reinforcing duality within the manufacturing sector.
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Studies agree on the fact that, although output growth was rapid during the oil boom, Total Factor 
Productivity Growth for this period was very low, between 0.7% and 1.1% p.a. on average.5 The 
estimation of new TFPG estimates will help shedding some more light on that contrasted period 
with regard to the sources of growth (intensive versus extensive).
From 1981 on, oil prices started to fall gradually, cutting the engine of growth abruptly. In the early 
1980s, GDP growth fell below 5%, owing to a drop in oil exports (imposition of OPEC quotas) and 
oil prices, and manufacturing and agricultural performance remained poor. Medium- and large-scale 
manufacturing sector value added grew on average at 9.1% p.a. during 1976-80, against 5.3% p.a. 
during 1981-83. Drastic macroeconomic management of the crisis led to cuts in government 
spending and devaluation of the Rupiah. Government however failed to adopt matching 
microeconomic reforms. Trade remained extremely regulated and the large State enterprise sector 
did not undergo major restructuration (Booth, 1992 ; Hill, 1996).
TFPG estimates for that period remain close to the oil boom period, between 0.1% and 1.10% p.a. 
for 1982-85. Aswicahyono (1996), however finds TFPG rates of -4.90% p.a. for the period 1981- 
83. Two hypotheses may be put forward. The oil crisis may have lowered TFP growth rate 
(relatively to the oil boom period), because value added dropped more dramatically than inputs, 
owing to a demand shock for manufacturing. However, the oil crisis could have led to TFP growth 
rate improvement, owing to exit of less productive firms.
Manufacturing output growth accelerated as soon as 1984, at the rate of 12.93%, to compare to an 
average of 5.26% p.a. for the recession period. Only after 1985 started the country liberalising the 
economy. Indonesia turned to export oriented policies to make up for loss of foreign exchange 
earnings from oil, removing trade barriers and promoting exports of manufactured products. 
Foreign investment and banking sector were liberalised, supporting private sector development 
(Hill, 1996, 1997). Numerous studies have shown that, for the Indonesian case, liberalisation 
tended to dramatically improve efficiency: exporting firms became more productive than non­
exporting firms, the number of exporting firms increased, foreign direct investment created forward 
and backward linkages leading to productivity growth of local firms, and financial market 
liberalisation helped allocating capital to more productive firms (Sjoholm, 1997a ; Goeltom, 1995). 
And indeed, TFPG estimates for that period range from 2.10% p.a. (1986-91), to 7.90% p.a. 
(1986-90). Indonesian manufacturing finally seemed to be on the right path. One of the usual 
periodisation distinguishes between the liberalisation period (1984-1988) and the post­
liberalisation/investment boom period (1989-1993). Aswicahyono (1996) finds TFPG estimates of 
5.50% p.a. and 6.00% p.a. for both periods respectively.
5 See Table 1
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By the early- or mid-nineties, in spite and because of market liberalisation, widespread corruption 
and increasing short-term (foreign) debt started to threaten the system, and the economy 
collapsed with 1997 crisis. Timmer (1999a) estimates TFPG at 2.1% p.a. for 1991-95, markedly 
lower than 7.9% for post-liberalisation period.
For the entire period -  1975-95 -  previous estimates of average annual TFP growth rate for the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector are comprised between 1% and 3%. There is clearly scope for 
improving and refining growth accounting, i.e. proposing an alternative capital stock growth series 
and using new elasticities of output with respect to intermediate inputs, capital and labour. I first 
briefly present the data used before tackling those two issues and presenting new TFP growth 
estimates.
2.4 Data: "Raw" versus "Backcast" datasets
Data commonly used to study Indonesian manufacturing and estimate TFPG is Statfstfk Industri 
dataset, collected by the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics (Biro Pusat Statistik, BPS) on an 
annual basis. It covers all manufacturing establishment with 20 employees or more. Two versions 
of this dataset exist: Raw Statistik Industri (RSI), and Backcast Statistik Industri (BSI).
RSI contains only original variables: it is an enumeration of all manufacturing establishments with 
20 employees or more, covering the period 1975-1998, and providing 160 variables. Up to 1989 
however, the dataset also contains a number of plants with less than 20 employees. In the mid- 
1980s, the number of firms covered by RSI increased dramatically. This did not correspond to a 
massive increase in the number of firms' entries, i.e. a growth of manufacturing, and rather 
corresponded to a large increase in the number of companies "discovered" by enumerators, i.e. an 
improvement of census coverage. In this respect, RSI is a static dataset: any growth rate calculated 
with this dataset does not reflect "economic" reality.
This "discovery" drove BPS to provide BSI. BSI provides a "backcast" series of employment, output, 
input and value added for establishments that were "discovered" after they had actually started 
operations.6 BSI is a dynamic dataset. It however only provides "backcast" figures for a narrow 
selection of variables, excluding investment, capital stock and employment costs figures, so that 
these have eventually to be backcast for the purpose of estimating TFPG.
In order to illustrate the data presentation, for each dataset and at the aggregate level, I estimate 
a capital stock series using the Perpetual Inventory Methodology (PIM) as outlined by Timmer
6 The backcast series are econometric estimates.
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(1999), and also estimate TFPG using a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, with alpha the 
share of labour In value added, and dots designate rate of growth:7
TFP = Y - a L - ( \ - a ) k  (10)
TABLE 2: A comparison of BSI and RSI figures
YEAR
No of oba annualgrowth
Real Value 
Added 
growth
Growth in 
the No of 
workers
Capital
stock
growth
share of 
labour in 
value 
added
TFPG
BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI
1975 7469 7469
1976 8247 7258 9.9 -2.9 6.1 -5.7 13.1 11.3 8.7 0.7 0.26 0.25 -3.7 -9.1
1977 9075 7656 9.6 5.3 9.1 12.6 4.3 2.1 7.9 1.9 0.27 0.25 2.2 10.7
1978 9908 7832 8.8 2.3 18.1 33.2 6.1 3.9 7.4 1.5 0.24 0.19 11.1 31.2
1979 10829 7960 8.9 1.6 -2.5 -1.0 7.7 4.6 7.7 0.2 0.24 0.19 -10.2 -2.1
1980 11888 8087 9.3 1.6 12.1 13.2 8.6 11.6 5.9 0.2 0.21 0.18 5.7 10.9
1981 13021 7942 9.1 -1.8 10.2 13.2 5.6 3.5 4.6 6.1 0.21 0.18 5.4 7.6
1982 14191 8020 8.6 1.0 2.9 2.1 5.8 5.3 8.2 12.2 0.25 0.22 -4.7 -8.6
1983 15578 7919 9.3 -1.3 1.5 1.8 6.0 2.8 9.5 10.8 0.27 0.23 -7.0 -7.2
1984 17233 8006 10.1 1.1 13.4 18.1 8.8 8.7 8.3 10.1 0.24 0.21 5.0 8.3
1985 19888 12909 14.3 47.8 16.3 42.5 8.5 34.1 7.3 14.7 0.24 0.21 8.7 23.7
1986 20946 12215 5.2 -5.5 13.3 26.1 3.3 -4.9 4.9 5.6 0.23 0.17 8.8 22.2
1987 22118 12778 5.4 4.5 6.9 -7.2 6.4 10.9 2.6 7.9 0.21 0.19 3.5 -15.6
1988 24107 14664 8.6 13.8 9.6 8.4 8.1 14.4 3.8 10.4 0.22 0.20 4.8 -2.8
1989 25731 14676 6.5 0.1 26.4 21.9 13.3 9.0 11.5 23.5 0.20 0.18 14.5 1.0
1990 28037 16536 8.6 11.9 19.8 20.6 11.5 16.4 18.0 22.4 0.20 0.18 3.1 -0.7
1991 30249 16494 7.6 -0.3 -3.2 8.6 -3.3 11.7 17.9 23.7 0.22 0.21 -16.5 -12.7
1992 32348 17648 6.7 6.8 26.8 27.5 13.4 10.1 12.5 13.4 0.22 0.21 14.2 14.8
1993 34058 18163 5.2 2.9 9.6 10.1 7.9 7.6 7.0 7.9 0.21 0.20 2.3 2.2
1994 35988 19016 5.5 4.6 17.9 10.7 6.5 6.4 7.1 8.8 0.21 0.19 11.0 2.4
1995 37852 21551 5.0 12.5 15.0 11.8 9.0 9.0 8.3 8.6 0.20 0.18 6.5 3.1
average 76/95 20417 12133 8.1 5.3 11.5 13.4 7.5 8.9 8.5 9.5 0.23 0.20 3.2 4.0
standard 
deviation 76/95 2.3 11.2 8.3 12.7 3.8 7.7 4.0 7.4 0.02 0.02 8.1 12.4
Growth rates calculated on constant IDR 1983 figures
BSI covers a larger number of establishments, and the number of observations rises more rapidly 
than for RSI, however, average annual growth of added value, number of workers and capital stock 
is 1.9 to 1.0 percentage point lower than for RSI figures. One of the main reasons is a larger 
variance of RSI growth rates, showing spurts in establishments "discovery". Main "discovery" year 
is 1985, when the number of observations increases by nearly 48%, leading to large increases in
7 Timmer's methodology Is presented at length later in this chapter.
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other selected variables. Value added increases by 42.5%, total number of workers increases by 
34.1%, and capital stock increases by 14.7%.
RSI is dearly not an adequate dataset for working on aggregate TFP Growth. Using RSI 
overestimates average TFP Growth for 1976-1995 by 0.8 percentage point. It also leads to very 
different outcomes for each year, where TFPG is more driven by establishments "discoveries" rather 
than by economic factors. The largest "discovery" made in 1985 (+48% in number of observations 
for RSI, against 14.3% for BSI), leads to TFP Growth of 23.7%, against 8.7% for BSI.
In order to overcome RSI dynamics problem, I calculate profits levels and profits as a percentage of 
value added, as shown in Table 3.8 From 1975 to 1977, RSI figures underestimate profits as a 
percentage of value added by 7.9 to 15.4 percentage points, as compared to BSI figures. From 
1978 to 1995, RSI figures overestimate profits as a percentage of value added by 7 percentage 
points on average. However, results are more similar and consistent than for TFP Growth 
estimates.
TABLE 3: Profits
Real Value added(con6tant DR 
1983)
Total employment costs 
(constant DR 1983)
Capital stock (constant DR 
1983) Profits (constant DR 1983)
Profits as % of 
value added
BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI BSI RSI
1975 3181000000 1970000000 858870000 463000000 7274000000 5810000000 867330000 345000000 27.3 17.5
1976 3382000000 1860000000 879320000 473000000 7937000000 5850000000 915280000 217000000 27.1 11.7
1977 3703000000 2110000000 999810000 524000000 8587000000 5960000000 985790000 394000000 26.6 18.7
1978 4438000000 2940000000 1065120000 555000000 9242000000 6050000000 1524480000 1175000000 34.4 40.0
1979 4328000000 2910000000 1038720000 564000000 9979000000 6060000000 1293480000 1134000000 29.9 39.0
1980 4885000000 3320000000 1025850000 612000000 10583000000 6070000000 1742550000 1494000000 35.7 45.0
1981 5412000000 3790000000 1136520000 690000000 11081000000 6450000000 2059280000 1810000000 38.1 47.8
1982 5572000000 3870000000 1393000000 854000000 12030000000 7290000000 1773000000 1558000000 31.8 40.3
1983 5656000000 3940000000 1527120000 892000000 13227000000 8120000000 1483480000 1424000000 26.2 36.1
1984 6470000000 4720000000 1552800000 996000000 14372000000 8980000000 2042800000 1928000000 31.6 40.8
1985 7613000000 7220000000 1827120000 1520000000 15464000000 10400000000 2693080000 3620000000 35.4 50.1
1986 8698000000 9370000000 2000540000 1580000000 16240000000 11000000000 3449460000 5590000000 39.7 59.7
1987 9315000000 8720000000 1956150000 1680000000 16667000000 11900000000 4025450000 4660000000 43.2 53.4
1988 10254000000 9480000000 2255880000 1940000000 17318000000 13200000000 4534520000 4900000000 44.2 51.7
1989 13348000000 11800000000 2669600000 2140000000 19433000000 16700000000 6791800000 6320000000 50.9 53.6
1990 16276000000 14500000000 3255200000 2660000000 23260000000 20900000000 8368800000 7660000000 51.4 52.8
1991 15766000000 15800000000 3468520000 3290000000 27832000000 26500000000 6731080000 7210000000 42.7 45.6
1992 20617000000 20800000000 4535740000 4440000000 31524000000 30300000000 9776460000 10300000000 47.4 49.5
1993 22688000000 23000000000 4764480000 4500000000 33824000000 32800000000 11158720000 11940000000 49.2 51.9
1994 27144000000 25600000000 5700240000 4820000000 36301000000 35800000000 14183560000 13620000000 52.3 532
1995 31523000000 28800000000 6304600000 5310000000 39433000000 39000000000 17331800000 15690000000 55.0 54.5
average 75/95 10955190476 9834285714 2391200000 1928714286 18171809524 15006666667 4939628571 4904238095 39.0 43.5
STD 75-95 8349482958 8448364085 1661336583 1610154034 9963839263 11147469818 4743448112 4650806993 9.5 13.1
The gross estimation of the profit rates -  that can be interpreted as implied excess return on capital 
- is very high, on average 39.0% to 43.5% for 1975-1995. Furthermore, over the period, the
8 Profits are calculated as value added minus employment cost, minus capital cost For BSI figures, employment costs are 
calculated as the ratio of employment cost/number of workers (from RSI) multiplied by number of workers (from BSI). 
Capital cost is set at a hypothetical 20%. For the period 1975-95, deposit interest rate was just over 13% p.a., against just 
over 21% for the lending interest rate (average for 1986-95), (source, World Bank Development Indicators). Capital stock 
figures already take depreciation and scrapping into account.
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overall rate of profit rises by 100% (BSI figures) or by 200% (RSI figures). There may be three 
different explanations to these high profit share and growth figures:
(a) some plants have a strong market power (Gershenkronian mechanism of economic growth), (b) 
the Perpetual Inventory Methodology (PIM) underestimates capital stock figures, and (c) 
employment costs are underreported. As the remainder of this chapter argues, the three 
explanations are not mutually exclusive.
The Raw Statistik Industri dataset is not suitable for the estimation of TFP Growth at aggregate 
level, as growth rates are mainly driven by spurts in establishments "discovery". The Backcast 
Statistik Industri is a suitable substitute, because growth in the number of establishments 
represents firms' entries - and therefore growth of manufacturing, and not random "discoveries".9 A 
way forward is taking advantage of both datasets by using the numerous variables available in RSI, 
and complementing it with BSI backcast figures on newly "discovered" establishments.
Results in tables 2 and 3 also shed some light on discrepancies observed in the literature. While 
Aswicahyono (1996) and Timmer (1999a) use the BSI dataset, Keuning (1991), and Osada (1994) 
use the RSI dataset, seeming to miss completely the difference between datasets.10
Another source of discrepancy stems from different vintages for the BSI dataset. As some 
establishments are still being discovered, BSI figures are recalculated for each new version. BSI has 
been amended several times from 1986 to 1998. I use the 1996 version, while most other authors 
use the 1993 version.
TFP Growth estimation should therefore be carried out using the latest BSI.11 Remaining issues in 
TFP Growth measurement are the construction of a capital stock series, and choice of elasticity of 
output with respect to labour.
2.5 Growth accounting framework
2.5.1 Construction of a capital stock series
Although conceptually straightforward, the construction of a capital stock series is in practice one of 
the most difficult task to perform in estimating TFP Growth rates.
The RSI dataset offers two types of relevant variables:
9 In fact, if "discoveries" were really randomly made, the RSI would be a fair representation of the reality. But at first sight, 
it seems that previously non-covered establishment belonged mainly to certain groups, for example, after 1979, non-covered 
establishments seemed to belong to the small-scale firms group.
10 Mentioned in Timmer (1999), footnote 5.
11 Since the 1998 version has not yet been made available to me, I am currently using the 1996 version.
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o Annual changes in fixed assets, distinguishing between five types of assets (land, buildings, 
machinery, vehicles, and other fixed assets), covering 1975-1998. This series is called the 
investment series
o Annual levels of fixed assets, distinguishing between five types of assets, covering a shorter 
period (1988-1998). This series is called fixed assets series
2.5.1.1 Previous methodologies
Literature on Indonesian manufacturing usually estimates a benchmark capital stock and constructs 
a capital stock series from fixed assets investment figures with the Perpetual Inventory 
Methodology (PIM).12 Initial benchmark capital stock is estimated using ICVARs (investment to 
capital and value added to capital ratios). It assumes the steady state and derives capital stock 
from value added to investment ratios. As I demonstrate further in this chapter, this methodology 
proves to be inaccurate, especially at the establishment level.
Goeltom (1995), uses RSI 1986' fixed assets figures as a benchmark capital stock and construct a 
capital stock series for 1981-1993 using PIM and investment figures at establishment level. 
However, she notes: "This method of back-casting and forecasting the capital stock has one 
important weakness, that is, some back-casted negative capital stock value might appear whenever 
investment in that particular year is much larger than the capital stock. I have eliminated all firms 
in which the capital stock becomes negative in any year" (Appendix 1). Her remark indicates that 
fixed assets figures do not match investment figures.
Indeed, working on RSI for 1988-98 shows that investment figures (given in the dataset) do not 
match fixed assets changes computed from fixed assets levels. Furthermore, the difference 
between given and computed fixed assets investment series is not consistent over time: the two 
series are correlated at the 3% level only.
I review here the literature and the different methodologies that have been used in core studies of 
TFP Growth measurement for the Indonesian manufacturing sector. I start with the most recent 
one, which is considered as the current benchmark and most accurate methodology in the 
literature.
Timmer (1999a)
Timmer describes his methodology at length in a 1999 article titled "Indonesia's ascent on the 
technology ladder: Capital Stock and Total Factor Productivity in Indonesian manufacturing, 1975- 
95".
12 PIM constructs a capital stock series by adding investment flows to a benchmark capital stock, taking depreciation and 
scrapping into account.
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The method follows Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumenl (1987), estimating stocks of different types of 
capital goods K it , in order to account for different marginal productivities. Other studies do not
follow this method and assume that capital is perfectly homogeneous. The growth of the capital 
stock is calculated as follow:
= Z  ' (11)
i=1
r K
where wit = 1/2 (v(7 + v f/_1) and vif = —-— , where r the rental price of an asset is given by
i=1
its current price divided by its lifetime.
Three types of assets are distinguished: land and buildings, machinery and other capital goods, and 
vehicles. The gross capital stock of each type of assets is calculated using the Perpetual Inventory 
Method, which is the summation of past investment flows. Assets are scrapped at the end of their 
lifetime and repair and maintenance expenditures are supposed to keep the physical production 
capabilities of an asset constant during its lifetime d . Sales of assets before the end of their 
lifetime are considered as premature scrapping. The stock of each asset is therefore given by:
K„= Z ( A , - S „ )  (12)
t -d + \
where K  is current investment stock, I  are new real investments (land and buildings, machinery 
and other capital goods, and vehicles), S is the sale of used items, i is a subscript for the asset 
type, t the time period and d is the asset's lifetime.
These data are however only available in the RSI dataset. After having calculated investment stocks 
with RSI figures, there is a need for backcasting them in order to make them compatible with the 
other BSI data. In order to backcast the investment figures, Timmer, "assume[s] that the 
investment behaviour of firms covered by the SI survey is representative of the investment 
behaviour of the firms included in the backcast dataset. [He] then calculate^] the ratio of 
investment to value added on the basis of the original published data and apply it to the backcast 
value added data...to arrive at a backcast investment series at the 3-digit level."
Let INV  be total investment, VAvalue added, r the subscript for raw and fcthe subscript for 
backcast. Timmer obtains backcast investment figures with the following formula:
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INV
INVb =  r-xVA,
b VAr 1
(13)
He uses import price indices (published in Indikator Ekonomi, BPS), to deflate machinery and 
transport equipment, because these are mainly imported. Construction is deflated by the implicit 
deflator for construction GDP from the national accounts.
Timmer uses Goeltom's (1995) estimates of depreciation rates to calculate assets' lifetime. These 
rates seem to correspond to other researchers findings such as Hulten and Wykoff (1981, table 1). 
The rates are 30 years for buildings, 10 for machinery and 5 for vehicles and other transport 
equipment.
He calculates the average of a three-year (1976-1978) incremental capital value added ratios 
(ICVARs, i.e. capital stock over value added) at the 2-digit industry level, allowing for a one-year 
lag, and applies it to gross value added in 1975 to estimate the benchmark capital stock for that 
year (Table A1 in Timmer, 1999a). Additionally, "to take scrapping into account, the vintages of the 
capital stock thus estimated must be known. Our estimates of vintage are based on the investment 
series by type given in Keuning (1988), which allows us to work out the proportion of each asset 
type in each year" (p.81). Timmer (1999a) "divided the stock over the period determined by its 
lifetime, using a (stylised) investment distribution. For buildings, (he) assumes that 2% of the stock 
originated in each year from 1945 to 1954 and 1958 to 1967, and 6% in each year from 1955 to 
1957 and 1968 to 1974. For machinery, (he) assumes a figure of 5.3% for 1965-67 and 12% for 
1968-74. No investment data were available for vehicles; (his) assumption is that 20% of the stock 
originated in each year from 1970 to 1974." (footnote 10).
He then calculates TFP Growth using a Cobb-Douglas production function:
TFP, =Y, - a ,L ,- fy -a ,)k ,  (14)
where Y is real value added (BSI), L the total number of workers (BSI), K  is the capital stock 
(calculated with RSI and BSI figures), and OL is the share of labour in value added (total 
employment costs over value added) taken from RSI.
Aswicahyono (1998)
Aswicahyono uses a version of the BSI prior to 1996 (probably 1993), and his study concentrates
on the 1975-1993 period. He constructs a capital stock series on the basis of the annual capital
expenditures reported in the RSI.
He assumes a geometric depreciation pattern and the capital stock is given by:
37
At = ( l - S ) A t_1+ I t_l (15)
where A is the capital stock, I  is the investment at constant price, S is the rate of geometric 
depreciation.
In order to work with BSI figures, Aswicahyono backcasts the investment figures from the RSI. He 
mentions Timmer's simple methodology, calculating the ratio of investment over value added, as 
well as the very complicated approach of backcasting investment figures following the same 
methodology as the BPS. He then describes his choice: "This thesis takes a middle approach, 
avoiding the use of complicated backcasting methodology on the one hand, while at the same time
minimising the bias in the simple scaling method. The idea is to regress the investment series with
the variables that appear in both series, and to use the parameters from the regression to predict 
the investment series for the backcast data. The firm level data of investment, value added, labour, 
and intermediate inputs in the SI are pooled, and the investment series are regressed on the three 
remaining variables for each 28 industries. Also included are time dummy variables 
(1975,1976,... 1993) to capture business cycles. The method has intuitive appeal, since the three 
independent variables have some relation with the investment value. For example, in the case of 
the clove cigarette industry, a large proportion of investment should be in building since it requires 
a large warehouse to store the intermediate inputs.1 (p. 159-160). He uses the following 
specification:
In /. = a 0 + d15 + ....+d93 + a v In VAi + a L In Li + a  In (16)
where I  is investment, VA value added, L total number of workers, R intermediate inputs, i 
the subscript for the firm.
"Another way to interpret the model is that the scaling factor for investment {Ib/Is, subscripts b 
and s refer to the backcast and SI respectively) is the weighted average of the ratio of value added 
(VAb/VAg), employment (Lb/Ls), and intermediate inputs (Ib/Is), with the weight being the 
parameters of the coefficient. The parameters, therefore, give a clue to the relative importance of 
value added, employment and intermediate inputs ratio in scaling investment series from the SI 
data. The weight does not always sum to one, indicating the existence of returns-to-scale 
phenomenon. Hence, a retum-to-scale coefficient of greater than unity indicates that large firms 
require more than proportionate investment than that of the small firms, and vice versa." (p. 160).
This method allows correcting for the under-reporting of investment data. Many authors, starting 
with Goeltom (1995), notice that many firms report zero investment, and wonder whether this 
corresponds to zero investment or a non-response. Timmer (1999a) compares investment figures 
from the RSI with BKPM figures (Investment Coordinating Board, macroeconomic figures) and find
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that investment seems to be underestimated by 35% in 1992. However, Timmer (1999a) does not 
account for this in his TFP Growth estimation.
Aswicahyono uses the domestic and imported goods wholesaie price index, including the domestic 
and imports wholesale price index for machinery, except electrical products, electrical machinery 
and transport equipment, and building. He uses the non-residential and residential building price for 
the price index of land.
'To get an estimate of benchmark capital stock, the steady state condition is assumed. In the 
steady state condition, the growth rate of investment will be the same as the growth rate of capital 
and value added, and the investment capital ratio stays constant." (p. 163).
He proceeds in two steps:
In /, = a  + b -t (17)
where a is the log fitted 1975' investment, i.e. ln /75, b is the growth of investment per year, t is 
the time trend (0, 1,...,18) for (1975, 1976,...,1993). The capital stock in 1974 is then given by:
Aswicahyono argues that this method avoids the bias of using only investment data for the start of 
the period. The growth rate of value added can also be used instead of the growth of investment (if 
we assume the steady state). Using value added growth could reduce the effects of the errors in 
the measurement of the investment series.
He uses the same depreciation rates as Goeltom (1995). "Depreciation rates are aggregated using 
the above numbers and the weight from the SI data. The initial capital stock is then distributed 
across the five types of assets to get the benchmark capital stock of each type of asset."(p. 165).
He then uses the method developed by Christensen and Jorgenson (1969, 1973) to calculate the 
capital services of each type of assets, using the following formula:
where p\ is the price of investment goods, A is the capital stock, r ‘ is the rate of return, 6 the
depreciation rate, and PC the value of property compensation, which is non-wage value added 
(value added minus wage bill). The rate of return, assumed to be equal for all assets, is calculated 
as the ratio of property compensation less depreciation and plus capital gains for all assets, to the
Pi
(19)
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value of all assets at the beginning of the period. On the other hand, Timmer (1999a) assumes that 
each asset has a different rate of return.
Osada (1994)
Osada (1994), estimates TFP growth for the period 1985-1990 and mentions Keuning's (1991) 
capital stock estimates, which have been calculated for 1975, 1980, and 1985 at 1980 constant 
prices. However, he chooses to work with two different capital stock estimates. "The first estimate 
is given using the industrial classification of the National Accounts Statistics published by the 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Indonesia (BPS) and relies on the preliminary results of the capital 
stock estimation by the BPS. It is worth noting that the BPS does not recommend the use of such 
capital stock figures. The second estimate classifies manufacturing into nine sectors and uses the 
capital stock data compiled for this purpose from the data contained in Industrial Statistics 
published by the BPS" (p. 480). The first TFP estimates include all sectors of the economy and are 
based on the National Accounts, while the second estimates concentrate on the manufacturing 
sector, using RSI figures. As argued previously, using the RSI figures is flawed if we consider the 
calculation of growth of aggregates, because results are mainly driven by the spurts of 
establishments "discovery". But there are other issues.
Osada (1994) uses a benchmark method in order to estimate the capital stock. He first calculates a 
nominal net fixed capital formation for each 2-digit sector. He does not mention how he calculates 
this variable, and we can suppose that he uses the sum of past investment flows. However, we do 
not know whether he uses the same depreciation rates, and whether or not he takes scrapping into 
account (normal and premature scrapping). He does seem to assume the homogeneity of capital, 
i.e. he does not consider different capital services for the three different types of assets. He then 
deflates this series by the implicit deflator of gross fixed capital formation. This contrasts with 
Timmer (1999a), who uses different deflators for the three types of assets: import price indices for 
machinery and transport equipment, implicit deflator for construction GDP from the National 
Accounts to deflate construction.
Osada (1994) then estimates the average of the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR) of each 
sector at the 2-digit level (Timmer, 1999a, uses a 3-digit disaggregation). He then assumes that 
this ICOR is identical to the capital-output ratio for 1987, and calculates the capital stock for 1987 
as the product of ICOR and the value added. Value added is deflated by the manufacturing implicit 
deflator of the national accounts. Using this as the benchmark, the data for other years are 
calculated. One discrepancy with Timmer's results (1999a) could be also attributable to different 
ICOR estimates using different aggregation level.
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Keuning (1991)
Keuning estimates capital stocks for the period 1975-85, using the Perpetual Inventory method. He 
however includes oil and refineries, and small-scale manufacturing. As a result, he obtains capital 
stock figures that are higher than figures dealing only with medium- and large-scale manufacturing.
In order to take scrapping into account, he uses a Gaussian distribution of discard, while Timmer 
(1999a) uses a rectangular survival distribution. In other words, Keuning (1991) assumes that 
"within 6 years after the initial investment nothing is scrapped. After that period, existing stock is 
retired at an ever-increasing rate. In the beginning, each year a larger proportion of initial 
investment does not survive, but later, when not so much remains, the survival function becomes 
convex instead of concave" (p. 94). He adds that "this function should, however, be considered as 
not more than an informed guess" (p. 94), because the data availability does not allow for a more 
formal estimation. He deflates investments with a time-series of investment prices. He assumes 
that the efficiency of capital goods is maintained constant by repair and maintenance expenditures.
He uses lifetimes of 45 years for construction and 22.5 years for machinery and equipment 
(including transport equipment).
He then estimates an ICVAR in order to estimate a benchmark capital stock. Although he seems to 
refer to an investment series covering the period 1953-85, he only uses 1975-80 investment figures 
to estimate ICVARs and the benchmark capital stock for 1975.
2.5.1.2 Previous methodologies: A critic
It is clear that the use of different benchmark years and the estimation of ICVARs over different 
periods lead to substantial discrepancies in capital stock estimates. Another problem with the use of 
the ICVAR methodology is that in a period of strong investment, capital stock could be 
underestimated, and in period of poor investment, capital stock could be overestimated, i.e. the 
steady state assumption may not hold.
Of particular interest is the deconstruction of the ICVAR methodology to estimate a benchmark 
capital stock. Most authors calculate ICVARs at the 2-digit level, estimate a benchmark capital stock 
at the 2-digit level, and then add up those benchmark capital stocks to obtain the aggregate 
benchmark capital stock. The question is: does the chosen disaggregation level matter?
I first demonstrate that the capital stock calculated with the ICVAR at the aggregate level can only 
be equal to the capital stock calculated with the ICVARs at the disaggregate level in one case.
Let us assume that the economy has two sub-sectors 1 and 2. At the aggregate level, the ICVAR is 
calculated as follows:
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T^ T74„ VA (VAU +VA2t)
ICVAR = ----- — = 7— -— -^--------1±L— r (20)
^ - i  ( /W 1(M)+/W 2(M))
At the aggregate level, the benchmark capital stock is calculated as follows:
KSTOCKa = ICVAR(VA„ + VA^,) (21)
At the disaggregate level, the capital stock is calculated as follows:
KSTOCK d = ICVARXVAU + ICVAR2VA2t (22)
and KSTOCKd = KSTOCKa if and only If ICVARX = ICVAR2 , meaning that all ICVARs are 
the same across sub-sectors of the economy.
Empirical studies show that this is not the case for the Indonesian manufacturing sector. Working 
on 1976-1978 figures at the 2-digit level of disaggregation, Keuning (1991) finds ICVARs ranging 
from 0.21 to 14.99. Timmer (1999a) finds ICVARs ranging from 1.3 to 5.4. Working with the same 
period and the same disaggregation level, I estimate ICVARs ranging from 1.98 to 10.22. 
Furthermore, the variance of ICVARs increases at a more disaggregated level.
If the condition ICVARX = ICVAR2 = ICVAR is not met, then we have:
VAllNV,l_n + VA*INV£,_n + 2VAuVA2iINV i INV2 > 0 , implying that (23)
KSTOCKd > KSTOCKa , i.e. the sum of the disaggregated capital stocks is always more than 
the capital stock calculated at the aggregate level.
Using the methodology at the aggregate level tends to underestimate the capital stock, while a too 
detailed degree of disaggregation tends to overestimate it. Since there is no simple way of defining 
the optimal degree of aggregation, and since establishment level figures are available, it seems 
more reasonable to rely on establishment level fixed assets figures.
Another issue affecting the use of PIM is the choice of depreciation rates and depreciation patterns. 
For the case of the Indonesian manufacturing sector, the standard assumption regarding service 
lives of assets are the ones used by Goeltom (1995). These are 5 years for vehicles, 10 years for 
plant and machinery, and 30 years for buildings, as used in Timmer (1999a).
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Let us compare the assumed assets service lives for Indonesia with data for the USA. The data 
have been taken from BEA estimates (US Bureau of Economic Analysis).13 The study gives service 
lives of different assets at a very detailed level, also differentiating between public and private 
assets. Service lives for industrial, commercial and office buildings range from 31 to 50 years, 
against 30 years for Indonesia. Service lives for plant and machinery in the US range from 6 to 33 
years, against 10 years for Indonesia. US vehicles have service lives between 5 and 14 years, 
against 5 years for Indonesia.
Indonesian assets are assumed to have average service lives shorter than US assets. Indeed, 
Indonesian service lives represent more or less the lower bound of US assets service lives. Assets 
service lives should be shorter if technological change is faster, if assets are used more intensively, 
and/or if repair and maintenance is inexistent or ineffective.
Keuning (1991), uses different service lives: 45 years for construction and 22.5 years for machinery 
and equipment, including transport equipment. These are significantly longer than the ones used by 
Goeltom, Timmer and Aswicahyono. However, Keuning notes "concerning the maximum length-of- 
life of each capital good, we have selected lifetimes which are slightly below those for most 
industrialised countries, on the ground that: (a) wear and tear affects capital goods more in tropical 
areas; and (b) we could not estimate the vintages of which the capital stock (1958) was composed, 
and treated that value as 1957 investment instead."
But there are other issues as far as depreciation is concerned.
For example, Timmer (1999a) chooses to assume that the productivity of the capital stock remains 
constant over its lifetime, and is only scrapped at the end of its lifetime. Goeltom (1995) and 
Aswicahyono (1998) assume a constant depreciation rate. Keuning (1991) uses a Gaussian 
distribution of discard. Different sets of assumptions lead to obvious differences in capital stock 
growth.
Aswicahyono (1998) reviews the literature on depreciation patterns and the evidence points in the 
direction of the geometric depreciation pattern written as follows:
A, = (l-< ? )-4 _ 1+/,_1 (24)
A final issue is the aggregation of the data by sector. There is no reason to believe that different 
sectors, and even different establishments within the same sector have the same service lives and 
retirement pattern for the capital stock.
To summarise, there are four ways of estimating a capital stock series:
13 US Department of Commerce, August 1999, "Fixed reproductible tangible wealth in the United States, 1925-94".
43
o Estimate a benchmark capital stock and construct a capital stock series from fixed assets
investment figures with the Perpetual Inventory Methodology. I have demonstrated that 
the estimation of the benchmark capital stock with the ICVAR methodology is inaccurate. 
This is more likely to be true at the establishment level, for which the steady state 
assumption may not hold.
o Use historical figures in order to estimate a benchmark capital stock and construct a capital 
stock series from fixed assets investment figures with the Perpetual Inventory 
Methodology. While this is feasible at the macroeconomic level, it is impossible to find 
historical figures for individual establishments. However, a historical macroeconomic 
benchmark capital stock may be used as a cross check.
o Use fixed assets levels as benchmark capital stock, and construct a capital stock series from 
fixed assets investment figures with the Perpetual Inventory Methodology. This is an 
appealing method, however, fixed assets levels and changes do not match and do not bear 
any consistent relationship.
o Work only on fixed assets (levels) figures: use fixed assets figures given for 1988-98 and
backcast figures for 1975-1987. This methodology seems -  at the moment - the best suited 
and the less biased. Since investment and fixed assets figures do not match, there is no 
reason to trust more one series over the other. And indeed, the literature using the SI 
dataset agrees in saying that both series suffer from underreporting. I argue that it is more 
reliable to work on fixed assets figures, because it avoids the artificial and unreliable 
estimation of a benchmark capital stock for 1975, as well as assumptions on depreciation 
rates and patterns. It also gives the possibility to estimate more accurately capital stock 
growth series at the establishment level.
2.5.1.3 New methodology
I propose to estimate a new capital stock series using fixed assets data only, using the two
datasets available:
o RSI, static dataset containing all relevant variables, i.e. output, intermediate inputs, labour
(number of workers), wages, and fixed assets figures. Fixed assets figures are available for 
1988-98, all other variables are available for 1975-98.
o BSI, dynamic dataset containing output, intermediate inputs, and labour (number of
workers) for 1975-96.
Two tasks have to be performed:
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o Backcast fixed assets data for 1975-87, i.e. perform a backward "prediction" of fixed assets 
figures at the establishment level for the early period.
o Backcast fixed assets data from RSI to BSI for 1975-1995, i.e. predict fixed assets figures 
for establishments discovered after 1985 (absent in RSI but present in BSI).
The first step is to choose the adequate deflators to work on constant figures. Timmer (1999a) 
uses import price indices to deflate machinery and transport equipment, because these are mainly 
imported, and he uses the implicit deflator for construction GDP from the national accounts to 
deflate land and buildings. Aswicahyono uses the domestic and imported goods wholesale price 
index, including the domestic and imports wholesale price index for machinery, except electrical 
products, electrical machinery and transport equipment, and building. He uses the non-residential 
and residential building price for the price index of land.
The National Accounts provide a wholesale price index for each 4-digit industry of the SI. I deflate 
output and intermediate inputs using this index at the 4-digit level. It would be more accurate to 
decompose intermediate inputs into several components (e.g. electricity, raw materials, etc) and 
deflate each component with the appropriate price index. This proves however impossible due to 
the unavailability of adequate price indices. I am however able to use fixed assets data 
decomposed by type of assets and deflate machinery and other fixed assets with the wholesale 
price index for machinery (excluding electrical products), and deflate vehicles with the wholesale 
price index for vehicles. The implicit deflator for construction GDP from the national accounts is 
only available from 1982 onwards, and I decide to use the implicit deflator for GDP to deflate land 
and buildings (World Bank Development Indicators). Base year is 1983.
I then "dean" the data by removing all observations with a negative output, intermediate inputs, 
fixed assets, and employment. All observations displaying output, or fixed assets equal to zero are 
kept but the value of output, value added or fixed assets is replaced by a missing value.14
To "clean" fixed assets data (in current prices), I calculate the difference between computed total 
fixed assets figures (computed from the breakdown into land, buildings, vehicles, machinery and 
other), and given total fixed asset data. All observations with a difference above 10% or below -  
10% are kept but the value of fixed assets is treated as a missing value in order to be predicted 
later on. This removes 718 observations out of 56,639 (i.e. 1.27% of the population).
In order to estimate a fixed assets series for all establishments over the period 1975-1995,1 need 
to find a robust statistical relationship between observed fixed assets and other variables available
14 For example, if an establishment displays fixed assets equal to zero (0), but an output of 10,000, the establishment is kept 
in the database with fixed assets displaying a missing value (.) and an output of 10,000. In proceeding so, regressions are 
not polluted by the spurious zeros, and I will additionally be able to predict missing observations for fixed assets later on.
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in the dataset. The idea is that fixed assets levels should bear a consistent relationship with output, 
and labour.15
Using observed RSI figures, I run the following regression over the period 1988-95, using Ordinary 
Least Square:
In FA = a  In OUTPUT + /?ln LTLNOU + YEAR + Idum + c (25)
where FA is fixed assets, OUTPUT is gross output, LTLNOU is number of workers, YEAR a 
time trend standing for technological change, Idum a set of eight 2-digit industry dummies, and c 
a constant. I obtain the following results:
Table 4a: Regressing plant-level capital stock on output and labour
Number of obs 56670
F( 11, 56658) 11395.11
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.6887
Adj R-squared 0.6886
InFA Coef. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] VIF 1/VIF
In OUTPUT 0.589663 138.44 0 0.581315 0.598011 3.53 0.283473
In LTLNOU 0.389431 57.51 0 0.376158 0.402703 3.43 0.291494
YEAR -0.011341 -5.56 0 -0.015341 -0.007341 1.01 0.991943
I32 -0.143907 -10.06 0 -0.171941 -0.115873 1.57 0.636348
I33 0.067622 4.2 0 0.03603 0.099213 1.4 0.714917
134 0.403002 17.7 0 0.358364 0.44764 1.16 0.85945
135 0.200593 12.89 0 0.170096 0.23109 1.44 0.696706
136 0.206683 10.58 0 0.168399 0.244968 1.28 0.783415
137 0.142198 3.1 0.002 0.052415 0.23198 1.07 0.938678
138 0.295549 18.03 0 0.263426 0.327673 1.37 0.730156
139 -0.059097 -1.5 0.133 -0.136131 0.017936 1.05 0.948338
cons 25.63516 6.31 0 17.6738 33.59651
Breush-Pagan test indicates no heteroskedasticity
As a test for multicolinearity among independent variables, I compute Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIFs). As a rule of thumb, a (1/VIF) close to zero indicates serious multicolinerarity. There is here 
no serious multicolinearity problem.
I then use these coefficients, estimated using RSI, and apply them to BSI data in order to backcast 
the log of fixed assets. This methodology performs three tasks at once:
o It backcasts fixed assets data for 1975-87, i.e. it "predicts" missing fixed assets data for 
each establishment for the period 1975-87.
15 Aswicahyono (1998) uses a similar methodology, using value added, intermediate inputs and labour to backcast 
investment figures. Since intermediate inputs are part of output, I  do not include them in the regression, as it would lead to 
multicolinearity problems between output and Intermediate inputs.
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o It backcasts fixed assets data from RSI to BSI, i.e. it "predicts" fixed assets figures for 
establishments discovered after 1985 (absent in RSI but present in BSI).
o It corrects for under- or misreporting of fixed assets data (spurious zeros, missing values, 
and underreported fixed assets figures), i.e. it "predicts" fixed assets data for 
establishments showing gaps in fixed assets data series, reporting zero fixed assets or 
reporting undervalued fixed assets data.
As Table 4b shows, I obtain on average a very good prediction of fixed assets, and fixed assets 
distribution is similar for observed and predicted figures.
Table 4b: summary statistics of observed log of fixed assets (InFA), 
predicted log of fixed assets using BSI data (lnFA_BSI), residuals 
(RES1), standard deviation of residuals (STDR1), and stardard
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
InFA 56643 12.76591 1.978903 4.919051 23.03142
lnFA_BSI 240002 11.95166 1.566543 7.571712 19.95103
RES1 56643 0.003126 1.103789 -7.816668 12.04139
STDR1 240002 1.100602 0.00017 1.099224 1.100756
STDP1 240002 0.019322 0.00771 0.009733 0.058862
summary statistics of log of fixed 
assets (observed and predicted) 
 using same sample______
stats InFA InFA BSI
N 56643 56643
mean 12.76591 12.76279
plO 10.44441 10.82757
p25 11.2459 11.40434
p50 12.53374 12.5169
p75 14.06723 13.96062
p90 15.43794 15.07323
min 4.919051 8.212639
max 23.03142 19.95103
However, it is necessary to verify that using predicted log of fixed assets to calculate fixed assets 
growth does not amplify the error of the prediction. Table 4c displays summary statistics of the 
annual growth rates of all elements of the production function, using the same sample size and 
composition for observed and predicted variables.
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Table 4c: Simple average of annual growth rates of the elements of the 
production function , using same sample for observed fixed assets growth
(K□ raw) and predicted fixed assets growth (Kg_BSI)
YEAR OUTg INPg Lg Kgraw(1) KgBSI (2) (1) - (2)
1988 3.47% 2.83% 2.48% 1.63%
1989 12.77% 11.85% 4.20% 1.27% 9.21% 7.94%
1990 13.44% 5.32% 4.09% 6.72% 8.50% 1.78%
1991 2.99% 1.85% 3.86% -0.59% 2.12% 2.71%
1992 9.51% 6.63% 2.84% 8.36% 5.68% -2.68%
1993 10.94% 10.43% 4.77% 0.82% 7.21% 6.39%
1994 7.66% 7.25% 2.87% 4.77% 4.74% -0.03%
1995 3.12% 2.39% 1.80% 1.07% 1.56% 0.50%
Average 89-95 7.99% 6.07% 3.36% 3.20% 5.08% 1.88%
Simple average of observed versus predicted fixed assets annual growth is fairly good, with a 
spread ranging only from -0.03 to 2.7 percentage points.
For 1989 and 1993 however, predicted fixed assets growth are respectively 8 and 6 percentage 
points higher than observed fixed assets growth. Indeed, for those years, output grew by 13% and 
11%, while observed fixed assets seemed to have grown only by just around 1%. The prediction 
rescales fixed assets growth to output growth. This corrects for underreporting of fixed assets 
increase for those particular years, or underestimate TFP growth.
Fixed assets growth between 1988 and 1989 are likely to have been underreported. Crego, Larson 
et alii (2000) estimate a capital stock series for a large number of countries including Indonesia. 
They use the Perpetual Inventory Methodology, but use historical investment series from 1913 
onwards in order to estimate a benchmark capital stock for 1967. They give a breakdown for 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors. They report a capital stock growth of 32% in the 
manufacturing sector for 1989, against 15% for the previous year, and 30% for the following year.
Historical figures from the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) are available annually 
from 1967 until 2000. For each year, I compute investment stock as the sum of past investments, 
so that investment stock in 1975 is the sum of 9 years of investment. Cumulated investment 
reported by BKPM grew by 32.5% in 1989, and by 18.5% in 1993.
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Table 4d: Capital stock growth, comparative figures
all figures in 
billion 1983IDR
Manufacturing 
Fixed Capital, 
1983 local 
currency (Crego 
et alii, 2000)
Manufacturing 
Fixed Capital 
growth (Crego 
et alii, 2000)
domestic and 
foreign 
investment 
(BKPM)
investment 
growth (BKPM)
cumulated
investment
(BKPM)
cumulated 
investment 
growth (BKPM)
1967 490.5 210.6 210.6
1968 1099.9 124.3% 295.0 40.1% 505.6 140.1%
1969 1367.0 24.3% 164.1 -44.4% 669.7 32.5%
1970 1561.5 14.2% 1466.7 793.8% 2136.4 219.0%
1971 1670.8 7.0% 528.7 -64.0% 2665.1 24.7%
1972 2196.2 31.4% 356.6 -32.6% 3021.7 13.4%
1973 2944.4 34.1% 830.9 133.0% 3852.6 27.5%
1974 4306.6 46.3% 780.2 -6.1% 4632.8 20.3%
1975 4871.5 13.1% 1314.0 68.4% 5946.8 28.4%
1976 5611.9 15.2% 652.8 -50.3% 6599.6 11.0%
1977 6299.6 12.3% 677.5 3.8% 7277.1 10.3%
1978 7904.0 25.5% 988.4 45.9% 8265.5 13.6%
1979 10880.6 37.7% 919.4 -7.0% 9184.9 11.1%
1980 13461.2 23.7% 2671.2 190.5% 11856.1 29.1%
1981 14089.9 4.7% 3131.9 17.2% 14988.0 26.4%
1982 15569.8 10.5% 6223.2 98.7% 21211.2 41.5%
1983 18457.6 18.5% 9011.0 44.8% 30222.2 42.5%
1984 20485.5 11.0% 3404.6 -62.2% 33626.8 11.3%
1985 23459.1 14.5% 4703.2 38.1% 38330.0 14.0%
1986 24328.5 3.7% 5762.8 22.5% 44092.8 15.0%
1987 28836.6 18.5% 12601.0 118.7% 56693.8 28.6%
1988 33038.2 14.6% 18861.8 49.7% 75555.6 33.3%
1989 43727.4 32.4% 24537.8 30.1% 100093.4 32.5%
1990 56959.7 30.3% 68496.2 179.1% 168589.6 68.4%
1991 75731.8 33.0% 50241.0 -26.7% 218830.6 29.8%
1992 87756.6 15.9% 39862.0 -20.7% 258692.6 18.2%
1993 47869.7 20.1% 306562.3 18.5%
1994 80644.7 68.5% 387207.0 26.3%
1995 109736.3 36.1% 496943.3 28.3%
average 76-92 28623.4 18.9% 14867.4 39.6% 64947.6 25.7%
average 76-95 24549.8 39.9% 114741.1 25.5%
average 76-87 15782.0 16.3% 4228.9 38.4% 23529.0 21.2%
average 88-92 59442.7 25.2% 40399.8 42.3% 164352.4 36.4%
average 88-95 55031.2 42.0% 251559.3 31.9%
Let us now look at the predictions for the entire BSI sample and the extended period 1975-95. I 
first present simple average of plant-level annual growth of output, intermediate inputs, labour and 
capital.
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Table 5: Simple average of plant-level growth of output, value added, intermediate inputs, 
_______________________________ labour and capital_______________________________
YEAR output growth input growth labour growth capital growth
1976 3.76% 2.33% 0.80% 1.55%
1977 -2.85% -4.03% 0.15% -2.62%
1978 6.40% 5.06% 0.65% 2.99%
1979 3.12% 9.60% 2.46% 1.75%
1980 4.69% 4.70% 3.17% 2.94%
1981 3.19% 1.97% 1.87% 1.58%
1982 3.29% 3.87% -0.74% 0.61%
1983 6.59% 8.79% 0.35% 2.96%
1984 8.24% 9.10% 1.57% 4.43%
1985 13.04% 10.96% 1.13% 7.02%
1986 13.27% 12.52% 1.87% 7.57%
1987 0.97% 5.94% 1.59% 0.19%
1988 3.31% 2.80% 2.41% 1.63%
1989 13.19% 11.88% 6.24% 9.21%
1990 13.61% 12.15% 4.13% 8.50%
1991 2.90% 1.79% 3.86% 2.12%
1992 9.48% 6.68% 2.85% 5.68%
1993 10.81% 10.30% 4.78% 7.21%
1994 7.75% 7.33% 2.87% 4.74%
1995 3.12% 2.41% 1.80% 1.56%
average 1976-95 6.39% 6.31% 2.19% 3.58%
1976-88 5.16% 5.66% 1.33% 2.51%
1989-95 8.69% 7.51% 3.79% 5.58%
Average plant output growth over the entire period is 6.39% p.a., with intermediate inputs growing 
almost as fast at 6.31% p.a., meaning that average plant value added grows very slowly.16 Average 
plant capital stock grows faster than employment, with growth rates of 3.58% and 2.19% p.a. 
respectively.
Average plant output grows significantly faster in the post-deregulation period than in the oil boom 
and deregulation period, with growth rates of 8.69% p.a. and 5.16% p.a. respectively. In the post­
deregulation period, intermediate input growth accelerates as well, but less than output growth, 
indicating an improvement in average plant value added. However, labour and capital stock growth 
accelerate faster, suggesting that productivity improvement might not be enormous.
I then present annual growth rates of aggregate output, intermediate inputs, labour and capital as 
measured with Divisia indices.
Hulten (1973) defines the Divisia Index "as a weighted sum of growth rates, where the weights are 
the components' share in total value" (p. 1017). The rate of change of the Divisia Index D is given 
by:
16 Value added is calculated as output minus intermediate inputs.
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log(D ,)-log(D ,_,) = X ^ K ,  +V,J.1Ilo g (X ,,)-lo g (X IJ. 1)] (26)
/=1 2
where
Vit  -------------   (27)
T h P „ X j,
with {X , ( t \ X 2 ( f X n (f)} the set of observations which are to be indexed, 
{Pi(0»P2 (*)»•••» P *(0} associated price vector, i denotes establishments, and t time.
For example, the rate of growth of the Divisia Index for gross output is computed using the 
following formula:
tog (A * ™ -,) -  log (Dovtpvt.,-! )= i i k ,  + V ,  Iiog(ot/rf>(/7;.,) -  ^ ( o u t p u t , , )]
«=l 2
(28)
where
OUT;
Vf, = — -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (29)
where output is in constant IDR (base year 1983).
The same methodology is applied to calculate the rate of growth of Divisia Indices of intermediate 
inputs, capital, and labour.
In order to calculate the weights for capital, I need to derive capital stock from the log of capital 
stock using the following formula:
KSTOCK = exp[log(FA)], (30)
Capital stock is the exponential of the log of fixed assets.17
The Divisia Index for labour uses data on the number of workers L :
l°siPlABOUR,t )— ^ 0B{OiAB0 UR,t-\ ) = + ^ \ f - l )“ )] (^ 1)
«=i 2
where
17 As a check for the growth of capital stock Divisia Index, I alternatively use output weights to aggregate capital -  because 
capital stock bears an important and constant relationship to output -  and the results do not change significantly.
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Results are shown in Table 6.
Table 6 : Divisia indices of growth of output, intermediate inputs, labour and capital
YEAR output growth input growth labour growth capital growth
1976 -5.08% -4.80% 9.51% 0.86%
1977 2.03% -0.33% -1.13% 3.30%
1978 8.60% 4.88% 3.11% 6.83%
1979 7.96% 14.24% 4.73% 7.20%
1980 13.44% 14.12% 7.62% 10.29%
1981 7.38% 5.71% 2.77% 4.80%
1982 4.09% 7.11% 3.37% 3.94%
1983 6.70% 9.78% 3.42% 5.09%
1984 10.69% 10.86% 6.54% 8.25%
1985 11.10% 9.53% 4.22% 7.46%
1986 14.63% 13.50% 3.65% 9.22%
1987 38.58% 34.97% 4.76% 13.39%
1988 -16.35% -7.89% 6.87% 2.86%
1989 29.05% 31.83% 12.87% 17.49%
1990 13.23% 10.01% 8.46% 10.49%
1991 2.74% 11.21% 8.09% 8.05%
1992 13.19% 15.22% 7.63% 10.55%
1993 5.76% 2.56% 6.36% 6.49%
1994 6.40% 8.54% 5.16% 7.73%
1995 11.82% 10.23% 9.99% 7.58%
average 76-95 9.30% 10.06% 5.90% 7.59%
76-88 7.98% 8.59% 4.57% 6.42%
89-95 11.74% 12.80% 8.37% 9.77%
Over the period 1976-95, aggregate annual capital growth is 7.59%, to compare to aggregate 
growth of 8.9% p.a. found with PIM on BSI data, 18.9% (1976-92) for Crego 8i alii (2000) figures, 
and 25.5% for BKPM cumulated investment figures.18
During the oil boom and deregulation period, annual capital stock growth is on average 6.42%, 
notably slower than in the post-deregulation era, with average growth of 9.77%. The PIM using 
ICVARs on the Statistik Industri dataset gives an average annual growth of capital stock of 6.92% 
for 1976-1988, against 12.58% for 1989-1996. Crego & alii (2000) find average growth rates of 
16.1% (1976-87), and 25.2% (1988-92), while BKPM figures show average growth rates of 21% 
(1976-87) and 32% (1988-96).
18 Figures using the PIM methodology using BSI data are based on the raw aggregate capital stock series given in Table 3.
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While in line with previous studies using Statistik Industri regarding the trend of the capital stock, 
new capital stock figures using fixed assets data seems to provide a lower bound for Indonesian 
manufacturing capital stock growth figures, while being very close to the estimates using the PIM.
These results suggest that investment figures (used for the PIM) and fixed assets figures (used for 
capital stock modelling) from Statistik Industri are consistent, but that the ICVAR methodology 
tended to underestimate the initial benchmark capital stock, thereby overestimating capital stock 
growth.
It remains however puzzling that estimating capital stock growth with Statistik Industri figures -  be 
it with investment or fixed assets figures -  leads to an average annual rate of growth twice to three 
times lower than macroeconomic figures (Crego et alii, 2000, or BKPM figures). Capital stock 
growth rates calculated here should therefore be considered as a lower bound.
An interesting aspect arises while comparing simple plant average and Divisia Index average 
growth rates of output, input, labour, and capital. Both series differ greatly, confirming the 
importance of focusing on plants' heterogeneity, plants' distribution and plants distribution 
dynamics. All weighted growth rates (Divisia Index) are higher than simple average growth rates, 
thereby confirming the importance of large plants. I return to this issue while examining TFP 
Growth results.
Let us now turn to the issue of the elasticity of output with respect to labour.
2.5.2 Elasticity of output with respect to labour
All authors working on Indonesian manufacturing with Statistik Industri use similar methodologies 
in order to calculate a , the elasticity of output with respect to labour. It is calculated as the ratio 
of total wages -  including non-monetary retributions - over value added, a  has two main 
features:19
o It stays almost constant over time.
o It has an average value of 0.2.
Some authors (in particular Aswicahyono, 1998 ; Timmer, 1999a) using Statistik Industri data 
question the surprisingly low share of labour in value added, and argue that labour figures might be 
underreported, especially for family workers. Indeed, usual estimates for OECD countries give a 
share of labour in value added at 60-70%.
Sarel (1997) re-estimates TFP and TFP Growth rates for several Asian countries including 
Indonesia. He emphasises the importance of the calculation of factor shares, and shows clearly its
19 See estimation of (X  on a yearly basis in Table 2.
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impact on TFP and TFP Growth rates. He criticises both the national account and econometric 
estimation of factor shares, and offers an alternative approach with the calculation of technological 
factor shares, i.e. elasticities of output with respect to each factor of production.
Presenting a sensitivity analysis for the period 1978-96, he shows that shifting the elasticity of 
output with respect to labour from 0.75 to 0.50 shifts TFPG from almost 2% a year to -0.25% a 
year for Indonesia. This divides TFP levels by a hundred. In other words, using a low elasticity of 
output with respect to labour (at about 20%) would tend to underestimate TFP and TFP Growth 
rates.
For his sample of South East Asian countries, he estimates a capital share for different sectors, and 
obtains a capital share of 30.80% for manufacturing (all South East Asian countries), estimate in 
line with previous international studies. For Indonesia alone, the capital share of the entire 
economy is estimated at about 35% (the study does not provide a share for Indonesian 
manufacturing in particular).
I determine new elasticities by estimating the following regression, using only observed figures for 
the period 1988-199520:
A in OUTtt_x = aA ln INPtt_x + /3Aln f_, + jA ln  Ktt_x + Sldum + c (33)
where A in OUTtt_x is the rate of change of gross output between time t and t -1 , A in INPt t_x is
the rate of change of intermediate inputs between time t and t - l ,  A i n f-1 is the rate of
change of the number of workers between time t and t - l ,  A ln /s^^ is  the rate of change of
capital (fixed assets) between time t and t — 1, Idum a set of eight two-digit industry dummies, 
and c a constant. I obtain the following elasticities:
a  = 0.71 
># = 0.18 
r =  0.026
I choose to estimate elasticities using rates of change rather than log levels because I later use 
those elasticities in a Divisia Index Number based on rates of change.
The details of the results are displayed in table 7.
20 As a cross check, I estimate the same regression using backcast fixed assets figures over the period 1975-95. Given that 
fixed assets figures have been predicted using output and labour data, the regression displays multicolinearity problems. 
However, dropping fixed assets from the equation and estimating the elasticities of output with respect to intermediate 
inputs and labour yields similar results.
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Table 7: Estimated elasticities of intermediate inputs, labour and 
capital with respect to output, on the period 1988-95, BSI dataset,
F(11, 38431) 10237.31
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.7456
Adj R-squared 0.7455
OUTg Coef. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
INPg 0.715904 297.9 0 0.711194 0.720614
Lg 0.179034 35.63 0 0.169184 0.188883
Kg 0.026551 12.83 0 0.022494 0.030608
I32 0.019452 4.27 0 0.010515 0.02839
I33 -0.005679 -1.09 0.278 -0.015938 0.00458
I34 0.002044 0.28 0.781 -0.012374 0.016461
I35 0.006205 1.26 0.207 -0.003432 0.015842
I36 0.010731 1.72 0.086 -0.001531 0.022994
I37 0.014698 1.04 0.3 -0.013101 0.042497
I38 0.016562 3.15 0.002 0.006269 0.026855
I39 0.003122 0.24 0.811 -0.022428 0.028672
_cons 0.014643 4.62 0 0.008431 0.020855
Variable VIF 1/VIF
I32 1.53 0.651922
I35 1.44 0.693972
I33 1.37 0.727434
I38 1.37 0.727522
I36 1.24 0.805625
I34 1.17 0.858107
INPg 1.14 0.876231
Lg 1.13 0.881105
I39 1.05 0.953961
Kg 1.04 0.958387
I37 1.04 0.96121
The VIF test does not indicate multicolinearity problems.
This means that - in fact - the elasticity of value added (gross output minus intermediate inputs) 
with respect to labour is 0.65 (against 0.22 for the elasticity calculated as share of wages in value 
added), and 0.09 for the elasticity of value added with respect to capital.21
Alternatively to the inclusion of industry dummies, I estimate elasticities for each 2-digit industry by 
running the following regression with each of the 9 industry populations:
21 Those results are obtained by regressing value added rate of change on labour and capital rate of change using the BSI 
raw data.
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MnOUTt = aMn!NPtt_x + yffAlnZ^ + jk \nK tt_x +c (34)
I obtain the following results:
Table 8: Elasticities of output with respect to intermediate inputs, labour, and capital, econometric
estimates at the 2-dlgit level
elasticity of output 
with respect to 
intermediate inputs
elasticity of output 
with respect to 
labour
elasticity of output 
with respect to 
capital
31-Food, beverages & tobacco 0.7524084 0.1019331 0.0273714
32-Textile, garments and leather 0.6697304 0.2676340 0.0299713
33-Wood products 0.7271595 0.2049208 0.0309931
34-Paper, printing & publishing 0.6728218 0.3076421 0.0478169
35-Chemicals, rubber & plastic 0.7616734 0.1172784 0.0108050
36-Non-metallic minerals 0.6940536 0.1892194 0.0318395
37-Basic metals 0.7168723 0.1864809 0.0501464
38-Metal products & machinery 0.6913947 0.2158866 0.0179731
39-Other manufacturing 0.6079127 0.2697141 0.0004104
All elaticities are significant at the 1% level, VIF test indicates no multicolinearity.
Those results illustrate to which extent it is important to take heterogeneity into account: the 
elasticity of output with respect to intermediate inputs ranges from 0.60 (other manufacturing) to 
0.76 (chemicals, rubber, and plastic), the elasticity of output with respect to labour ranges from 
0.10 (food, beverages, and tobacco) to 0.30 (paper, printing, and publishing), and the elasticity of 
output with respect to capital ranges from 0.0004 (other manufacturing) to 0.05 (basic metals). 
The limited number of observations for each group at more disaggregate levels renders the 
econometric estimation of elasticities unreliable below the 2-digit threshold.
I use BSI output, intermediate inputs and labour figures, backcast fixed assets figures and new 
estimated elasticities to provide new estimations of TFP and TFP growth. I have shown that capital 
stock growth might have been previously overestimated, and that the elasticity of output with 
respect to capital has been greatly overestimated: I would expect higher TFP growth rates than 
what has been previously estimated. However, I estimate TFP growth based on a gross output 
rather than value added production function. Using directly value added rather than gross output 
along with intermediate inputs generally overestimates TFP growth rates.
2.6 New Total Factor Productivity Growth estimates
I now turn to TFP growth calculation using the BSI dataset, the new capital stock series, and the 
new elasticities.
I use the standard Cobb-Douglas production function at the aggregate and at the 2-digit industry 
level. Aggregation is made following the Divisia Index Number methodology.
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I first calculate annual rates of growth of the Divisia Index for each component X  of the 
production function (gross output, intermediate inputs, labour, and capital) at the establishment 
level i:
log (d „  ) -  log(D,„_,) = I  [vir + V ,„, I lo g ( x ,) -  lo g (x ,M )] (35)
where,
(36)
L j j = \ P  jJ  X  j , t
and ^ ”=i Pj j Xj  t is the sum of all pjtlX jt for aggregation at the manufacturing level, and the 
sum of all P Jt, X j  t within each 2-digit industry for aggregation at the 2-digit industry level.
I then sum the plant level Divisia Index rates of growth to obtain annual aggregate rates of growth 
for each component of the production function:
log(D,)-log(D,_1) = X ^  + V . I log(x,J-l°g(x,,J (37)
i=l ^
For the calculation of TFP growth, I use the two following equations:
Aggregate manufacturing level
TFPGt = Yt - 0.7159039/M^ -0.1790335/* -0.0265512Kt (38)
where TFPG is Total Factor Productivity Growth rate, Y is the Divisia Index rate of growth of
gross output, INP is the Divisia Index rate of growth of intermediate inputs, L is the Divisia Index
rate of growth of labour, and K  is the Divisia Index rate of growth of capital. All components are 
calculated annually at the aggregate manufacturing level.
57
2-digit industry level
TFPG31t = Y3lt -0.7524084///^!, -0.10193314f -0.02737144,
TFPG32it=Y32t -0.6697304INP32t -0.2676344,, -0.02997134,
TFPG33it = Y33j -0.7271595///7>33, -0.20492084,, -0.030993l43>,
TFPG3Ait=YMt -0.6728218////>34, -0.30764214, -0.04781694,
TFPG35it=Y35t - 0.7616734////^5, -0.11727844,-0.0108054, (39)
TFPG36it=Y36t -0.6940536////>6, -0.18921944,, -0.03183954,
TFPG31it=Y31t -0.71687237//T537, -0.18648094,, -0.05014644,
TFPG3ftit = 4 ,  -0.69139477/7P38/ -0.21588664, -0.01797314,
TFPG39 it = y39>, -  0.60791277/77^ 9 f -0.269714 l 4 f, -0.00041044,
where all components are calculated annually at the 2-digit manufacturing level.
Table 9a displays the results at the aggregate level using the Divisia Index methodology. Table 9b 
displays simple average of growth rates across establishment at the aggregate level: growth rates 
are calculated at the establishment level, and the aggregate growth rate for a given year is the 
simple average of all establishments' growth rates.
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Table 9a: Output, input, labour, capital and TFP growth rates by year (elasticities
estimated on growth rates, no industry dummy)
Divisia Index methodology
output growth input growth labour growth capital growth TFPG
1975
1976 -5.08% -4.80% 9.51% 0.86% -3.48%
1977 2.03% -0.33% -1.13% 3.30% 2.40%
1978 8.60% 4.88% 3.11% 6.83% 4.34%
1979 7.96% 14.24% 4.73% 7.20% -3.31%
1980 13.44% 14.12% 7.62% 10.29% 1.62%
1981 7.38% 5.71% 2.77% 4.80% 2.64%
1982 4.09% 7.11% 3.37% 3.94% -1.74%
1983 6.70% 9.78% 3.42% 5.09% -1.08%
1984 10.69% 10.86% 6.54% 8.25% 1.46%
1985 11.10% 9.53% 4.22% 7.46% 3.28%
1986 14.63% 13.50% 3.65% 9.22% 4.04%
1987 38.58% 34.97% 4.76% 13.39% 12.33%
1988 -16.35% -7.89% 6.87% 2.86% -12.09%
1989 29.05% 31.83% 12.87% 17.49% 3.38%
1990 13.23% 10.01% 8.46% 10.49% 4.18%
1991 2.74% 11.21% 8.09% 8.05% -7.03%
1992 13.19% 15.22% 7.63% 10.55% 0.57%
1993 5.76% 2.56% 6.36% 6.49% 2.54%
1994 6.40% 8.54% 5.16% 7.73% -0.89%
1995 11.82% 10.23% 9.99% 7.58% 2.40%
average 76-95 9.30% 10.06% 5.90% 7.59% 0.78%
76-80 5.39% 5.62% 4.77% 5.70% 0.31%
81-83 6.06% 7.54% 3.18% 4.61% -0.06%
84-88 11.73% 12.19% 5.21% 8.24% 1.80%
89-93 12.79% 14.17% 8.68% 10.61% 0.73%
94-95 9.11% 9.38% 7.58% 7.66% 0.75%
89-95 11.74% 12.80% 8.37% 9.77% 0.74%
Table 9b: Output, input, labour, capital and TFP growth rates by year (elasticities
estimated on growth rates, no industry dummy)
Simple plant-level average
output growth input growth labour growth capital growth TFPG
1975
1976 -1.48% -2.01% 0.79% -1.75% -0.07%
1977 -3.81% -4.94% 0.16% -3.07% -0.25%
1978 6.25% 5.11% 1.43% 3.28% 2.24%
1979 2.98% 8.42% 4.34% 2.53% -3.93%
1980 5.70% 5.34% 3.96% 3.99% 1.02%
1981 3.49% 2.51% 2.99% 2.31% 1.07%
1982 4.18% 4.73% 1.36% 2.06% 0.49%
1983 6.05% 8.21% 2.76% 3.72% -0.43%
1984 7.60% 7.83% 3.75% 5.01% 1.15%
1985 10.44% 8.30% 7.62% 8.23% 2.83%
1986 8.59% 8.28% -0.13% 4.06% 2.61%
1987 2.27% 6.31% 1.61% 1.04% -2.56%
1988 8.50% 7.94% 7.16% 6.90% 1.29%
1989 14.16% 13.16% 6.59% 10.00% 3.33%
1990 13.40% 11.89% 6.57% 9.52% 3.29%
1991 6.78% 6.00% 5.82% 5.32% 1.22%
1992 11.43% 8.59% 4.64% 7.58% 4.23%
1993 11.19% 10.45% 5.50% 7.78% 2.43%
1994 6.84% 5.89% 3.68% 4.52% 1.84%
1995 3.18% 1.43% 2.88% 2.06% 1.51%
average 76-95 6.39% 6.17% 3.67% 4.25% 1.17%
76-80 1.93% 2.39% 2.14% 1.00% -0.20%
81-83 4.58% 5.15% 2.37% 2.70% 0.38%
84-88 7.48% 7.73% 4.00% 5.05% 1.06%
89-93 11.39% 10.02% 5.82% 8.04% 2.90%
94-95 5.01% 3.66% 3.28% 3.29% 1.67%
89-95 9.57% 8.20% 5.10% 6.68% 2.55%
My estimates of annual TFP Growth rates of 0.78% for the period 1976-95 are considerably lower 
than Aswicahyono (1998) and Timmer (1999a) estimates of 2.7% to 2.8% for 1976-93 and 1976- 
95 respectively. Indeed, while a lower capital stock growth would tend to increase TFP Growth 
rates, a much lower elasticity of output with respect to capital more than counterbalance the 
previous effect. We should also keep in mind that using gross output based rather than value 
added based production function tends to lower (in our case) TFP Growth rates .
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More interesting is to look at TFP Growth rates over relevant sub-periods.22 During the oil boom 
period (1976-80), other authors find TFP Growth figures ranging from 0.70% to 1.10% p.a., and I 
obtain a positive but lower average figure at 0.31% p.a.. Indeed, output grew on average at 5.39% 
p.a., while inputs grew at 5.62% p.a., labour at 4.77% p.a., and capital at 5.70% p.a.. This result 
is in line with previous findings displaying low TFP Growth, and could suggest that, in spite of high 
economic growth rates, the allocation of resources in manufacturing during that period has been 
rather unproductive. It is however striking to observe a negative plant-level average TFP rate of 
change (-0.20% p.a.) for the same period: this suggests that some companies have allocated 
resources more productively than others during that period, again underlining the importance of 
taking plant heterogeneity into account in the study of aggregate TFP Growth.
During the recession period (1981-83), following oil prices and exports drop, average annual TFPG 
drops to -0.06%. This again is in line with previous studies, but the results are less dramatic than 
the negative TFPG estimated by Aswicahyono (1998) for exactly the same time span (-4.9%). The 
main reason for that productivity drop is the stickiness of intermediate inputs use: average output 
growth increases slightly from 5.39% p.a. to 6.06% p.a. (but drops from 10% to 6.06% if I 
compare 1978-80 figures to 1981-83 figures), and intermediate input growth increases from 5.62% 
p.a. to 7.54% p.a..
If I now compare the changes in simple and weighted (Divisia Index) average of TFPG between the 
oil boom and the recession period, I find that simple average TFPG improves, while weighted TFPG 
worsens. This underlines the importance of industrial demography for the purpose of that study. It 
may be the case that during the recession period, a greater number of firms become more 
productive, but that large firms become less productive, maybe due to a lack of flexibility during 
shocks.
From the liberalisation period (1984-88) onward, Indonesia does experience a new surge in TFPG, 
with an estimate of 1.80% p.a.. This result is more than three times slower than Aswicahyono's 
(1998) findings at 5.5% p.a. for the same period. Here again, it will be crucial to estimate the effect 
of firms' distribution dynamics on TFPG. Between recession and liberalisation, weighted average 
TFPG increases faster than simple average TFPG, suggesting that -  size distribution of firms being 
held constant - liberalisation caused larger firms to become more productive. A decomposition into 
2-digit industry productivity growth shows that the surge in productivity occurring in 1987 is mainly 
attributable to the basic metals industry and the entry of a new large company.23
22 Comparative results have been summarised in Table 1.
23 This issue is discussed in details in chapter 6.
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The post- deregulation period (1989-93) witnesses surprisingly a great drop of TFPG, with a figure 
of 0.73% p.a.. Aswicahyono (1998) estimates TFPG for the same period at 6.0% p.a., while 
Timmer (1999a) estimates annual TFPG at 7.9% for the period 1986-90. This large drop in TFP 
growth rates is due to rapid acceleration of inputs, labour and capital accumulation coupled to a 
nearly zero increase of output growth. I need here to point at the importance of the choice of sub­
periods. The low TFPG figure for 1989-93 is mainly due to a negative TFPG in 1991, year of a halt 
in output growth. Removing that particular year from the post- deregulation period gives an 
average TFPG of 2.67%, i.e. 0.87 percentage point higher than TFPG of the deregulation period.
Simple average TFPG increased rapidly, while weighted average TFPG dropped between the 
deregulation and the post-deregulation periods, suggesting that -  size distribution of firms being 
held constant again -  post- deregulation caused smaller firms to become more productive and/or 
large firms to become less productive.
Finally, the three years preceding the crisis witness a slight rise in TFPG at 0.75% p.a.. Indeed, 
output growth decelerates massively, but the deceleration of input growth is faster.
Graph 1: TFP level, base 100 in 1975
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While aggregate TFP growth over the period 1976-95 has been 0.78% per annum on average, a 
decomposition into 2-digit industry level shows wide discrepancies across industries, with average 
TFP growth ranging from -0.45% p.a. for the food, beverages and tobacco industry to 3.69% p.a. 
for the basic metals industry.
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Table 10 displays average annual TFP Growth rates at the 2-digit industry level for the different 
historical periods.
T rill*  10: Avarag* TFP growth ra h t at tha M g K  industry lavri
Note: Industry 35 axdudea 01 and gas ralMng
(1— )
11 food.
12 taxriaa, garmanta i
product*
printing A ptriBahlng
15 chomlcala, rubbar 0 ptasttc
11 food, bavaraqaaA
>2 la i l Oa*. yan iian l*  A
13 wood product*
30 matal product* A machlnary
11 food.
12 twthaa, garmanta A
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Comparing the results with other authors' figures also indicates that changing elasticities of 
substitution, together with a different aggregation methodology leads to very different outcomes 
for each industry. Over the entire period, I find that the food, beverages and tobacco industry 
displays negative rather than positive average TFP Growth (Timmer, 1999a), mostly due to output 
recession in 1991-92. This result is in line with the historiography of the sector indicating slow 
productivity gains, slow adoption of new technology, and monopolistic structure (Manning, 1979 ; 
Robison, 1986 ; Tabor, 1992 ; Tarmidi, 1996; Aswicahyono, 1998).24
I also find that chemicals, rubber and plastic, together with non-metallic minerals, display positive 
TFP Growth, while Timmer (1999a) finds they experience an average negative TFP change. For 
these two industries, my results are more in line with Aswicahyono & Hill (1996) and Aswicahyono 
(1998).
Looking at sub-periods shows that recession (1981-83) did not reduce TFP Growth rates in all 
industries: TFP growth worsens for all industries previously displaying positive TFP growth, but 
improves for wood products, paper, printing & publishing, chemicals, rubber & plastic, industries 
previously displaying TFP deterioration. The same phenomenon is observed from Aswicahyono's
24 A detailed review of the literature on this sector is given in chapter 6 of the thesis.
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(1998) results. One could argue that in the worse performing sectors, the crisis shakes out the 
worse performing plants and reallocate market shares to better performing plants, thereby 
improving 2-digit industry productivity gains. The shake-out might have happened earlier in the 
best performing industries, so that the crisis results in a loss of productivity. This issue is assessed 
in following chapters.
The rebound and deregulation period witnessed improving TFP growth in all sectors. This is 
especially true for the wood products, paper, printing & publishing, basic metals, and other 
manufacturing.
The post- deregulation period (1989-95) has experienced a global drop in TFP growth, due to the 
worse performance of several industries: food, beverages and tobacco, wood products, paper, 
printing and publishing, and basic metals. Indeed, the food, beverages and tobacco and basic 
metals industries saw output dropping by 27% and 4% respectively in 1991, while output in the 
wood product and the paper, printing and publishing industries dropped by 21% and 15% 
respectively in 1993. As argued previously, aggregate weighted average TFP growth (Divisia Index) 
dropped during the post-deregulation period, while aggregate simple average TFP growth 
improved, suggesting that the largest establishments drove TFP down during the post-deregulation 
period. This issue is investigated in following chapters.
Using new capital stock series, new elasticities in the production function, and working at 
establishment level rather than at aggregate level suggests that Total Factor Productivity Growth 
may have been less than what has previously been argued.
The results suggest that previous studies, constructing a capital stock series with the Perpetual 
Inventory Methodology and a hypothetical benchmark capital stock, tended to overestimate capital 
stock growth. Nevertheless, given the high macroeconomic historical capital stock growth figures, I 
treat the new estimated series as a lower bound, and new estimates of TFP growth as an upper 
bound.
Previous studies tended to overestimate greatly the elasticity of output with respect to capital. 
Working with new elasticities and using a gross output based production function rather than a 
gross value added production function lowers TFP growth estimates.
Working at establishment level and using Divisia Index Numbers in order to aggregate results leads 
to TFPG estimates that are lower than simple average figures. This suggests that the dominance of 
large-scale establishments in terms of output led to lower TFP Growth. However, this feature varies 
across sub-periods and industries, so that a detailed industrial demographic study is necessary to 
reach more robust and detailed conclusions.
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2.7 Conclusion
Preparing the ground for a study of industrial demography and dynamics in the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector, in order to shed more light on the mechanisms leading aggregate TFP 
Growth, this chapter reviews the existing theoretical and empirical literature on Total Factor 
Productivity Growth estimation for Indonesian manufacturing using Statistik Industri dataset. I 
criticise the usual approach estimating a hypothetical benchmark capital stock -  both on the basis 
of the methodology and on historical evidence. I then derive a new methodology for contraction of 
a capital stock series based on fixed assets figures at the establishment level. It/Appears! that 
manufacturing capital stock growth seems to have been slightly lower -  on average/7.59% p/a. for 
1976-95 - than what has been previously calculated using the PIM and ICVAR metnodojocjy (8.5% 
p.a.). The discrepancy mainly stems from an underestimation of the initial benchmark capital stock 
with the ICVAR methodology. I however treat the new capital stock growth series as cMower^ 
bound. Indeed, macroeconomic historical evidence suggests that capital stock grew by 1 
p.a. over the period.
Estimating rather than calculating the elasticities of the production function shows that the elasticity 
of output with respect to capital had been previously greatly overestimated.
Using the new elasticities, I estimate TFPG at the establishment level rather than at the aggregate 
level, and present simple TFPG averages, as well as weighted TFPG averages using Divisia Index 
Numbers. Estimating TFPG at establishment level accounts for different distributions of inputs 
(capital and labour) across companies. Weighted establishment TFPG averages account for firms' 
size distribution within manufacturing.
Results suggest that for 1975-1996, TFP Growth rates may have been lower (0.78% p.a.) than 
what had been previously suggested (2% to 3% p.a.). Dividing the period into relevant historical 
sub-periods shed light on the evolution of TFPG.
Results confirm that the oil boom period (1975-80) witnessed low but positive TFP Growth (0.31% 
p.a.). Comparing weighted and simple average TFPG suggests that positive weighted TFPG may 
largely be due to large-scale firms.
During the oil and export crisis (recession, 1981-83), average weighted TFP Growth worsens, 
because the use of intermediate inputs does not slow down as fast as output. However, simple 
average TFPG improves, suggesting that smaller firms withstand the crisis in a better way.
Results for 1984-88, reform and liberalisation period, are in line with previous studies, showing a 
large improvement of TFP Growth. However aggregate TFP Growth deteriorates slightly during the
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post-deregulation period (1989-95), mainly because of a halt in output growth in 1991 in most sub­
sectors.
Estimation of TFP Growth at the establishment level, and the comparison of simple and weighted 
TFPG averages have clearly shown the Importance of productivity differential across plants 
according to their size. It also underlines the importance of industrial dynamics. The task is now to 
explore further plants' demography over the period in order to shed more light on the mechanisms 
behind aggregate TFP change.
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3 Industrial demography: A Review of the Literature Applied on 
Developing Countries
3.1 Introduction
The discussion of the previous chapter focused on how to measure TFP growth as accurately as 
possible, and gave a first estimation of TFP Growth for the manufacturing sector using several 
aggregation methods. In this chapter, the emphasis is put on the micro-dynamics of aggregate TFP 
growth. In particular, the focus is put on the heterogeneity issue: within the manufacturing sector, 
and within each sub-industry, technology, factor mix, and therefore TFP and TFP growth may vary 
across plants. The causes of heterogeneity and turnover are in turn discussed. These include: 
international trade issues, financial reforms, competition and industrial policy, as well as broad 
institutional framework.
The previous study has concentrated on providing new estimates of TFP and TFP growth in the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector, but has also helped underline the importance of industrial 
heterogeneity in terms of firm's size and productivity. Indeed, calculating productivity growth using 
different method of aggregation -  simple average versus weighted average (using Divisia Index 
numbers) -  shows that different types of firms have different productivity growth rates (and 
therefore different technologies) within the same industry at each point in time and at different 
periods. This heterogeneity is in turn affecting the aggregate productivity growth of the 
manufacturing sector. This review of the literature sheds some new light on the problem of 
aggregation of microeconomic data into an industry-wide aggregate. It complements the discussion 
of accurate TFP and TFPG estimation.
In their 1996 book, Roberts and Tybout compile a series of works dealing with industrial 
demography issues in Developing Countries, including studies covering manufacturing in Chile (Liu, 
L. & Tybout, J.R., 1996 ; Tybout, J. R., 1996), Columbia (Liu, L. & Tybout, R., 1996 ; Roberts, MJ., 
1996), and Morocco (Haddad, M., de Melo, J., and Horton, B., 1996).25 They survey the theory of 
industrial evolution and derive a methodology taking into account plant heterogeneity in the 
estimation and explanation of productivity and productivity growth. Other existing studies of 
Developing countries industrial demography include Israel (Griliches and Regev, 1992) and Taiwan 
(Aw, Xiaomin, and Roberts, 1997). More recently, a few scholars have used new methodologies to 
reassess industrial evolution and its causes using data on Chilean and Colombian manufacturing 
(Levinshon & Petrin, 2000; Pavcnik, 2002; Fernandes, 2002). Finally, Hahn (2000) investigates the 
relationship between plant turnover and aggregate TFP growth in Korean manufacturing.
25 Some chapters include case studies for other countries but do not directly deal with industrial demography.
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While the issue of plant productivity heterogeneity has been largely discussed for the case of OECD 
countries, in particular for the United States, LDCs have not been the focus for studying industrial 
demography and its dynamics. The latter could however beneficiate greatly from such studies to 
inform policy. Indeed, LDCs are the countries experiencing dramatic industrial changes, first 
through rapid industrialisation, rapid technological change (catching-up phenomenon), and quite 
often, market liberalisation.
In this chapter, I firstly propose to review the theory underpinning the study of industrial evolution 
at the microeconomic level, as well as the methodology used in industrial demographic studies. In a 
second part, I review the empirical literature of industrial evolution for LDCs. Finally, I review the 
scarce literature directly or indirectly linked to industrial evolution in the Indonesian manufacturing 
sector. The conclusion gives directions for the next chapter, a study of industrial evolution in 
Indonesian manufacturing.
3.2 Industrial demography: theory and methodology
3.2.1 Theory
Tybout (1996) summarises the role of plant or firm heterogeneity in aggregate productivity 
improvement in those words:
"Entry, exit and market share reallocations reflect three forces. The first involves long-run shifts in 
technology and demand patterns that generate expansion of output and net entry of producers in 
some sectors, while generating contraction of output and net exit of producers in others. The entry 
and exit that result as a developing country shifts from the assembly of low technology 
manufactured goods to the production of higher quality differentiated ones are an example of this 
long-run adjustment. The second force is short-run or cyclical fluctuations in demand, such as 
might arise from changing macroeconomic conditions or trade policy. These could be an important 
source of entry and exit variations in industries where sunk costs are small so that short-term or 
hit-and-run entry may be profitable. The third factor contributing to turnover is the replacement of 
less-efficient producers by more efficient ones in the same industry. If producers in an industry are 
heterogeneous in their levels of profit or productivity, market force are likely to generate continual 
entry and exit, even if demand remains stable" (Roberts, M.J., Tybout, J.R., 1996, p.2, emphasis 
added). This is of course true if markets are competitive. If markets are not competitive, then 
market share reallocation and plants turnover are the products of market distortions such as 
monopolies or corruption.
In general, TFP growth is explained by macroeconomic environment and policy, as well as overall 
changes in technology. The usual approach is the representative plant approach to productivity and
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productivity growth modelling. All firms behave following identical production functions, thereby 
ignoring the heterogeneity of industrial composition. "Productivity growth must thus occur through 
an orderly shift in the production technology common to all plants or through some general 
improvement in the quality of inputs." (Tybout, 1996, p.44).
Within the representative plant approach, one strand of the literature concentrates on the effect of 
product market competition ^through industrial and/or trade policy -  on entrepreneurial effort on 
innovation for the production process (Corden 1974, Hart 1983, Martin and Page 1983, Scharfstein 
1988, Rodrick 1991).
Another area of study concentrates on the role of scale economies in explaining the link between 
policy and productivity. Here again, trade policy is the main focus. Thirdly, productivity changes are 
explained by externalities. This is the core explanation utilised by the "big push" theorists 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Murphy, Schleifer and Vishny 1989), scholars focusing on productivity 
spillovers (Krugman 1991, Matsuyama 1991), or endogenous growth literature focusing on 
learning-by-doing (Krugman 1987, Lucas 1988).
However, as Tybout (1996) underlines "if technological innovation takes place through a gradual 
process of efficient plants displacing inefficient ones, or through plant-specific innovation and 
leaming-by-doing, the representative plant assumption embedded in the literature mentioned 
above is at best misleading" (p.45).
Indeed, the previous works study productivity improvements using the representative plant 
approach without specifically taking firms heterogeneity and turnover into account, but at the same 
time concede that heterogeneity exist.
Endogenous growth theory takes part of plant heterogeneity into account by differentiating among 
different qualities of goods, and/or different qualities of labour. These models work however in a 
general equilibrium framework, and do not allow detailed microanalysis of industrial composition 
and evolution. Partial equilibrium models offer greater possibilities regarding industrial demography 
study (Tybout, 1996).
A stylised fact regarding industry is its heterogeneity in terms of labour and capital intensity, 
technology, plant's size, and profit. "If the dispersion in these plants characteristics reflects an 
underlying dispersion in productivity and if entry, exit, or differential growth rates are continually 
altering market shares, then heterogeneity can be a basis for significant productivity change." 
(Tybout, 1996, p.43).
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The alternative approach to the study of productivity growth allows for changes in market shares, 
entry and exit, and plant-specific improvement in efficiency. It relaxes the assumption of a unique 
and widespread technology, and allows for different factor mixes for each plant.
Jovanovic (1982) argues that a widespread empirical observation is that, within an industry, smaller 
firms grow faster, their rates of growth are more heterogeneous, they are less cost-efficient and 
more likely to fail than larger firms. He explains this "deviation from the proportional growth law" 
with a "theory of'noisy' selection". As firms leam about their relative cost-efficiency through 
market participation, the most efficient ones expand, while the least efficient ones eventually exit. 
Sunk entry costs and the degree of individual uncertainty affect exit patterns and efficiency. 
Jovanovic underlines that "enduring differences in size and in growth are no doubt caused by the 
fixity of capital. This paper shows, I think, that selection matters too." (p. 649). Another interesting 
feature of Jovanovic's model is that it allows for heterogeneity in industrial composition -  firms of 
different size and efficiency coexist in the same industry at any point in time -  while keeping the 
assumption of perfect market competition -  the number of firms is always infinite.
Hopenhayn (1992) proposes a model similar to Jovanovic's (1982) but extending to the case of the 
steady state equilibrium -  entry and exit rates are equal, and so is job creation and destruction; 
distribution for firm size, profits and value are stationary. Steady state analysis is helpful to analyse 
the long-run properties of dynamic models. Hopenhayn "use[s] it here to understand how changes 
in the structural characteristic of an industry [...] affect turnover, growth of firms, and the 
distributions of size, profits, and value of firms" (p. 1129). "Most of Jovanovic's results still hold, but 
Hopenhayn goes beyond them to describe the long-run effects of changes in fixed costs, aggregate 
demand, and sunk costs, inter alia, on industry characteristics." (Tybout, 1996, p.45). In a 
stationary equilibrium, entry and exit will occur If plants face a minimum of fixed costs. If these 
fixed costs increase, this effect will be to prevent low productivity plants to enter, under the 
condition that technological change is disembodied. Using the same technological assumption, 
"changes in aggregate demand are neutral on all life cycle properties and on the rate of turnover in 
the industry, causing only changes in the total number of firms and the market price for the good in 
the industry" (p. 1143). Increased sunk entry costs lowers plant turnover, resulting in the 
continuation of less productive plants, while expected profits and market share of large plants 
increase. "So policies that inhibit entry reduce average productivity through selectivity effects, and 
they can appear to exacerbate market power in a setting where all plants are price takers." 
(Tybout, 1996, p.46).
In earlier studies, some other partial equilibrium models treat production costs as endogenous: 
firms determine the diffusion of technology, and decide of the best timing to introduce a new 
technology. The decision depends on several factors such as the costs of adopting the technology,
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the productivity gain that the technology provides, and the number of firms having already adopted 
the technology (externalities). Adoption or non-adoption of a new technology has an impact on 
costs and productivity, in turn affecting entry and exit.
Pakes and Ericson (1987), and Pakes and McGuire (1994) allow for imperfect competition and 
uncertainty about investment outcomes in their models. Here again, each firm decides whether to 
invest, to utilise existing capital, or to exit, according to its expectations in terms of return on 
investment and competition with other firms. "Young firms are more likely to invest in 
improvements than old firms, so a firm's rate of productivity growth is correlated with its stage in 
the life cycle" (Tybout, 1996, p.46). But as many authors point out, the framework developed here 
is too complex to be easily used for empirical work.
Finally, Dixit (1989), and Lambson (1991) point out that in an uncertain institutional framework 
with constantly changing incentives, firms are less likely to invest in new technology. They usually 
prefer to shift to labour-intensive technology. This framework also explains the long-term 
coexistence of firms using different technologies - set up at different periods and under different 
institutional framework -  resulting in productivity heterogeneity.
Another cause for productivity heterogeneity are economies of scale. Plants have different sizes and 
therefore experience different economies of scale and productivity. The reallocation of market 
shares also reallocates economies of scale and reshuffles productivity across plants. Tybout notes 
that there is a "countercyclical tendency in sectoral productivity growth" (1996, p.54): in a period of 
recession, aggregate productivity may improve because the less productive plants exit; and in 
period of boom, aggregate productivity may drop because new less productive plants enter. He 
however concedes that empirical work tends to indicate that, at the plant-level, returns to scale are 
close to unity, so that economies of scale do not explain a large part of the productivity 
heterogeneity.
Tybout (1996) mentions four other potential causes of productivity heterogeneity. The first one 
relates to different capacity utilisations creating productivity differentials. The second is the learning 
effect: entering plants start to learn and are less productive than incumbents, which have already 
learned. Thirdly, empirical work shows that plants tends to maintain their productivity ranking over 
time, probably because of specific managerial skills or permanent plant-level productivity shocks. 
Finally, different plants may face different externalities: these are however very difficult to isolate 
empirically.
Tybout (1996) then reviews the correlates of productivity growth components. A feature of 
Developing Countries' manufacturing sectors is the wide dispersion of plant productivity 
distribution, which is in general not due to differences in factor stocks. It could be the case that
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some of the dispersion reflects measurement errors of factor stocks such as labour. However, 
Tybout, de Melo and Corbo (1991) find that even controlling for heterogeneity of labour, a large 
part of the productivity dispersion remains. Other studies indicate that export-orientated firms or 
plants affiliated to a foreign company such as a multinational corporation are more productive than 
others.
Productivity dispersion suggests that there are large potential productivity gains to achieve through 
entry, exit and market share reallocation, especially in industries protected from international 
competition, or in industries where plants are heterogeneous in terms of market orientation (export 
versus domestic market). However, productivity gains can be impeded because of market 
imperfections such as barriers to entry and exit, factor markets frictions such as stickiness of the 
labour market, uncertainty, imperfection of the financial market, etc.
Productivity dispersion can also be viewed as a great potential for low productivity plants to "catch­
up", that is the within plant productivity improvement hypothesis.
Does this mean that export- and Foreign Direct Investment promoting policies necessarily imply 
productivity gains? The answer is yes if the causality is straightforward and runs from policy to 
productivity. However, it is often the case that highly productive firms tend to decide to export, or 
that highly productive plants are chosen to be part of an Multinational Company (MNC) or become 
an MNC themselves. As a result "there is no guarantee that policies to encourage exports or foreign 
direct investment would reduce the market share of low-productivity firms or move them toward 
the efficient frontier" (Tybout 1996, p.59).
As mentioned earlier, industrial turnover also correlates with economic shocks: macroeconomic 
shocks tend to be countercyclical (aggregate productivity improves in downturns), and industry- 
specific characteristics tend to explain average rates of turnover.
Market share reallocation is another way to improve aggregate productivity, especially when 
competition increases through different channels such as openness to international trade or 
deregulation for a specific industry: market shares are reallocated from low to high productivity 
plants. Another effect of trade liberalisation and domestic deregulation can be that market shares 
are reallocated from very large to small plants, thereby reducing plant-level economies of scale in 
the industry, but not necessarily aggregate productivity.
There are not many candidates to explain intra-plant productivity growth. Tybout (1996) argues 
that, "internal scale effects are probably not a dominant source of efficiency gain because big 
plants, which dominate the behavior of sector aggregates, are typically scale-efficient" (p. 61), and 
explicitly dismisses the fact that trade liberalisation improves scale efficiency. Trade liberalisation 
and foreign ownership may have a small positive impact but it is not a general observation.
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The reviewed theoretical literature show that industrial heterogeneity in terms of technology and 
productivity can occur even in competitive markets for final goods. They show that policy influences 
industrial composition, industrial change, and productivity through several channels. The first 
channel is policy affecting the markets for final goods, such as industrial or trade policy. The second 
channel is the broad institutional framework in which entrepreneurs are meant to take investment 
decisions and predict return on investment. This institutional framework encompasses financial and 
regulatory framework, as well as informal institutional environment.
Several types of empirical methodologies have been developed in order to take heterogeneity 
issues into account while assessing productivity and productivity changes.
3.2.2 Methodology
3.2.2.1 Taking heterogeneity into account
The usual representative plant approach to measuring aggregate TFP growth has been dealt with 
extensively in chapter 2.
As Tybout (1996) underlines: "clearly this productivity measure has nothing to say about the role of 
heterogeneity in productivity growth; indeed, the assumptions that lie behind it are inappropriate if 
technology varies across plants" (p.48).
In the preceding chapter, I have presented a first attempt to take plant-level heterogeneity into 
account by using different elasticities for each 2-digit sector, and by estimating productivity growth 
at the establishment level before aggregation using Divisia Index numbers. I have also shown that 
simple and weighted average TFP growth rates differ greatly, underlining the importance of 
heterogeneity, and calling for a more detailed study of industrial demography for the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector.
Tybout (1996) points at several caveats in the representative plants approach. Notably, "some 
unrealistic assumptions, including frictionless adjustment in factor stocks, competitive product and 
factor markets, and identical constant returns technologies at all plants" (p.48). Another important 
limitation is that the usual approach cannot disentangle aggregate productivity growth resulting 
from economy-wide productivity gains (common to all plants) and aggregate productivity growth 
resulting from plant-specific productivity gains, market share reallocations, entry, and exit. The 
microeconomic assessment of productivity growth distinguishes between within firm productivity 
improvement, market share reallocation among firms with different productivity levels, and changes 
in the population of firms.
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As pointed out in the previous chapter, assessing productivity changes at the plant level is less 
sensitive to the aggregation bias, and each plant is allowed to have its own technology and factor 
mix, thereby offering a more real and detailed picture of the manufacturing sector as a whole.
The first approach simply consists in estimating TFP and TFP growth at the plant level. "The other 
begins by using the micro data to estimate a production function, Y* = f(v ,t). Depending on the
application, Y * may represent either the average or the maximum amount of output attained at 
the input vector in period t, and the production function may be estimated either econometrically 
or as a nonparametric envelope of data points. Given /( .) , the efficiency of the ith plant in year t
is then imputed as Eit = Yit/f { v intQ) r where Yit is the realised output of the implant, vit is its 
input vector, and the denominator is a benchmark productivity level in period t0" (Tybout, 1996, 
p.49).
Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) calculate TFP levels at the plant level using:
In TFPit = In Qit -  a K In Kit -  a L In Lit -  a M In M it (1)
They then obtain an aggregate TFP level for time t using:
\nTFP, = '£ d ll\nTFPl, (2)
I
where 0it is the share of the ith plant in industry output in current currency.
The growth of industry TFP over the period t - r  to t\s then:
A In TFPt = In TFPt -  In TFPt_t (3)
The aggregation of plant level TFP with market shares is not optimal, and it would be preferable to 
use Divisia Index numbers, as shown in the previous chapter. However, the formulation of the 
Divisia Index Number would not allow to disentangle easily aggregate TFP growth stemming from 
within plants productivity improvements, market share reallocation, entry and exit.
Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) also use an alternative approach, where they calculate relative 
TFP, which is calculated by relating the deviation of plant output from the industry mean to the 
deviations of the factor inputs from the industry means:
InTFPi =ln<2, - \ n Q - a K(\nKit -  \n K ) - a L(\nLit -  \n L ) - a M(\nM it - I n M )  (4)
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where bars indicate industry geometric average values of output and factor inputs.26 The relative 
TFP index is adjusted to have mean zero for each industry.
Elasticities of output with respect to inputs are calculated at the plant level using costs shares, not 
adding to one and therefore avoiding the assumption of constant returns to scale.27 For the 
calculation of TFP growth at industry level, they use industry average factor income shares, 
averaged again over the beginning and ending year of the period of growth. When the focus is on 
the relative productivities of plants within an industry within a single year, they use -  for a given 
plant -  the average of the plant's factor cost shares and the industry shares. "This method is better 
for giving the relative productivity of a given plant in a single year" (Baily, Hulten, and Campbell, 
1992, p. 192).
They underline an important property of the relative productivity ranking: "they do not depend 
upon the output deflator. For a given year a dollar is a dollar, and output is measured in the same 
units in all plants. And this virtue even extends to some intertemporal comparisons. For example, 
we can see how plants move in the rankings from one period to the next without introducing errors 
from the output deflator. The deflators are, of course, important to any calculation of productivity 
growth over time, for individual plants or for the industry"(Baily, Hulten, and Campbell, 1992, 
p. 192). This discussion also applies to factor inputs deflators (intermediate inputs, labour and 
capital).
Calculating TFP and TFP growth at the establishment level allows to rank them from the most to 
the least productive within different categories: at the aggregate manufacturing level, or at a more 
disaggregate industry level. Doing so for each year of observation allows tracking down plants 
staying in the population, plants switching industrial sector, as well as entering and exiting plants.
The methodology also allows disentangling aggregate productivity growth stemming either from 
entrants, exits, or incumbents. It also takes into account changes in output shares. For incumbents, 
the decomposition allows allocating aggregate productivity growth to plants moving up or down the 
productivity ladder. This is done using the following specification, where i is the subscript for 
plants, S designates the group of incumbents, N  the group of entrants, X  the group of exiters, t 
the end year, and t — T the start year:
Ain TFP = In TFP, -0„_r lnTFP„_r)+ lnTFP, In TFP,.,
ieS \ ie N  ieX
(5)
26 The arithmetic mean of log(X) corresponds to the geometric average of X.
27 Capital share is based on the rental cost of capital, labour share is based on wages, and intermediate input share is based 
on inventory rental rates.
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"The productivity growth among the stayers can be broken down in two ways. First, their 
contribution can come from improvements in each plant separately (holding output shares 
constant) and from changes in the output shares:
1 (0 ,, 1"T F P , - e ^ ln T F P ^ h e ^ M n T F P ,  + £ (« „  - 0,,_r)lnTFPu"
ieS \ ie S  ieS
(Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p. 193). I note this the BHC decomposition.
(6)
They use a second methodology in order to decompose TFP growth into several factors for the 
stayers. In order to do so, they use the yearly ranking of plants according to their TFP level, and 
cut the population into quintiles. They then identify groups of plants going up or down by two 
quintiles or more (UP2 and DWN2 respectively), as well as groups of plants staying either in the 
two top quintiles (TOP), medium (RST) or the bottom two quintiles (BTM). The obtained 
decomposition "assess[es] the importance to industry growth of the leading plants, the rising and 
falling plants, and the plants that stay in the middle" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p. 194). 
The decomposition writes:
Ain TFP, = \nTFPu In TFPu_t )
ieUP2
+ 2 (0„ InT F P ,-e it_, InTFPu_r)
ieTOP2
+ 'Z V J n T F P '.-e ^ ln T F P ^ ,)  (7)
<e DWN 2
+ ]>>,., ]nTFPil-e„_t \nTFP„_r)
i'e BTM
+ Y i (0,AnTFPi,-0 ,,_TlnTFPi,_r)
ieRST
Haitiwanger (1997) argues that the BHC decomposition may be problematic. Indeed, even if 
entrants are very productive and exiters very unproductive, if exiters totalise a large market share 
relatively to entrants, then the net entry could still have a negative effect on aggregate productivity 
growth. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) propose to decompose aggregate productivity 
growth relatively to the mean (FHK decomposition):
ATFP = + £ >  -TFPl,_k)+ Y iAei,Atfp„
isS i6 5 /g \
+ 2> „((/P „ - T F P ^ - ^ J f f p , , ^  -TFPu_k)
ieN ieX
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where S is the group of incumbents, N  the group of entrants, X  the group of exiters, t -  k the 
beginning of the period, t the end of the period, 0 the market shares in terms of output or 
employment, tfp total factor productivity of plants, and TFP average tfp, / subscript for plants.
The first term represents incumbents intra-plant productivity growth, the second term stands for 
the contribution of market share reallocation (it is positive when market share increases for 
incumbents with above average productivity level at the beginning of the period). The third element 
is a covariance term. The contribution is positive when market shares are reallocated from plants 
with declining productivity to plants with increasing productivity. The last two terms stand for the 
contribution of net entry, which is positive when entrants display productivity higher than the 
average irrespective of market share.
As Disney, Haskel and Heden (2000) point out "this method [FHK] is vulnerable to measurement 
error. Suppose that employment is measured with error and that the 0S are employment weights.
Measurement error would give a spuriously high correlation between A0 and Atfp understating
the covariance effect. In addition it would give a spuriously high correlation between 0it_k and
Atfp , giving a spuriously low within-plant effect." (p. 13)
One solution is to use a decomposition proposed by Griliches and Regev (1992) (GR 
decomposition):
where bars stand for time average over base and end year. "The first term measures the within 
contribution of survivors' productivity growth weighted by time-average market shares. The other 
terms are all relative to time-average productivity. The advantage of this procedure is that 
averaging removes some of the measurement error. The disadvantage is that interpretation is more 
obscure. The within effect will reflect, to a certain extent, external restructuring effects since they 
affect 0 " (Disney, Haskel and Heden, 2000, p. 13).
Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997), in their industrial demographic study of Taiwanese manufacturing, 
use a multilateral TFP index at the firm level. They use a specification developed by Caves, 
Christensen and Diewert (1982) and refined by Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1996). This multilateral 
TFP index "relies on a single reference point that is constructed as a hypothetical firm with input 
revenue shares that equal the arithmetic mean revenue shares over all observations and input
A TFP, -TFP ,)
(9)
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levels that equal the geometric mean of the inputs (which is equivalent to the arithmetic mean of 
the log of the inputs) over all observations. Each firm's output, inputs, and/or productivity in each 
year is measured relative to this hypothetical firm and the multilateral index provides transitive 
comparisons between any subset of the observations. Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1996) discuss an 
extension of the multilateral index that uses a separate hypothetical-firm reference point for each 
cross-section of observations and then chain-links the reference points together over time in much 
the same way as the conventional Tornqvist index of productivity growth. This productivity index is 
particularly useful in our application because it provides a consistent way of summarizing the cross- 
sectional distribution of firm productivity, using only information specific to that time period, and 
how the distribution moves over time", (Aw, Chen, and Roberts, 1997, p. 11).
The specification dealing with a single type of output writes:
In T F P , = (in Y „ -  In Y ,)+  £  (in Y, -  I f f ^ . , )
S = 1
Z  I + S„ Xln x *  -  In X „  )+  Z  Z  + 5 ,. ,  X>" ^  "  1" *  * - . )
. 1=1 ^ f=2 (=1 ^
(10)
with /  the subscript for a firm, t the subscript for time, s the subscript for the base period, i the
subscript for input type, n the number of inputs, Y represents output, X  the inputs, and S the 
cost shares of inputs, and bars indicate the average.
Good, Nadiri and Sickles (1996), show that this is the right index to use when working with panel 
data because it allows both for a comparison between firms and between time periods.
"For a panel data set, both the chaining approach of the Divisia and the hypothetical firm approach 
of Caves, Christensen and Diewert have appealing features. Chaining allows the information in the 
cost minimizing shares to be as close as possible to that appropriate for current technology. This is 
especially important when the cost minimizing shares of subcomponents are changing quickly, or 
when the time series is long. The hypothetical firm approach provides an unambiguous basis for 
comparison of observations which have no natural ordering" (Good, Nadiri and Sickles, 1996, p. 11).
They add that: "this chained multilateral total factor productivity index also provides a
decomposition of TFP change into two components that exploit between and within variations 
available in panel data for firms. When describing the change in TFP between firm /  at time rand 
t', the first set of terms:
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(11)
describes the change in TFP relative to that of the hypothetical or representative firm (catching up
or falling behind or productive efficiency) while the remainder
- E f J - i l S f o  +SIJ-J\nXb-mXijA) (12)
4=1 4=1 ^  1=1
describes the change in productivity for the typical firm (technological innovation or technological 
change)" (Good, Nadiri and Sickles, 1996, p. 12-13).
While these chained indices are appealing for the purpose of comparing different plants, they do 
not offer the possibility of accounting for market share reallocation, entry and exit in aggregate TFP 
growth.
The most appropriate solution for the study of Indonesian manufacturing productivity, taking into 
account plant heterogeneity and studying demographic features such as entry and exit is to
calculate TFP at the plant level using the BHC methodology, and then compare aggregate TFP
growth decompositions using BHC, FHK and GR specifications.
3.2.2.2 Estimating elasticities using plant-level panel data
The previous studies calculate the elasticity of output with respect to inputs (intermediate inputs, 
labour and capital) as costs shares. This approach is attractive, because it avoids the econometric 
estimation of elasticities, and allows each plant to have its own elasticities.
However, as seen in chapter 2, for the case of Indonesian manufacturing, it may be preferable to 
estimate elasticities using an econometric approach. This is motivated by the observation of errors 
in the data, especially the under-reporting of wages and/or under-reporting of the number of 
workers.
I have already underlined and discussed the importance of dealing with the "right" elasticities in the 
estimation of Total Factor Productivity. I have attempted a first estimation of those elasticities at 
the aggregate level (time-invariant technology identical for all establishments), as well as at the 2- 
digit industry level (time-invariant technology identical for all establishments within the same 2-digit 
industry).
When tackling the issue of heterogeneity and productivity at the plant-level, it is preferable to 
estimate elasticities at a more disaggregate level (i.e. up to the 5-digit whenever possible) using
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panel data estimation. This allows accounting for more heterogeneity of production functions and 
technologies.
Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) offer a review of the main literature regarding the estimation of 
elasticities using panel data, propose a new alternative estimation procedure to obtain consistent 
elasticities while "conditioning out serially correlated unobserved shocks to the production 
technology" (abstract), and apply the methodology to Chilean manufacturing panel data.
They recall the strong potential correlation that can occur between input levels and the unobserved 
firm-specific shocks, leading to simultaneity problems in the estimation of the production function 
parameters. "Firms that have a large productivity shock may respond by using more inputs. To the 
extent that this is true, Ordinary Least Squares estimates of production functions will yield biased 
parameter estimates, and, by implication, biased estimates of productivity. The fixed effects 
solution has the unappealing feature of requiring a component of the productivity shock to be fixed 
over time. Instrumental variables is another alternative, but valid instruments need to be correlated 
with firm-level input choices and orthogonal to the productivity shock. In many cases, there simply 
are no valid instruments" (p. 2).
They take Olley and Pakes (1992) alternative estimation methodology as a starting point for 
developing their own estimation process. Olley and Pakes (1992) use investment to control for the 
correlation between input levels and the unobserved firm-specific productivity. Instead, Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2000), use a similar methodology but with intermediate inputs to control for the same 
phenomenon.
They argue that there are three potential advantages for using intermediate inputs over 
investment. When using panel data to estimate productivity, the productivity term can be 
decomposed into a forecastable part (productivity at period t can be predicted by productivity at 
period t -1 ), and an unforecastable part (the "news"). "The first advantage is that intermediate 
inputs will generally respond to the entire productivity term, while investment may respond only to 
the "news" in the unobserved term" (p. 2). Indeed, capital stock may already have adjusted to the 
forecastable part of the productivity term, and the investment proxy only captures the "news". 
"Also, productivity may be characterized by two components, a serially correlated component to 
which investment responds, and a separate firm-time shock that is independent over time, to which 
investment will not respond, but to which the choice of variable factors (intermediate inputs and 
labour) will respond" (p.2). The second advantage is that intermediate inputs are not a state 
variable and therefore make sense from an economic point of view: some intermediate inputs such 
as electricity are not stocked and may respond entirely to productivity changes rather than 
reflecting the state of a plant. The third advantage is data-driven. They argue that in most
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datasets, a relatively large number of plants report zero investment In most cases, zero investment 
just corresponds to a strong adjustment to a productivity shock. Using then investment as a proxy 
will lead to a truncation of the dataset (exclusion of plants reporting zero investment for estimation 
purposes), and therefore to a sample bias. On the other hand, almost all plants report intermediate 
inputs such as electricity or raw materials.
Fernandes (2002) uses this methodology applied to Colombian manufacturing panel data and 
summarises the main idea. "Implicit in the estimation procedure is a structural dynamic model of 
plant production decision with cross-plant heterogeneity, plant specific uncertainty and the 
maximisation of the expected discounted values of future net profits" (p. 6).
Each plant observes its productivity 6)jt and chooses the level of variable inputs l/t , m/t and ejt ,
labour, raw materials and energy, while capital stock is assumed to be a quasi-fixed input k/t . The
production function is then y{t = /  {l/,; mjt ; ejt ; k/t ; 0)jt ; eft ), where yjt represents gross output,
e(t the "news" (unobserved shock), superscript j  indexes the industry, subscripts / indexes the 
plant, and t  indexes time. Productivity is assumed to follow a first-order Markov process, i.e. the 
expected value of a)jt conditional on knowing co}it_x is the same as the expected value given cojt_x,
G)!t_2, etc, and productivity is decomposed into two elements: 0)jt = e [o):\
production function is a standard Cobb-Douglas in a logarithmic form. "The estimating equation for 
plant /in industry /a t period t is given by:
yi = A + PA,+P A +A X  + PAL +A, + 4 " (p. n  (13)
The observed productivity cojt is known by the managers and is potentially correlated to labour,
energy and raw material inputs, and creating a simultaneity problem in the estimation of the 
parameters of the production function. Fernandes (2002), drawing on Basu (1996), argues that, 
"the use of raw materials to correct the simultaneity between inputs and unobserved productivity 
parallels its use to correct for unobserved variation in labor and capital utilization. So our 
productivity estimates may reflect in part changes in capital or labor utilization" (p. 7).
Under the profit maximising assumption, the demand for raw materials can be written as 
mit = mt ’ kit) : tte  demand for raw materials is an increasing function of observed productivity 
conditional on quasi-fixed capital input. This demand function can be inverted and productivity 
becomes a function of raw materials and capital: coit = cot (mit, kit).
Omitting the /'superscript, equation (1) becomes:
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y,, = PA,+P,e„ + <t>, (mi,;k«)+£i, with t  K  ;*„)=Po+Pmm„ +A*„
(14)
"Since eu has zero unconditional mean, £ [ £ , . , is also zero. The difference between (2) 
and its expectation, conditional on raw materials and capital is given by:
y„-Ehulmu\K] = PAh - E[lJ m,,<k„])+ PAe„ - £k M , ;<:„])+£,, (15)
Equation (3) is estimated by OLS (with no constant term) -once the conditional expectations are 
obtained by locally weighted least squares (LWLS) regressions of output, employment and energy 
on m and k -  to obtain consistent parameter estimates for labor and energy, the variable inputs 
that do not correct the simultaneity bias" (p.8).
Using LWLS, the authors then regress (y(, -  ptlit -  peeit) on (mit; kit), corresponding to the 
estimation of is generally estimated over different periods in order to account for
variations of unobservable ratios of input to output prices. This allows obtaining <f>t (.).
Then, choosing a good candidate value for (fim\Pk) , say )- such as parameters
estimated via OLS on the log-linear production function -  they compute A and B such as:
A = Q}„+  £„ = y„ -  PA -  Pa , ~ P * „m„ - P * t h  (16)
B = <P,(m„-i'’ ki , - i ) -P*„  m„-i ~P * t  (17)
Using LWLS, A is regressed on B. The constant of this regression as it is evaluated at each 
observation is called variable C and is E(coit / coit_x), the expected value of coit conditional to coit_x.
Using:
y, -  PA, -  P,ei, - P * m -P *k  A  -  E(o)a ) = £, + £„ (18)
they now compute £u +€it . In order to estimate J3m and /3k, they then use a grid search to 
minimise the following moment criterion function:
\ 2  /  T  \ 2
min^ X X + £u K + X X  + £u k-i
V ' ,=7lo J \  1 f=7io
(19)
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However appealing, this complex and time-consuming method of estimating elasticities may not be 
necessary for Indonesian manufacturing data.28 Indeed, a feature of the factor shares as calculated 
with the data is that they remain quasi constant over time, so that it is reasonable to keep the 
plant-level TFP measures calculated in the previous chapter.
Let us now turn to the review of empirical findings of industrial demographic studies, focusing on 
Developing Countries, but also giving two examples of developed countries as a benchmark for 
comparison.
3.3 Industrial demography: Empirical evidence
Studies on Developing countries relating to the link between industrial demography and productivity 
growth are scarce. The attention has mostly been on OECD countries. This review of the empirical 
literature picks only a few of the studies on the USA and Canada, while concentrating on the 
literature dealing with developing countries. So far, only a few of studies covering the following 
countries have been carried out: Chile, Columbia, Israel, Morocco, Taiwan, and Korea.
Using data on American manufacturing plants, Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) propose four 
patterns of plant dynamics.
"First, it [distribution of productivity among plants] may be the result of a random draw in the level 
of productivity in each period or of error of measurement7' (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, 
p. 194). If this is the case, productivity levels only reflect random shocks or error on measurement 
and they change at every period randomly and rankings are not consistent over time.
"Second, it may be the result of a random draw in the growth of productivity rather than in the 
level" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p. 194), and the variance of the productivity distribution 
will display an increasing variance over time. Under the assumption that there exists a minimum 
relative productivity level, plants falling below this level will exit and will play a large role in 
aggregate productivity changes.
"Third, it may be the result of plants of different vintages" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, 
p. 194). The assumption is that plants entering at different points in time have different 
technologies and therefore different productivity levels. If new technologies improve productivity, 
then older firms will become less productive relatively to young ones over time and will eventually 
exit. This is an appealing theory, however, it is difficult to deal with because older plants have the 
possibility of renewing their technology by updating the capital stock. It becomes then necessary to 
test whether or not new capital stock expenses have an Impact on productivity.
28 In their study of Chilean manufacturing at the 3-digit level, Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) have to estimate 2000 production 
functions in order to attain the final results.
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"Fourth, it may simply reflect permanent plant heterogeneity" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, 
p. 194), i.e. not due to plant vintage. In that case, a given plant's productivity can increase or 
decrease, but productivity in the current period will be a fairly good predictor of plant productivity 
in the next period. This is modelled as a plant fixed-effect using panel data estimation. They note 
that "the case in which plant productivity effects persist, turns out to be an important feature in the 
results" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p. 199), and they offer two types of explanation for the 
existence of plant-specific fixed effects.
The first explanation is linked to returns to scale and utilisation effects. As underlined previously, 
they allow for increasing returns to scale and empirical evidence shows that scale varies very slowly 
over time. The implication is that plants of different size have different productivity levels, with 
persistence in the productivity distribution. "If scale is an important determinant of productivity, this 
will give rise to persistence in the productivity distribution. If big plants are high in the distribution, 
then their size will help them stay at the top" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p. 199). Utilisation 
effects may vary a lot in periods of recession. If all plants are affected in the same way, then the 
productivity distribution will not change much. But if different plants are affected in different ways, 
then productivity distribution will change as a result of the macroeconomic shock. They concede 
that the phenomenon is very difficult to model, and limit their empirical observation to the 
productivity distribution for a given year of economic recession.
The second type of plant-specific fixed effects is concerned with managerial ability: plants with 
good managers are more productive than plants with bad managers. The literature suggests that 
different managers have different managerial skills and are each able to manage plants of different 
size: the greater the skills, the larger the plant he/she can manage efficiently. There are however 
decreasing returns to scale, implying the larger the firm, the less efficient the manager: "the 
diminishing returns measure the effects of the loss of productivity resulting from a given manager 
being spread too thin" (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p.201). Therefore plant size could have a 
negative impact on productivity. But managerial skills are dynamic, this idea relates to Jovanovic's 
(1982) model where plants (i.e. their managers) learn about their abilities over time, deciding then 
to stay, expand, or exit. Another pattern of managerial behaviour is the case where managers are 
slacking off with time, resulting in plant productivity decline, eventually moving back up the 
productivity ladder once It has hit the bottom.
Finally, differences in plant productivity can stem from difference in the quality of the workforce. 
This can be tested for using detailed data on wages and on workers skills.
They find that "entry and exit play only a very small role in industry over five-year periods and that 
the increasing output shares in high-productivity plants are very important to the growth of
84
manufacturing productivity7' (Baily, Hulten and Campbell, 1992, p. 189). As mentioned before, they 
also find evidence of persistence of the productivity distribution.
Olley and Pakes (1992) conduct a study using data similar to Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), 
and find that aggregate productivity growth occurred thanks to "a reallocation of capital from less 
to more productive plants. Note that since this reallocation process seems to be greatly facilitated 
by entry and exit, an important part of it would not be picked up from the analysis of balanced 
panels" (Olley and Pakes, 1992, p. 37). Tybout (1996) underlines that, while this confirms that a 
large part of aggregate productivity growth occurs thanks to output shares reallocation, Olley and 
Pakes results show that entry and exit matter.
Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) study the effect of entry and exit on aggregate productivity growth in 
Canadian manufacturing. They recall that in the industrial evolution theory, entry end exit is the 
mechanism that allows eliminating excess profit and helps the market to remain competitive, and 
add that, " this argument has been given theoretical elegance by contestability theory" (Baldwin 
and Gorecki, 1991, p.301). Entry and exit is also a process bringing about technological and 
organisational change. They first focus on the size of entry and exit: do entry and exit matter in 
terms of output and employment? Secondly, they distinguish two types of entry: greenfield entry 
and entry via a merger. Thirdly, they study the behaviour of continuing plants in manufacturing and 
their relationship to entry and exit. Finally, they assess the dynamic effect of entry, exit and growth 
path of continuing plants. They find that turnover of plants accounts for 30% of productivity 
improvement (using value added per worker). They find that greenfield entry has a very small 
impact on employment, but when merger entry is taken into account, the impact becomes 
significant (about 3% of employment), i.e. reorganisation of large firms play an relatively important 
role in industrial evolution. The study shows that entrants are numerous but small, that the infant- 
mortality rate is high, and that entrants' growth rate is slow. In other words, entry and exit do not 
have a great impact on output and employment in the short run, but the impact is felt on the 
medium- to long-term (about 10 years), when non viable entrants have exited (about 50% of a 
cohort of entrants) and when the remaining entrants have grown. They also find that exit occurs in 
all groups of the plant-size distribution. Entrants also grow faster than incumbents. Tybout (1996) 
underlines that in this study "among continuing plants those gaining market share over the decade 
were more productive than those losing market share. Also, on the basis of medians used to 
summarize the performance of subgroups, exiting plants were less productive than continuing 
plants, and entering plants were more productive than continuing plants" (p.51).
Griliches and Regev (1992), provide an industrial demographic study of Israeli manufacturing, 
assessing the role of entry and exit on productivity gains as measured by output per person-year. 
Unlike the other case studies, they find that plants turnover has little effect and that most
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productivity gains occur within plants. An interesting feature of the report is the identification of a 
"shadow of death" effect: plants that are going to exit in the near future are less productive than 
others.
Tybout (1992) applies the common methodological framework of industrial evolution and 
productivity change on Chile, Colombia and Morocco, and finds that entry and exit have an 
important impact on aggregate productivity growth for both Chile and Morocco. "During Chile's 
severe recession in the early 1980's, net exit increased the market share of incumbents, net exit 
was the main component of productivity change. Net entry did the opposite in Morocco, where 
macroeconomic expansion was associated with rapid net entry, falling market share for incumbents, 
and lower aggregate productivity" (Tybout, 1996, p. 52). Most of the turnover concerns small and 
young plants, which are on average less productive. He also notices the "shadow of death" effect. 
Tybout finds that the productivity gap between continuing plants, and entering and exiting plants is 
larger than the productivity gap between entering and exiting plants.
Liu (1993) uses the same panel data on Chilean manufacturing and find that exiting plants are less 
productive than incumbents, and also display the "shadow of death" effect. Another feature of 
Chilean manufacturing is that young plant cohorts become more productive as they mature, 
reflecting the effect of unproductive plants exiting and continuing plants gaining in productivity.
Liu and Tybout (1996) complete the previous analysis by decomposing aggregate productivity 
growth into intra-plant productivity growth and heterogeneity effects on productivity growth for 
Chile and Colombia. "They depart from Liu (1993) in several respects, however. First, they use 
weighted averages of plant-level productivity trajectories to construct the productivity growth 
components...and to examine cohort-specific productivity growth" (Tybout, 1996, p. 53). For 
Colombia, they find that most of the aggregate productivity growth stems from intra-plant 
productivity improvement rather than from entry, exit and market share reallocation, although 
these seem to have a relatively important impact on the short run. This contrasts with the American 
case where most of the aggregate productivity gains stemmed from reallocation of output shares. 
"Put differently, entry, exit, and market share reallocations appear to be driven by much more than 
cross-plant differences in productivity" for Colombia (Tybout, 1996, p. 54). "Nonetheless, the 
cumulative impact of turnover on productivity is probably substantial. The 'shadow of death' effect 
implies that exiting plants are in a downward spiral, and they might well get worse if they were to 
hang around. Further, as new plants mature, their weighted average productivity rises rapidly: one- 
year-old and two-year-old plants are nearly as unproductive as exiting plants, but plants that 
survive to be four-year-olds match or exceed industry norms. Both phenomena are consistent with 
the industrial evolution models surveyed earlier. I f  this shakedown process were thwarted by 
institutional barriers to entry, severance pay laws, or attempts to prop up sick firms, the eventual
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effects on industry-wide productivity would probably be much larger than the productivity 
differential between exiting plants in their last year and entering plants in their first year" (Tybout, 
1996, p.54, emphasis added). Tybout invokes here the possibility of uncompetitive markets and 
institutional (formal or not) barriers to industrial evolution, but so far, no study deals directly with 
the impact of the institutional environment on industrial evolution.
More recently, Levinsohn and Petrin (1999) use data on Chilean manufacturing and explore two 
hypotheses to account for aggregate productivity changes. The first hypothesis is labelled the "real 
productivity case", where aggregate productivity improvements stem mainly from within firms 
productivity changes. The second hypothesis is called the "rationalisation case", where within plant 
productivity remains unchanged and aggregate productivity improvements stem from the expansion 
of highly productive firms and the exit of less productive firms. They find that the rationalisation 
case explains much of productivity improvements. However, when an entire industry experiences 
productivity drop, the real productivity case prevails.
Pavcnik (2002), uses Ericson and Pakes's (1995) Markov-perfect equilibrium model for industry 
dynamics in order to assess the impact of trade liberalisation on productivity for Chilean 
manufacturing. She "explicitely incorporates plant exit in the estimation to correct for the selection 
problem induced by liquidated plants" (p. 245). She finds that within plant productivity growth is 
due to trade liberalisation for the plants exposed to foreign competition. She also finds that "in 
many cases, aggregate productivity improvements stem from the reshuffling of resources and 
output from less to more efficient producers" (p. 245). Indeed, she underlines that the international 
trade literature most of the times uses the representative plant approach and only considers the 
impact of trade liberalisation on sectoral productivity improvements. There is however a need to 
consider the effects of plant heterogeneity in the process. Within an industry, plants with different 
productivity may coexist because of a lack of competition. Trade liberalisation increases competition 
and forces less productive plants to exit, thereby reshuffling resources from low to high productivity 
plants. This occurs when exit costs are not too high. She also points at the costs of such a 
reshuffling of resources such as labour and capital. The study is important from a policy-making 
point of view in that it assesses the costs of this reshuffling, as well as the benefits. She finds that 
plants of industries exposed to foreign competition displayed productivity growth 3 to 10% higher 
than protected industries. She also finds that exiting plants were on average 8% less productive 
than incumbents.
Fernandes (2002) uses Levinsohn and Petrin (2000) dynamic industrial framework to study the 
impact of trade liberalisation on productivity using plant-level panel data on Colombian 
manufacturing for the period 1977-1991. The framework control for simultaneity between 
productivity and input demand, and estimates time-varying plant-specific productivity measures.
87
She finds a strong negative relationship of nominal tariffs on plant productivity. Furthermore, "plant 
exit plays a minor role in generating productivity gains in face of lower trade protection" (abstract). 
Tariffs have a stronger negative impact on productivity for larger plants, and for plants engaged in 
less competitive industries. Trade protection is also found to have a negative impact on plant 
productivity growth. Her methodology differs from Pavcnik in that trade policy changes differ across 
industries and over time.
Aw, Chen, and Roberts (1997) provide one of the two only direct industrial demographic study for 
Asia that 1 am aware of, with their paper dealing with Taiwanese manufacturing. Their choice is 
motivated by the peculiarity of Taiwanese manufacturing, dominated by small subcontracting firms 
in less capital-intensive industries. The authors draw on the previously reviewed theory of industrial 
evolution, arguing that low barriers to entry and exit favour industrial turnover, where the most 
efficient firms survive, while the others exit, thereby transferring resources from the least to the 
most productive firms and improving aggregate productivity. They use Hoppenhayn's model (1992). 
They find that industrial turnover account for up to 50% of aggregate productivity improvement in 
Taiwanese manufacturing, which is exceptionally high compared to other case studies. Other 
results are in line with studies on other countries: entering firms are on average less productive 
than incumbents, but are a heterogeneous group, where the most productive firms survive and 
converge toward incumbent firms in terms of productivity, and the least productive exit. They also 
find that exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting firms. "These patterns are 
consistent with the view that both the domestic and export market sort out high productivity from 
low productivity firms and that the export market is a tougher screen" (Aw, Chen, and Roberts, 
1997, abstract).
Hahn (2000) uses plant level panel data on Korean manufacturing for the period 1990-98, and aims 
at estimating the contribution of entry and exit to aggregate productivity growth. He finds that 
Korean manufacturing display high rates of entry and exit for international standard, and that entry 
and exit reflects plants productivity differentials. In this study, the contribution of net entry (or exit) 
to aggregate productivity growth is 45% during expansionary periods and 65% in periods of 
contraction of the economy. Hahn concludes that "the most obvious lesson from this study is that it 
is important to establish a policy or institutional environment where efficient businesses can 
succeed and inefficient businesses fail." In other words, if entry and exit contributes to over half of 
aggregate productivity gains, then competition policy and enforcement of bankruptcy laws 
potentially play a central role in triggering productivity gains.
It has been observed that in Developing Countries, plants' entry and exit play a large role in 
aggregate productivity improvements. It seems to be particularly the case for the two Asian 
countries studied so far: in both the case of Taiwan and Korea, plants' turnover account for over
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half of aggregate productivity gains. Another common feature is that entering plants are a 
heterogeneous group, but are on average less productive than incumbents. A large part of an entry 
cohort does not survive very long, but the survivors experience high productivity gains. At the other 
end of the spectrum, exiting plants are less productive than incumbents, and most studies observe 
the so-called "shadow of death" effect: plants about to exit are a lot less productive than 
incumbents. Studies linking industry turnover and productivity to international trade issues find that 
trade liberalisation tends to exacerbate the importance of entry and exit. Other elements of the 
broader institutional framework -  such as barriers to entry or uncertainty -  also affects industry 
and productivity dynamics.
In spite of these broad common findings, all case studies seem to yield different results and display 
different industrial dynamic patterns. This might however be imputable to the variety of researched 
topics rather than to fundamental differences of industrial behaviour. What however differs greatly 
from country to country are the broad policy and institutional environment, and macroeconomic 
shocks. It is therefore important to put any case study into its historical-economic framework. 
Studying the impact of plant heterogeneity on aggregate productivity is also a pertinent way to 
assess the Impact of the Institutional environment on economic growth.
A number of scholars scratch the issue of uncertainty and institutional framework without explicitly 
accounting for them empirically. In particular, no account is made for market imperfection 
stemming from political protection of firms and corruption-related issues. These could turn out to 
be quite important, be it for Developed or Developing Countries.
3.4 Indonesian manufacturing sector demography: What do we know?
Indonesian manufacturing has received very little attention regarding plant-level analysis in 
general, and plant-level industrial evolution in particular.
Probably the most important and complete overview of the Indonesian manufacturing sector to 
date is found in Hill (1990a and b), updated in Hill (1997). The study "examine[s] the pattern and 
changing structure of industry, focusing on industry composition, regional industrialisation, 
ownership, scale and wages" (Hill, 1990a, abstract).
Hill (1990a) firstly finds that "employment grew rapidly over the period 1975-86, in large and 
medium and small firms (Table 5: the rates were 5.9% and 5% respectively). Moreover, although 
productivity growth was more rapid in large and medium firms, there has been no demise of small 
industry in Indonesia: these firms have been technologically progressive, as indicated by a real 
annual productivity growth of more than 4%" (p.91). He notes that there aren't almost any cases of 
declining labour productivity, apart from the food, beverages and tobacco sector, decline that he
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imputes to the technologically backward and dominant sugar industry. He then interestingly notes 
that "there are no consistent trends in employment and productivity growth among large and small 
firms. Indeed, in many industries the trends diverge enormously - low or even negative growth for 
one, rapid expansion in the other. Case studies would be necessary to identify the disparate factors 
at work in each case, but the data do at least suggest a pronounced heterogeneity in many 
industries, with large and small firms in different 'markets' for technology, output and labour. This 
presumed differentiation may hold the key to the impressive performance of small industry"(pp.91- 
93). This indicates that at the aggregate level, size might not be a powerful explanatory factor for 
plant productivity heterogeneity. However, this does not exclude the possibility for size to be a 
more powerful explanatory factor if specific sectoral effects are controlled for. Besides size and 
sectoral effects, his findings open up a whole range of possibilities explaining plant productivity 
heterogeneity: group membership, patronage, ownership, cronyism, etc.
He also observes a wide dispersion of industries' productivity, with a convergence phenomenon, 
with, for example, the textile industry or the wood products experiencing rapid productivity gains. 
He touches on the causes of productivity growth, noting that "productivity growth is constrained in 
some industries by institutional factors (as in sugar), in others (such as rice milling) the 
technological 'shake-out1 had already occurred by 1975, while in others - notably garments - there 
is no great scope or incentive for dramatic increases in productivity" (p.95). this again underlines 
the importance of a disaggregated study of productivity growth, and stresses the need to assess 
the impact of the broad institutional environment on aggregate and plant level productivity growth.
He finds that industrial concentration is fairly high, with "19% of the industries, generating 28% of 
non-oil manufacturing output, have extremely high concentration (the four largest plants producing 
at least 70% of industry output), while in 56% of industries, accounting for a similar share of 
output, concentration is significant (a ratio of at least 40%)" (p.96). He explains these high 
concentration figures with the need for economies of scale in some industries such as automotive 
or electrical equipment, but also with government ownership and institutional barriers to entry. He 
notes however that concentration figures are on the decline.
Looking at plant characteristics, he finds that most plants are privately rather than state or foreign 
owned, but that privately owned plants belong generally to the small and medium scale sector, 
while state and foreign owned plants tend to be large. Large plants account for up to 68% of total 
manufacturing output, and for half of total employment, excluding oil and gas. Hill (1990b) argues 
that "labour productivity could be expected to be positively correlated with size for a number of 
reasons: large firms operate at a scale which permits the use of more advanced and capital- 
intensive technology, and specialist skilled labour; large production runs may lead to enhanced
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market power and the scope for product differentiation; and to the extent that high value added 
industries are also scale-intensive, large firms have an advantage" (pp.90-91).
He finds that this is indeed the case for some industries such as weaving, clove cigarettes 
manufacturing, pharmaceutics, structural metals and motor cycles. He however also finds that "In 
some [industries], productivity in the very large firms is actually well below that of medium firms; in 
two extraordinary cases - tea processing and printing - the ratio in the smaller firms exceeds that in 
the largest!" (p.92). He explains this result by the potential non-significance of economies of scale 
in those industries, the presence of large inefficient state enterprises (tea processing in particular), 
product differentiation -  with large enterprises specializing in cheap mass market products and 
SMEs taking the high end of the market (in magazine printing and garment manufacturing). He 
however shows "clearly that the higher productivity of large firms often derives from their location 
in high productivity industries, rather than their higher productivity in the same industry" (p.93).
Hill's review of the manufacturing is probably the most complete to date, it covers very well some 
topics regarding industrial structure and evolution, however, it has so far not covered the issue of 
plant turnover and market share reallocation, and does not link aggregate TFP change, plant 
heterogeneity, and industrial dynamics.
Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) get closer to the topic and study survival duration of manufacturing 
establishment in Indonesia for the period 1975-85, using the Raw Statfstfk Industri dataset. The 
authors notice that over 50% of establishments present in 1975 did not survive until 1985. They 
find that establishments with higher survival duration were "older and larger; in more concentrated 
industries; with larger foreign shares; proportionately fewer family workers; a larger share of their 
electricity own-produced; and a higher ratio of gifts and donations to value added" (abstract).
Rather than building on a formal theory of plant survival, they "adopt an empiricist approach in this 
paper, and simply ask how well observed characteristics of establishments at one point in time 
predict the duration of survival into the future" (p. 215). "Because the distribution of the dependent 
variable [i.e. survival length in number of years] is limited to the range zero to 10, with a 
considerable number of observations at both ends, particularly for those who survived at least until 
1985, [they] use a two-limit Tobit estimator" (p. 219). They also offer a brief microeconomic 
description of the manufacturing sector for 1975, looking at the distribution of plants according to 
several factors such as age, size, ownership, labour and input use at the 5-digit level.
Although helpful and interesting, the study uses the Raw Statistik Industri (RSI) dataset rather than 
the Backcast Statistik Industri (BSI) dataset, leading to a potential bias in the sample. As 
demonstrated in chapter 2, the RSI is of limited use when it comes to study dynamic phenomena.
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Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) however underline that they do not study year-to-year survival 
probability, thereby bypassing the pitfalls of the RSI dataset.
Another interesting result of the paper is that plants with higher average labour productivity display 
a longer expected survival duration. They however do not embark on TFP and TFP growth 
estimation.
Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) investigate the impact of foreign ownership on plants' exit probabilities 
for the period 1975-89. They find that foreign plants are less likely to close down than domestic 
plants, but that this is mostly due to the larger size of foreign plants. This corroborates the finding 
that the most important factor influencing closure is the size of plants. Their results also shows that 
relatively higher labour productivity reduces the chances of exit, while a higher share of non­
production workers in total labour force increases these chances. Their results are interesting and 
provide a good framework for the analysis of the factors influencing plant survival. They could 
however be reviewed by using TFP rather than labour productivity, and they could extend to the 
mid-1990s. More importantly, their results show that there is a great need to concentrate on the 
issue of size in Indonesian manufacturing. It appears to be the most important explanatory factor 
in survival probabilities. The effects of size need to be researched into more details.
Another article directly related to industrial evolution has been provided by Okamoto and Sjoholm 
(1999). The study focuses on the automotive sector in Indonesia using data from SI in both 1990 
and 1995. The authors follow Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) methodology: they first estimate 
TFP at the establishment level and use the following specification to account for incumbents, entry 
and exit at the aggregate level:
Ain TFP = £ ( » ,  In TFP, -0„_T \nTFP„_r)+  In TFP, - J X *  ]nTFP«-
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where S represents the group of incumbents, N  the group of entrants, X  the group of exits, t the 
end period, r  the start period, and 6 the plant output share.
They also provide employment and labour productivity measures using the same approach of 
decomposition.
Okamoto and Sjoholm (1999) find that both labour productivity and TFP fall in all automotive sub­
sectors between 1990 and 1995.29 They find that exiters have a very strong negative impact on 
productivity growth because of their declining productivity just before exiting. Entries have a 
positive impact on productivity growth, i.e. entrants show productivity improvements. Incumbents
29 One drawback of this study is that the way TFP is calculated is not specified.
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show no improvement or even deterioration of productivity growth. In the framework of that paper, 
they do not propose a demographic study of the sector.
In two previous studies, Sjoholm (1997 a and b) also uses Indonesian establishments data for 1980 
and 1991. In the first study, he attempts to assess the impact of international trade on productivity 
growth. In this study, the author uses only two dates, thereby dropping all entries and exits 
occurring in between 1980 and 1991. Sjoholm (1997a) finds that exporting plants are more 
productive than non-exporting plants, and that imports of inputs does not seem to matter. Using 
the same data and methodology, Sjoholm (1997b) assesses the effect of Direct Foreign Investment 
(DFI) on productivity. He finds that DR produces spillovers, especially in competitive industries, 
where competition stems mainly from domestic plants rather than imports.
Goeltom (1995) uses establishment-level panel data over the period 1981-88 in order to assess the 
relationship between productivity and financial liberalisation. She uses a value added based 
production function, with a firm-specific fixed effect reflecting the time-invariant efficiency of each 
plant. As argued in chapter 2, her estimation of a capital stock series is questionable. She however 
provides several estimation of TFP using different forms for the production function. She then 
regresses TFP on several factors and finds that, ceteris paribus, larger plants, plants belonging to a 
conglomerate, and exporting plants tend to be more productive than others. She also finds that age 
and ownership do not have a significant impact on TFP.
Goeltom also recalls that: "Hill and Kalirajan (1991) argue that older firms have had more time to 
learn and become more experienced, and are therefore more efficient. On the contrary, Pitt and 
Lee (1981) and Page (1984) have found that younger firms are more efficient, for they possess the 
latest and presumably more efficient technology" (p. 56).
The empirical literature on Indonesian manufacturing relating to productivity gains and using plant- 
level data focuses on different sub-periods: 1975-85, 1975-89, 1981-88, 1980-91, and 1990-95. It 
will be interesting to carry out a complete study for the period 1975-95. Secondly, the literature 
does not deal with a detailed demographic study of the manufacturing sector. However, the works 
point at several interesting results. Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) suggests that plant turnover is 
an important feature of the sector for the period 1975-95, that survival length is positively 
influenced by higher labour productivity, suggesting that competitive market forces are at play. 
These results are corroborated by more recent works in Bernard and Sjoholm (2003). But at the 
same time, Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) find that survival duration is longer in concentrated 
industries, and potentially positively related to corruption and cronyism.
The other authors point at the effects of de-regulation: openness to international trade tend to 
increase productivity, and financial liberalisation has the effect of reallocation capital from low to
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high productivity plants (Goeltom, 1995). In other words, de-regulation has a positive impact on 
aggregate productivity gains.
3.5 Conclusion
While the empirical literature dealing with industrial demography in Developing Countries is scarce, 
the few studies reviewed here suggest that industrial heterogeneity plays an important role in 
industrial evolution and productivity growth.
The review also shows that a common pattern emerges: entrants are a heterogeneous group but 
are on average less productive than incumbents, a large percentage of an entrants cohort does not 
survive very long, only the plants with high productivity and productivity growth remains, there is a 
shadow of death effect where plants about to exit display lower productivity. However, country 
case studies constitute a very useful exercise to account for peculiarities of the institutional 
framework, economic policies, and macroeconomic shocks.
For the case of Indonesian manufacturing, the contribution of the next chapter is to offer a detailed 
demographic map of the sector over a long period of time (1975-1995), focusing on plant size and 
productivity distribution, patterns of survival, as well as entries and exits. This will then lead to the 
decomposition of aggregate TFP growth and assess the contribution of plant turnover. This will 
represent a first step in unveiling the microeconomic mechanisms behind aggregate productivity 
gains. The following chapter then assesses potential factors explaining plant productivity 
heterogeneity, while the last chapter turns to the issue of industrial change.
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4 Industrial demography and productivity: The case of Indonesian 
manufacturing, 1975-95
4.1 Introduction
The literature review dealing with industrial demographic issues has underlined the importance of 
microeconomic heterogeneity in the dynamic process of productivity growth. It has shown that 
plants or firms differ in terms of size, factor mix, technology, and productivity, and that productivity 
dispersion could be a great potential source of productivity gains.
While those issues remain interesting in general, the economic history of Indonesia raises particular 
issues for the manufacturing sector. So far, no in-depth study has assessed the microeconomic 
dynamics of the sector, and a number of questions remain open.
In this chapter, I am chiefly interested in the actual dynamics of industrial structure and its link to 
productivity growth. While a clear link is made with macroeconomic policy and exogenous shocks in 
order to identify relevant sub-periods, the causality between policy, industrial evolution and 
productivity changes will be kept aside for chapter 6.
The debate over aggregate TFP growth for Asia has concentrated on the issue of extensive versus 
intensive economic growth, i.e. growth in the use of inputs versus TFP growth. In chapter 2 ,1 have 
shown that using different methodologies and assumptions for estimating aggregate TFP growth 
can lead to the predominance of either hypothesis. However, using a new capital stock series and 
the Divisia Index methodology, I find that average TFP growth has been positive over the period 
1975-1995, at 1.30% p.a..
Even though positive, this average TFP growth figure is considerably lower than the average output 
growth at 10.24% p.a. for the manufacturing sector. A simple conclusion would be that economic 
growth has been mostly extensive. But the interesting issue is to explore the reasons why TFP 
growth has been so low when the catch-up potential was high. As a first step, I propose here to 
decompose aggregate TFP growth into three elements: intra-plant productivity growth, market 
share reallocation among incumbents, and the effect of plant turnover (entry and exit). Assessing 
which components have dragged down aggregate TFP growth will be the first step in assessing why 
TFP growth has been low.
The issue of industrial heterogeneity and productivity growth is particularly relevant for the case of 
Indonesia. Indeed, the Indonesian economic historiography has underlined that the industrial 
sector has long been dominated by large-scale companies in terms of output and value added 
share, while small-scale plants dominate in terms of numbers. There obviously has been a high 
degree of industrial heterogeneity, for various historical reasons.
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4.2 Industrial heterogeneity in historical context: ownership and policy issues
The size of companies can be influenced by many determinants, such as the level of development 
of the economy, and Industrial specialisation -  relating to economies of scale, exposition to foreign 
competition, etc. In a world of perfectly competitive and free markets, only purely economic factors 
should determine the size of companies. However, under imperfect markets, ownership issues and 
industrial policy matter.
It is widely accepted in the literature that Indonesia has long been dominated by large-scale 
companies in terms of output and value added, and that those few but heavy weights have co­
existed with large numbers of small- and medium-scale firms. The large-scale sector has first been 
controlled by the Dutch colonial capitalists until the second World War, to pass into the hands of 
the State and the Army after independence under President Sukarno (1949-1965), and expand with 
large companies under the control of the State and the Generals in collaboration with Chinese and 
foreign entrepreneurs, especially during the Suharto period (1965-1998), with a clear emergence of 
conglomerates in the 1980s, the most famous being the so-called "Suharto empire". It is worth 
underlining that the typical Indonesian conglomerate is family-owned and has close links with the 
ruling power (through shareholding, and/or personal connection).
Lecraw (1992, p. 2) shows clearly the importance of large-scale economic entities and argues that 
"A substantial share of the industrial sector in Indonesia is populated by large, family-owned 
corporate groups. Although accurate statistics are not available, based on rough estimates, the 
sales of the top five groups were approximately equal to 10% of the GDP of Indonesia in 1990; the 
sales of the top 20 groups were equal to about 25% of GDP."
The issue of capital ownership is relatively well documented. The most complete historical account 
is given in Robison (1986), and shows that ownership and policy issues are deeply embedded. I use 
Robison's historical account of ownership issues to shed some light on industrial structure during 
the Suharto era.
The industrial public sector is one of the most important since independence and constitutes a 
crucial element of domestic capital for at least four reasons. Since 1950, public property of firms is 
one of the only means of domestic capital control for Pribumi (indigenous Indonesian). Indeed, 
Dutch colonisation left only little space for the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Economic 
activities introduced in Indonesia by the Dutch were too capital-intensive for the Pribumi to take 
active part. Furthermore, the surplus produced by these activities was dominantly remitted to the 
Netherlands, rather than reinvested in Indonesia. After independence, Indonesian rulers tried to 
keep domestic capital and industry away from foreign and Chinese influence and property. Large
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enterprises were managed and owned by the State, the one and only indigenous entity being able 
to gather enough capital for an industrial development on a large scale.
The second reason for the predominance of industrial public capital is one that is common to many 
developing countries. From 1970 onwards, a national industrialisation strategy developed, strategy 
that could only be led by the State in absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie. This one, mainly 
financed by oil and gas export income, allowed the State to impose certain directions to economic 
development, aim which could not have been easily achieved with a private industrial sector only.
Thirdly, the objective of the government was also to help the emergence of a private industrial 
sector. To achieve this, the State concentrated its investments in infrastructure and heavy 
industries in order to create linkages.
State's presence in industry also permitted political parties' financing, and contributed to the wealth 
increase of rulers. The allocation of building, supply and distribution contracts offered by the control 
of large firms helped the construction of a patron-dient system ruled by political power. This 
system of course reinforced State's control over large firms. The State was mainly present in 
natural resources, banking, manufacture and basic goods distribution sectors.
State's triple function -  industrial Pribumi development, political parties and rulers financing, 
reinforcement of political power -  favoured public ownership, ownership concentration, and 
formation of large-scale companies.
The Army began to take part in economic activities in the early 1950s. At the beginning, it was 
principally to earn additional revenues, because State's budget was neither sufficient for its usual 
military functions, nor could cover offidals increasing living standards. Military enterprises were 
built on three types of resources. The first type is constituted by existing firms, which were 
nationalised and taken over by the Army in 1958. These were mainly in entrepot, freight and 
shipping industries. The second source stems from the confiscation of economic entities such as 
funds, hotels, exdusive agencies for automobile freight and distribution, entities formerly controlled 
by Sukarno's people. The Army sold also numerous forest exploitation concessions and amassed a 
certain amount of capital at the origin of new industrial conglomerates. The recipients were mainly 
military sub-groups and actual and/or retired offidals. The third source was a privileged access to 
supply and building contracts, import licences and loans.
Industrial military activity was driven in partnership with Chinese and foreign capital, because both 
detained financial and management resources for development. As a consequence, a political- 
economic alliance between the Army and Chinese and foreign groups supplied the latter with an 
important political protection. The structure of economic activity took the form of large-scale 
companies gravitating around political-bureaucratic power centres, often hampering the
97
development of competitive domestic markets. This gave incentives to the government for adopting 
measures favouring protection and subvention of Pribumi SMEs. Furthermore, the entry of the 
Army in the business area implied the creation of groups of Generals. These Generals, now 
managers, acquired a large economic and political power, firstly thanks to their influence in the 
allocation process of licences, monopolies, concessions, and secondly thanks to their power of 
public resources appropriation. This allowed of course also an increase in Generals' wealth.
The double objective of military activities' financing and of personal wealth accumulation did 
increase the lock-in of military firms' capital (firms owned directly by the Army or only controlled by 
it -  Chinese and foreign).
Another important factor in the development of a capitalist class in Indonesia is the profound social 
and political division between Chinese and Pribumi. Before 1965, a major contradiction within the 
capitalist class was that Its economically dynamic and dominant part was at the same time 
politically weak and socially persecuted. Chinese capitalist could not transform their financial power 
into a dominant class power. However, their activities continued to flourish thanks to close familial 
and inter-personal links within the community (at a national, as well as at an international level), 
allowing an efficient informal financing.
After the counter-revolution in 1965, growth and the promotion of industrial development gave rise 
to a climate that was more favourable to Chinese entrepreneurs and allowed them to build joint 
ventures with foreign and military partners, for who Chinese acted as capital providers and 
managers. Chinese became then major capital owners in Indonesia under the Suharto era. They 
base their power on political alliances with the rulers, and also on close financial ties with the South 
East Asian Diaspora (in particular in Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand and Malaysia). They 
also attracted foreign investors attention. However, in spite of all these positive aspects, political 
pressure subsisted.
The Chinese business community is hermetic by essence, and the non-integration of this group into 
the Indonesian community just reinforced the phenomenon. This is therefore evident that the 
ownership structure of Chinese firms remained very protected, concentrated in the hand of few 
individuals or families.
Since independence, small Pribumi capitalists disappeared and larger scale indigenous capitalists 
replaced them. These indigenous capitalists owe their existence to an important battle against 
Chinese and foreign capital. The emergence of those groups under the New Order is principally 
imputable to the forced integration of Pribumi (individuals and firms) into partly foreign joint 
ventures, to the building of consortiums and to arrangements concerning distribution and 
management. Such an integration was made possible by a public legislation assuring Indonesian
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participation into joint-ventures, imposing restriction on the entry of Chinese and foreign capital in 
certain sectors. The success of Pribumi firms was also built on a large political protection basis, 
assuring a privileged access to capital, to diverse licences as well as to supply contracts. These 
measures rendered Pribumi firms more attractive for foreign investors seeking for a compulsory 
indigenous business partner.
This global view of the industrial ownership structure in Indonesia shows clearly that the opposition 
between the different groups for the economic and political power drove to a concentrated 
ownership structure of firms. In an environment of imperfect competition, each interest group tries 
to protect its position and to reinforce i t  Therefore, widely held firms cannot survive in such an 
environment, because it would immediately be taken over by one of the interest groups.
But of course, this account of ownership structure deals mostly with large-scale firms: State and 
Army concentrated on industries with economies of scale, firstly because those were inherited from 
the colonial period, secondly because the developmental role of the State translated into the 
investment of heavy industry and infrastructure. As the Chinese worked in partnership with, either 
the State, or the Army, or foreign ventures, these also specialised on large-scale industry. As a 
result, Pribumi entrepreneurs were confined into the small- and medium-scale end of the spectrum.
As argued, as one of the objective of the government was to promote the emergence of an 
indigenous capitalist class, mostly through regulation. Hill (1997) argues that while SMEs have 
tended to be favoured by government policy in order to help the emergence of an Indonesian 
bourgeoisie -  to counter-balance Chinese and foreign (especially Japanese) entrepreneurship), and 
complement public-owned industry -  it has been with little effect. Indeed, most SMEs promotion 
has been cancelled by other industrial policy measures. Protection of industries from foreign 
competition almost only concerned industries with economies of scale (aircraft, automobile, and 
steel, industries for example). Credit subsidies also targeted larger companies. Hill argues that in a 
distorted economy - where for example connections with officials are required -  transactions costs 
can only be paid for by larger enterprises, so that "SMI firms have a strong interest in moves 
towards a liberal commercial environment featuring low and uniform levels of protection, and a 
transparent and uncomplicated regulatory system" (p.289). This would tend to suggest that if SMEs 
emerge, it should be after the liberalisation period, provided that liberalisation was effective. 
Goeltom (1995) shows that this is at least the case -  to a certain extent -  regarding the financial 
liberalisation.
The second interesting argument that Hill puts forward is that in ASEAN, most policies promoting 
SMI were welfare rather than efficiency oriented: "Most official statements stress the importance of 
SMI as a means of (i) generating employment; (ii) achieving greater equality through a more
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diverse ownership structure in business; (iii) promoting rural and regional development; (iv) 
providing a basis for entrepreneurial development; and (v) enhancing the socio-economic status of 
women and, in Indonesia and Malaysia, redressing the perceived ethnic imbalance in business 
ownership" (p. 285). This suggests that I should not expect SMI to be more productive than larger 
enterprises, at least before the liberalisation of the economy.
Robison (1986), summarises the contradictions the government faced regarding the promotion of 
indigenous entrepreneurship, suggesting that this sector of the economy was disregarded because 
of a lack of efficiency:
"On the one hand, economic policy is based upon the maximisation of growth through 
development of the forces of production, and therefore, of productivity as well as production 
levels. Giving credit, protection and subsidy to a potentially inefficient sector of the economy 
contradicted this intention. Similarly, it made sense to build upon the most productive and 
effective element of national capital, the Chinese. However, these policies confronted 
significant political problems involving the hostility of the extensive indigenous petty 
bourgeoisie and the erosion of the state's claim to being nationalist, or even Indonesian. To 
complicate matters, leading elements of the military and the politico-bureaucrat factions had 
established business links with large-scale capital, predominantly Chinese." (p. 123)
While it made sense to promote small- and medium scale indigenous companies from a political 
point of view, from an economic point of view, promotion of a supposedly inefficient section of the 
economy seemed to be sub-optimal.
To summarise, it is at first sight very difficult to forecast which type of firms are the most 
productive: (i) because of market distortions and ownership issues, large-scale companies may use 
market power to prevent entry and/or growth of smaller competitors, and not be forced to exit in 
case of lack of productivity; (ii) small- and medium-scale enterprises have been promoted, but the 
aim has been welfare rather than efficiency; (iii) furthermore, industrial protection has mostly been 
harmful to SMEs. While one can reasonably predict that market distortions favoured the dominance 
of large-scale plants, and that liberalisation probably triggered a rise of SMEs, it is more difficult to 
predict which size category has been the most productive and how this has evolved over time.
The period under scrutiny is very interesting to study because it encompasses clear cut historical 
sub-periods: the oil boom period, followed by the oil crisis period that triggered the liberalisation of 
the economy in several respects (trade and finance especially), ending with the post-liberalisation 
and investment boom period.
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Pre-liberalisation period, 1975-1985:
Oil boom, 1975-1980:
The start of the Suharto period (1965-1998) coincides more or less with the oil boom period (1973- 
1980), when most resources were devoted to the formal and large-scale manufacturing sector. 
Some scholars argue that the government operated sound macroeconomic policy during that 
period, helping build a solid basis for economic growth. Others argue that policy tended to favour 
large-scale plants and conglomerates, creating concentrated and uncompetitive sub-sectors, where 
small plants were prevented from growing to medium size. This "missing middle" could have 
hampered productivity growth.
This chapter firstly assesses to which extent manufacturing had been dominated by large-scale 
plants and conglomerates, and to which extent medium sized plants were absent from the 
manufacturing sector. It also considers whether some manufacturing sub-sectors were less 
competitive than others by looking at plant turnover.
It secondly considers whether large-scale plants and conglomerates were more productive than 
small- and medium-size plants. It also studies the dispersion of productivity distribution during the 
oil boom period as a way to assess the potential for productivity gains: a wide productivity 
dispersion indicates that productivity gains can be made by market share reallocation from less to 
more efficient plants, and by the exit of less efficient plants.
Finally, the sources of TFP growth for the oil boom are assessed, distinguishing among entry, exit, 
market share reallocation, and within plant productivity improvement.
Recession, 1981-1983, and "recovery" 1984-1985:
The second part of the pre-liberalisation period is characterised by a short recession (1981-1983) 
caused by the oil shock and a drop in exports, immediately followed by a "recovery" period in 1984- 
1985. Some of the theoretical and empirical literature argues that productivity, and more 
particularly microeconomic productivity is counter-cyclical: productivity improves during recessions 
because market shares are reallocated to the most efficient plants, less efficient plants exit the 
market, and entry of less efficient plants is limited.
This section firstly examines the changes of industrial structure during recession and recovery, in 
terms of size distribution of plants, concentration and plant turnover, and dispersion of productivity. 
It also identifies the behaviour of different types of plants during recession, particularly, which ones 
exit, and which ones grow. This naturally leads to the decomposition of aggregate productivity 
growth into entry, exit, market share reallocation and within plant productivity improvement 
effects.
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Deregulation period (1986-88), and Post-Deregulation period, 1989-1995:
As a response to recession and to the end of the oil boom period, the Indonesian government 
implemented a series of deregulatory reforms in the domain of industrial, trade and financial policy. 
The actual reform period stretched over three years from 1986 to 1988, and was followed by an 
investment and economic boom thereafter (1989-1995).
Distinguishing between the actual reform period and the post-liberalisation period, this section 
scrutinises the changes in industrial composition, focusing on size distribution of plants, 
concentration and plant turnover, and dispersion of productivity, underlining the difference between 
large-scale and small- and medium-scale plants. It attempts to discover whether liberalisation 
tended to create a more homogenous and more competitive industrial sector. As previously, it also 
identifies the behaviour of different types of plants during this period: what types of plants enter 
and exit, and which plants beneficiate from market share reallocation. The decomposition of 
aggregate productivity growth into entry, exit, market share reallocation and within plant 
productivity improvement effects helps shedding some light on different productivity growth 
estimates for that period. Indeed, while most scholars find that TFP growth had been very high, 
especially during the post-liberalisation period, I find that taking heterogeneity into account leads to 
low TFP growth estimates, i.e. the lowest of the entire 20-year period, apart from the recession 
period.
4.3 Accounting for entry and exit: Data issues
Accounting for entry and exit of establishments is in theory simple. However, in practice, there are 
a number of issues to be resolved in order to correct or account for data specificity.
As discussed in chapter 2, two datasets exist, the Raw Statfstfk Industri (RSI) and the Backcast 
Statistik Industri (BSI). The BSI is clearly the dataset to use to account for entry and exit, because 
it should comprise all establishments, especially those that had been omitted in RSI before 1985.
The dataset gives an identification number for each establishment, allowing tracking down 
establishments throughout the 20-year period (1975-1995). Therefore, a new identification number 
appearing in the dataset should be counted as entry, while an identification number disappearing 
should be counted as exit.
However, the dataset only accounts for establishments with 20 employees or more (with some 
exceptions for the pre-1985 period). Therefore, an establishment may appear and disappear from 
the dataset because it crossed the 20 employees threshold. These represent only less than 3% of 
the total number of establishments across the entire period. Discontinuous observations occur 
mostly for establishments entering the dataset at the beginning of the period, and discontinuity
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reflects more omission to report than crossing the 20 employees threshold. In some instances, 
identification numbers can change due to data error. Given the structure and information included 
in the datasets, these are however almost impossible to detect.
Another important problem is the discrepancy observed between the date of entry in the dataset 
(apparition of the establishment in the dataset) and the date at which the establishment started 
operation (that is a series given in the dataset). This can happen when the establishment started 
operation before 1975, i.e. before the Census started. It can also be the case that an establishment 
started operation with less than 20 employees. Finally, an establishment could have started 
operation with 20 employees or more, but the Census failed to take it into account. This exercise is 
interesting in itself, not only for data cleaning purposes, but also for identifying establishments' 
growth pattern. I assume that working with BSI minimises Census errors, i.e. that all 
establishments have been accounted for as soon as they reached the 20 employees threshold. The 
availability of a birth date allows assessing the age of establishments regardless of their date of 
entry in the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector. For establishments entering the dataset 
after 1975, this provides information on how long establishments stay in the small-scale 
manufacturing sector before crossing the 20-employee threshold. For establishments present in the 
dataset in 1975, this provides information on the age distribution of establishments for the start 
year.
Table 1a: Birth-Entry discrepancy summary statistics (all industries)
variable mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 max
Discrepancy (nb of years) 8.701307 0 3 10 23 39 93
Table 1b: Birth-Entry discrepancy summary statistics (by 2-digit industries)
Discrepancy (nb of years) mean p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 max
31 - Food, beverages and 
tobacco 10.80686 0 4 14 27 52 92
32 - Textile, garments and 
leather 9.376421 0 3 12 23 38 92
33 - Wood products 5.175604 0 1 5 13 22 93
34 - Paper, printing & 
publishing 9.417761 0 3 12 25 39 86
35 - Chemicals, rubber & 
plastic 8.826372 0 2 9 24 48 92
36 - Non-metallic minerals 8.087739 0 3 9 19 30 92
37 - Basic metals 4.893023 0 1 4 10 27 92
38 - Metal products & 
machinery 7.231537 0 2 7 19 28 92
39 - Other manufacturing 6.286908 0 1 7 18 25 90
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Discrepancy between birth date and date of entry in the dataset concerns 69% of establishments 
across the entire period.30 On average, an establishment stays over 8 years in the small-scale 
sector before entering the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector. However, half of 
establishments only remained 3 years or less in the small-scale manufacturing sector before 
crossing the 20-employee threshold. The top 25% of establishments had to stay 10 years or more 
in the small-scale sector, and the top 10% remained small in size for 23 years or more.
At the 2-digit industrial level, the food, beverages & tobacco industry (31) presents the longest stay 
in the small-scale sector before entering the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector, with 
25% of establishments staying under the 20-employee threshold for at least 14 years. Three other 
sectors present a similar pattern: the textile, garments & leather industry (32), paper, printing & 
publishing (34), and chemicals, rubber 8i plastics (35). While this makes sense for the first three 
sub-sectors, it is surprising to find chemicals, rubber & plastics in this category: one expects this 
industry to have high fixed costs that require minimum economies of scale. However, this industry 
includes for example the "manufacture of native preparation" (5-digit codes 35223 and 35224), as 
well as the "manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations, including tooth paste" (5-digit code 
35231), which can be carried out on a small scale using traditional technology. It can also be the 
case that establishments had less than 20 employees, but were part of a larger company.31
At the other end of the spectrum, both the wood products industry (33) and the basic metals 
industry (37) stand out for entering the medium- and large-scale sector at an early stage: half of 
establishments entered directly or after only one year, 75% of them entered respectively after 5 or 
4 years or less. Indeed, both sectors require a large minimum efficient size.
I then define entry and exit as entry and exit of the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector: 
entry and exit are entry and exit from the dataset, under the assumption that the BSI dataset has 
been correctly updated. On a first account, length of life is therefore length of life in the medium- 
and large-scale manufacturing sector. On a second account, I use operation starting date as date of 
entry in order to calculate establishments' "true" age.
Table 2a, b and c give aggregate summary statistics regarding the scope of entry and exit and 
turnover rates over the entire period. The entry rate is calculated as the number of entrants (or 
output or employment of entrants) in year t divided by the total number of plants in year t-1 (or 
total output or employment). The exit rate is calculated as the number of exiting plants (or output 
or employment of exiting plants) in year t  divided by the total number of plants in year t  (or total 
output or employment). The turnover rate is calculated as the sum of the entry and the exit rates.
30 The variable d isc  is calculated as date of actual birth minus date of entry in the dataset
31 We are dealing with establishment- rather than firm-level data.
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Number o f establishments —  life tables
Over the period 1976-94, the average annual entry share in number of establishments was 9.95%, 
against 5.46% for exit share, and 15.41% for the turnover rate. Focusing on sub-periods, figures 
regarding the "recovery" period (1984-85) are to be interpreted with caution. At first sight, it looks 
like the manufacturing sector experienced a boom in entries (entry rate is 19.40% in 1985): these 
figures might reflect reality to a certain extent because of better economic conditions, but part of it 
is probably still due to the "discovery" of establishments by the enumerator, especially in 1985.32 
Surprising is the substantial drop in exit share and the increase in entry share during the recession 
period (1981-83), while I would expect the opposite, due to tougher economic conditions. While 
entry rates do not change much over the period (apart from the 1984-85 period), exit shares 
increase substantially from the mid-1980s onwards, i.e. during and in the aftermath of the 
liberalisation period.
Table 2a: Aggregate annual demographic data (lifetable), number of planta
YEAR
total
number of 
planta
number of 
new planta,
start of year
number of 
exiting 
planta, end 
of year
number of 
continuing 
planta
entry rate (number 
of new plants as a 
% of previous year's 
total number of 
plants)
exit rate (number of 
exiting plants as a % 
of current year's total 
number of plants)
turnover
rate (entry 
plus exit 
rates)
1975 9498 491 5.17
1976 9917 910 257 8750 9.58 2.59 12.17
OIL BOOM
1977 10477 817 299 9361 8.24 2.85 11.09
1978 11014 836 301 9877 7.98 2.73 10.71
1979 11606 893 711 10002 8.11 6.13 14.23
1980 11974 1079 674 '10221 9.30 5.63 14.93
1981 12451 1151 455 10845 9.61 3.65 13.27
RECESSION 1982 13173 1177 515 11481 9.45 3.91 13.36
1983 14031 1373 451 12207 10.42 3.21 13.64
1984 15231 1651 1453 12127 11.77 9.54 21.31
1985 16733 2955 791 12987 19.40 4.73 24.13
1986 16987 1045 516 15426 6.25 3.04 9.28
DEREGULATION 1987 17707 1236 1848 14623 7.28 10.44 17.71
1988 18014 2155 924 14935 12.17 5.13 17.30
1989 18636 1546 527 16563 8.58 2.83 11.41
1990 20461 2352 2556 15553 12.62 12.49 25.11
1991 20101 2196 1406 16499 10.73 6.99 17.73
POST-DEREGULATION 1992 20745 2050 1359 17336 10.20 6.55 16.75
1993 21079 1693 1246 18140 8.16 5.91 14.07
1994 21784 1951 1164 18669 9.26 5.34 14.60
1995 22596 1976 20620 9.07 9.07
76-80 10998 907 448 9642 8.64 3.99 12.63
81-83 13218 1234 474 11511 9.83 3.59 13.42
m 84-85 15982 2303 1122 12557 15.58 7.13 22.72
& 86-88 17569 1479 1096 14995 8.56 6.20 14.77
s 89-94 20468 1965 1376 17127 9.93 6.69 16.61
< 76-94 15901 1530 919 13453 9.95 5.46 15.41
32 The backcast of the dataset took place in 1985 because of this "discovery". Although I am working with the BSI, some 
error may remain.
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Output -  life tables
If I look at similar measures but in terms of output, I observe that in fact, while more plants enter 
towards the end of the period, they represent less in total output (entrants become relatively 
smaller). Exit rates also increase in terms of output.
Table 2b: Aggregate annual demographic data (lifetable), groaa output
YEAR total output
output Of 
new planta,
start of year
output of 
exiting 
planta, end
of year
output of
continuing
planta
entry rate
(output of new 
plants as a % 
of previous 
year's total 
output)
exit rate (output of 
exiting plants as a 
% of current year's 
total output)
turnover 
rate (entry 
plus exit 
rates)
1975 8.10E+09 2.24E+07 8.08E+09 0.28
1976 8.29E+09 4.92E+08 3.73E+07 7.76E+09 6.07 0.45 6.52
OIL BOOM
1977 8.72E+09 3.09E+08 7.14E+07 8.34E+09 3.72 0.82 4.54
1978 9.92E+09 5.31 E+08 5.27E+07 9.33E+09 6.09 0.53 6.62
1979 1.11E+10 4.25E+08 3.45E+08 1.03E+10 4.28 3.11 7.39
1980 1.29E+10 5.61 E+08 1.09E+08 1.22E+10 5.05 0.85 5.89
1981 1.43E+10 5.45E+08 1.41 E+08 1.36E+10 4.23 0.99 5.22
RECESSION 1982 1.53E+10 5.41 E+08 1.27E+08 1.46E+10 3.79 0.83 4.62
1983 1.67E+10 4.69E+08 1.65E+08 1.61 E+10 3.07 0.99 4.07
REBOUND 1984 1.91E+10 7.29E+08 1.97E+08 1.82E+10 4.37 1.03 5.401985 2.26E+10 1.21E+09 8.49E+08 2.06E+10 6.32 3.75 10.07
1988 2.59E+10 6.06E+08 2.24E+08 2.50E+10 2.68 0.87 3.55
DEREGULATION 1987 3.77E+10 7.23E+08 1.34E+09 3.56E+10 2.79 3.55 6.35
1988 3.31 E+10 1.07E+09 5.23E+08 3.15E+10 2.84 1.58 4.43
1989 4.06E+10 1.08E+09 7.05E+08 3.89E+10 3.27 1.73 5.00
1990 4.86E+10 2.67E+09 2.25E+09 4.36E+10 6.58 4.64 11.22
1991 5.29E+10 2.20E+09 2.01 E+09 4.87E+10 4.54 3.79 8.33
POST-DEREGULATION 1992 6.21 E+10 2.56E+09 1.65E+09 5.79E+10 4.85 2.65 7.50
1993 6.77E+10 1.66E+09 1.15E+09 6.49E+10 2.68 1.70 4.38
1994 7.61 E+10 1.88E+09 1.16E+09 7.31 E+10 2.78 1.52 4.30
1995 1.59E+09 8.42E+10 2.09
78-80 10186000000 463600000 123080000 9586000000 5.04 1.15 6.20
81-83 15433333333 518333333 144333333 14766666667 3.70 0.94 4.64
» 84-85 20850000000 969500000 523000000 19400000000 5.34 2.39 7.73
a t 86-88 32233333333 799666667 695666667 30700000000 2.77 2.00 4.77I 89-94 58000000000 2008333333 1487500000 54516666667 4.11 2.67 6.79
< 76-94 30717368421 1066368421 689810526 28959473684 4.21 1.86 6.07
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Employment—life tables
In terms of employment, entry rates remain pretty constant over the period, but exit rates increase.
Table 2 c : Aggregate annual demographic data (lifetable), employment (number of workers)
YEAR
total
employ
ment
employment 
of new 
plants, start 
of year
employment 
of exiting 
plants, end of
year
employment 
of continuing 
plants
entry rate
(employment of new 
plants as a % of 
previous year's total 
employment)
exit rate
(employment of 
exiting plants as a % 
of current year's 
total employment)
turnover 
rate (entry 
plus exit 
rates)
1975 913167 21181 891986 2.32
1976 1056790 60007 10259 986524 6.57 0.97 7.54
OIL BOOM
1977 1097877 33002 18492 1046382 3.12 1.68 4.81
1978 1166286 47475 13808 1105002 4.32 1.18 5.51
1979 1260192 42887 51401 1165903 3.68 4.08 7.76
1980 1376578 62698 34240 1279640 4.98 2.49 7.46
1981 1447377 62988 26260 1358130 4.58 1.81 6.39
RECESSION 1982 1539412 65379 27658 1446374 4.52 1.80 6.31
1983 1626876 61328 30694 1534854 3.98 1.89 5.87
REBOUND 1984 1781812 79758 38853 1663202 4.90 2.18 7.081985 1970428 123133 82911 1764384 6.91 4.21 11.12
1986 2011481 54795 30407 1926279 2.78 1.51 4.29
DEREGULATION 1987 2153673 59569 126527 1967577 2.96 5.87 8.84
1988 2304686 122425 64130 2118131 5.68 2.78 8.47
1989 2643195 112490 60875 2469830 4.88 2.30 7.18
1990 3009509 181057 212899 2615553 6.85 7.07 13.92
1991 3226016 161140 136101 2928775 5.35 4.22 9.57
POST-DEREGULATION 1992 3498827 150752 136162 3211914 4.67 3.89 8.56
1993 3705825 105509 118924 3481392 3.02 3.21 6.22
1994 3910230 143803 113126 3653301 3.88 2.89 6.77
1995 4180064 120000 4060064 3.07
76-80 1191545 49214 25640 1116690 4.53 2.08 6.62
81-83 1537888 63232 28204 1446453 4.36 1.83 6.19
• 84-85 1876120 101445 60882 1713793 5.91 3.19 9.10
o> 86-88 2156613 78930 73688 2003996 3.81 3.39 7.20
5 89-94 3332267 142458 129681 3060128 4.78 3.93 8.71
< 76-94 2146688 91063 70196 1985429 4.61 2.95 7.56
The overall picture is one of increasing exit rates in the 1990s in terms of number of 
establishments, output, and employment. Is this phenomenon symptomatic of increasing or 
decreasing competition? Indeed, the main causes for exit could either be an increasingly self­
regulating market where less efficient establishments exit, or be an increasingly distorted market 
where young small and medium-scale efficient establishments exit because settled large 
establishments prevent them from growing or deter competition through various mechanisms. This 
question is investigated in chapter 6 when assessing the factors leading to plant exit.
In terms of number of plants, turnover rate average 15.4% over 1976-94, while output and 
employment turnover rates average 6.1% and 7.6% respectively: entrants and exiters are 
numerous but small both in terms of output and employment, relatively to incumbents.
To complement the previous life tables, I provide survival rates by cohort of entrants (1976 to 
1994) for each survival length (1 to 19 years). The survival rate is the share of surviving firms in a 
given year as a percentage of the total number of entrants in the beginning year (share of survivors 
in a cohort).33
33 The hazard rate would be calculated as [100%-(survival rate)].
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Table 3a: Survival rata by yaarty antry cohort
survival 
length (nb of 
years)
1976
cohort
1977
cohort
1978
cohort
1979
cohort
1980
cohort
1961
cohort
1962
cohort
1983 1984
cohort
1985
cohort
1986
cohort
1987
cohort
1988
cohort
1989
cohort
1990 1991
cohort
1992
cohort
1993
cohort
1994
cohort
average
1976-94
average
1976-79
average
1960-
1968
average
1989-94
1 95 82 96.33 97.85 98.43 96.39 98.78 98.13 99.49 98.30 92.52 97.51 92.88 94.34 96.41 89.41 96.17 91.71 95.87 94.96 96.75 97.11 96.48 93.76
2 93.08 94.37 95.22 94.96 96.18 96.61 96.36 95.85 95.46 88.60 90.05 87.46 89.66 83.83 82.57 89 12 86.39 90.96 91.43 94.41 92.80 86.57
3 89.78 90.45 91.63 92.27 92.12 94.44 92.01 91.62 91.52 72.28 85.84 85.19 73.87 77.43 75.55 63.38 80.68 85.89 91.03 86.55 7926
4 84.18 87.15 88.88 09.36 89.90 87.23 87.85 88.06 70.68 68.26 82.78 73.30 66.68 71.15 71.05 77.55 00.75 87.39 80.30 7325
5 79.89 84.58 06.00 86.90 83.78 83.32 85.47 77.86 73.96 66.29 73.30 69.17 81.11 65.46 6726 76.29 04.34 74.92 66.36
6 78.15 82.50 83.01 79.84 79.52 81.06 77.99 74.65 72.50 56.28 68.42 64.97 57.49 61.90 72.59 80.38 70.32 61.90
7 71.98 79 80 75.80 76.60 77.29 71.07 74.00 73.12 62.75 50.66 66.26 61.73 54.01 68.76 75.99 65.56
8 89.78 72.58 71.41 73.91 70.62 67.18 72.13 66.04 57.84 47.41 61.53 58.50 65.66 71.92 62.53
9 60.88 69.52 69.02 69.09 66.82 65.33 63.96 80.82 5421 44.40 56.18 62.02 67.13 59.11
10 57.69 67 69 84.11 64.39 64.69 57.78 60.32 57.68 50.94 42.47 58.78 63.47 55.65
11 58.37 61.81 61.60 63.16 57.92 53.78 57.01 54.84 48.39 57.21 80.74 54.39
12 51.21 58.63 60.53 55.88 54.12 50.39 53.53 52.37 54.58 56.56 52.60
13 49.45 57 28 53.83 51.96 50.97 47.26 50.96 51.68 53.13 49.74
14 48.13 51.29 50.60 48.49 48.10 44.92 48 59 49.63 46.51
15 43.96 47.37 48.56 4569 45.41 46.20 46.39 46.41
16 41.87 44.68 46.17 43.56 44.07 44.07
17 40.88 42.96 44.86 42.90 42.90
18 37.58 41J 7 39.48 39.48
19 35.82 35.82 35 82
A plant entering in 1976 has 95.8% of chances to survive 1 year, 89.8% of chances to survive 3 
years, almost 80% of chances to survive 5 years, 57.7% of chances to survive 10 years, and just 
over 35% of chances to survive 19 years.
Graph 1 shows the evolution of survival rates through cohorts. The line labelled "1" display the 
evolution of the one-year survival rate through cohorts, etc. At first sight, it seems that survival 
rates tends to decline over cohort-years: for example, a plant entering in 1976 had 57.7% of 
chances to survive 10 years, while a plant entering in 1985 only had 42.5% of chances to survive 
for the same length of time. One notable cohort is the 1985's cohort that seems to have very low 
survival rates. Part of it is probably due to the start of the liberalisation period (although survival 
rates started dropping before that in the early 1980s), but the bulk of it may again be due to plants 
"discovery" in 1985.
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To obtain a smoother picture (graph 2), I calculate average survival rates for groups of cohorts. 
The graph titled "average 1976-94" display average survival rates of plants having entered between 
1976 and 1994, the column titled "average 1976-79" display average survival rates of plants having 
entered between 1976 and 1979, etc.
G raph 2:
Average survival rates by groups of cohorts
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The earlier the entry, the higher the chances of survival: for example, entering in the 1970s gives 
over 80% of chances to survive 6 years, against just over 70% of chances if entry occurred in the 
1980s, and almost 62% of chances if entry occurred in the 1990s. Declining survival rates (or, 
correspondingly, increasing hazard rates) may stem from several factors. Firstly, if the number of 
entries increases (with decreasing barriers to entry and/or an increasing number of entrepreneurs), 
mechanically, the number of failures may increase. That is the "increasing competition" hypothesis. 
Secondly, it could be the case that plants entering late in the period are "pushed out" by 
incumbents (which may have acquired some sort of market power). Thirdly, the "quality" of 
entrants may have dropped over the period (less productive). These correspond to the "decreasing 
competition" hypothesis. This list of factors is not exhaustive and is complemented in chapter 6 
when assessing the reasons for exit.
Table 3b gives annual aggregate distribution statistics on age and survival by cohort. 
Establishments present in the dataset in 1975 survived on average 16.8 years, and 50% of
establishments did not survive up to the end of the period (1995). Among the 50% of
establishments that exited the manufacturing sector before the end of the period, 50% survived
less than 13 years, i.e. up to 1987. The rest of the survival figures shows that 50% of
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establishments entering between 1976 and 1988 exited before the end of the period in 1995. 25% 
of establishments entering between 1989 and 1992 exited before 1995. These figures underline 
that establishments turnover has been a striking feature of the sector over the entire period and 
raises of course the question of the impact of plant turnover on aggregate productivity growth.
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1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
itry
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Table 3b: Survival and age statistics by cohorts 
survival
mean p5______ p10_____ p25_____ p50_____ p75_____ p90_____ p95
16.8 6________ 8_______ 13 21 21 21 21
16.4 6________ 8_______ 13 20 20 20 20
16.1 7________ 8_______ 14 19 19 19 19
15.4 7________ 8_______ 13 18 18 18 18
14.5 6________ 8_______ 12 17 17 17 17
13.8 6________ 8_______ 12 16 16 16 16
12.8 5________ 7_______ 11 15 15 15 15
12.3 6________ 7_______ 11 14 14 14 14
11.4 5________ 6_______ 10 13 13 13 13
10.3 4________ 5________9_______ 12 12 12 12
9. 2______ 3________ 4________7_______ 11_______11_______ 11_______11_
9. 0______ 4________ 5________9_______ 10 10 10 10
8. 1_______4________4________9_______ 9________9________9________9_
7. 0______ 3________3________7_______ 8________8________8________8_
6. 3______ 3________4________7_______ 7________7________7________7_
5. 5______ 3________4________6_______ 6________6________6________6_
4. 7______ 3________4________5_______ 5________5________5_______ 5_
3. 8______ 2________3________4_______ 4________4________4_______ 4_
2. 9______ 3________3________3_______ 3________3________3_______ 3_
2. 0______ 2________2________2_______ 2________2________2_______ 2_
1.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
age
mean p5______ p10_____ p25_____ p50_____ p75_____ p90_____ p95
26.6 4________ 6_______ 12 20 32 63 81
18.2 1_________3________6_______ 13 20 37 78
17.3 1_________3________6_______ 12 19 33 78
17.8 1_________3________6_______ 12 19 37 78
16.4 2________ 3________6_______ 12 18 33 62
16.1 1_________3________6_______ 11_______17 31_______72
15.9 1_________3________5_______ 10 16 33 72
15.2 1_________3________6_______ 10 16 29 63
14.2 1_________2________5_______ 10 16 29 42
14.2 1_________2________5_______ 9_______ 15 28 54
13.6 1_________2________4_______ 8_______ 14 28 49
11.6 1_________2________4_______ 7_______ 12_______22______ 38
10.8 1_________ 1________ 3_______ 6_______ 1J_______20______ 34_
9. 7______ 1_________ 1________ 3_______ 6_______ 10 19 31
7. 9______ 0________ 1________ 2_______ 5_______ 8_______ 16 24
7. 8______ 0________ 1________ 2_______ 4_______ 8_______ 16 24
5. 6______ 0________ 0________ 1________3_______ 5_______ 12_______17_
4. 6______ 0________ 0________ 1________2_______ 4_______ 10 16
3. 2______ 0________ 0________ 1________2_______ 3________7_______ 12_
2. 4______ 0________ 0________0________1________2________6_______ 10
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 5 10
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In terms of age, establishments enumerated in 1975 were on average 26.6 years old, 25% of 
establishments were under 12 years old, 50% were under 20 years old, and 25% were over 32 
years old. A striking feature is that as time goes by, entrants become younger: establishments 
entering the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector were on average 18.2 years old in 
1976, 13.6 years old in 1985 and 1.5 year old in 1995 ; 50% of them were over 13 years old in 
1976, against 8 years old in 1975 and brand new in 1995. This can broadly reflect two phenomena: 
(1) establishments spent less and less time in the small-scale sector before entering the medium- 
and large-scale manufacturing sector (2) the enumerator became more efficient over the years. 
The second explanation is for sure part of the story, and it is difficult to disentangle both causes. 
However, I can reasonably assume that the first explanation plays a role as well: the fact that 
entrants become younger with time means that (1) some small-scale establishments grow faster 
and are able to enter the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector sooner than before, and 
that more and more establishments enter directly the medium- and large-scale manufacturing 
sector without going through the small-scale sector. This could have an impact on productivity if 
younger entrants are more productive than older ones. Furthermore, this could partly explain 
increasing exit rates over time: it may be the case that because establishments enter with less 
experience in the small-scale sector of the economy, their survival rate drops. In other words, it 
could be called a "growth crisis". This may partly be due to the liberalisation of the economy in the 
1990s.
4.4 Establishments' size, age, and population distribution
4.4.1 General description
This part assesses the first set of questions for each of the historical sub-periods:
• Do large-scale establishments dominate the manufacturing sector? How does this evolve over 
time?
• Is there really a "missing middle", i.e. are medium-size plants under-represented? How does 
this evolve through time?
While those issues are intrinsically interesting, they are also central to the understanding of the 
competition processes at play in the Indonesian manufacturing sector.
I measure the size of establishments with gross output as well as number of workers. The difficult 
task is to choose size categories: what is small, medium or large? Goeltom (1995) uses the number 
of workers as a measure for size, calling small establishments those having less than 100 workers, 
medium establishments those having between 100 and 499 workers, and large establishments 
those having 500 or more workers. Using number of workers as a size measure is appealing
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because the scale is easy to grasp, and does not depend on currency deflators. Hayashi (2003, 
p. 12) reviews the different size categorisation in Asia, and shows that Asian countries tend to treat 
SMEs as having less than 200 to 300 workers. He chooses 300 workers as a cut-off point, in order 
to include more plants than the Biro Pusat Statistik (Indonesian Central Census Bureau) definition 
would allow (cut-off point at 100 workers). I choose to keep Goeltom's categorisation, that, while 
reflecting US and Canadian standards, goes beyond Hayashi in the inclusion of plants in the SMEs 
category and might be more appropriate for the study of a population with number of workers per 
plant ranging from 1 to 116,052.
Labour is however only one input in the production process: capital-intensive establishments could 
appear smaller than they are, while labour-intensive establishments would appear larger. In the 
absence of accurate fixed assets figures for all plants, I choose to complement the employment 
figures with output figures.34 For the output figures, I only display size distribution without having a 
clear-cut size categorisation.
34 In chapter 2 , 1 construct a series the log of capital stock for all plants and all years, however, transforming this measure 
into fixed assets levels would suffer from measurement errors that would bias any study on size distribution.
TABLE 4: Size distribution of establishments by year, employees and output
OUTPUT in thousand IDR1983 constant prices
moan_________ g l__________ p5_________ glO_________ g25_________ g50_________ g75_________ Q90_________ g95_________ p99
1975 944112 2583 7024 11481 24003 65409 239444 1211039 3371889 15200000
1976 838450 2179 6101 10115 22671 60111 223341 1131989 3206766 13500000
1977 834781 1954 5736 9479 21580 59096 221283 1162600 3230843 14400000
1978 903026 2087 6329 10404 24071 64093 244788 1246122 3479326 15500000
1979 960714 2298 6532 11239 25234 67311 266526 1373545 3774715 16800000
1980 1079020 2778 7357 12133 26871 73677 299761 1515342 4038054 17700000
1981 1148101 2131 7401 12500 28414 79093 318579 1612686 4242121 17400000
1982 1161495 2431 8202 13364 30206 83098 328575 1629891 4403137 18800000
1983 1192229 2650 8600 14052 31744 86496 346077 1762062 4642954 18400000
1984 1258557 2909 8744 14566 32683 90175 364554 1891699 5012157 18900000
1985 1354550 3425 10673 16838 36272 98385 411198 2037587 5483248 20700000
1986 1528721 3462 10601 17218 38181 105500 441136 2316603 6095384 22600000
1987 2136763 2988 10029 16751 38215 106936 462903 2604983 6754851 29900000
1988 1844263 3959 12277 19696 42531 119032 523761 2803456 7041228 28100000
1989 2190206 5590 14568 22878 47621 139164 634455 3350960 8203897 34500000
1990 2384656 6755 16688 25341 50619 149853 703323 3526743 8509766 36900000
1991 2648322 6167 15791 25230 52966 167440 829599 4285415 9730009 41400000
1992 3006857 6002 16508 26133 57490 185765 957140 4951235 11400000 47100000
1993 3223824 7685 18620 29221 63820 201772 1005130 5397459 12200000 52200000
1994 3503872 7822 19190 30603 68325 209370 1023050 5768691 13900000 54300000
1995 3795568 8436 19736 30443 66723 201145 981334 5965662 14000000 59100000
WORKERS
mean P1 PS P10 p2S PS0 p75 P90 P95 P99
1975 98.3 12 19 20 24 34 66 176 368 1129
1976 106.6 10 17 20 24 34 69 190 372 1206
1977 104.8 8 15 20 23 34 69 192 381 1207
1978 105.9 8 15 19 23 33.5 72 199 400 1168
1979 108.6 11 15 19 23 34 74 211 418 1224
1980 115.0 10 15 19 23 35 76 222 444 1347
1981 116.2 10 15 20 24 35 79 230 470 1307
1982 116.9 10 15 19 23 35 77 231 485 1290
1983 115.9 10 15 20 23 34 76 234 477 1277
1984 117.0 10 15 20 23 34 75 232 478 1296
1985 117.8 20 20 21 24 36 79 233 464 1262
1986 118.4 12 18 20 24 35 80 235 462 1272
1987 121.6 11 17 20 24 35 82 238 474 1377
1988 127.9 20 21 21 25 37 68 258 495 1478
1989 141.8 20 21 22 25 39 98 288 574 1660
1990 147.1 20 21 22 25 40 103 302 609 1676
1991 160.5 20 21 22 26 41 112 342 673 1831
1992 168.7 20 21 22 26 42 119 361 711 1927
1993 175.8 20 21 22 26 43 122 379 727 2029
1994 179.5 20 21 22 26 44 123 382 756 2173
1995 185.0 20 21 22 26 43 123 386 742 2145
Table 4 displays the annual distribution of establishments in terms of output and number of 
workers. In terms of output, in 1975, the median establishment was 52 times smaller than an 
establishment of the top 5% of the size distribution. This discrepancy remained roughly constant 
until the recession, when it started to widen from a factor 54 in 1983 to a factor 70 in 1995. 
Comparatively, the spread between the top 25% and the top 5% of the size distribution remained 
constant over the period, with the former being roughly 14 times larger than the latter. The same is 
observed for the spread between the bottom 5% and the median (median plant 9 to 10 times 
larger than the bottom 5% of plants) and the spread between the bottom 25% and the median 
(median plant 3 times larger than the bottom 25%). The spread between the top 25% and the 
median increased slightly from a factor 4 to 5. The striking feature is that, while establishments of 
the bottom 5% of the size distribution are only 10 times smaller than the median establishment, 
establishments of the top 5% of the size distribution are 52 (1975) to 70 times (1995) larger than 
the median establishment. Extremely large establishments evidently represent a heavy weight.
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Graphs 3: Output density kernels
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Graph 3 presents size distribution of establishments in terms of output. Distributions are 
represented with density kernels rather than histograms: density kernels are the "continuous" 
version of histograms, they present smoother graphs and have the advantage of being independent 
of the choice of the origin. Because of the obvious huge difference in size between the top 5% and 
the rest, I choose to graph the size distribution of the first and second half of the entire distribution 
for the years 1975, 1985 and 1995. The first graph shows that over time, the size distribution of 
the first 50% of the entire size distribution becomes more heterogeneous (the distribution becomes 
flatter). While the bulk of establishments are small in 1975, their size increase and their number 
decrease over time, with more establishments in the right-hand tail of the distribution. The same
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phenomenon is observed when graphing the first 75% and first 95% of the entire distribution -  
although it is graphically less clear.
In other words, if I omit the extra-large establishments, the output-size structure of the 
manufacturing sector becomes more heterogeneous over time, with a drop in the dominance of 
small establishments in terms of numbers, and the possible emergence of a middle class of 
establishments.
Taking into account the extra-large establishments, the three right-hand side graphs of graph 3 
display the size distribution of the top 50%, 25% and 5% of the entire distribution. The extremely 
narrow and abrupt left-hand picks followed by a very wide right-hand flat line show the particularly 
heterogeneous size composition of the top quantiles. One could argue that this flat line only 
represents outliers. Is this really the case?
TABLE 5a: share in total output of each output size distribution quantile by year 
Year/Quantile 0-5% 5-10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-90% 90-95% 95-100% total
1975 0.023 0.049 0.28 1.09 3.34 8.5 10.7 76.0 100
1976 0.022 0.048 0.29 1.15 3.51 9.2 11.7 74.1 100
1977 0.021 0.046 0.28 1.12 3.41 9.2 11.6 74.3 100
1978 0.021 0.047 0.28 1.13 3.45 9.4 11.6 74.1 100
1979 0.021 0.046 0.28 1.11 3.47 9.6 11.6 73.9 100
1980 0.021 0.046 0.27 1.08 3.48 9.5 11.3 74.3 100
1981 0.018 0.044 0.26 1.08 3.46 9.5 11.4 74.2 100
1982 0.020 0.047 0.28 1.13 3.56 9.5 11.7 73.8 100
1983 0.021 0.048 0.28 1.14 3.66 10.0 12.0 72.8 100
1984 0.020 0.046 0.28 1.12 3.65 10.0 12.4 72.5 100
1985 0.023 0.051 0.29 1.14 3.77 10.3 12.3 72.1 100
1986 0.020 0.045 0.27 1.07 3.62 10.2 12.3 72.5 100
1987 0.013 0.031 0.19 0.77 2.66 7.9 9.7 78.7 100
1988 0.020 0.043 0.25 1.00 3.49 10.2 12.1 72.8 100
1989 0.020 0.043 0.24 0.96 3.48 10.3 12.1 72.9 100
1990 0.022 0.044 0.24 0.94 3.48 10.3 11.7 73.3 100
1991 0.019 0.039 0.22 0.92 3.62 11.1 12.1 72.0 100
1992 0.017 0.036 0.20 0.89 3.61 11.2 12.6 71.4 100
1993 0.019 0.037 0.21 0.92 3.59 11.3 12.8 71.1 100
1994 0.018 0.036 0.21 0.89 3.36 11.0 12.9 71.6 100
1995 0.017 0.033 0.19 0.79 2.98 10.0 12.1 73.9 100
To have a clearer opinion on the dominance of large-scale establishments, let us look at Table 5a, 
displaying the share in total output of each output size distribution quantile by year. In 1975, the 
bottom 5% of the size distribution represented 0.023% of total output of the manufacturing sector, 
while the top 5% of the size distribution represented 76% of the same total output! This last figure 
dropped to 71.1% in 1994 but rose again to 73.9% in 1995. The smaller half of establishments 
accounted for 1.4% of total output in 1975 against just over 1% in 1995, while the larger half 
accounted for the rest. This clearly demonstrates the persistent dominance of large establishments 
in the Indonesian manufacturing sector in terms of output. This again raises the issue of the level 
of competition in the Indonesian manufacturing sector.
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Is the picture exactly the same in terms of employment? In table 4, similarly to output figures, the 
median size of establishments in terms of number of workers increases over the period from 34 in 
1975 to 43 in 1995. Referring to Goeltom's size classification, 75% of all establishments are small 
until 1989, and at least 50% of all establishments are small for the period 1990-95. In 1975, the 
median establishment is at least 11 times smaller than the top 5% of the size distribution in terms 
of number of workers. This increases to the factor 17 in 1995. In spite of an identical trend, the 
discrepancy is less spectacular than for output figures, already suggesting a wide dispersion of 
productivity.
Graph 4 : Employment density kernels
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Graph 4 displays the employment-size distribution of the manufacturing sector. The dynamics of 
the size distribution of the first half of the entire distribution shows a homogeneisation of the
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manufacturing sector (size convergence). The same phenomenon is observed for the first 75% of 
the distribution but only up to mid-period -  1985 -  date after which the size-distribution diverges 
slightly again. However, for this chunk of the distribution, as well as for the first 95% of the size 
distribution, the size convergence phenomenon is rather limited, given the very long right-hand tail 
of the distributions. This is further emphasised by the three right-hand graphs displaying the top 
50%, 25% and 5% of the size distribution.
In summary, the study of establishments7 size distribution dynamics shows that the manufacturing 
sector is becoming more heterogeneous. At the start of the period, small establishments dominate 
in terms of number, but large and extra-large establishments dominate in terms of output and 
employment, while there seems to be a "missing middle". At the end of the period, small 
establishments dominate less in terms of numbers, with the possible emergence of a 
"manufacturing middle class", but large and extra-large establishments still dominate in terms of 
output and employment.
TABLE 5b: share in total employment of each employment size distribution quantile by year 
Vear/Quantlie 0-5% 5-10% 10-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-90% 90-95% 95-100% total
1975 0.92 0.83 3.8 7.0 11.5 16.1 12.7 47.2 100
1976 0.64 1.06 3.6 6.1 11.0 15.6 12.2 49.9 100
1977 0.55 1.49 2.8 6.6 10.8 15.9 12.7 49.2 100
1978 0.64 0.76 3.3 6.1 11.5 16.2 13.0 48.6 100
1979 0.64 0.75 3.1 6.3 11.3 16.6 13.3 48.1 100
1980 0.62 0.67 2.8 6.3 10.8 16.4 13.6 48.8 100
1981 0.59 1.29 2.8 5.5 11.0 17.1 14.0 47.7 100
1982 0.61 0.71 2.8 6.1 10.6 16.9 14.1 48.2 100
1983 0.59 1.46 2.2 5.8 10.6 17.0 14.3 48.0 100
1984 0.58 1.37 2.4 5.7 10.4 16.5 14.0 49.1 100
1985 0.85 1.00 2.9 6.3 10.8 17.0 13.8 47.4 100
1986 0.63 0.83 3.3 5.5 11.0 17.0 13.6 48.1 100
1987 0.62 1.02 3.1 5.2 10.8 17.1 13.6 48.6 100
1988 1.59 0.00 3.2 5.3 10.8 17.5 13.8 47.8 100
1989 1.25 0.80 2.1 5.2 10.6 17.7 14.1 48.4 100
1990 1.17 0.78 2.0 5.3 10.5 17.7 14.3 48.3 100
1991 0.99 0.69 2.2 4.6 10.4 18.3 14.6 48.2 100
1992 0.96 0.61 2.1 4.5 10.1 18.4 14.8 48.4 100
1993 0.83 0.54 2.0 4.6 10.1 18.1 14.9 48.8 100
1994 0.92 0.56 1.9 4.5 9.9 18.2 14.9 49.1 100
1995 0.91 0.56 1.8 4.2 9.7 17.5 14.5 50.8 100
Table 5b shows that the bottom half of establishments represent 12.5% (1975) to 7.5% (1995) of 
total employment: Even though small establishments have a heavier weight in terms of number of 
workers than in terms of output, and in spite of their very large number, they still represent a small 
share of economic activity.
Furthermore, reasoning in terms of establishments rather than in terms of companies 
underestimate the dominance of large-scale entities. Indeed, small establishments may belong to
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larger groups and add to the already huge size of the very large sector of Indonesian 
manufacturing.35
After having clearly made the point that large-scale establishments dominate the manufacturing 
sector both in terms of output and employment, while small-scale establishments dominate the 
sector in terms of the number of establishments, let us have a closer look at the "missing middle" 
hypothesis.
As a first approach, following Goeltom (1995), let us define medium-size establishments as 
establishments having between 100 and 499 workers.
Table 6 shows clearly that small-scale establishments dominate the sector in terms of number, 
although this dominance tends to reduce over time: in 1975, small-scale establishments 
represented over 82% of all establishments, against nearly 71% in 1995. All other three size 
categories saw their share in the number of establishments rise over the period: in 1975 medium, 
large and extra large (over 2,000 workers) establishments accounted for 14%, 3% and 0.3% of 
total establishments, against shares of 21.4%, 6.5% and 1.2% respectively. Clearly, in terms of 
number of establishments, the "missing middle" starts to emerge, but the share of large and extra 
large establishments continues to grow.
Of course, the reduction in the number of small-scale establishments results in lower shares in 
output and employment: in 1975, this size category represented 16.4% of total output and 30.2% 
of total employment, against 6.9% and 14.7% respectively in 1995.
Although medium-scale establishments grew in numbers over the period, their share in total output 
and employment dropped from respectively 43.1% and 29.8% in 1975, to 26.2% and 25.5% in 
1995.
On the other hand of course, the output and employment share of large and extra-large scale 
establishments shoots up.
35 Here I  could possibly use 1996 data determining whether or not an establishment is part of a group. However, this would 
not allow assessing the actual size of these groups.
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Table 6: shares of plant size categories in total number of plants, total output, and total employment
YEAR
share of small plants 
in total nb of plants
share of medium 
plants in total nb of 
plants
. . ,  , . share of extra-large share of large plants a , , , ^> plants in total nb of in total nb of plants r  , .plants
1975 82.5 14.1 3.1 0.3
1976 81.9 14.4 3.3 0.3
1977 81.9 14.3 3.5 0.3
1978 81.2 14.9 3.6 0.3
1979 80.7 15.2 3.7 0.3
1980 80.3 15.3 4.1 0.4
1981 79.4 15.9 4.3 0.4
1982 79.7 15.5 4.4 0.4
1983 79.8 15.5 4.4 0.4
1984 80.2 15.0 4.4 0.4
1985 79.3 16.0 4.3 0.4
1986 79.1 16.4 4.2 0.4
1987 78.5 16.7 4.3 0.4
1988 77.2 17.8 4.5 0.5
1989 75.2 19.0 5.1 0.7
1990 74.1 19.7 5.4 0.7
1991 72.5 20.7 6.0 0.8
1992 71.5 21.2 6.3 0.9
1993 71.0 21.4 6.6 1.0
1994 70.6 21.6 6.6 1.2
1995 70.9 21.4 6.5 1.2
share of small plants share of medium share of large plants share of extra-large
YEAR in total output plants in total output in total output plants in total output
1975 16.4 43.1 29.7 10.8
1976 16.8 40.6 31.9 10.7
1977 17.0 35.9 35.8 11.3
1978 16.7 35.9 35.5 11.9
1979 16.1 33.7 36.7 13.5
1980 15.0 32.1 37.7 15.2
1981 13.8 32.4 37.8 16.0
1982 14.2 31.9 37.8 16.1
1983 14.2 32.6 34.0 19.2
1984 13.9 32.1 33.3 20.7
1985 14.4 31.5 35.2 /T8.8'
1986 12.9 33.2 32.9 (20.9 |
1987 9.8 31.9 28.5 29.9 I
1988 12.1 31.8 33.5 1:22.7 I
1989 11.6 28.7 33.5 fce.2y
1990 10.9 30.1 32.2 26.9
1991 10.7 29.0 35.0 25.3
1992 10.2 29.3 35.7 24.8
1993 9.1 28.2 36.7 26.0
1994 7.5 27.6 35.1 29.7
1995 6.9 26.2 35.6 31.2
YEAR
share of small plants 
in total employment
share of medium 
plants in total 
employment
.  ^ share of extra-large share of large plants
in total employment p , ' r  employment
1975 30.2 29.8 28.3 11.7
1976 27.5 28.2 28.4 15.9
1977 27.6 28.3 30.3 13.8
1978 26.9 29.1 30.6 13.3
1979 26.4 29.4 30.7 13.5
1980 25.1 28.4 31.8 14.8
1981 24.5 29.0 32.6 13.9
1982 24.3 28.4 33.9 13.4
1983 24.2 28.6 33.9 13.3
1984 24.2 27.4 32.8 15.5
1985 25.0 29.0 32.3 13.7
1986 24.2 29.4 31.7 14.8
1987 23.2 28.9 32.5 15.3
1988 22.6 29.7 31.7 16.0
1989 20.0 28.6 33.1 18.3
1990 19.0 28.4 33.7 18.9
1991 17.3 28.1 34.7 19.9
The figures show clearly that in terms of number of establishments, small establishments dominate, 
while large and extra large establishments have a growing dominance in terms of output and 
employment. In terms of number of establishments, the "missing middle" seems to emerge, but 
seems to loose in importance in terms of output and employment. If, as the theoretical literature 
suggests, the medium-size establishments are the most productive, the disappearance of such a 
category could have adverse effects on the aggregate productivity growth of the manufacturing 
sector.
4.4.2 Entrants, incumbents, and exiters
In order to refine the analysis, I examine the three following sub-groups: entrants (establishments 
entering the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector in the current year), incumbents 
(establishments which entered at least the previous year), and exiters (establishments exiting the 
sector at the end of the current year).
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Table 7a: Size distribution statistics (gross output) of entrants, exitors and incumbents by
year
YEAR entrants incumbents
average output (constant IDR 1983)
size discrepancy size discrepancy 
incumbent-entrants incumbent-exiters 
exiters as a% of incumbents as a% of incumbents
size discrepancy 
entrants-exiters as 
a% of entrants
1976 552579 885289 145092 38% 84% 74%
1977 383900 890482 238845 57% 73% 38%
1978 640530 945824 175232 32% 81% 73%
1979 481947 1036491 485859 54% 53% -1%
1980 548973 1193839 161606 54% 86% 71%
1981 478800 1253062 309283 62% 75% 35%
1982 469612 1272022 246639 63% 81% 47%
1983 348655 1317198 366423 74% 72% -5%
1984 445637 1501061 135443 70% 91% 70%
1985 484339 1560005 1072987 69% 31% -122%
1986 600658 1623847 434926 63% 73% 28%
1987 723387 2431246 724996 70% 70% 0%
1988 538326 2099431 567470 74% 73% -5%
1989 758135 2343105 1337756 68% 43% -76%
1990 1180341 2772564 882167 57% 68% 25%
1991 1026220 2948074 1428215 65% 52% -39%
1992 1324502 3319571 1212916 60% 63% 8%
1993 1019592 3572945 924429 71% 74% 9%
1994 1017900 3901998 995820 74% 74% 2%
median output (constant IDR 1983)
size discrepancy size discrepancy size discrepancy
incumbent-entrants incumbent-exiters entrants-exiters as
YEAR entrants incumbents exiters as a% of incumbents as a% of incumbents a% of entrants
1976 57911 61824 27802 6% 55% 52%
1977 51063 61671 21153 17% 66% 59%
1978 64564 66293 21143 3% 68% 67%
1979 75348 69395 36600 -9% 47% 51%
1980 73288 78903 30956 7% 61% 58%
1981 57287 85599 30030 33% 65% 48%
1982 64418 88291 33635 27% 62% 48%
1983 55351 94500 37424 41% 60% 32%
1984 58823 113600 27548 48% 76% 53%
1985 56554 114067 97282 50% 15% -72%
1986 82783 110353 53336 25% 52% 36%
1987 89253 121946 46318 27% 62% 48%
1988 82958 132739 57549 38% 57% 31%
1989 99255 144301 94299 31% 35% 5%
1990 108620 172254 91529 37% 47% 16%
1991 119180 183370 97755 35% 47% 18%
1992 123148 201814 109381 39% 46% 11%
1993 119000 223636 84557 47% 62% 29%
1994 108561 230588 122185 53% 47% -13%
In terms of output, the average entrant is about 38% (1976) to 74% (1994) smaller than the 
average incumbent, while the median entrant is 6% (1976) to 54% (1994) smaller than the median 
incumbent. This suggests that, at the beginning of the period, size distribution of entrants was 
more heterogeneous than at the end of the period: the population of entrants becomes relatively 
homogeneous and small-sized relatively to incumbents.
122
If entrants become a lot smaller than incumbents, and the group of small entrants becomes more 
homogeneous In terms of size, this could be part of the explanation for relatively lower survival 
rates and an increase in exit rates. It could be the case that the increased size discrepancy between 
entrants and incumbents prevent entrants to compete with incumbents for several different 
reasons: lack of economies of scale, lower efficiency, or facing other uncompetitive barriers to 
growth.
On the other hand, the size discrepancy between incumbents and exiters remains pretty constant 
over time: on average over the period 1976-94, the average exiter is 69% smaller than the average 
incumbent, and the median exiter is 54% smaller than the median incumbent. This suggests that 
exiters are be small entrants that did not manage to grow or to become efficient.36 This is 
supported by the fact that the median exiter is on average 32% smaller than the median entrant, 
although the gap between the size of the median exiter and the median entrant tend to reduce 
over time. The difference between the average exiter and the average entrant is a lot more erratic, 
but the gap between the two groups tends to reduce over time as well.
36 The reasons for exit will be examined in further details later in chapter 6.
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Table 7b: Size distribution statistics (number of workers) of entrants, exitors and
incumbents by year
average employment (number of workers)
YEAR entrants incumbents exiters
size discrepancy size discrepancy 
incumbent-entrants incumbent-exitera 
as a% of incumbents as a% of incumbents
size discrepancy 
entrant8-exiters as 
a% of entrants
1976 67 112 40 40% 64% 41%
1977 41 111 62 63% 44% -49%
1978 57 112 46 49% 59% 20%
1979 49 116 72 58% 38% -46%
1980 62 125 51 50% 59% 19%
1981 56 125 58 55% 54% -4%
1982 57 126 54 54% 57% 6%
1983 45 126 68 64% 46% -51%
1984 49 137 27 64% 80% 45%
1985 50 134 105 63% 22% -110%
1986 54 125 59 57% 53% -9%
1987 54 134 68 59% 49% -26%
1988 61 141 69 5 7% 51% -15%
1989 76 148 116 49% 22% -51%
1990 82 166 83 51% 50% -2%
1991 75 176 97 57% 45% -29%
1992 80 183 100 56% 45% -25%
1993 65 191 95 66% 50% -46%
1994 78 195 97 60% 50% -25%
median employment (number of workers)
size discrepancy size discrepancy size discrepancy
incumbent-entrants incumbent-exitera entrants-exitera as
YEAR entrants incumbents exiters ss a% of incumbents as a% of incumbents a% of entrants
1976 25 35 26 29% 26% -4%
1977 25 35 23 29% 34% 8%
1978 25 35 24 29% 31% 4%
1979 25 36 28 31% 22% -12%
1980 25 38 26 34% 32% -4%
1981 24 38 26 37% 32% -8%
1982 24 37 25 35% 32% -4%
1983 23 37 25 38% 32% -9%
1984 23 40 17 43% 58% 26%
1985 25 40 36 38% 10% -44%
1986 26 37 27 31% 28% -4%
1987 26 39 23 33% 41% 12%
1988 26 41 26 37% 37% 0%
1989 29 41 29 30% 29% -2%
1990 26 44 30 41% 32% -15%
1991 28 44 32 36% 27% -14%
1992 28 45 31 38% 31% -11%
1993 26 47 31 45% 34% -19%
1994 26 47 30 45% 36% -15%
The same exercise using number of employees lead to similar conclusions: incumbents are larger 
than entrants, and become relatively larger over time, exiters are smaller than incumbents, the 
average exiter becomes smaller over time relatively to the average incumbent, while the median 
exiter becomes larger over time relatively to the median incumbent.
The main difference between output and employment figures concerns the gap between entrants 
and exiters: in terms of output, exiters are generally smaller than entrants, but in terms of workers,
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entrants turn out to be generally smaller than exiters. This suggests that the average and median 
entrants display a higher labour productivity than the average and median exiter: one reason for 
exit could be this lower productivity. This issue is investigated further when looking at TFP levels of 
entrants, incumbents and exiters.
Let us now focus on the size distribution of establishments in terms of number of workers. Most 
entrants are small (about 90% have less than 100 workers), the rest being medium-sized (about 
10% have between 100 and 500 workers), and entry of large establishments is marginal. The same 
is true for exiters, however, while entrants become smaller over time, exiters become larger. This 
suggests that entrants remain in the manufacturing sector for a while, grow, and eventually exit, 
but over the period, establishments grow more rapidly. Finally, incumbents are larger than entrants 
or exiters, but small establishments still dominate in terms of number of establishments.
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TABLE 8: Age distribution of entrants, exitors and incumbents by year
YEAR average p10
entrants 
p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
1975 16.85 1 4 11 21 42 75 75
1976 9.49 0 0 3 12 23 57 76
1977 9.04 0 0 2 8 22 58 77
1978 9.64 0 0 3 10 26 60 78
1979 9.39 0 1 3 9 24 49 79
1980 9.20 0 0 3 10 23 45 80
1981 9.34 0 1 3 9 24 58 81
1982 9.06 0 1 3 9 22 47 82
1983 8.75 0 1 3 10 23 33 83
1984 9.03 0 1 4 10 22 34 84
1985 8.80 0 1 3 10 22 35 85
1986 7.34 0 0 2 7 18 29 86
1987 7.01 0 0 2 7 17 27 87
1988 6.58 0 0 2 7 15 27 88
1989 5.11 0 0 1 5 13 22 89
1990 5.40 0 0 1 5 13 22 90
1991 3.71 0 0 1 3 10 15 78
1992 3.14 0 0 0 2 8 14 49
1993 2.17 0 0 0 2 6 11 23
1994 1.91 0 0 0 1 5 10 24
1995 1.49 0 0 0 0 5 10 24
YEAR average p10 p25
exitors
p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
1975 10.37 1 3 7 16 23 27 52
1976 11.18 1 4 7 16 25 36 54
1977 12.71 2 4 9 19 25 32 55
1978 13.25 2 6 10 18 26 29 57
1979 14.26 3 5 9 19 28 40 79
1980 16.30 3 7 12 22 30 42 80
1981 18.31 4 8 14 24 33 51 81
1982 17.50 4 8 12 23 31 48 82
1983 18.64 5 8 13 26 33 48 83
1984 21.08 6 10 17 27 36 54 84
1985 12.76 1 4 9 16 28 34 85
1986 13.13 2 4 8 16 28 36 86
1987 15.76 3 6 11 20 31 40 87
1988 15.42 2 5 11 20 34 40 88
1989 16.37 2 6 11 20 34 41 89
1990 15.34 2 5 11 20 34 42 90
1991 14.50 2 5 10 19 32 40 91
1992 14.54 1 3 9 19 33 43 92
1993 16.68 2 4 11 21 37 61 93
1994 16.50 2 4 9 20 38 75 94
1995 16.15 1 4 10 20 36 60 95
YEAR average pio
incumbents 
p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99
1976 18.35 2 5 13 23 46 76 76
1977 18.71 3 6 13 23 46 77 77
1978 19.12 3 6 13 24 46 78 78
1979 19.75 4 7 13 24 49 79 79
1980 20.10 4 7 13 25 49 80 80
1981 20.16 4 7 13 25 49 81 81
1982 20.23 4 7 12 25 48 82 82
1983 20.27 3 7 13 25 48 83 83
1984 19.97 4 7 13 24 48 84 84
1985 19.88 3 7 13 25 48 85 85
1986 19.19 3 12 24 43 86 86
1987 19.84 3 7 13 24 45 87 87
1988 20.07 4 7 13 24 44 88 88
1989 19.54 3 7 13 23 41 87 89
1990 19.77 3 7 13 23 41 89 90
1991 19.37 2 6 13 22 41 85 91
1992 18.78 2 6 12 22 41 81 92
1993 18.31 2 5 12 22 40 75 93 126
1994 18.01 2 5 12 22 39 73 94
In terms of age, entrants become younger over time, and are of course younger than exiters.37 This 
suggests that entrants spend less and less time in the small-scale sector (under 20-employees), 
and/or that the enumerator becomes more efficient. For example, in 1976, 25% of entrants were 
brand new, against 75% of them in 1995.
On the other hand, exiters become older with time, suggesting that survival tend to lengthen, 
and/or that old establishments are more likely to exit in the second half of the period, 
corresponding roughly to the deregulation- and post-deregulation period. In 1975, the average 
exiter was just over 10 years, against 16 years in 1995.
It is however noticeable that the trend can be dichotomised into two sub-periods: 1975-1984, and 
1985-95: the average age of exiters increased from 10 to 21 during the first period, dropped to 
almost 13 years in 1985, only to increase again up to 16 years in 1995. The 1984-85 period is 
characterised by a strong recovery of the economy after the 1981-83 recession, with a high rate of 
entries and exits. It could be the case that recession triggered this establishment turnover with a 
lag, the recession hitting the youngest establishments harder, as it is shown in the survival statistics 
in Table 9. The age distribution of incumbents remains roughly the same, with 50% of 
establishment being less than 12 to 13 years old. Since the age distribution of exiters and 
incumbents do not differ greatly, it is probably the case that age is not crucial in the decision to 
exit. This will however have to be assessed more precisely.
In summary, medium sized establishments increased in numbers, but their share in total output 
and employment decreased. Furthermore, this phenomenon is accompanied by an increase in the 
share of large and extra-large establishments both in terms of output and employment, at the 
expenses of the small and medium-scale sector. This means that the so-called "missing middle" 
starts to emerge in terms of number of establishments but not in terms of output or employment 
where its share drops substantially. By no means does this imply the end of the dominance of 
large-scale establishments, on the contrary. Rather than a movement towards market 
homogeneisation, it seems that the sector becomes more heterogeneous and experiences an 
increase in the dominance of large and extra large entities.
What are the implications of industrial demography in terms of productivity and productivity 
growth?
371 recall here that age is independent from the date of entry in the dataset, as birth date is defined as the year in which the 
establishment started operations.
127
4.5 Total Factor Productivity distribution and dynamics
After having provided a detailed demographic picture of the Indonesian manufacturing sector over 
a 20-year period, I can now turn to the core issue of this chapter: the descriptive study of 
productivity distribution and its dynamics.
I use TFP figures estimated at the establishment level in chapter 2, TFP is expressed in logarithm.38 
Table 9 displays annual TFP distribution of entrants, incumbents and exiters.
TABLE 9: TFP summary statistics of entrants, incumbents, and exttara, by year
average TFP median TFP standard deviation TFP
YEAR entrants incumbents exftere
gap entrant- 
incumbents 
as%of 
entrants entrants incumbents exiters
gap entrant- 
incumbents 
as %of 
entrants entrants incumbents exiters
1975 1.27 1.18 0.49
1976 1.42 1.38 1.28 3% 1.33 1.29 1.19 3% 0.49 0.44 0.53
1977 1.41 1.39 1.23 2% 1.32 1.29 1.16 3% 0.42 0.46 0.43
1978 1.47 1.41 1.24 4% 1.37 1.31 1.17 4% 0.47 0.46 0.41
1979 1.45 1.38 1.34 5% 1.36 1.29 1.25 5% 0.48 0.42 0.45
1980 1.47 1.39 1.30 5% 1.38 1.31 1.21 6% 0.43 0.41 0.37
1981 1.47 1.41 1.31 4% 1.38 1.33 1.24 3% 0.43 0.42 0.36
1982 1.48 1.42 1.37 2% 1.39 1.34 1.28 4% 0.39 0.42 0.41
1983 1.44 1.41 1.38 2% 1.38 1.34 1.30 3% 0.37 0.39 0.36
1984 1.46 1.42 1.42 3% 1.38 1.35 1.32 2% 0.44 0.38 0.44
1985 1.45 1.44 1.48 0% 1.37 1.37 1.36 0% 0.43 0.40 0.49
1986 1.51 1.48 1.46 3% 1.44 1.38 1.33 4% 0.40 0.39 0.52
1987 1.48 1.44 1.41 3% 1.41 1.37 1.32 3% 0.38 0.38 0.42
1988 1.47 1.45 1.42 2% 1.39 1.38 1.34 1% 0.42 0.37 0.46
1989 1.51 1.47 1.48 2% 1.42 1.39 1.36 2% 0.45 0.39 0.44
1990 1.55 1.49 1.53 4% 1.44 1.41 1.41 2% 0.48 0.38 0.48
1991 1.49 1.50 1.51 -1% 1.44 1.42 1.42 1% 0.44 0.39 0.45
1992 1.54 1.54 1.56 1% 1.47 1.44 1.45 2% 0.42 0.41 0.45
1993 1.54 1.55 1.51 -1% 1.48 1.48 1.41 1% 0.41 0.40 0.46
1994 1.51 1.56 1.59 -3% 1.44 1.47 1.48 -2% 0.39 0.39 0.47
1995 1.58 1.47 0.45
Let us first compare the median TFP of the three categories of establishments. In most cases, 
exiters display a TFP lower than the TFP of entrants and incumbents: establishments with the 
lowest TFP exit the market, supporting the hypothesis of the existence of competitive market 
forces. Only in two cases (1992 and 1994) do exiters exhibit a slightly higher TFP than incumbents. 
If I now turn to average figures, exiters surprisingly display higher TFP than incumbents for 1985 
and from 1989 to 1994 with the exception of 1993. Standard deviation figures for exiters' TFP are 
higher than the TFP standard deviation figures for incumbents, explaining the discrepancy between 
average and median results: exit is not a "clean" process, and even less so in the 1990s. In order 
to have a clearer view on these average results, there may be a need to distinguish among 
different sub-sectors of the economy for those years (1985,1989-92 and 1994).
38 In the remaining of the thesis, I use TFP measures calculated at the plant level using elasticities calculated at the 2-digit 
level.
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TABLE 10: average TFP of entrants, exitors and incumbents by industry for selected years
1985 1989 1990
entrants exiters incumbents entrants exiters incumbents entrants exiters incumbents
31 - Food, beverages and 
tobacco 1.35 1.30 1.38 1.41 1.39 1.40 1.47 1.38 1.44
32 - Textile, garments and 
leather 1.50 1.54 1.44 1.54 1.47 1.51 1.63 1.68 1.51
33 • Wood products 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.50 1.58 1.53 1.51 1.54 1.55
34 • Paper, printing & 
publishing 1.45 1.46 1.49 1.53 1.43 1.49 1.59 1.49 1.53
35 - Chemicals, rubber & 
plastic 1.40 1.51 1.50 1.54 1.52 1.49 1.50 1.49 1.51
36 - Non-metallic minerals 1.51 1.52 1.47 1.56 1.44 1.48 1.56 1.54 1.51
37 - Basic metals 1.40 1.58 1.41 1.46 2.60 1.50 1.43 1.83 1.53
38 - Metal products & 
machinery 1.50 1.59 1.48 1.57 1.54 1.48 1.52 1.50 1.51
39 - Other manufacturing 1.50 1.71 1.53 1.60 1.47 1.54 1.67 1.54 1.58
entrants
1991
exiters incumbents entrants
1992
exiters incumbents entrants
1994
exiters incumbents
31 - Food, beverages and 
tobacco. 1.42 1.36 1.44 1.49 1.40 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.50
32 - Textile, garments and 
leather 1.53 1.66 1.52 1.63 1.68 1.59 1.63 1.74 1.63
33 - Wood products 1.50 1.56 1.56 1.51 1.53 1.56 1.45 1.53 1.53
34 - Paper, printing & 
publishing 1.49 1.61 1.55 1.52 1.57 1.57 1.63 1.61 1.60
35 - Chemicals, rubber & 
plastic 1.53 1.44 1.52 1.53 1.55 1.54 1.53 1.63 1.58
36 - Non-metalllc minerals 1.55 1.50 1.52 1.49 1.63 1.53 1.49 1.59 1.55
37 - Basic metals 1.28 1.45 1.51 1.47 1.74 1.46 1.45 1.25 1.59
38 - Metal products & 
machinery 1.49 1.49 1.51 1.55 1.59 1.55 1.48 1.59 1.57
39 - Other manufacturing 1.44 1.50 1.60 1.47 1.51 1.65 1.55 1.68 1.64
Table 10 shows that all industries but one (31: food, beverages and tobacco) experience at best 
two years (33: wood products, 34: paper, printing and publishing) and at worse five years (32: 
textile, garments and leather) where the average exiter is more productive than the average 
incumbent. This feature seems symptomatic of the post-liberalisation period, when exiters 
heterogeneity in terms of TFP booms. This suggests first that the period could be split in two: pre- 
and post-liberalisation period.39 Secondly, it could be the case that in the post-liberalisation period, 
gross exit reduces TFP growth. Finally, this could suggest that exits occurring during the post­
liberalisation period have other causes than low productivity. It will be interesting to have a closer 
look at the nature of the reforms inl986-1988, as well as at the investment boom phenomenon 
after the reforms to start isolating the potential causes for exit.
Another striking feature is that entrants display higher average and median TFP than incumbents.40 
This suggests that gross entry should have a positive effect on aggregate TFP growth and 
incumbents TFP should increase over time.
391 do not here suggest that liberalisation is the cause for different behaviours of establishments in terms of productivity, 
this will have to be assessed closely.
40 The only exceptions are 1991,1993 (average) and 1994 (average and median).
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Graph 5: TFP gap between entrants and incumbents as a % of entrants' TFP
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Graph 5 shows clearly that the discrepancy between entrants and incumbents TFP decreases over 
time, supporting the view that relatively more productive entrants reduce the productivity gap 
between entrants and incumbents.41
The graph also suggests that there might be two sub-periods in the trend: before 1981, the gap 
was increasing (oil boom), but as soon as recession hit, the gap started to narrow abruptly: 
recession may have "cleaned" the market of the worse performers. The effect of the reforms 
(1986-88) is far less clear. The gap becomes nil to negative in the 1990s.
41 The gap is calculated as TFP of entrants minus TFP of incumbents as a share of TFP of entrants.
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Graph 6: TFP standard deviation for entrants, incumbents and exitors
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Let us now scrutinise the dynamics of TFP dispersion within the three groups (as measured by TFP 
standard deviation). Graph 6 shows that incumbents TFP dispersion decreases throughout the 
period, with a slight increase in the 1990s. The sharpest drop in TFP dispersion seems to occur just 
before the recession. At the same time, incumbents TFP increased over the period (Table 10). This 
already suggests a potential convergence of TFP among incumbents that triggered part of the 
aggregate TFP growth.
Entrants' TFP dispersion experiences more ups and downs: the dispersion drops from the beginning 
of the period up to the end of the recession in 1983, with the sharpest drop during the recession: 
the lower TFP bound increases, the upper TFP bound decreases, median TFP remains unchanged, 
and average TFP drops. Recession triggered more entries than previously, and entrants became a 
more homogeneous group. Entrants TFP dispersion increased again during recovery, with a slight 
drop in median TFP. The dispersion fell again sharply during the first two years of the reform period 
with a slight increase in average and median TFP. The investment boom period saw the dispersion 
rise again up to 1990, to fall after this date.
More striking is the recovery period: TFP dispersion of exiters shoots up, while the gap between 
exiters' TFP and incumbents' TFP narrows: while exits in the previous years seemed to reflect 
competitive market forces via the exit of the least productive establishments, the recovery period 
witnesses the exit of a large range of establishments not only based on low productivity. This trend
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continues during the reforms' and post-liberalisation periods but with a lower dispersion of 
productivity.
Graph 7: TFP density entrants, incumbents, exiters by year
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To complete the analysis, I compare the TFP distribution of entrants, incumbents and exiters for 
four years: 1976 (start year), 1985 (mid-period but potentially biased data), 1987 (mid-period with 
potentially less biased data), and 1994 (end year). Clearly, for 1975, exiters are less productive 
than incumbents, which in turn are less productive than entrants. However, the gaps between the 
three TFP distributions do not appear to be massive. Especially, the gap between incumbents and 
exiters TFP looks quite narrow and the two distributions overlap. Of course, this does not account 
for different sectors and other factors, but still, the graph does show that the exit process is not 
"clean".
The 1987's TFP distributions show the same patterns, but with narrower gaps between the three 
groups. The last year of observation, 1994, show no obvious differences between the three groups 
but the higher heterogeneity of the exiters group.
If exiters display lower TFP than entrants and incumbents, then exit should lead to an increase in 
aggregate TFP. Furthermore, if entrants display higher TFP than incumbents, entry is also a 
mechanism triggering aggregate TFP growth. I assess this hypothesis in the next section of the
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chapter, while decomposing aggregate TFP growth. However, as the TFP gap between entrants and 
incumbents narrows, and TFP of exiters becomes higher than incumbents' TFP, the net entry effect 
on aggregate TFP growth should slow down over time.
It is also interesting to observe the evolution of TFP distribution for each establishment type over 
time. The first graph in Graph 8 compares TFP distribution for entrants in 1976, 1985 and 1994. 
Entrants have become more productive over time and this group has become more homogeneous 
in terms of productivity.
Graph 8: TFP density dynamics, by establishment type
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I observe the same phenomenon of TFP convergence for the incumbents group, with a noticeably 
thicker base of the right-hand tail of the distribution. This sub-group of plants displaying higher TFP 
growth could have a positive effect on aggregate TFP growth (possibly "pulling" the rest of 
incumbents).
The most striking graph shows exiters' TFP dynamics. This group presents a higher TFP growth 
than both entrants and incumbents, and the right-hand tail becomes a lot thicker over time. This is 
a clear indication of the aggregate convergence phenomenon. Furthermore, this group become 
more heterogeneous in terms of TFP over time. If exiters were consistently less productive than 
incumbents, one could argue that the market has become more exigent and that exiting plant 
display higher productivity levels -  that is the "increased competition" hypothesis. However, I know 
that if exiters were less productive than incumbents from 1975 to the mid 1980s, the opposite is 
consistently true in the 1990s. This, again, raises two issues. Is the gross exit process lowering the 
potential aggregate productivity gains? And what are the reasons for plant exit if it is not a 
differential in productivity level? I investigate the first question in this chapter, while keeping the 
second issue for chapter 6.
As a first attempt to determine econometrically whether or not entrants, incumbents and exiters 
display a statistically significant productivity differential, I regress the log of TFP on the entry and 
exit dummies, controlling for time and different sectors with year and 2-digit industry dummies. 
This follows the methodology used by Aw, Chen 8i Roberts (1997) in their study of Taiwanese 
manufacturing. This type of regression helps assessing whether or not entrants and exiters have a 
significantly different average productivity level than incumbents.42
Table 11a displays the results of the OLS regression on pooled data for the period 1976-1994. The 
coefficients on year dummies represent the average incumbent TFP level for that year. I find that 
on average, entrants are more productive than incumbents (about 1.23% more productive for 
1976, positive sign), and that exiters are less productive than incumbents (about 1.24% less 
productive for 1976, negative sign). The spread between entrants and incumbents, and between 
exiters and incumbents is of the same amplitude. But of course, this does not account for changes 
of spread over time. In other words, do the results hold for the entire period?
42 Since this methodology uses averages, it has limitations.
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Table 11a: log(TFP) regressed on entry, exit, years and 2-digit industry
dummies (no constant), pooled data 1976-94
Number of obs 300484
F( 29,300455)
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.929
Adj R-squared 0.929
Root MSE 0.40523
TFP Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
entry 0.017973 0.002527 7.11 0 0.01302 0.022926
exit -0.018089 0.003189 -5.67 0 -0.02434 -0.011838
dum76 1.452395 0.007571 191.83 0 1.437556 1.467235
dum77 1.459859 0.007509 194.42 0 1.445142 1.474576
dum78 1.486985 0.007457 199.42 0 1.47237 1.501599
dum79 1.451367 0.007404 196.02 0 1.436855 1.465879
dum80 1.466754 0.007377 198.84 0 1.452296 1.481212
dum81 1.486023 0.00734 202.46 0 1.471637 1.500409
dum82 1.492634 0.007286 204.86 0 1.478354 1.506915
dum83 1.485634 0.007236 205.31 0 1.471452 1.499817
dum84 1.496662 0.007178 208.52 0 1.482594 1.51073
dum85 1.514299 0.007107 213.07 0 1.50037 1.528229
dum86 1.535782 0.007075 217.08 0 1.521916 1.549648
dum87 1.509163 0.007055 213.91 0 1.495335 1.522991
dum88 1.518807 0.007037 215.82 0 1.505014 1.5326
dum89 1.543274 0.007006 220.29 0 1.529543 1.557005
dum90 1.570143 0.006953 225.81 0 1.556515 1.583771
dum91 1.569431 0.006948 225.88 0 1.555813 1.583049
dum92 1.602374 0.006917 231.66 0 1.588816 1.615931
dum93 1.614178 0.006906 233.74 0 1.600643 1.627714
dum94 1.624463 0.006884 235.98 0 1.610971 1.637955
d31 -0.130086 0.006529 -19.93 0 -0.142881 -0.11729
d32 -0.071158 0.006557 -10.85 0 -0.084008 -0.058307
d33 -0.0132 0.006762 -1.95 0.051 -0.026454 5.41 E-05
d34 -0.014557 0.007284 -2 0.046 -0.028833 -0.000282
d35 -0.040451 0.006741 -6 0 -0.053662 -0.027239
d36 -0.044031 0.006869 -6.41 0 -0.057494 -0.030568
d37 -0.070366 0.011551 -6.09 0 -0.093005 -0.047728
d38 -0.032964 0.006806 -4.84 0 -0.046303 -0.019625
d39 (dropped)
Indeed, I have noted earlier that in the 1990s, entrants tended to become less productive than 
incumbents, and exiters tended to become more productive than incumbents. Table l ib  shows the 
results of the same regression, but on pooled data for the period 1975-89. I find that on average, 
entrants are more productive than incumbents (about 2.10% more productive for 1976, positive 
sign), and that exiters are less productive than incumbents (about 3.03% less productive for 1976,
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negative sign). For this period, the spreads are higher for both entrants and exiters, but the gap 
between exiters and incumbents is larger than the gap between entrants and incumbents.
Table 11b: log(TFP) regressed on entry, exit, years and 2-digit industry 
dummies (no constant), pooled data 1976-89
Number of obs 196913
F( 24,196889)
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.9253
Adj R-squared 0.9253
Root MSE 0.40613
TFP Coef. Std. Err. t P>jt| [95% Conf. Interval]
entry 0.029052 0.003147 9.23 0 0.022884 0.035219
exit -0.041879 0.004262 -9.83 0 -0.050233 -0.033526
dum76 1.381505 0.013183 104.79 0 1.355666 1.407344
dum77 1.388748 0.013143 105.67 0 1.362988 1.414508
dum78 1.415388 0.013113 107.94 0 1.389688 1.441089
dum79 1.380157 0.01308 105.51 0 1.35452 1.405794
dum80 1.395096 0.013068 106.76 0 1.369483 1.42071
dum81 1.413664 0.013047 108.36 0 1.388093 1.439235
dum82 1.41997 0.013013 109.12 0 1.394466 1.445474
dum83 1.41249 0.012986 108.77 0 1.387038 1.437942
dum84 1.424579 0.012952 109.99 0 1.399193 1.449966
dum85 1.439731 0.012916 111.47 0 1.414416 1.465046
dum86 1.462143 0.012901 113.34 0 1.436857 1.487429
dum87 1.437076 0.012888 111.51 0 1.411816 1.462336
dum88 1.444532 0.012878 112.17 0 1.419291 1.469774
dum89 1.4689 0.012864 114.19 0 1.443688 1.494113
d31 -0.054079 0.012661 -4.27 0 -0.078894 -0.029265
d32 -0.029543 0.012691 -2.33 0.02 -0.054417 -0.004669
d33 0.090498 0.012896 7.02 0 0.065221 0.115774
d34 0.066106 0.013276 4.98 0 0.040087 0.092126
d35 0.038517 0.012834 3 0.003 0.013363 0.063671
d36 0.043616 0.012947 3.37 0.001 0.018239 0.068993
d37 (dropped)
d38 0.054546 0.012907 4.23 0 0.02925 0.079843
d39 0.070872 0.015291 4.63 0 0.040902 0.100843
Table 11c displays the results for the period 1990-1994. It shows that the trend has been reversed: 
entrants are less productive than incumbents, while exiters are more productive than incumbents, 
although the t statistics are lower than for the previous period.
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Table 11c: log(TFP) regressed on entry, exit, years and 2-digit industry
dummies (no constant), pooled data 1990-94
Number of obs 103571
F( 15,103556) .
Prob > F 0
R-squared 0.936
Adj R-squared 0.936
Root MSE 0.40079
TFP Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| > Conf. Interval]
entry -0.007967 0.004215 -1.89 0.059 -0.016227 0.000294
exit 0.010976 0.004771 2.3 0.021 0.001626 0.020327
dum90 1.502569 0.015133 99.29 0 1.472908 1.53223
dum91 1.503818 0.015122 99.44 0 1.474179 1.533457
dum92 1.536361 0.015109 101.68 0 1.506747 1.565976
dum93 1.548218 0.015103 102.51 0 1.518618 1.577819
dum94 1.559325 0.015084 103.37 0 1.52976 1.58889
d31 -0.071331 0.015097 -4.73 0 -0.10092 -0.041742
d32 0.055911 0.015115 3.7 0 0.026286 0.085536
d33 0.009779 0.015297 0.64 0.523 -0.020202 0.039761
d34 0.036324 0.016052 2.26 0.024 0.004863 0.067785
d35 0.013483 0.015349 0.88 0.38 -0.0166 0.043567
d36 -0.0042 0.01549 -0.27 0.786 -0.03456 0.02616
d37 (dropped)
d38 0.00913 0.015386 0.59 0.553 -0.021025 0.039285
d39 0.069817 0.017539 3.98 0 0.035441 0.104192
Table 12 displays the results of the same exercise on yearly cross-section data.43 From 1976 to 
1989 (if I exclude 1985), entrants are consistently more productive than incumbents, and exiters 
are consistently less productive than incumbents. In 1990, both entrants and exiters are more 
productive than incumbents. But from 1991 to 1994, with the exception of 1993, entrants are less 
productive than incumbents, and exiters are more productive than incumbents.
43 For clarity purposes, I only report the coefficients on the entry and exit dummies with their significance level. Full results 
are available from the author.
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Table 12: log(TFP) regressed on entry and exit dummies, 2-digit industry dummies (not
reported), cross-section data, by year
year stat. entry exit year stat. entry exit
1985 coef. -0.007 0.025
sign, level 40.90% 9.30%
1976 coef. 0.034 -0.079 1986 coef. 0.034 -0.005
sign, level 2.90% 0.50% sign, level 0.70% 78.20%
1977 coef. 0.016 -0.116 1987 coef. 0.028 -0.037
sign, level 33.90% 0.00% sign, level 1.30% 0.00%
1978 coef. 0.051 -0.149 1988 coef. 0.011 -0.030
sign, level 0.20% 0.00% sign, level 23.20% 2.20%
1979 coef. 0.059 -0.055 1989 coef. 0.021 -0.001
sign, level 0.00% 0.10% sign, level 4.50% 96.20%
1980 coef. 0.070 -0.099 1990 coef. 0.044 0.029
sign, level 0.00% 0.00% sign, level 0.00% 0.10%
1981 coef. 0.048 -0.101 1991 coef. -0.020 0.006
sign, level 0.00% 0.00% sign, level 2.60% 60.70%
1982 coef. 0.026 -0.059 1992 coef. -0.003 0.015
sign, level 3.70% 0.20% sign, level 79.20% 18.40%
1983 coef. 0.025 -0.040 1993 coef. -0.015 -0.039
sign, level 2.20% 3.20% sign, level 14.20% 0.10%
1984 coef. 0.035 -0.004 1994 coef. -0.050 0.031
sign, level 0.10% 72.10% sign, level 0.00% 1.00%
Let us now assess TFP distribution by size category. I define size using the number of workers. I 
use Goeltom's classification (1995), adding an extra-large category: small establishments have less 
than 100 workers, medium-scale establishments have between 100 and 499 workers, large-scale 
establishments have between 500 and 1999 workers, and extra large establishments have 2000 
workers and over.
Which size category is the most productive?
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Graph 9: Average plant TFP by size category, by year
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At the beginning of the period, the average small establishment is less productive than the 
medium-scale one, which in turn is less productive than the large-scale one, with the extra large 
establishment being less productive than the previous three. The same pattern is observed for 
median figures regarding the first three categories, the median extra large establishment is less 
productive than the medium- and large-scale ones, but slightly more productive than the small 
establishments.
At the end of the period, the most productive average and median establishment is the medium­
sized one, followed by the large-scale and small-scale ones, the extra large one arriving last again.
The TFP growth of the average extra large and small establishments has been 0.8% a year 
between 1975 and 1995, against 0.5% a year for medium-size establishments and 0.2% a year for 
large-scale establishments. The TFP growth of the median small establishments has been 0.8% a 
year between 1975 and 1995, against 0.5% a year for medium-size and extra large establishments 
and 0.03% a year for large-scale establishments.
It is interesting to note that medium-size establishments became leaders in terms of productivity 
during the recession (1982), and maintained their position thereafter.
Clearly, while medium-size establishments have become the most productive, the categories that 
presented the most productivity growth were at the extreme of the distribution, because they were
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converging towards the most productive medium categories: in 1975, the average extra large and 
small establishments were respectively 11.8% and 10.5% less productive than the average large- 
scale establishment; in 1995, the average extra large and small establishments were respectively 
1.9% and 0.6% less productive than the average medium-scale establishment. This is already an 
indication showing that TFP heterogeneity reduction may have led to TFP growth. There is also 
material to assume that in terms of demographic changes, the recession period appears to have 
had stronger effects than reforms.
Graph 10: TFP distribution dynamics, historical sub-periods
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Graph 10 shows the movement of TFP distribution over historical sub-periods. The last graph 
compares TFP distribution for 1975, 1985 and 1995. The entire manufacturing sector has 
experienced TFP growth (distribution moves to the right), the sector has experienced convergence
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in terms of productivity levels (distribution becomes narrower and is higher), and the base of the 
right-hand tail has become thicker, showing the appearance of a group of very productive plants 
with similar productivity levels, suggesting a productivity convergence phenomenon within the 
group of the most productive plants.
How does this decompose in the sub-periods? During the oil boom (1975-80), the manufacturing 
sector experiences slow TFP growth and substantial convergence. An identical phenomenon is 
observed during the oil crisis (1980-83). During the recovery period (1983-85), I observe slow TFP 
growth but the shape of the distribution remains the same, maybe with a slight drop in density 
(slight divergence). The reform period (1985-88) only experiences a very thin movement of the 
distribution to the right. The most spectacular TFP growth occurs during the post-liberalisation and 
investment boom period (1989-95), convergence restart substantially, and the thick base of the 
right-hand tail appears.
This raises issues to be answered in chapter 6: what impact have the reforms had on TFP growth? 
How can I link the policy implemented to the process of entry, exit and convergence, and to 
aggregate TFP growth? Why did relatively highly productive plants exit in the 1990s? If plants 
having exited in the 1990s had stayed in the manufacturing sector, would TFP growth have been 
higher?
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Graph 11: TFP distribution dynamics by 2-digit industry
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Graph 11 displays TFP distribution dynamics at the 2-digit industrial level. This exercise attempts to 
underline the different behaviour of distinct industries.
All sectors experience TFP growth, however, some have higher TFP growth than others. In both the 
wood products and the paper, printing and publishing sectors, TFP growth is rather limited, 
especially for the former. Both sectors experience convergence.
The food, beverages and tobacco sector experiences substantial productivity growth together with 
strong convergence. This is also true for the chemicals, rubber and plastic sector and the non- 
metallic minerals sector. These five examples show that convergence can be accompanied either by 
very small or more substantial TFP growth. However, one should keep in mind that a movement of 
the distribution to the top without a movement of the distribution to the right could still result in 
substantial aggregate TFP growth.
Two sectors experience TFP growth without a lot of change in the shape of the distribution (neither 
convergence nor divergence): the metal products and machinery, and the other manufacturing 
sectors. Those sectors display an increase of productivity in plants, but no obvious change in the 
industry composition.
Finally, two sectors display spectacular TFP growth: textile, garments and leather, and basic metals. 
However, both these sectors display an obvious divergence of plants in terms of productivity.
This short review of productivity distribution dynamics for 2-digit industries raises another issue 
here: what triggers the highest aggregate productivity growth? Is it plants productivity convergence 
or divergence? Is it intra-plant productivity growth? Is it the processes of entry and exit? This is 
partly assessed in the section dealing with aggregate TFP growth decomposition, and investigated 
into more details in chapter 6, with a detailed historical analysis of individual sub-sectors.
4.6 TFP Growth distribution and dynamics
I have shown that average and median medium-scale establishments become the most productive 
establishments during and after the recession period. However, this part of the population, 
although increasing in numbers, tends to decline in terms of output and employment share. In 
order to complete the analysis, I here examine the behaviour of TFP Growth by demographic 
category.
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TABLE 13: Plant-level TFP Growth rates summary statistics for entrants, exitors, and incumbents, by year
YEAR entrants
average
incumbents exitors entrants
median
incumbents exitors entrants
standard deviation
incumbents exitors
1976 0.57% 0.54% 2.07% -2.33% -2.36% -0.93% 0.34 0.34 0.34
1977 -1.23% 0.33% 0.41% -2.44% -1.43% -1.43% 0.28 0.30 0.27
1978 3.52% 1.97% 0.62% 0.01% 0.35% -1.06% 0.30 0.32 0.27
1979 -4.41% -4.51% -6.51% -3.78% -3.13% -3.45% 0.30 0.32 0.40
1980 -0.32% 0.32% -0.69% -1.49% -0.34% -1.78% 0.18 0.26 0.35
1981 -0.56% 1.03% -0.97% -0.29% 0.43% -0.45% 0.17 0.26 0.31
1982 -1.81% 0.00% -2.59% -0.81% •0.41% -1.80% 0.19 0.27 0.34
1983 -2.44% -1.18% 0.13% -1.83% -1.30% 0.72% 0.18 0.26 0.31
1984 -0.74% 0.37% 1.67% -0.38% 0.02% -0.05% 0.16 0.23 0.36
1985 0.84% 1.60% 6.95% 0.22% 0.70% 0.77% 0.16 0.26 0.46
1986 3.34% 1.96% 3.64% 1.25% 1.12% 1.20% 0.38 0.36 0.58
1987 -3.53% -2.61% -5.96% -4.29% -2.42% -4.13% 0.20 0.29 0.40
1988 1.11% 0.75% 1.31% 0.99% 0.78% 1.32% 0.19 0.26 0.32
1989 1.26% 1.99% 3.12% 1.26% 1.32% 3.54% 0.29 0.28 0.28
1990 0.71% 2.04% 2.12% -0.04% 0.52% -0.26% 0.30 0.31 0.26
1991 0.64% 0.56% 1.25% -0.45% 0.09% 0.94% 0.30 0.29 0.29
1992 5.14% 3.20% 5.23% 4.37% 1.92% 3.13% 0.38 0.35 0.31
1993 5.72% 1.34% 1.26% 1.25% 0.35% 1.42% 0.36 0.33 0.39
1994 2.55% 1.23% 0.31% 0.06% 0.77% -0.27% 0.39 0.32 0.40
1995 6.48% 0.42% 0.33
Table 13 displays TFPG summary statistics for entrants, incumbents, and exiters by year. The 
measure of TFP Growth is taken from chapter 2 and has been calculated at the plant level, using 
elasticities of output with respect to inputs (intermediate inputs, labour and capital) estimated at 
the 2-digit level on a log level equation.
Average and median exiters' TFP growth appears to be higher than incumbents' TFP growth in most 
years. This phenomenon manifests itself especially after the recession, from 1982 onwards. This 
tends to confirm the trend observed graphically. Also, in most years, TFP growth is more 
heterogeneous for exiters (higher standard deviation). Again, this raises the question of the 
efficiency of the exit process: if exiters had stayed in the manufacturing sector, would aggregate 
TFP growth have been higher? This observation is also compatible with the fact that plants about to 
exit sometimes experience a surge in productivity growth in an ultimate attempt to survive.
The average and median entrant experience in most cases lower TFP growth than incumbents. This 
is not surprising since entrants display generally a higher TFP level. Also noticeable is the fact that 
average and median entrant displays negative TFP growth up to the mid 1980s. Meanwhile, the 
TFP gap between entrants and incumbents is larger during that period. This suggests that the 
contribution from entrants to aggregate TFP growth stems from the entry of higher TFP level plants 
rather than from early TFP growth of entrants, especially up to the mid 1980s.
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Graph 12: TFP Growth rates averages by year, by size group
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Graph 12 displays TFP growth averages by size category. Over the period 1975-95, the average 
small plant experiences a higher TFP growth than all other three size categories, followed by the 
medium sized plants, followed by large and extra-large plants, which experience negative TFP rates 
of change. The ranking is similar in terms of median.
Large and extra-large establishments represent an overwhelming majority in terms of output and 
employment, but they are the plants that experience the least productivity growth over the period, 
and in fact, their average productivity change is negative. This suggests that -  since aggregate 
productivity growth is positive -  the positive contribution should stem both from small-medium 
sized plants and entrants.
4.7 TFP Growth decomposition
The earlier sections firstly confirm that large- and extra-large-scale plants increasingly dominate the 
sector both in terms of output and employment. Meanwhile, the number of medium-scale plants 
increases at the expenses of the small-scale sector. Secondly, during the oil boom, large-scale 
plants are the most productive, but medium-scale plants follow closely. Extra-large plants are the 
least productive. Medium-scale plants become the most productive as soon as 1982. Finally, the 
bulk of entry and exit occurs with the small- and medium-scale plants sector.
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Plant heterogeneity in terms of size, factor proportion and technology results in productivity and 
productivity growth heterogeneity. The literature, as well as previous empirical evidence, shows 
that aggregate productivity growth can be decomposed into three elements: intra-plant productivity 
growth for incumbents, reallocation of market shares among incumbents, and reallocation of 
market shares from exiters to entrants (net entry effect).
I estimate aggregate TFP Growth using different decompositions into entry, exit, market share 
reallocation, and within plant productivity growth.
The basic decomposition is carried out using:
f  \
Ain TFP = £ ( * „  InTFP,- 6 , . ,  In777>, J +  In TFP, - £ X _ r In TFP,_
ieS \ ie N  ieX
(1)
where TFP is Total Factor Productivity, i is the subscript for plants, S designates the group of 
incumbents, N the group of entrants, X the group of exiters, t the end year, and t — t  the start 
year.44
Following Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992), I decompose productivity growth among the survivors 
in two ways (the BHC decomposition). Their contribution comes from improvements in each 
plant separately (holding output shares constant) and from changes in the output shares:
InTFP, -0,_,\nTFP,_t ) = 2 X _ ,A ln TFP, + £ > „  -  0,_r)\nTFP„
ieS /eS
(2)
44 TFP estimates at the establishment level are taken from chapter 2.
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Table 14: Decomposition of aggregate TFP Growth
Simple 
average of 
plant TFPG dlvlsla Index BHC decomposition (TFP aggregated with market shares)
YEAR
Aggregate
TFPG
excluding net 
entry
Aggregate
TFPG
excluding net 
entry
market
share
reallocation
among
incumbents
Intraplant TFPG 
for incumbents
total TFPG
Of
Incumbents
net entry 
TFPG
Aggregate 
TFPG from 
decomposition
1976 1.39% -3.51% -14.43% -4.22% -18.65% 9.72% -8.93%
1977 -0.37% 2.41% -4.49% -0.75% -5.24% 4.97% -0.27%
1978 2.15% 4.68% -5.38% 0.95% -4.43% 9.99% 5.57%
1979 -4.66% -3.36% -5.40% -6.69% -12.09% 2.24% -9.84%
1980 0.24% 1.54% -1.87% -2.88% -4.75% 6.37% 1.62%
1981 0.97% 2.70% -3.70% 1.03% -2.67% 5.09% 2.43%
1982 0.23% -1.87% -3.86% -4.21% -8.07% 5.34% -2.73%
1983 -0.23% -1.10% -3.20% -3.51% -6.71% 3.03% -3.68%
1984 0.90% 1.42% -5.78% 0.71% -5.07% 4.62% -0.45%
1985 4.42% 3.30% -6.80% 0.02% -6.78% 4.85% -1.93%
1986 3.37% 3.62% 4.22% -1.26% 2.96% 2.80% 5.76%
1987 -3.93% 12.58% 11.14% -0.32% 10.81% -1.79% 9.02%
1988 0.49% -12.25% 1.80% -15.68% -13.88% 3.34% -10.54%
1989 3.06% 3.87% 1.05% •0.50% 0.55% 2.37% 2.92%
1990 3.45% 3.26% -3.09% 0.58% -2.51% 11.21% 8.71%
1991 0.48% -0.69% 0.36% -3.69% -3.34% 1.91% -1.43%
1992 3.66% 5.08% 3.60% -0.70% 2.90% 3.69% 6.59%
1993 1.97% 2.54% 3.78% -5.54% -1.76% 1.00% -0.75%
1994 1.53% -0.80% 2.49% -9.49% -7.00% 2.15% -4.85%
1995 0.62% 2.48% 2.33% 5.78% 8.12% 3.33% 11.44%
average 76-94 1.01% 1.23% -1.66% -2.96% -4.51% 4.36% -0.16%
average 76-80 -0.25% 0.35% -6.31% -2.72% -9.03% 6.66% -2.37%
average 81-83 0.32% -0.09% -3.59% -2.23% -5.82% 4.49% -1.33%
average 84-85 2.66% 2.36% -6.29% 0.36% -5.93% 4.74% -1.19%
average 86-88 -0.02% 1.32% 5.72% -5.76% -0.04% 1.45% 1.41%
average 89-94 2.36% 2.21% 1.36% -3.22% -1.86% 3.72% 1.86%
FHK decomposition (TFP aggregated with market shares, TFP relative to the 
average)
GR decompostlon (TFP aggregated with market shares and time 
average market shares, TFP relative to the average - time 
average)
YEAR
market share 
reallocation 
among 
Incumbents
intraplant 
TFPG for 
incumbents
covariance 
term for 
Incumbents
total TFPG of 
incumbents
net entry 
TFPG TFPG
market share 
reallocation 
among 
incumbents
Intraplant 
TFPG for 
Incumbents
total TFPG 
of
Incumbents
net entry 
TFPG TFPG
1976 -7.59% -4.22% 3.55% -8.26% 2.08% -6.18% -5.82% -2.45% -8.26% 2.08% -6.18%
1977 -3.28% -0.75% 3.03% -1.01% 1.02% 0.01% -1.77% 0.76% -1.01% 1.08% 0.07%
1978 -3.82% 0.95% 4.75% 1.88% 3.15% 5.04% -1.44% 3.32% 1.88% 3.15% 5.03%
1979 -5.49% -6.69% 4.28% -7.89% 0.61% -7.28% -3.34% -4.55% -7.89% 1.17% -6.72%
1980 -3.60% -2.88% 3.51% -2.97% 1.22% -1.75% -1.85% -1.12% -2.97% 1.21% -1.76%
1981 -1.78% 1.03% 2.01% 1.26% 1.00% 2.27% -0.78% 2.04% 1.26% 1.05% 2.32%
1982 -2.64% -4.21% 2.45% -4.39% 1.38% -3.02% -1.39% -2.99% -4.38% 1.40% -2.98%
1983 -4.01% -3.51% 3.46% -4.06% 0.34% -3.72% -2.28% -1.78% -4.06% 0.40% -3.66%
1984 -3.19% 0.71% 1.38% -1.10% 0.65% -0.45% -2.50% 1.40% -1.10% 0.67% -0.43%
1985 -3.97% 0.02% 4.37% 0.42% 1.71% 2.13% -1.79% 2.21% 0.42% 1.51% 1.93%
1986 -3.74% -1.26% 5.80% 0.79% 0.61% 1.40% -0.85% 1.64% 0.79% 0.62% 1.42%
1987 -0.21% -0.32% 12.04% 11.51% -0.33% 11.17% 5.81% 5.70% 11.51% 0.00% 11.51%
1988 -13.26% -15.68% 15.26% -13.68% 0.60% -13.08% -5.63% -8.05% -13.68% 0.62% -13.06%
1989 -2.66% -0.50% 5.16% 2.00% 0.76% 2.76% -0.03% 2.08% 2.05% 0.78% 2.83%
1990 -2.16% 0.58% 4.30% 2.72% 9.59% 12.31% -0.01% 2.73% 2.72% 9.71% 12.43%
1991 -5.70% -3.69% 5.98% -3.41% 1.39% -2.02% -2.71% -0.70% -3.41% 1.39% -2.02%
1992 -5.66% -0.70% 10.28% 3.91% 1.56% 5.47% -0.47% 4.44% 3.97% 1.45% 5.42%
1993 -6.67% -5.54% 10.47% -1.73% 0.21% -1.52% -1.44% -0.30% -1.74% 0.81% -0.93%
1994 -9.28% -9.49% 12.72% -6.05% 0.54% -5.51% -2.93% -3.13% -6.05% 0.62% -5.43%
1995 -1.55% 5.78% 4.48% 8.72% 0.41% 9.12% 0.70% 8.02% 8.72% 0.41% 9.13%
average 76-94 -4.67% -2.96% 6.04% •1.58% 1.48% -0.10% -1.64% 0.07% •1.58% 1.56% •0.01%
average 76-80 -4.76% -2.72% 3.82% -3.65% 1.62% -2.03% -2.84% -0.81% -3.65% 1.74% -1.91%
average 81-63 -2.81% -2.23% 2.64% -2.40% 0.91% -1.49% -1.48% -0.91% -2.39% 0.95% -1.44%
average 84-85 -3.58% 0.36% 2.88% -0.34% 1.18% 0.84% -2.14% 1.80% -0.34% 1.09% 0.75%
average 86-88 -5.74% -5.76% 11.03% -0.46% 0.29% -0.17% -0.22% •0.24% -0.46% 0.42% -0.04%
average 89-94 -5.36% -3.22% 8.15% -0.43% 2.34% 1.92% -1.26% 0.85% -0.41% 2.46% 2.05%
The BHC methodology gives a negative average annual TFP change for 1976-94 at -0.15%, with a 
strong positive contribution from net entry at 4.36% p.a. and a strong negative contribution from 
incumbents at -4.51% p.a.. Both intra-plant TFP growth and market share reallocation among 
incumbents contribute negatively to aggregate TFP growth, with an average of -2.96% p.a. for the 
former, and -1.56% p.a. for the latter.
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The highest positive contribution to aggregate TFP growth from net entry occurs during the oil 
boom, with an annual average of 6.66%, dropping to 4.49% during the oil crisis. It increases 
slightly during the short recovery period to 4.74% p.a.. The de-regulation period witnesses the 
lowest net entry contribution at 1.45% p.a., followed by a strong recovery during the investment 
boom with an annual contribution at 3.72%.
Incumbents contribution to aggregate TFP growth follows exactly the opposite pattern: strongly 
negative during the oil boom at -9.0% p.a., it ameliorates during the oil crisis and recovery at 
respectively -5.8% and -5.9% p.a.. The negative contribution becomes almost nil during de­
regulation at -0.04% p.a., but rises again during the investment boom at -1.9% p.a..
While the contribution of intra-plant productivity growth does not show any consistent positive sign 
over the period, the contribution of market share reallocation becomes positive during de-regulation 
at 5.72% p.a., to drop slightly during the investment boom at 1.36% p.a..
In summary, were net entry not taken into account, aggregate TFP change would have remained 
negative over the entire period. As the positive contribution of net entry fades, incumbents' 
consistent negative contribution to aggregate TFP growth, especially in terms of intra-plant 
productivity growth, could represent a threat to future aggregate TFP growth. However, one could 
argue that Indonesian manufacturing is still at an early stage of development in terms of 
demography.
The Indonesian manufacturing sector started with a low productivity level and low 
productivity growth in a relatively uncompetitive environment, where however entry 
and exit was an operating process. At this stage, the only positive contribution to 
aggregate TFP growth stems from the entry of relatively high TFP plants and the exit of 
relatively low TFP plants. The very high net entry contribution to aggregate TFP growth 
during the oil boom period suggests that under adverse conditions for SMI, only very 
productive plants managed to enter the medium- and large-scale industrial sector. As 
those entrants become incumbents, incumbents' negative contribution ameliorates to 
become positive, at least in terms of market share reallocation during market de­
regulation. However, the negative contribution of intra-plant productivity growth 
remains.
Haltiwanger (1997) argues that the BHC decomposition may be misleading. Indeed, even when 
entrants are very productive and exiters very unproductive, if exiters totalise a large market share 
(relatively to entrants), then net entry could still have a negative effect on aggregate productivity 
growth. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) propose to decompose aggregate productivity 
growth relatively to the mean (FHK decomposition):
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where tfp is total factor productivity of plants, and TFP average tfp.
The first term represents incumbents' intra-plant productivity growth, the second term stands for 
the contribution of market share reallocation (it is positive when market share increases for 
incumbents with above average productivity level at the beginning of the period). The third element 
is a covariance term. The contribution is positive when market shares are reallocated from plants 
with declining productivity to plants with increasing productivity. The last two terms stand for the 
contribution of net entry, which is positive when entrants display productivity higher than the 
average, irrespective of market share.
Results are similar to those obtained with the BHC decomposition, with the exception of the market 
share reallocation effect that worsens over time with the FHK decomposition. However, the FHK 
decomposition includes an additional covariance term reflecting market share reallocation from 
declining to increasing productivity plants. In FHK, this term is consistently positive and improves 
over the period.
As Disney, Haskel and Heden (2000) point out "this method [FHK] is vulnerable to measurement 
error. Suppose that employment is measured with error and that the 0S are employment weights.
Measurement error would give a spuriously high correlation between AO and Atfp understating
the covariance effect. In addition it would give a spuriously high correlation between 0it_k and
Atfp , giving a spuriously low within-plant effect." (p. 13) One alternative is to use a decomposition
proposed by Griliches and Regev (1992) (GR decomposition):
a tfp , = Y jS ^ p „  - t f p )
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where bars stand for time average over base and end year.
As opposed to the FHK decomposition, using the GR decomposition leads to an improvement of the 
within-plant effect. Furthermore, while total incumbents' effect on TFP growth is similar in both FHK 
and GR, average market share reallocation effect is negative, and the intra-plant contribution is 
positive, as opposed to both BHC and FHK.
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In summary, the contribution of net entry to aggregate TFP growth is consistently positive and 
always higher than the aggregate rate of TFP change over the period: in relative terms, high 
productivity entrants replace low productivity exiters, thereby triggering TFP Growth. To a certain 
extent, the market seems to behave in a competitive way. As the turnover process occurs mainly in 
the small- and medium-scale sector, these results suggest that any positive TFP change stems from 
turnover in that sector. What is quite striking is that this effect is at its highest during the oil boom 
period. During that period, large-scale plants have been the most productive (moderated by the 
fact that extra-large plants are the least productive), but the catching up process within the small- 
and medium-scale sector of manufacturing has been accountable for the positive TFP growth rates.
In the first set of results (BHC decomposition), the market share reallocation effect appears to be 
negative, at least before the deregulation period, meaning that market shares are redistributed 
from high to low productivity plants. This can seems surprising at first. Considering the FHK 
decomposition confirms that market share reallocation occurs from high to low productivity plants, 
but in the mean time, it also appears that market shares are reallocated from low to high 
productivity growth plants (covariance term). Adding up the two terms shows that the market share 
reallocation effect is in fact positive on average over the entire period.
Intra-plant productivity growth could be considered as being procyclical, in that it turns out to be 
positive during both the rebound period after the oil crisis, and the investment boom that followed 
the deregulation period (GR decomposition). However, it is negative during the oil boom period, 
suggesting that output growth does not necessarily translate into intra-plant productivity growth in 
a distorted environment. The intra-plant contribution is also negative during the deregulation 
period, suggesting that it might have been a hard time for all plants.
Comparing the results of the different decompositions of aggregate TFP growth shows 
two consistencies: (1) net entry effect is on average always high and positive, (2) TFP 
growth of incumbents is on average always negative, and any positive aggregate TFP 
growth is due to net entry. The different methodologies also show that it is difficult to 
decompose accurately incumbents' contribution to aggregate TFP growth.
As a last remark, let us concentrate on average figures for the entire period 1976-1994. The 
reestimation of aggregate TFP Growth using the BHC decomposition into the effects of entry, exit, 
market share reallocation and intra-plant productivity growth gives an annual average aggregate 
TFP Growth of -0.15%, against 1.23% for aggregate TFP Growth estimated using the Divisia Index 
methodology and 1.01% for the simple average methodology. The discrepancy between both sets 
of results stems from the use of different weights in the construction of the index numbers. TFP 
Growth in Chapter 2 is aggregated using different weights for each component of productivity
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growth: output is weighted with output shares, input is weighted with input shares, labour is 
weighted with labour shares, and capital is weighted with capital shares. Here, TFP and TFP growth 
are calculated at the establishment level, and aggregated using output shares only. While the first 
TFP estimate emphasises the importance of the relative size and the relative use of different inputs, 
the second TFP estimate simplify the weighting exercise by using output shares only, but 
emphasizes the decomposition of aggregate TFP Growth decomposition into the effects of entry, 
exit, market share reallocation and intra-plant productivity growth.
Table 15a: Aggregate TFP of entrants, Table 15b: Aggregate TFP of entrants,
incumbents, and exitors incumbents, and exitors, base 100 in 1976
entrants incumbents exitors entrants incumbents exitors
1975 -0.004
1976 0.104 1.645 -0.007 1976 100.0 100.0 100.0
1977 0.061 1.682 -0.012 1977 58.9 102.2 172.7
1978 0.108 1.689 -0.008 1978 103.7 102.7 116.5
1979 0.071 1.618 -0.048 1979 68.0 98.4 718.9
1980 0.076 1.629 -0.013 1980 73.5 99.1 190.1
1981 0.066 1.658 -0.015 1981 63.0 100.8 217.5
1982 0.065 1.630 -0.012 1982 62.5 99.1 172.2
1983 0.045 1.610 -0.015 1983 43.3 97.9 218.2
1984 0.063 1.587 -0.017 1984 60.7 96.5 251.1
1985 0.110 1.535 -0.062 1985 106.2 93.3 922.6
1986 0.043 1.645 -0.015 1986 41.1 100.0 219.4
1987 0.040 1.726 -0.057 1987 38.1 105.0 856.7
1988 0.059 1.602 -0.025 1988 56.4 97.4 375.6
1989 0.050 1.634 -0.027 1989 48.5 99.4 399.2
1990 0.191 1.572 -0.079 1990 183.5 95.6 1172.8
1991 0.081 1.673 -0.062 1991 78.4 101.7 930.2
1992 0.084 1.745 -0.048 1992 81.3 106.1 710.2
1993 0.048 1.779 -0.038 1993 46.1 108.2 565.2
1994 0.047 1.729 -0.026 1994 45.6 105.1 386.8
1995 0.033 1.856 1995 32.0 112.8
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Graph 13: Aggregate TFP levels for entrants, incumbents and exitors
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After having looked at the "representative" entrant, incumbent and exiter through average and 
median figures, let us turn to the aggregate productivity level of each demographic category. 
Aggregate TFP level for each category is the sum of all n establishments' i TFP levels weighted by 
their output share 0 . For example, aggregate TFP for the incumbents group (noted S ) is:
n
TFps = Y .° iTFP> (5)
i= l
For all years, aggregate TFP of entrants is higher than the aggregate TFP of exiters. However, the 
productivity differential between aggregate entry and aggregate exit tend to reduce over time, 
explaining the overall decline in the contribution of net entry to aggregate TFP Growth. Indeed, 
during the reform period, the net contribution drops to an average of 1.45% p.a. The net effect 
rises again to 3.7% p.a. in the post-liberalisation period, but this reflects mainly what happens in 
1990 when entrants' aggregate TFP shoots up comparatively to exiters' aggregate TFP.
At the same time, aggregate TFP of incumbents rose, with two steep rises after 1985 and 1990, 
while aggregate entrants' productivity shot up and aggregate exiters' productivity dropped 
dramatically.
What I observe is a phenomenon of convergence between aggregate entrants, and exiters TFP 
levels, with a rise in aggregate incumbents productivity: as highly productive establishments 
entered, incumbents productivity increased (maybe due to competition and surely due to 
assimilation of entrants that became incumbents), and as poorly productive establishments exited,
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aggregate exiters' TFP increased. The Indonesian manufacturing sector has, to a certain extent, 
realised potential productivity gains through a reduction in productivity heterogeneity.
Graph 13 sheds also light on exiters productivity as compared to entrants and incumbents. It shows 
that, although average and median exiters may sometimes be more productive than their 
counterparts in the entrants and incumbents sub-groups, aggregate exiters' TFP is always lower 
than entrants' and incumbents aggregate TFP.
4.8 International comparative evidence
How do these life tables compare with previous evidence regarding the Indonesian manufacturing 
sector? Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird (1998) look at different indicators among which size distribution 
dynamics for the period 1977-91 and distinguish among three size groups in terms of employment: 
20 to 99 workers, 100 to 499 workers and over 499 workers. They choose to display the value 
added share of each size group rather than the gross output share.
Table 16: Comparative evidence for industrial size distribution
Indonesia % of value added % of gross output
Years
Current year size group (No 
employed)
Current year size group (No 
employed)
20-99 100-499 >500 20-99 100-499 >500
1975 16.4 43.1 40.5
1976 16.8 40.6 42.6
1977 9.0 24.2 66.8 17.0 35.9 47.1
1978 8.8 25.2 66.1 16.7 35.9 47.4
1979 8.1 25.7 66.3 16.1 33.7 50.2
1980 7.3 25.0 67.7 15.0 32.1 52.9
1981 6.6 23.8 69.6 13.8 32.4 53.8
1982 6.9 25.1 68.1 14.2 31.9 54.0
1983 6.4 23.3 70.3 14.2 32.6 53.2
1984 6.4 22.7 70.8 13.9 32.1 54.0
1985 12.0 30.3 57.6 14.4 31.5 54.0
1986 8.4 27.3 64.3 12.9 33.2 53.8
1987 7.4 27.0 65.7 9.8 31.9 58.4
1988 9.1 28.6 62.3 12.1 31.8 56.1
1989 7.6 27.4 65.0 11.6 28.7 59.7
1990 7.0 27.3 65.7 10.9 30.1 59.1
1991 10.7 29.0 60.3
1992 10.2 29.3 60.5
1993 9.1 28.2 62.7
1994 7.5 27.6 64.8
1995 6.9 26.2 66.9
Source: Hill, Aswicahyono, and Bird (1998, _ _ , , ..’ '  ’ Source: Own calculationstable 3.5, p.71)
153
Results are at first sight very similar, confirming the predominance of large-scale establishments, 
although the dominance seems to be more pronounced in terms of value added. However, in terms 
of value added, the shares of all size groups tend to remain rather unchanged, while output shares 
change significantly.
It is a stylised fact that in developing countries, small establishments dominate in terms of 
numbers. In Chile, over the period 1979-85, their share represented between 92% and 93.7%. In 
Colombia, between 1977 and 1985, the small scale sector represented between 87.5% and 85.4% 
(Tybout, 1996, various chapters). In Singapore, between 1965 and 1992, small scale plants 
represented between 91.7% and 82.1%. Their employment and value added shares diminish to the 
benefit of medium and large-scale plants. For example, the employment share of plants with 300 
employees or more Increases from 21.5% to 53.3% between 1965 and 1992, while their value 
added share increases from 31.1% to 61.2% (H.Hill, 1997, p277). However, these figures do not 
permit to account for the importance of large and extra-large plants separately.
Table 17 presents additional comparative figures for other countries. The most striking difference 
between Indonesia and other countries regard the higher survival rates, even when compared to 
developing countries figures. In their latest study of industrial dynamics for OECD countries, 
Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi (2003), find that OECD countries have a 7-year survival rate 
ranging between 50% and 40%, while Indonesia displays an average 7-year survival rate at 
68.8%, about the same as Portugal. This could have two different explanations, depending on the 
sign of the productivity differential between entrants and incumbents and incumbents and exiters:
(1) because entrants are more productive than incumbents, the cohort survival rates are high, or
(2) the exit process is not functioning properly, some plants with lower productivity remain in 
activity.
t
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Table 17: Comparative evidence for industrial dsmographic statistics
Entry 
rates p.a.
Exit rates 
p.a.
Entry penetration 
rates p.a. (output)
Gross job 
addition p.a. 
(employment 
entry rates)
Gross job 
losses p.a. 
(employment 
exit rates)
Employe 
ment 
turnover 
rates p.a.
1-year
survival
rates
3-year
survival
rates
5-year
survival
rates
7-year
survival
rates
10-year
survival
rates
UK 1974-79 
(Disney, Haskel, & 
Heden, 2000)
2.5 to 
14.5% 1.5 to 6.4% 40% 20%
UK 1989-94 
(Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta & 
Schivardi 2003)
10% 78% 45%
US 1972-87 (Baily, 
Hulten & Campbell, 
1992)
9.20% 10.40% 19.60%
US 1989-94 
(Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta & Schivardi 
2003)
3.80% 03% 65% 55% 45%
Indonesia 1976-94 
(Author) 9.95% 5.46% 4.21% 4.61% 2.95% 7.56% 95.75% 85510% 76.30% 68.80% 58.80%
Portugal 1989-94 
(Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta &  
Schivardi 2003)
8% 83% 63% 52%
Canada 1970-82 
(Baldwin & 
Gorecld, 1991)
4.90% 6.50% 2% 3.20% 40%
Canada 1989-94 
(Bartelsman, 
Scarpetta &  
Schivardi 2003)
3.00%
Chile 1979-86 (Liu, 
1993, Tybout & Liu, 
1996)
6.10% 10.80% 1.60% 12.90% 13.90% 26.80% 73%
Colombia 1977-85 
(Tybout & Liu, 
1996)
12.20% 11.10% 4.90% 79%
Colombia 1977-91 
(Fernandes, 2002) 12.50% 12.20% 24.60%
Morocco 1984-89 
(Haddad, De Melo, 
& Horton, 1996)
13% 6% 18.60% 12.10% 30.70%
Taiwan 1986 &  
1991 (Aw, Chen, & 
Roberts, 1997)
20.5% & 
66.05%
63.07% & 
15.70% 25.04% & 38.14%
In terms of productivity and productivity growth, Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) find that for 
the US over the 1972-87 period, entry and exit have a very small impact on aggregate TFP growth, 
the bulk of it being attributed to market share reallocation. Using the same data for the 
Telecommunication sector in particular, Olley and Pakes (1992) find that aggregate productivity 
growth is mostly due to market share reallocation and plants turnover.
Griliches and Regev (1992), for the Israeli industry over the period 1979-88, find that aggregate 
labor productivity gains are attributable to intra-plant productivity improvement. While entrants 
generally display higher productivity than incumbents, turnover only accounts for 10% of 
productivity gains.
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Table 18: Comparative evidence for aggregate TFP Growth decomposition
I n t r a  - p  la n t 
p ro d u c t iv i tv g r o w t h
M a r k e t  s h a r e  
re a llo c a t io n
E n t ry & e x i t  
p r o c e s s
U S  (B a ily , H ul t e  n & 
C a m p b e l l ,  1 9 9 2 ;
H a I t iw a n g e r ,  1 9 9 7 )
s e c o n d a r y  s o u r c e  
o f  a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G ro w th a n d  
p ro c v c l ie a I
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G r o w t h
m a r g i n a l  
c o n t r i b u  t i o n
I s r a e I ( G ri l ic he  s & 
R e g e v ,  1 9 9 2 )
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G ro w th a n d  
p ro c y c l ie a I
m a r g i n a l  
c o n  t r ib u t io n
m a r g i n a l
c o n t r i b u t i o n
C o lo m b ia ( L i u  & 
T v b o u t ,  1 9 9 6 )
s u b s ta n t i a I 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  a n d  
p ro c y c l ie a I
s u b s t a n t i a l
c o n t r i b u t i o n
s u b s t a n t i a l  
c o n t r i bu  t i o n
U K  (D y s n e y  & 
H a s k e l .  2 0 0 0 )
m a rg in a I
c o n t r i b u t io n ( 1 8 %  
a t i ts m o s t) a n d 
p ro c v c l ie a I
s e c o n d a r y  s o u r c e  
o f  T F P  G r o w t h
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G ro w th ( 5  0 % )
T a i w a n  ( A w ,  C h e n  
& R o b e  r t s .  1 9 9 7 )
s e c o n d a r y  s o u r c e  
o f  a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G ro w th a n d  
p r o c v c l i c a  I
m a r g i n a l  
c o n t r ib u t io n
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G ro w th ( 5 0 % )
K o r e a  ( H a h n ,  
2 0 0 0 )
s u b s ta n t i a I 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  a n d  
p r o c y c l i c a l
m a r g i n a l  
c o n t r i b u t io n
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G r o w t h  ( 3 5 %  to 
4 5 % )
I n d o n e s i a  ( V i a l ,  
2 0 0 4  )
m a rg in a I
c o n t r i b u t i o n ,
s o m e h o w
p ro c y c l ie a I, b u t
s e e m s  o n  a v e r a g e
n e g a t i v e
s u b s  t a n t i a  I 
c o n t r ib u t io n f ro m 
re a llo c a t io n f ro m 
l o w to h i g h  T F P  
G r o w t h  p la n ts
m a i n  s o u r c e  o f  
a g g r e g a t e  T F P  
G ro w th
Baldwin and Gorecki (1991), for Canadian manufacturing 1970-1979, find that entering plants are 
more productive than incumbents, exiters are less productive than incumbents and turnover 
accounts for about 30% of aggregate TFP gains.
Tybout (1996, p. 52) also reports that "during Chile's severe recession of the early 1980s, net exit 
increased the market share of incumbents, improving aggregate productivity...Net entry did the 
opposite in Morocco, where macroeconomic expansion was associated with rapid net entry, falling 
market shares for incumbents, and lower aggregate productivity." For Chile (1979-85) net exit 
accounted for about 30% of aggregate productivity growth, while for Morocco, net entry accounted 
for about 45% of productivity decline. On the other hand, in Colombia (1977-87), net entry only 
accounted for about 8% of aggregate TFP growth.
For Taiwan (1981-91), Aw, Chen 8i Roberts (1997) find that entrants and exiters are less productive 
than incumbents. However, surviving entrants' productivity level converges with incumbents' 
productivity level, and net entry can account up to 50% of aggregate TFP growth.
For Korea (1990-98), Hahn (2000) finds that on average, both entrants and exiters display lower 
productivity levels than incumbents. For the period 1990-95, net entry account for over 45% of 
aggregate productivity growth, and over 65% for the period 1995-98. The market share 
reallocation effect is negative for the first sub-period, but improves substantially in the second
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period. Intra-plant productivity growth played a large positive role in the first sub-period, but 
becomes negative in the second period.
Indonesian manufacturing data are in line with the UK and New Industrialised Countries in 
particular, in that entry and exit is a great source of aggregate TFP Growth. Market share 
reallocation has a slightly positive effect because the reallocation from high to low productivity 
plants is counterbalanced by the reallocation from low to high productivity growth plants. Intra­
plant productivity growth could be considered as being procyclical to a certain extent, with the 
noticeable exception of the oil boom period.
In Indonesia, because entrants are generally more productive than incumbents, and exiters 
generally less productive than incumbents, it is far from surprising to find that net entry accounts 
for most of aggregate productivity gains, and generally counterbalancing the productivity losses of 
incumbents.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter proposes a detailed demographic study of the Indonesian manufacturing sector, 
focusing on size distribution, the process of entry and exit, and the dynamics of TFP Growth. It 
firstly underlines the importance of the entry and exit process of plants in Indonesia, both in terms 
of plant, employment and output turnover, but also in terms of productivity gains. It also shows 
that, while entry rates are in line with international evidence, exit rates -  even though rising in the 
1990s - tend to be lower than most developing countries. This of course raises the issue of the 
degree of competition in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. The decreasing cohort survival rates 
raise the same question: is the market becoming more or less competitive? This issue is 
investigated in chapter 6 when assessing the factors influencing industrial change and the causes 
for plant exit.
The second important issue addressed here is the one of the dominance of large-scale plants. I 
show that, while small-scale establishments dominate in terms of numbers, large- and extra large- 
scale plants dominate in terms of output, and to a lesser extent, in terms of employment. Over the 
20-year period, small-scale plants tend to loose their dominance in terms of numbers, and the 
dominance of large-scale plants in terms of output and employment increases. The other striking 
feature is the huge gap between small- and medium-scale plants, and large- and extra-large plants. 
For example, while establishments of the bottom 5% of the size distribution are only 10 times 
smaller than the median establishment, establishments of the top 5% of the size distribution are 52 
(1975) to 70 times (1995) larger than the median establishment. Over time, the bulk of the size 
distribution becomes less dispersed around the median -  suggesting the possible emergence of a
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"middle class" of plants, but the huge gap between small- and medium-scale plants and large-scale 
plants remains.
The third issue dealt with here is the productivity gap between entrants, incumbents, and exiters. I 
find that, over the 20-year period, the average entrant is more productive than the average 
incumbent, and that the average exiter is less productive than the average incumbent. This 
suggests that the process of entry and exit should play a large positive role in aggregate 
productivity growth.
I also look at the dynamics of the productivity gaps, and find that those tend to reduce over time, 
suggesting a process of convergence in terms of productivity level. This phenomenon is particularly 
marked during the post-liberalisation period in the 1990s. Plant heterogeneity is a potential source 
of productivity gains, and as heterogeneity reduces, potential productivity gains from entry, exit 
and market share reallocation reduce as well. What is more striking in this process is that for some 
years, the average exiter becomes more productive than the average incumbent, questioning the 
hypothesis of exit due only to relatively lower productivity. This issue will be dealt with in the next 
chapter.
The dynamics of productivity distribution of the entire manufacturing sector shows that it has 
experienced aggregate productivity growth over the 20-year period, as well as a convergence of 
plants productivity levels. These phenomena are particularly marked in the 1990s, corresponding to 
the post-deregulation period.
The analysis of productivity growth by plant-size categories shows that, while large-scale plants 
increasingly dominate in terms of output and employment, these plants experience average 
negative productivity changes, suggesting that positive aggregate productivity growth stems from 
small and medium-scale plants and entrants, with the bulk of entrants belonging to the small and 
medium size category.
One could argue that the Indonesian manufacturing sector started the period with a low 
productivity level with low productivity growth in a relatively uncompetitive environment dominated 
by large entities, but where at least entry and exit was an operating process, suggesting the 
potential existence of a competitive market for small and medium scale plants. This is compatible 
with the history of the manufacturing sector, starting with in a heavily regulated and distorted 
environment favouring large-scale plants. At an early stage of manufacturing development, the only 
positive contribution to aggregate TFP growth stems from the entry of relatively high TFP plants 
and the exit of relatively low TFP plants. As those entrants become incumbents, the negative 
contribution of incumbents becomes less of a burden, to become positive, at least in terms of
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market share reallocation, especially once the market has been deregulated. However, intra-plant 
productivity growth still contributes negatively to aggregate productivity growth.
The main source of aggregate productivity growth stems from the entry of high 
productivity plants and the exit of low productivity plants. But as productivity levels of entrants, 
incumbents and exiters converge, the net entry effect tends to fade. The process of entry and exit 
mostly occurs among SMI plants, which could be considered as the relatively competitive sector of 
manufacturing.
The effects of market share reallocation among incumbents are negative when considering 
that the reallocation of market shares operates from high to low productivity plants. However, 
market shares are also reallocated from negative to positive TFP Growth plants. The combined 
effect is negative throughout the oil boom, oil crisis, and recovery periods, and becomes positive 
during and after the deregulation period.
Intra-plant productivity growth could be considered as being procyclical (GR decomposition). It is 
however negative during the oil boom period: in a distorted environment, output growth does not 
necessarily translate into intra-plant productivity growth. The intra-plant contribution is negative 
during the deregulation period, suggesting that it might have been a hard time for all plants.
The highest aggregate productivity gains occur after the de-regulation period. However, de­
regulation seems to have a stronger positive impact on incumbents' productivity gains than on the 
net entry effect.
This chapter also raises issues to be answered in the next chapters. What are the explanatory 
factors of different productivity levels across plants? What impact have the reforms had on TFP 
growth? What characterises the dynamics of industrial change and aggregate productivity? What 
are the factors explaining plants' exit, and why did relatively highly productive plants exit in the 
1990s?
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5 Determinants of industrial performance in Indonesian 
manufacturing, 1975-95
In chapter 2, I propose a demographic study of the manufacturing sector at the aggregate level;
focusing on survival, size distribution and productivity distribution. One of the main results is that
Indonesian manufacturing plants are heterogeneous both in terms of size and productivity, and that
both size and productivity distributions change over time. More specifically, the dominance of large-
and extra-large-scale plants increases over time in terms of output and employment.
Simultaneously, plants within the small- and medium scale sector become larger and a more
heterogeneous group. In terms of productivity, I find that plant with different sizes display different
productivity levels, with ranking changing over time. I also find that different demographic groups
(entrants, incumbents and exiters) display different productivity levels, and productivity gaps are
narrowing over time (convergence process). Building up on the demographic results, I shed some
new light on the process of aggregate productivity growth by decomposing it. The main result is
that net entry of plants account for all positive productivity growth over the period 1975-95.
Two main questions then arise:
• How can I explain plant productivity heterogeneity?
• How can I explain changes in the industrial structure?
In this chapter, I aim at answering the first question, while keeping the second question for the 
following chapter.
5.1 Plant productivity heterogeneity in historical perspective 
Plant heterogeneity is a feature of any economy, and especially of developing countries, where the 
literature has often underlined the existence of dual markets. Dual markets are characterised by the 
coexistence of large-scale modern industries and small-scale "backward" industries. Backed by the 
historiography of Indonesian manufacturing, the demographic study of Indonesian manufacturing 
in chapter 2 has shown the existence of such a duality in the manufacturing sector, especially in 
terms of plant size. It also shows that the four plants size groups -  small, medium, large, and 
extra-large -  display consistent productivity differentials over time, i.e. the ranking of the 
productivity distributions of each size group does not randomly change every year. This means 
that, even if there exist productivity differentials within size groups, size must be an important 
determinant in explaining plant productivity heterogeneity.
Large companies dominate the Indonesian manufacturing sector firstly for historical reasons: 
independent Indonesia inherited large companies from the Dutch colonialists, and these served as a 
base for developing a modem -  mostly state-owned- industrial sector. The dominance of state
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ownership in large-scale enterprises is in general explained by the lack of local private 
entrepreneurship and capital. While this reason can explain the heavy state intervention from 
independence to the take-off of the Indonesian economy in the beginning of the Suharto period, 
there has been an evident lack of development of large-scale private domestic entrepreneurship 
(Robison, 1986).
Robison (1986) reports that large-scale companies have been favoured by economic policies, 
because of their supposed higher relative productivity. But in the mean time, the state tried to 
promote small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), mostly for social reasons, i.e. in order to 
avoid political unrest and reduce income inequality. Thee (1994) provides an overview of the 
measures taken to improve the participation of SMEs into manufacturing.
Policies, Programs and Organisations for SME Development in Indonesia
Sources: Thee (1994:101-11), internal documents prepared by the Indonesian Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Hayashi (2003, p. 14).
Technology
1969 MIDC (Metal Industry Development Center) established.
1974 BIPIK (Small Industries Development) Program formulated as a technical support program for SMEs.
1979 Under BIPIK program, LIK and PIK (Small Industrial Estates) constructed and technical assistance 
extended to SMEs in or near LIK/PIK mainly through UPT (Technical Service Units) staffed by TPL (Extension
1994 BIPIK program finished and PIKM (Small-scale Enterprises Development Project) launched.
Marketing
1979 Reservation Scheme introduced to protect markets for SMEs.
1999 Anti-Monopoly Law enacted.
Financing
1971 PT ASKRINDO established as a state-owned credit insurance company.
1973 KIK (Credit for Small Investment) and KMKP (Credit for Working Capital) introduced as government- 
subsidised credit programs for SMEs.
1973 PT BAH AN A founded as a state-owned venture capital company.
1974 KK (Small Credit) administered by BRI (Indonesian People's Bank) launched and later (1984) changed to 
KUPEDES scheme (General Rural Savings Program) aimed at promoting small business.
1989 SME Loans from state-owned enterprises (1 to 5 % benefits) introduced.
1990 Government-subsidised credit programs for SMEs (KIK/KMKP) abolished and unsubsidised KUK (Credit 
for Small Businesses) scheme introduced.
1998 The Liquidity Credit Scheme restarted.
1999 The responsibility of directed credit programs transferred from Bank Indonesia (the central bank) to PT 
PNM (State-owned Corporation for SMEs) and Bank Export Indonesia.
2000 Major government credit programs for SMEs, including KUK, abolished.
General
1973 Ministry of Light Industry and Ministry of Heavy Industry merged into Ministry of Industry.
1976 Deletion (localisation) Programs for commercial cars introduced (motorcycles in 1977 and some other 
products such as diesel engines and tractors later on).
1978 Directorate General for Small-scale Industry established (in Ministry of Industry).
1984 Foster Father (Bapak Angkat) Program introduced to support SMEs.
1991 Foster Father-Business Partner Linkage extended to a national movement.
1991 SENTRAs (Groups of Small-scale Industry) in industrial clusters organised as KOPINKRA (Small-scale 
Handicraft Cooperatives).
1993 Deletion Programs for the commercial cars finished and Incentive Systems adopted.
1993 Ministry of Cooperatives started handling small business development.
1995 Basic Law for Promoting Small-scale Enterprises enacted.
1997 Foster Father (Bapak Angkat) Program changed to Partnership Program (Kemitraan).
1998 Ministry of Cooperatives and Small Business added medium business development to its responsibilities.
1998 SME promotion emphasised in People's Economy as a national slogan.
1999 New Automobile Policy announced and Incentive Systems finished.
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Hayashi (2003) offers a good review of these programs promoting SMEs and argues that these 
have not been very effective. In fact, the demographic study proposed in chapter 2 shows that 
large-scale plants are increasingly dominant, especially in terms of output. Size could explain a 
good chunk of the productivity differentials between plants, because it influences productivity in 
many ways.
Firstly, plant size matters because of economies of scale, influencing productivity. Plant size also 
matters in terms of technology, as small plants generally do not use the same technology as large 
plants in a similar sector. Hill (1990a) indeed reports that, "case studies would be necessary to 
identify the disparate factors at work in each case, but the data do at least suggest a pronounced 
heterogeneity in many industries, with large and small firms in different 'markets' for technology, 
output and labour" (p.93). Plant size matters also in terms of product differentiation. For example, 
Hill (1990b) suggests that, "small firms rarely compete directiy with larger units, locating instead in 
different industries, or producing different products in the same industry" (p.92). Plant size matters 
in terms of flexibility in face of shocks, as they adjust more rapidly, especially in terms of labour 
and capital utilisation.
Finally, and importantly in the case of Indonesian manufacturing, plant size matters in terms of 
their relationship to the State. Large plants have a close and preferential relationship to the State, 
either through direct state ownership, or through connections to state officials via family ties or 
business links (such as managers). On the other hand, small and medium plants are generally 
privately owned and have fewer to no ties with the state, unless they are part of a larger group or 
conglomerate. This can matter in terms of productivity differential because state links can lower 
input costs in several ways.
Firstly, large plants have an easier and cheaper access to capital, especially - but not exclusively - 
in the pre-deregulation period. Public large-scale enterprises have benefited from the abundant oil 
revenues during the oil boom, and private large-scale entities have also benefited from easy access 
to capital resources. Easy access to capital by large plants is achieved either through the domestic 
banking market, but large-scale plants have also an easier access to the stock market, and can 
borrow overseas at lower interest rates. Soesastro and Drysdale (1990) report for example that, 
"recent events have raised interest rates back to their level before the 1988 deregulation. The costs 
of intermediation have also returned to pre-1989 deregulation levels, as the spread between credit 
and deposit rates has risen from around 3-4% in 1989 to over 6%. There is naturally concern about 
the distributional effects of high interest rates, which are seen to be detrimental to small 
enterprises. There is also concern about the apparent concentration of funds in the hands of a 
small number of business conglomerates (Business News, 3 August 1990). These enterprises can 
resort to offshore borrowing at lower interest rates, and can raise a large amount of relatively
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'cheap' capital in the stock market" (p.20). This problem is only dealt with from 1990 onwards, as 
Soesastro and Drysdale (1990) continue exposing, "Finance Minister Sumarlin says that there is 
enough liquidity in the economy, but that the problem is in its distribution (Bisnis Indonesia, 8 
August 1990). This concern is being addressed by the introduction of a kind of credit allocation 
system, which has two elements. The first is the establishment of legal lending limits intended to 
democratise access to credit and prevent concentration of financial power. This regulation, taking 
effect from October 1990, restricts the aggregate amount of loans and advances that can be made 
to conglomerate groups. The second is the rule, introduced as an element of Pakjun in January 
1990, which requires state banks and private domestic banks to allocate a minimum of 20% of their 
loan portfolios to small-scale enterprises and cooperatives" (pp. 20-21). However, Nasution (1991) 
adds that it is difficult to assess the results of those programmes because of the low level of 
accountancy standards and financial transparency in Indonesia, and even reports that "no 
information exists on who receives credit and how much is received" (p. 27).
Secondly, large plants can also have access to cheaper intermediate inputs through the acquisition 
of import and distribution licences. For example, Robison (1986) and Chapman (1992) report that 
the company Krakatau Steel was the sole licenced importer of scrap metal, which made it the sole 
provider of the main input for the entire industry. Wibisono (1989) reports a similar case in the 
textile industry, where a company, P.T. Centra Bina Tekstil Indonesia, had been given the 
monopoly for synthetic fibre importation. Booth (1986) reports interestingly that "although 
Indonesia has pursued a policy of restricting imports to protect domestic industry since 
independence, the use of quantitative restrictions to curb the volume of imports has become much 
more widespread since the early 1980s. The usual form these restrictions take is the granting of a 
sole import licence to a state trading organisation or the enterprise involved in the domestic 
production of the particular product. In the first case the import monopoly obviously allows its 
owner to restrict supplies while at the same time collecting considerable rents, in the second case it 
affords blanket protection to the domestic producer" (pp. 10-11). In fact, the system of import and 
distribution licences allows the owners to gain a comparative advantage in terms of quantities and 
costs of intermediate inputs.
There remains however still a wide productivity distribution within each size category -size does not 
explain everything. In fact, looking at the very different historical sub-periods of the Suharto era, it 
seems that plants entering the market under different economic, political and institutional 
environment could differ quite a bit in terms of productivity. It has been argued that during the oil 
boom, the state provided the economy with a much needed macroeconomic stability, but that it 
had created a heavily distorted environment, mostly favourable to large-scale, public and crony 
enterprises. This probably carried on during the deregulation period, with an improvement towards
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more competitive markets in the 1990s. Does it make a difference in terms of productivity to enter 
the market under different broad institutional conditions? The literature has concentrated on the 
effects of liberalisation on plants in general, i.e. incumbents as well as entrants. For example 
Goeltom (1995) finds that the financial liberalisation results in a more widespread access to capital, 
and that capital tends to go to more productive plants. Chapman (1992) assesses the impact of the 
trade liberalisation that has occurred since the mid-1980s in the footwear and steel industry, 
underlines its unevenness across industries, and shows that where trade deregulation has been 
fully Implemented (for example in the footwear industry), competitiveness has improved 
dramatically, while sectors where trade deregulation has been patchy (for example in the steel 
industry), outcomes are more mixed. What those two studies show is that changes in the broad 
institutional environment have affected all plants. What has not been yet assessed is whether these 
environmental changes affect the productivity of entrants: are plants entering after deregulation 
more productive than plants having entered during the protectionist period? In other words, do 
initial conditions matter more than current conditions?
Initial environmental conditions possibly shape plants capabilities, but the time of entry surely 
affects productivity through the specific vintage of their capital stock. In a specific year of 
observation, plants of different vintages hold capital stocks of differing degrees of obsolescence. In 
a context of technological catch-up, age should account for some of the productivity differentials. 
The historiography underlines that different industries have upgraded their production technologies 
at different paces, often influenced by state policy. For example, clove cigarettes industry has 
upgraded its machinery very late in the oil boom period, mostly because of a struggle for power 
accompanied by protectionism (Tarmidi, 1996), while the textile, garment and leather industries 
have experienced a more early and rapid technological change (Hill, 1991). This might explain 
some of the productivity differentials across industries, but does not account for productivity 
differentials within industries.
The age of the capital stock of plants matter, because they influence the level of technology of 
each plant. This is an important issue, but the literature has mainly focused on attempting to 
generate a reliable capital stock series for plants rather than assessing the impact of capital 
obsolescence on productivity levels.45 Different capital obsolescence rates could account for some 
of the productivity differentials, and plants with an older capital stock should be less productive. In 
the mean time however, some learning effects linked to age should push up productivity levels. In 
the case of Indonesian manufacturing, learning effects could take place not only in the area of the 
production processes, but also in the domain of skills for dealing with the distorted and corrupted
45 See in particular Keuning (1991) and Tlmmer (1999). A full discussion of capital stock measurement is provided in chapter 
2.
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environment.
The historiography underlines the importance of ownership in explaining both size and productivity. 
From Robison (1986) a broad typology of plants can be drawn, with the small and medium scale 
sector being primarily privately owned by domestic entrepreneurs, and the large scale sector being 
the domain of state ownership, with some foreign joint ventures.
The literature agrees on the effect of foreign ownership on productivity, in that it tends to induce 
relatively higher productivity levels through the adoption of more recent and more effective 
technologies of production and of organisation. For example, Blomstrom 81 Sjoholm (1998), using 
the Statistik Industri dataset for the year 1991, find that "both minority and majority owned foreign 
affiliates are more [labour] productive than domestic establishments" (p.5). Foreign-owned plants 
are also supposed to be more productive because they tend to be more export-orientated and more 
exposed to foreign competition.
Meanwhile, the public sector is supposed to display lower productivity figures because it has tended 
to be protected from foreign competition, in order to protect both "infant industries" and vested 
interests. Public enterprises also benefited from soft budget constraints, especially through a 
facilitated access to cheap public capital through public banks. Bartel and Harisson (1999) indeed 
argue that "to identify the sources of public sector inefficiency, we use a 1981-1995 panel of all 
public and private enterprises in manufacturing in Indonesia. Our results suggest that in recent 
years, all of the observed inferior performance of publicly owned manufacturing enterprises in 
Indonesia is attributable to plants which received loans from state banks and plants which were 
shielded from import competition" (p.4).
The literature has paid much attention to the effects of public and foreign ownership on 
productivity, because those two categories represented the largest share of output and value 
added, however, it is worth recalling that the bulk of plants in Indonesian manufacturing is of 
private domestic ownership. For example, 95% of plants that entered between 1976 and 1995 had 
some private domestic ownership. This chunk of the population is supposed to have been less 
productive than both foreign and public plants because of a lower technological standard, and 
especially because they did not benefit from a normal access to capital. Hill (1990b) reports that 
"because private firms lack comparable access to skills, technology, finance and overseas markets, 
their average labour productivity is a good deal lower7' (p.85).
Linked to both the ownership and the size issues is of course the group affiliation question. A small 
private domestic plant could achieve productivity levels similar to a large foreign plant if it is part of 
a large foreign group or of a large group that has connections to the government. Groups or 
conglomerates have an important place in Indonesian manufacturing, and the advantages of being
165
part of a group are the same as the advantages conferred by a large size.
Additionally to group affiliation through ownership, benefiting from the advantages offered by a 
large group or firm can also through a system of patronage called Program Keterknitan Sistem 
Bapak Angkat (Linking Large and Small Enterprise, including Subcontracting), introduced in the 
very late 1980s, whereby a large group provides technological help to small and medium plants. 
According to Sandee, Rietveld, Supratikno, and Yuwono (1994) "this program aims at deepening 
the industrial structure of Indonesia, and also at reducing inequalities between different types of 
industrial enterprise, by strengthening the linkages between industri kecil [small-scale industry] and 
large enterprise. (The latter is not solely confined to industrial enterprises but encompasses big 
business in general.) The program originally aimed to develop industrial subcontracting linkages 
between large and small industrial enterprises, with the latter functioning as suppliers of inputs 
through 'putting out1 systems. Large industrial firms were encouraged to buy inputs domestically 
instead of importing, and to buy certain inputs from SKI instead of making these themselves. The 
concept has been extended to require large scale enterprises to assist SSCI in general, including 
those in other branches of industry. The support of a large scale industry may include assistance in 
supply of raw materials, training, technical advice and marketing. Each of the Ministry of Industry 
programs listed below provides additional opportunities for large firms to fulfill their responsibilities 
under the bapak angkat system" (pp. 122-123). The authors report a number of industries where 
this program has been put into action, for example, in the case of the metal casting industry "an 
Indonesian conglomerate is highly active in this cluster [of small plants] through the bapak angkat 
system. It provides long-term training including a study tour to Japan for selected producers" 
(p. 129). This patronage system requires not only large private but also large public enterprises to 
provide assistance to small scale enterprises. The scheme in fact requires public enterprises to 
spend 1 to 5% of their net profit on the development of small scale enterprises through the funding 
of "managerial training, technical assistance, provision of working capital, marketing assistance, 
and provision of loan guarantees to the formal banking system when SSCI lack collateral to 
implement feasible economic projects" (Sandee, Rietveld, Supratikno, and Yuwono, 1994, p. 123). 
Hill (1995), and Hayashi (2003) argue that those programs have been mostly unsuccessful.
Of course of great interest in the case of Indonesia is the role that cronyism played in 
manufacturing. Basri (2001), for example shows how crony capitalists influenced the policy making 
in the area of trade protection. He shows that crony capitalist formed lobbies that directed trade 
policy making, and raises the question of the quite successful implementation of trade liberalisation 
that started in the mid-1980s. He suggests that crony capitalists became involved in some export- 
orientated sectors, but primarily concentrated in non-tradable sectors, trade and natural resources. 
Fisman (2001), using data on companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Index for the 1990s, shows
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that up to a quarter of share values of companies linked to President Suharto was due to political 
connections. He concludes "The large proportion of value that some firms derive from connections 
provides support for the perspective that political connections have distorted rates of return, and 
therefore the allocation of capital, in Indonesia. Moreover, in looking at firm-level data of publicly 
traded firms, there is no discernible relationship between accounting return on assets and political 
dependence. This suggests that it is possible that the massive political rents described above are 
being dissipated through rent-seeking activities. If the proceeds of such rent-seeking are not used 
productively, then this system of patronage will be a further source of economic inefficiency. 
Combined with the welfare losses from monopoly pricing, the total drag on the economy from these 
various factors may be very large" (pp. 21-22). Robison (1986) provides several detailed example 
of groups acquiring monopolies in certain sectors through political connections, for example in the 
case of the steel industry or the wheat industry. What is the impact of cronyism on the relative 
productivity of plants? If advantages prevail, raising sale prices through monopolies on the market 
for final goods, lowering intermediate inputs prices through the acquisition of sole importer and/or 
distributor licences, facilitating access to capital, then the effect of cronyism on the measured 
relative productivity should be positive. The literature also underlines the success of the 
deregulation program started in the mid-1980s, the effect of cronyism should then be found to be 
attenuated in the 1990s.
5.2 Explaining plant productivity heterogeneity: A framework for analysis
In their seminal work on US manufacturing, Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) identify four 
hypotheses to explain plant productivity heterogeneity:
• Productivity heterogeneity is the result of a random draw in productivity levels due to 
measurement errors and random shocks. As a result, plant productivity ranking is not 
consistent over time.
• Productivity heterogeneity is the result of a random draw in productivity growth rates due 
to measurement errors and random shocks. As a result the variance of productivity levels 
will increase over time.
• Productivity heterogeneity is the result of different plant vintages: (1) different vintages for 
capital stock and technology trigger different productivity levels, the choice of technology is 
influenced by the external environment (broad institutional environment and external 
shocks), as time goes by, old vintage plants become less productive. (2) But new 
investment has to be accounted for as well. As plants get older, they get less productive 
unless they invest. I have here to underline that this hypothesis is appealing, but does 
however contradict the hypothesis where plants become more productive over time
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because of learning effects (see, for example, Jovanovic, 1982). The test of the plant 
vintages hypothesis will have to include the three effects (capital stock vintage, new 
investment, and learning effects).
• Finally, plant productivity heterogeneity could be the result of permanent plant 
heterogeneity, with the existence of plant fixed effects, where previous productivity level is 
a fairly good predictor of current productivity level. (1) The first component of the fixed 
effect is size, which evolves very slowly over time. Size relates to issues of optimal size and 
economies of scale, thereby influencing productivity levels. Size can either be proxied by 
output, employment or capital stock. In the case of asymmetrical macroeconomic shock, 
size may not adjust instantaneously, but capacity utilisation will change and affect 
productivity rankings. (2) The second component of the fixed effect is managerial ability. 
One can first distinguish between good and bad managers, triggering consistent high or 
low productivity. But even a good manager can trigger low productivity levels if the plant 
becomes too large (i.e. if the good manager is "spread too thin"): there are decreasing 
returns to scale for management. In that case, plant size could be negatively correlated 
with productivity levels. Managers can also slack over time and become efficient again once 
they have hit the bottom. (3) The third component of the fixed effect can be the quality of 
the workforce, which can be proxied by data on educational attainment or wages if one 
made the hypothesis that higher quality workers are able to ask for higher wages. (4) The 
authors also complement the analysis by looking at the effects of being part of a group of 
companies on productivity levels: a plant belonging to a large and productive group could 
benefidate from positive externalities.
Baily, Hulten, Campbell (1992) control for industry-specific effects (with 5-digit industry dummies) 
for each hypothesis, and run the tests on each demographic sub-group (entrants, incumbents and 
exiters). They find that the fixed effect hypothesis turns out to explain most of plant productivity 
heterogeneity.
While their analysis of the fixed effect explanation seems rather complete when dealing with the 
case of US manufacturing in the 1980s, the framework has to be amended when dealing with 
Indonesian manufacturing over the period 1975-95. The first obvious determinant for productivity 
differentials, which has been used in other studies, is whether or not the plant is exporting part of 
its production. Exporting plants are expected to be more productive, because they are exposed to 
international competition.
Another determinant for productivity heterogeneity is ownership type (private versus public, 
domestic private versus foreign private). Indeed, both the theoretical review in chapter 2 and the
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historical analysis have shown the importance of ownership in general, and the importance of 
political economic issues in particular for the case of Indonesian manufacturing.
Political economic issues link naturally to the problem of cronyism that seems to be a feature of the 
Suharto era. Are plants acting in "crony" sectors more or less productive than plants acting in other 
sectors? Within individual sectors, are "crony plants" more or less productive than other plants? 
Basri (2001) provides a dataset of crony sectors dummies at the 5-digit level in order to test for the 
first hypothesis. For the second hypothesis, I propose to use a plant-level series labelled "gifts, 
charities, donations" already used in Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) as a proxy for plant cronyism.
The usual Cobb-Douglas production function can be augmented with those variables in order to 
explain plant-level performance. Many authors point at simultaneity problems using this 
specification and prefer to regress directly productivity levels on the previous explanatory variables. 
Following Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), this is the methodology I use to explain plant-level 
productivity. I have here to recall that the dependent variable being a residual, R-squares are likely 
to be lower than usual. As a benchmark, Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) publish satisfying 
results with R-squares ranging from 17% to 32%.
The following table summarises the raw variables available for testing the previous hypothesis:
Variable Time
period
Plant-level TFP 1975-95
Age of plant (derived from year of birth) 1975-95
Investment in capital stock 1975-95
Size (output, and employment) 1975-95
Wages of non- production workers (proxy for management quality) 1975-95
Wages of production workers (proxy for labour quality) 1975-95
Ratio of non-production workers over total number of workers (white collar share) 1975-95
5-digit industry dummies 1975-95
Ownership type (central government, local government, domestic private, foreign private) 1975-95
Gift, charities, donations (proxy for plant-level cronyism) 1975-95
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Capacity utilisation 1990-98
Percentage of production exported 1990-98
Conglomerate-related variables: Is the plant a foster parent company? Foster parent company services 
rendered (type)? Does establishment have foster parent? Foster parent above company provided services 
(type)? Member of group of companies?
1996
Crony sector dummy 1975,
1987,
1995
I also construct a number of other potential explanatory variables:
TFP and relative TFP
I use plant TFP level calculated in chapter 2. Additionally, I propose to work on relative TFP levels 
in order to control for specific industrial sectors. Relative TFP is calculated as plant TFP level minus 
plants TFP average for each 5-digit sector:
where n is the number of plants in each 5-digit sector.
Investment variables
The original dataset provides us with a raw investment variable. However, we know from chapter 2 
that this variable only exists for a number of plants and for a short time period. I have proposed a 
methodology to estimate a capital stock for all plants in all years. The methodology generates the 
log of the estimated capital stock noted. The log of capital stock has allowed calculating yearly 
capital stock growth for each plant, and can also allow the calculation of the total capital stock 
growth between the year of entry and the current year of observation as:
total _ capital _ stock _ growthit h = In capital _ stockit -  In capital _ stocky (2)
which is a good measure for total capital stock renewal controlling for the size of companies as 
measured by capital stock, without causing multicolinearity problems with the TFP measures.
Conglomerates-related variables
These variables only exist for one year, 1996. I transform them into time-unvarying dummies for 
the period 1989-1996.
be_parent equals 1 if the plant is a foster company, 0 otherwise.
(1)
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have_parent equals 1 If the plant is has foster company, 0 otherwise. 
group_member equals 1 if the plant is member of a group of companies, 0 otherwise.
Export variables
The dataset provides a variable labelled "percentage of production exported" for the period 1990- 
1998. Using this variable, I create two dummy variables, "exporter" taking value 1 if "percentage of 
production exported" is more than zero but lower than 80%, 0 otherwise, and "grand exporter" 
taking the value 1 if "percentage of production exported" is over 79%, 0 otherwise. This helps 
distinguishing plants almost entirely devoted to the export market and plants participating in both 
the export and the domestic market.
Percentage Capacity Realised
For the period 1990-95, the dataset provides a variable labelled "Percentage Capacity Realised". I 
clean this series by replacing all observations above 100% and those equal to 0% by a missing 
value.
Ownership variables
The dataset provides series on the percentage of plants held by four categories of owners:
• private domestic owners
• foreign owners
• central government
• local government
I clean these series by replacing any observation above 100% by a missing value. I additionally
create two types of ownership dummies.
Private domestic dummy equals 1 if private domestic owners hold 50% or more (over 50% 
definition), and private domestic dummy equals 1 if private domestic owners hold any positive 
share of capital (any positive share definition).
Foreign dummy equals 1 if foreign owners hold 50% or more (over 50% definition), and foreign 
dummy equals 1 if foreign owners hold any positive share of capital (any positive share definition).
Central government dummy equals 1 if central government holds 50% or more (over 50% 
definition), and central government dummy equals 1 if central government hold any positive share 
of capital (any positive share definition).
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Local government dummy equals 1 if the local government holds 50% or more (over 50% 
definition), and local government dummy equals 1 if local government hold any positive share of 
capital (any positive share definition).
Crony variables
Basri (2001) constructs a crony dummy variable for the years 1975, 1987, and 1995 at the 5-digit 
level. The crony dummy equals 1 if the sector is considered as a crony sector for the period 1975- 
1995, 0 otherwise. The sector is considered as "crony" if it is dominated by crony companies. Basri 
(2001) takes a narrow definition of rent-seekers and crony capitalists as being those well connected 
to Suharto's family, i.e. those businesses including members of Suharto's family either as 
shareholder, manager, or business partner. His work is based on evidence from political studies and 
press cuttings.
In 1975 the crony influenced sectors are the following:
• Canning & preserving meat
• Canning & preserving fish and other sea food
• Wheat flour & other grain mill products
• Maccaroni, noodles & similar products
• Sawmills planning and other processing
• Ceramics
• Glass and glass products
• Cement
• Motor vehicles
In 1987 the crony influenced sectors are the following:
• Processed meat
• Milk products
• Processed fish
• Refined vegetable & animal oil
• Wheat flour
• Other flours
• Noodles and the like
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• Sugar
• Other foods
• Sawn processed wood
• Plywood
• Paper & paper board
• Basic chemicals
• Plastic ware
• Ceramics & earthenware
• Glass & glassware
• Cement & lime
• Basic iron and steel
• Batteries
• Motor vehicles excluding motorcycles
• Motorcycles
In 1995 the crony influenced sectors are the following:
• Processed and preserved meat
• Dairy products
• Processed and preserved fish
• Wheat flour
• Other flours
• Noodles and the like
• Sugar
• Soybean products
• Other foods
• Animal feeds
• Sawmill and preserved wood
• Manufacture of plywood and the like
173
• Pulp
• Paper & cardboard
• Basic chemicals excluding fertiliser
• Plastic products
• Ceramics & earthenware
• Glass products
• Cement
• Basic iron and steel
• Batteries
• Motor vehicles excluding motorcycles
• Motorcycles
Source: Basil (2001)
I add a plant-specific crony proxy, which is a specific part of the "other expenses" category in 
plants' accounts and is a variable labelled "gifts charities donations". To my knowledge, only 
Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) ever made use of this series and also use it as a proxy for plant- 
level cronyism. I also generate the variable "gifts share" as the share of gifts, charities, donations in 
total gross output to control for size. These series are available for the entire period. Plants report a 
series of expenses in the "other expenses" category and include loan interest; gift, charities, 
donations; representation allowance; royalty; management fee; promotion, advertising; water 
expenses; telecommunications; travel expenses; preventive environment pollution; R81D and 
production engineering; human resources and training; and others. It is widely acknowledged that 
what can be found in some of these other expenses is linked to corruption expenses, especially the 
"gifts, charities, donations expenses". There are numerous examples supporting the link between 
those expenses and cronyism. Robison (1986) reports that the P.T. Bogasari, the quasi-monopoly 
for flour milling "was owned by the Liem group, in partnership with Sudwikatmono, the half-brother 
of President Suharto, who was also President Director. The articles of association stipulated that, in 
effect, 26% of profits be set aside for 'charitable' foundations including Mrs Suharto's Yayasan 
Harapan Kita and Kostrad's Yayasan Dharma Putra" (p.232). In the same book, Robison (1986), in 
a detailed description of military-owned business groups, reports that "the articles of incorporation 
of Karana [a deep-sea shipping line] include a dispersal of dividends to various foundations, 
including Mrs Suharto's Yayasan Kartika Jaya" (p.260). About these Yayasans (Foundations), 
Robison (1986) adds that "there is a difficulty in distinguishing between companies owned by
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politico-bureaucrats on behalf of political institutions and those where capital is owned and invested 
on their own private behalf. Probably there is no clear delineation of these facets in any one firm. 
Yayasans Harapan Kita, Kartika Jaya and Trikora have members of the Suharto family as 
shareholders. The degree to which they function as charitable institutions, as sources of funds for 
the military or for patronage, or as the private investment of the Suharto family is a matter of 
conjecture. They receive funds both from direct investments and from other companies which 
specifically set aside a portion of their profits" (p. 345-346). These examples regarding exclusively 
the Suharto family constitute only a small sample of the existing relationship between the Yayasans 
and the manufacturing industry. Of course, not all of the corruption is channelled through 
Yayasans, however, this variable could constitute a good proxy for it.
In ternal labour structure proxies
I define two plant-specific labour structure proxies. The first is the number of non-production 
workers over the total number of workers, and is labelled "white collar share". This variable 
captures the "managerial intensity" of a plant. This managerial intensity can be either too low, 
triggering inefficiencies in the organisational process, or too high, especially in the case where a 
large number of family workers benefit from "fictive" managerial positions. Additionally, I use the 
share of total non-production workers' wages over total workers' wages in order to control for any 
super-normal remuneration of non-production workers.
Proxies for management and labour quality
In the absence of data regarding the level of education of workers, I use the average wage for 
workers as a labour quality proxy. I distinguish between production and non-production workers. 
The labour quality variable is calculated as total production workers wages, divided by the total 
number of production workers. The management quality variable is calculated as total non­
production workers wages, divided by the total number of non-production workers.
As pointed out previously, I am using two datasets, the "Raw Statistik Industri" (RSI), and the 
"Backcast Statistik Industri" (BSI). The BSI is more accurate in terms of population, but contains 
only a limited number of variables: Output, input, labour, capital, age, allowing to generate 
survival, TFP and relative TFP. All other variables are only available for RSI. Therefore, in order to 
explain TFP differences across companies, I will test the random draw hypothesis, the capital 
vintage hypothesis and the fixed effect hypothesis on BSI, but will only be able to specify the fixed 
effect on the RSI dataset.
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5.3 Examining pair-wise correlation between variables
Before modelling and explaining plant-level TFP and relative TFP, I chose to observe the correlation 
between the different variables.
Random draw hypothesis
Differences in TFP levels and relative TFP can stem from errors in measurement or random shocks. 
If this is the case, TFP or relative TFP today will not be strongly correlated with TFP or relative TFP 
yesterday.
Table 1: Correlation between TFP, relative TFP and their one-, two-, and three<
year lags
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
TFP TFP TFP
Iag1 TFP 0.5115* 0.5281* 0.4669*
Iag2 TFP 0.5062* 0.5229* 0.4619*
Iag3 TFP 0.5116* 0.5301* 0.4651*
5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
Iag1 5-digit relative TFP 0.6737* 0.6985* 0.6347*
Iag2 5-digit relative TFP 0.5609* 0.5961* 0.5075*
Iag3 5-digit relative TFP 0.4914* 0.5345* 0.4285*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
Over the period 1975-95, TFP levels are significantly correlated to their lags, by over 50% on 
average, the correlation is stronger in the pre-1990 period with correlation coefficients above 52%, 
while the correlation is weaker in the post-1990 period with correlation coefficients just above 46%.
Correlations are stronger when using the relative TFP measure. Over the entire period, relative TFP 
is significantly correlated to its one-year lag by over 67%, the correlation is even stronger in the 
pre-1990 period with a correlation over 69%, against 63% for the post-1990 period. The correlation 
coefficients decrease with the two- and three-year lags.
TFP and relative TFP are strongly and significantly correlated to their lags, suggesting that, while 
there might be a small percentage of measurement error and random shocks, most of the data are 
sound and the random draw hypothesis cannot be validated. Further tests will be conducted in the 
next section.
Demographic factors
How does relative TFP correlate with demographic factors? I chose first to examine survival, age, 
and entry and exit dummies.
I also create four historical period of entry dummies: the "oilboom entry dummy" equals 1 if the 
plant entered during the oilboom period (1975-80), the "crisis entry dummy" equals 1 if the plant
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entered during the crisis (1981-83), the "recovery entry dummy" equals 1 if the plant entered 
during the recovery period (1984-85), the "deregulation entry dummy" equals 1 if the plant entered 
during the deregulation era (1986-1989), and the "investment boom entry dummy" equals 1 if the 
plant entered during the investment boom (1990-95).
Additionally, following Baily, Hulten, and Campbell's methodology (1992), I create another four 
historical period of entry dummies: "pre_1981" equals 1 if the plant entered during the period 
1975-80, "pre_1984" equals 1 if the plant entered during the period 1975-83, "pre_1986" equals 1 
if the plant entered during the period 1975-85, and "pre_1990" equals 1 if the plant entered during 
the period 1975-89.
Table 2: Correlation between relative TFP and demographic factors
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
TFP_5D_rel TFP_5D_rel TFP 5D rel
survival -0.0095* -0.0039 -0.0185*
age -0.0056* -0.0056* -0.0055
entry dummy 0.0048* 0.0133* -0.0110*
exit dummy -0.0025 -0.0152* 0.0073*
oilboom entry dummy -0.0169* -0.0182* -0.0196*
crisis entry dummy 0.0066* 0.0109* -0.001
recovery entry dummy 0.0058* 0.0071* 0.0038
deregulation entry dummy 0.0099* 0.0102* 0.0107*
investment boom entry dummy 0.0042* 0.0077*
pre_1981 entry dummy -0.0169* -0.0182* -0.0196*
pre_1984 entry dummy -0.0133* -0.0125* -0.0186*
pre_1986 entry dummy -0.0107* -0.0102* -0.0156*
pre_1990 entry dummy -0.0042* -0.0077*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
Survival and age are both negatively correlated to relative TFP: as plants grow older, their relative 
TFP tends to fall, which is compatible with the vintage capital hypothesis, if I assume that survival 
or age are good proxies for the age of the capital stock. This, of course, does not take into account 
new investment during plants' lives.
The correlation coefficient between relative TFP and entry and exit dummies corroborates what had 
been found in the previous chapter. In the pre-1990 period, entrants are more productive than 
incumbents, and exiters are less productive than incumbents, suggesting that competitive forces 
might be at play. Correlation coefficients however take the opposite sign for both dummies in the 
post-1990 period.
The first set of historical period of entry dummies (oilboom, crisis, recovery, deregulation and 
investment boom entry dummies) suggests that having entered during the oil boom has had a 
negative effect on relative TFP. On the other hand, having entered during the deregulation period
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or the crisis seems to result in stronger relative TFP. This could indicate that having entered in a 
period of soft economic constraints (abundance of capital, less competition, etc) triggered lower 
relative TFP at the plant level. On the other hand, having entered during a period of stronger 
economic constraints (more competition, competitive allocation of capital, etc) triggered higher 
relative TFP at the plant level.
The second set of historical period of entry dummies just seems to reflect the age effect on relative 
TFP: as plants grow older, they become relatively less productive.
Size
I choose to proxy plant size with four measures: total number of workers, total gross output, total 
wages, and percentage of capacity realised. The total number of workers has a negative (but not 
significant) correlation with relative TFP, while total gross output and total wages have a significant 
positive correlation with relative productivity. Larger sizes could have a positive impact on relative 
productivity, but those figures suggest that labour-intensive activities could display lower 
productivity. Wages reflect both size and labour and management quality: while the number of 
workers (labour intensity) is negatively correlated with relative productivity, wages (labour and 
management quality) are positively correlated with relative productivity, especially in the pre-1990 
period. But the sense of causation still needs to be determined: higher wages, reflecting higher 
labour and management quality, could trigger higher relative productivity, but the gains of higher 
relative productivity could also be redistributed in higher wages.
Table 3: Correlation between relative TFP and size measures
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
nb of workers -0.0005 0.0027 -0.0042
OUTPUT 0.0605* 0.0416* 0.0836*
WAGES 0.0035 0.0069* 0.0028
% capacity realised 0.0187* 0.0187*
log number of workers -0.0106* -0.0076* -0.0153*
log OUTPUT 0.1120* 0.1266* 0.0944*
log wages 0.0688* 0.0838* 0.0436*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
Percentage of capacity realised is significantly and positively correlated to relative productivity. This 
is a fairly intuitive result: the under-utilisation of assets leads to relatively lower productivity.
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Total investment, and initial productivity level
I now examine the correlation between relative TFP and a measure of cumulated capital stock 
growth (capital stock growth between the year of observation and the year of entry). The measure, 
"total capital stock growth" presents a strong and significantly positive correlation with relative 
TFP, about 3% for both periods. The more plants invest, the higher the relative productivity. Of 
course, the other sense of causation could be present as well: the more productive the plants, the 
better the investment possibilities. This will be taken into account when testing for the capital 
vintage hypothesis in order to control for capital stock renewal.
Table 4: Correlation between relative TFP, cumulated capital stock growth, and
initial TFP evel
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
total capital stock growth 0.0276* 0.0329* 0.0248*
initial TFP 0.4801* 0.5499* 0.3682*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
Finally, I investigate the correlation between the initial level of TFP, which is the TFP level of plants 
in their year of entry, and relative TFP for each year. The reason for including this explanatory 
variable is that it might better capture both year of entry and plants-specific characteristics than the 
simple year of entry or period of entry dummies. The correlation is strong and positive (48% for the 
entire period, 55% for the pre-1990 period, but dropping to 37% for the post-1990 period). The 
higher the initial TFP level, the higher the relative TFP in consequent years. In other words, initial 
conditions seem to matter a lot when explaining relative productivity.
Conglomerate-related and export variables
I firstly examine the correlation between relative productivity and a set of three conglomerate- 
related dummies. The strongest and positive correlation is between relative productivity and the 
group member dummy: a plant member of a larger group of companies is more likely to display 
higher relative TFP, and/or plants with higher relative productivity are more likely to become part of 
a larger group of companies. This phenomenon is true throughout the period, but is more acute 
during the post-1990 era. The correlation between relative productivity and the dummy showing 
whether or not a plant has or is a parent company ("have_parent" or "be_parent") corroborates 
this. However, it could be the case that having a parent company is more beneficial than being a 
parent in terms of relative productivity, especially in the post-1990 period. These results are 
however to be interpreted with caution, as the dummies only exist for the year 1996 and have been 
assumed to remain constant for the period 1975-1995.
179
Table 5: Correlation between relative TFP, conglomerate-related and
export variables_______ ______________
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
be_parent 0.0168* 0.0244* 0.0082*
have_parent 0.0326* 0.0265* 0.0381*
group_member 0.0448* 0.0394* 0.0498*
exporter 0.0165* 0.0165*
grand exporter -0.0116* -0.0116*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
The export-related dummies "exporter" and "grand exporter" are only available for the period 1990- 
95. The partial correlation coefficients suggest that exporting plants are more likely to display 
higher relative TFP than non-exporting plants. This is not a surprising result, as most studies find 
similar results that are also supported by the theory: exporting plants are exposed to foreign 
competition and should therefore be more competitive and more productive. Sjoholm (1997a) 
reports in the abstract of his paper that, "establishments participating in exports or imports have 
relatively high levels of productivity. Furthermore, the results suggest that establishments engaged 
in exports have shown comparable high productivity growth. The larger the share of an 
establishment's output that is exported the higher its productivity growth."
What is however surprising is the negative and significant coefficient on the dummy for export- 
devoted plants ("grand exporter", plants exporting 80% of their production and over). The 
discrepancy stems from the differences in average TFP of the 5-digit sectors: it seems that over the 
period 1990-95, export-devoted plants belonged to industries where average TFP levels were 
higher than in other industries. Two thirds of export-devoted plants belong either to the textiles, 
garments and leather sector (sector 32) or to the wood products sector (sector 33), which display 
the highest average sector TFP for the 1990s (behind the "other manufacturing" sector). And within 
those high productivity sectors, export-devoted plants tend to be less productive than their peers, 
this is especially striking in the wood products sector (one third of all export-devoted plants).
Looking more closely at the economic history of the latter sector, shed some light on those striking 
results. Pangetsu (1996), in his study of the Indonesian deregulation era, shows that in fact both 
the forestry and wood products sectors did not benefit from the trade reform package and 
remained heavily protected, with the old system of import and export licensing still active. For 
example, in 1989, 82.8% of the wood products sector production was under export restriction. It is 
therefore not surprising that export-devoted plants, that acquired their export licences via a 
distorted system rather than on a competitive basis, are less productive than their non-export- 
devoted counterparts.
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Ownership shares
I examine the correlation between relative productivity and two sets of ownership variables 
described in the previous section. Both sets suggest that private domestic ownership is negatively 
correlated to relative productivity. This is compatible with historical accounts of weak local 
bourgeoisie and entrepreneurship, and accounts of lower productivity of small domestic private 
companies. However, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, small plants are not the least 
productive, so that the argument implying that small domestic private companies are the least 
productive of the industrial sector only holds partially: relative productivity could be more 
attributable to ownership than size.
Table 6a: Correlation between relative TFP and ownership variables
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
5-diglt relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
private domestic dummy -0.0570* -0.0623* -0.0479*
foreign dummy 0.0488* 0.0525* 0.0437*
central government dummy 0.0313* 0.0382* 0.0184*
local government dummy 0.0109* 0.0126* 0.0076*
private domestic ownership 
share -0.0615* -0.0666* -0.0526*
foreign ownership share 0.0544* 0.0577* 0.0503*
central government 
ownership share 0.0333* 0.0390* 0.0227*
local government ownership 
share 0.0141* 0.0170* 0.0082*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
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Table 6b: TFP statistics by 2-digit sectors for all plants and privately
owned plants
All plants, 1975-95
2-digit
sector Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
31 95912 1.402749 0.3681043 -1.1176 9.956626
32 79965 1.466603 0.4823857 -0.6282203 7.535044
33 36061 1.530209 0.3850262 -0.0079976 6.605114
34 14660 1.522698 0.3806493 0.1967519 4.72717
35 38150 1.497832 0.4065378 0.2493532 7.630556
36 28036 1.494718 0.3713308 0.1479674 5.645116
37 1985 1.475499 0.3828748 0.1789171 4.563709
38 32328 1.50911 0.4025633 -0.2263555 7.404039
39 4550 1.556456 0.5246292 0.2416836 6.422881
Privately owned plants, 1975-95
2-digit
sector Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
31 88020 1.381615 0.3479862 -1.1176 6.986887
32 75914 1.465592 0.488535 -0.6282203 7.535044
33 33892 1.530954 0.3862178 -0.0079976 6.605114
34 13298 1.516613 0.3814321 0.1967519 4.72717
35 32747 1.464619 0.3819447 0.2493532 7.630556
36 26518 1.492702 0.3737588 0.1479674 5.645116
37 1568 1.444586 0.3820221 0.1789171 4.563709
38 28425 1.493611 0.3950081 -0.2263555 7.404039
39 4084 1.557407 0.5280965 0.2455875 6.422881
Further investigation in Table 6b shows that over 50% of privately owned domestic plants belong 
to the food, beverage and tobacco sector (sector 31) and the textiles, garments and leather sector 
(sector 32), both sectors display the lowest average TFP levels over the entire period and especially 
in the pre-1990 period. The average TFP in the food, beverage and tobacco sector remains the 
lowest in the post-1990 period, whereas the textiles, garments and leather sector becomes one the 
most productive sector.
Clearly and not surprisingly, the highest positive correlation coefficient is between relative 
productivity and foreign ownership. As other studies have demonstrated (Aswicahyono & Hill, 2002; 
Bernard and Sjoholm, 2003), foreign ownership seems to have a positive impact on productivity 
levels through better technology, increased capital-intensity, better management, better 
competitiveness etc. The advantage drops slightly in the post-1990, but this only seems to reflect 
the general lower importance of ownership in explaining relative productivity in that period. Indeed, 
in the post-1990 period, all coefficients drop slightly.
Relative productivity is positively correlated to both central and local government ownership. 
However, the correlation is stronger for central government ownership, especially in the pre-1990
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period, when the State played a very active role in the industrial development. Did the central 
government pre-empt the most productive sectors and plants? Or did the central government 
manage its plants in a better way than local governments? Did the State favour central government 
owned plants? The correlation between relative productivity and central government ownership 
halves between the two sub-periods: What role played deregulation in this process? Does this show 
that after a certain stage of development, the State looses it comparative advantage in managing 
plants (especially when compared to the correlation between relative productivity and foreign 
ownership)? These questions are addressed in chapter 6 when dealing with industrial dynamics.
Industrial and plant-level crony and bureaucracy indicators
I now turn to the crony proxies presented in the previous section of this chapter. The level of gifts, 
donations and charities is positively correlated to relative productivity. It is not surprising that gifts, 
donations and charities figures increase with the size of the plant in both sub-periods (gifts, 
donations and charities correlates with gross output by roughly 13% over the period). Gifts, 
donations and charities expenses can be considered as a rough measure for tax reduction/evasion 
propensity (depending on who is the ultimate recipient of the gift), and/or as a cronyism measure if 
the person or charity receiving the gifts renders specific services to the company (such as political 
protection, facilitated access to licences, etc). The larger the plant, the larger the gifts: larger plants 
can afford to spend more on this item. However, the share of gifts, donations and charities 
expenses does not significantly correlate with total gross output or even total number of workers, 
which can let me suppose that there might be some flat rate for the payment of gifts, charities and 
donations.
Table 7: Correlation between relative TFP, and crony and bureaucracy Indicators
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
5-digit relative TFP 5-dlgit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
gifts, charities, donations 0.0084* 0.0105* 0.0103*
gifts share -0.003 0.0008 -0.0058
plant level crony dummy -0.0064* 0.0047* -0.0233*
5-digit crony dummy 0 0 0
white collar share 0.0665* 0.0722* 0.0580*
white collar wages share 0.0469* 0.0504* 0.0423*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
To account for the size effect, I examine the correlation between the share of gifts, donations and 
charities in total gross output ("gifts share"). This variable correlates positively with relative 
productivity in the high cost economy of the pre-1990 period, while the correlation becomes 
negative in the more competitive post-1990 period. Transforming this share of gifts into a plant 
level crony dummy (equals 1 if the share is positive, 0 otherwise) confirm the previous results: 
while it pays off to be a crony plant in the pre-1990s, the returns on such expenses become
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negative after the deregulation. In the pre-1990 period, the higher the share of gifts, charities and 
donations, the higher the relative and absolute productivity: either more productive plants are more 
"taxed" (informally) than less productive ones, and/or plants paying a higher level of gifts, charities 
and donations see returns on investment in the form of increased productivity (through easier 
access to licences, infrastructure, administrative facilities, etc). In the 1990s, the higher the share 
of gifts, charities and donations, the lower the relative and absolute productivity: this could either 
signal that less productive plants are more likely to spend more on gifts, charities and donations 
(maybe as a way to stay in the market), and/or that the payment of a large share of gifts, charities 
and donations hampers productive performance because too much resources are spent on that 
item without much "return on investment". The 5-digit sector crony dummy is not significantly 
correlated to relative TFP.
I also use two proxies for the internal market structure, the first is defined as the number of non­
production workers over the total number of workers, and the second is defined as the total wages 
of non-production workers over total wages of all workers. Both correlate positively and 
significantly with relative productivity. "White collar share", or "management Intensity", is positively 
associated with higher productivity, either that more management triggers a better allocation of 
resources or that higher productivity is redistributed under the form of more managers. The second 
variable calculated in terms of wages is a proxy for management quality, which seems to be 
positively associated with higher relative productivity.
Management and labour quality
Table 8: Correlation between relative TFP and management and labour quality
indicators
1975-95 1975-89 1990-95
5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP 5-digit relative TFP
management
quality 0.0136* 0.0459* 0.0156*
labour quality 0.0498* 0.0495* 0.0587*
* indicates a correlation significant at the 5% level
Management and labour quality are both significantly and positively correlated to relative 
productivity, either that better paid workers trigger higher relative productivity or that higher 
relative productivity is redistributed in higher wages. More interesting is the strong drop in the 
correlation between management quality and relative productivity in the 1990s, while the 
correlation between labour quality and relative productivity increases.
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5.4 Random draw hypothesis
The random draw hypothesis assumes that differences in productivity levels across plants results 
from measurement errors, either on the productivity levels or on the productivity growth rates. If 
this hypothesis is true, productivity levels will be uncorrelated from period to period (random draw 
for TFP levels) and the overall productivity distribution will display an increasing variance over time 
(random draw for TFP growth rates). It is necessary to investigate this hypothesis first before 
tackling other economic-based hypothesis.
As a first test for the random draw hypothesis on TFP levels, I refer to Table 1 and consider 
correlation coefficients between TFP and relative TFP levels, and their lags. As noted before, the 
correlation between current TFP (absolute and relative) and past TFP is quite high (ranging 
between 46% and 69%) and significant at least at the 5% confidence level. Correlation is higher 
between current relative TFP and the one-year lag for the period 1975-1989. For the period 1990- 
1995, correlation remains high but drop slightly, confirming a change in the industrial environment 
and dynamics noted while conducting other tests in this thesis.
A second test for the random draw hypothesis consists in regressing current relative TFP levels on 
their one-, two-, and three-year lags. Results are shown in Tables 9a, b, and c and confirm 
previous conclusions: lagged relative TFP explains on average 50% of current relative TFP, with a 
stronger explanatory power for the pre-1990 period. The regression gives similar results to those 
presented in tables 9a, b, and c when separating exiters and incumbents, or when running the 
regression yearly (not reported here). We can reasonably reject the random draw hypothesis on 
TFP levels: there might be some measurement error, but at least half of the current productivity 
levels relate to former productivity levels.
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Table 9a: Regression of relative TFP on its one-, two-, and three- 
year lags, full sample, 1975-95
Number of obs 221635 Variable VIF 1 A/IF
F( 3,221631) 63961.82 lag2TFP_5D_rel 2.42 0.41
Prob > F 0 lag3TFP_5D_rel 1.97 0.51
R-squared 0.464 lag1TFP_5D_rel 1.9 0.53
Adj R-squared 0.464 Mean VIF 2.1
5-digit relative TFP Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Iag1 5-digit relative TFP 0.5007078 0.0021396 234.02 0 0.4965143 0.5049013
Iag2 5-digit relative TFP 0.1462115 0.002404 60.82 0 0.1414996 0.1509233
Iag3 5-digit relative TFP 0.1027912 0.0021453 47.91 0 0.0985864 0.106996
_cons -0.0031122 0.0005701 -5.46 0 -0.0042296 -0.0019949
Table 9b: Regression of relative TFP on its one-, two-, and three- 
year lags, full sample, 1975-89
Number of obs 129315 Variable VIF 1A/IF
F( 3,129311) 41878.96 lag2TFP_5D_rel 2.64 0.38
Prob > F 0 lag3TFP_5D_rel 2.15 0.46
R-squared 0.4928 lag1TFP_5D_rel 2.07 0.48
Adj R-squared 0.4928 Mean VIF 2.29
5-digit relative TFP Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Iag1 5-digit relative TFP 0.4960067 0.0028326 175.11 0 0.490455 0.5015585
Iag2 5-digit relative TFP 0.1502868 0.0031577 47.59 0 0.1440978 0.1564758
Iag3 5-digit relative TFP 0.1157459 0.0028051 41.26 0 0.110248 0.1212439
_cons -0.0046149 0.0007269 -6.35 0 -0.0060396 -0.0031902
Table 9c: Regression of relative TFP on its one-, two-, and three- 
year lags, full sample, 1990-95
Number of obs 92320 Variable VIF 1A/IF
F( 3,92316) 22673.78 lag2TFP_5D_rel 2.16 0.46
Prob > F 0 lag3TFP_5D_rel 1.76 0.57
R-squared 0.4242 lag1TFP_5D_rel 1.71 0.59
Adj R-squared 0.4242 Mean VIF 1.87
5-digit relative TFP Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
Iag1 5-digit relative TFP 0.5043914 0.0032733 154.09 0 0.4979757 0.5108071
Iag2 5-digit relative TFP 0.1401693 0.0037099 37.78 0 0.1328978 0.1474407
Iag3 5-digit relative TFP 0.0848137 0.0033393 25.4 0 0.0782687 0.0913587
_cons -0.0011045 0.000914 -1.21 0.23 -0.0028961 0.000687
Now, to test for the random draw hypothesis on TFP growth rates, I examine TFP distribution 
statistics by year and by demographic type. This table is taken from chapter 4. As demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, there is a TFP convergence phenomenon within each demographic group: as 
time goes by, TFP levels of plants tend to converge. This result goes against the random draw 
hypothesis on TFP growth rates, since such a phenomenon would result in TFP level divergence.
186
Table 10: TFP distribution statistics
E=entrants_________ Hncumbents_______ X=exitors
E I X E I X E I X
YEAR mean TFP mean TFP mean TFP YEAR
median
TFP
median
TFP
median
TFP
standard
deviation
TFP
standard
deviation
TFP
standard
deviation
TFP
1975 1.37 1.27 1975 1.28 1.18 0.45 0.49
1976 1.42 1.38 1.28 1976 1.33 1.29 1.19 0.49 0.44 0.53
1977 1.41 1.39 1.23 1977 1.32 1.29 1.16 0.42 0.46 0.43
1978 1.47 1.41 1.24 1978 1.37 1.31 1.17 0.47 0.46 0.41
1979 1.45 1.38 1.34 1979 1.36 1.29 1.25 0.46 0.42 0.45
1980 1.47 1.39 1.30 1980 1.38 1.31 1.21 0.43 0.41 0.37
1981 1.47 1.41 1.31 1981 1.38 1.33 1.24 0.43 0.42 0.36
1982 1.46 1.42 1.37 1982 1.39 1.34 1.28 0.39 0.42 0.41
1983 1.44 1.41 1.38 1983 1.38 1.34 1.30 0.37 0.39 0.36
1984 1.46 1.42 1.42 1984 1.38 1.35 1.32 0.44 0.38 0.44
1985 1.45 1.44 1.48 1985 1.37 1.37 1.36 0.43 0.40 0.49
1986 1.51 1.46 1.46 1986 1.44 1.38 1.33 0.40 0.39 0.52
1987 1.48 1.44 1.41 1987 1.41 1.37 1.32 0.38 0.38 0.42
1988 1.47 1.45 1.42 1988 1.39 1.38 1.34 0.42 0.37 0.46
1989 1.51 1.47 1.48 1989 1.42 1.39 1.36 0.45 0.39 0.44
1990 1.55 1.49 1.53 1990 1.44 1.41 1.41 0.48 0.38 0.48
1991 1.49 1.50 1.51 1991 1.44 1.42 1.42 0.44 0.39 0.45
1992 1.54 1.54 1.56 1992 1.47 1.44 1.45 0.42 0.41 0.45
1993 1.54 1.55 1.51 1993 1.48 1.46 1.41 0.41 0.40 0.46
1994 1.51 1.56 1.59 1994 1.44 1.47 1.48 0.39 0.39 0.47
1995 1.58 1.57 1995 1.47 1.48 0.45 0.41
These results tend to reject the hypothesis that a difference in productivity levels among plants is 
merely due to error (random draw hypothesis). These two tests have shown that current 
productivity levels are evolving rather consistently over time, so that it is reasonable to assume that 
productivity differential across plants can be explained by economic reasons. I can now examine 
the second potential explanation for plants TFP differential: the plant vintage hypothesis.
5.5 Plant vintage hypothesis
According to this hypothesis, plant productivity levels differ because they were created at different 
time periods, with different technologies and under different economic and institutional 
circumstances. If this hypothesis is true, then the majority of plants created in the same period, say 
the same year, should have similar TFP levels. It is pertinent to examine this hypothesis in the case 
of Indonesian manufacturing because the history of the sector presents clear-cut sub-periods 
corresponding to different broad institutional environments.
The oil boom (1975-80) corresponded to a period of protection from foreign competition, a market 
of reduced access for foreign investment, highly regulated economy with a complex system of 
quotas and licences for imports, exports and domestic market distribution and investment, resulting 
in a highly distorted system labelled as the "high cost economy", and at the same time, plants were 
evolving in a climate of high economic growth rates. How do plants born in that period compare 
with plants born either before or after this in terms of relative productivity? Has protectionism acted 
in favour of productivity, or have the economic distortions resulting from protectionism reduced oil
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boom plants productivity compared to their non oil boom peers? How do plants started after the oil 
boom and before the economic rebound (1981-89) perform when compared to their peers? Are 
those plants, entering during a major restructuration of the economy, different from the others? 
Are plants entering during the most competitive sub-period (1990-95) the best performers?
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Table 11a: Distribution statistics of time-period/plant average relative plants productivity by year of
birth
year of birth nb of obs mean sd p10 p25 P50 p75 p90
1900 15151 0.005117 0.382791 -0.344013 -0.203198 -0.05992 0.119881 0.388341
1901 428 -0.008298 0.369791 -0.373713 -0.237811 -0.091562 0.148802 0.364433
1902 121 -0.058927 0.501912 -0.503434 -0.327387 -0.136493 0.083982 0.301618
1903 106 0.102662 0.412637 -0.240716 -0.152391 0.03506 0.263074 0.487811
1904 95 0.117828 0.305045 -0.190163 -0.087362 0.024522 0.314775 0.527124
1905 92 0.027167 0.345798 -0.487152 -0.238799 0.043344 0.225651 0.482535
1906 208 0.032033 0.409139 -0.313699 -0.201355 -0.051948 0.095342 0.46617
1907 267 0.007198 0.444329 -0.305268 -0.208494 -0.094255 0.124432 0.359832
1908 303 -0.028948 0.459953 -0.377799 -0.226961 -0.098128 0.081247 0.416457
1909 57 0.219 0.672818 -0.260094 -0.184143 0.018087 0.324178 1.122073
1910 504 0.009264 0.396417 -0.37114 -0.236464 -0.078092 0.121484 0.506165
1911 248 0.092203 0.439335 -0.376619 -0.158426 0.051634 0.264282 0.573093
1912 333 0.002624 0.564806 -0.429608 -0.29863 -0.105953 0.059089 0.450505
1913 158 0.167326 0.530269 -0.280323 -0.103475 0.04605 0.146626 0.718222
1914 109 -0.041178 0.254715 -0.335448 -0.190479 -0.104042 0.085867 0.370369
1915 169 -0.076951 0.213708 -0.305798 -0.21012 -0.107997 0.03333 0.181576
1916 164 0.003642 0.275352 -0.262716 -0.163464 -0.022988 0.172311 0.299576
1917 244 0.024476 0.378668 -0.310793 -0.18209 -0.0501 0.154795 0.479633
1918 556 0.256743 0.852068 -0.240059 -0.111653 0.045227 0.284089 0.785772
1919 797 -0.031948 0.309476 -0.313753 -0.204148 -0.07251 0.08273 0.266729
1920 378 0.047628 0.413711 -0.274021 -0.149362 -0.01353 0.136166 0.420476
1921 408 0.010983 0.299763 -0.317964 -0.188899 -0.051815 0.192347 0.448115
1922 202 0.019709 0.308377 -0.322776 -0.129811 -0.025104 0.114251 0.40971
1923 290 -0.014496 0.306813 -0.347836 -0.189571 -0.037535 0.128829 0.337978
1924 197 0.205455 0.490158 -0.241135 -0.123859 0.016487 0.553836 0.918099
1925 376 -0.02835 0.394523 -0.360253 -0.266857 -0.116573 0.078052 0.517968
1926 310 0.0169 0.301955 -0.319904 -0.189533 -0.046893 0.177803 0.449124
1927 457 0.059012 0.448286 -0.407364 -0.218091 0.00949 0.24456 0.558845
1928 355 0.046827 0.408438 -0.316827 -0.190794 -0.033967 0.167926 0.514952
1929 228 0.06472 0.362541 -0.253368 -0.159407 -0.007434 0.171879 0.595441
1930 850 -0.010347 0.349993 -0.361516 -0.221577 -0.07322 0.100693 0.458014
1931 282 0.023619 0.377694 -0.330058 -0.249989 -0.066902 0.172899 0.509053
1932 516 0.013383 0.360401 -0.347832 -0.180946 -0.053173 0.170488 0.520986
1933 301 -0.005777 0.309082 -0.310671 -0.175952 -0.045273 0.108403 0.30621
1934 587 -0.026435 0.28212 -0.299122 -0.199968 -0.083018 0.073683 0.305168
1935 650 0.018163 0.339956 -0.337448 -0.17735 -0.053425 0.156072 0.522226
1936 745 -0.017452 0.350059 -0.366716 -0.208965 -0.049396 0.124751 0.369513
1937 760 0.026533 0.349111 -0.299675 -0.173986 -0.036041 0.113277 0.513452
1938 674 -0.01484 0.319269 -0.308905 -0.225685 -0.108227 0.121122 0.445925
1939 527 -0.037983 0.287897 -0.322043 -0.233749 -0.095479 0.104709 0.275816
1940 646 0.004505 0.335658 -0.280742 -0.203781 -0.08738 0.076561 0.481801
1941 382 -0.023112 0.287808 -0.30427 -0.221566 -0.082185 0.12328 0.282429
1942 529 0.02505 0.349528 -0.266195 -0.170385 -0.047359 0.123035 0.357772
1943 310 -0.026945 0.252975 -0.297238 -0.176914 -0.035652 0.072858 0.204133
1944 123 -0.033113 0.245347 -0.254147 -0.208118 -0.076855 0.074962 0.227669
1945 581 -0.054122 0.336787 -0.364855 -0.217402 -0.087815 0.05933 0.330234
1946 339 -0.033911 0.294086 -0.325627 -0.200943 -0.050129 0.091096 0.26336
1947 785 -0.003055 0.359382 -0.34246 -0.182909 -0.062673 0.10356 0.406363
1948 1591 -0.002374 0.389869 -0.304913 -0.205962 -0.073811 0.082761 0.344665
1949 1397 -0.020215 0.33762 -0.334923 -0.201852 -0.068611 0.093042 0.340034
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year of birth nb of obs mean sd p10 p25 P50 p75 p90
1950 3766 -0.024267 0.347008 -0.345223 -0.209628 -0.077223 0.089957 0.343269
1951 2460 -0.015193 0.332129 -0.315091 -0.194562 -0.067374 0.09684 0.314248
1952 3584 -0.025348 0.342419 -0.34574 -0.219872 -0.085698 0.096168 0.346491
1953 2362 -0.030207 0.369563 -0.332758 -0.21469 -0.078122 0.074327 0.282611
1954 2938 0.000408 0.394595 -0.351646 -0.212605 -0.072287 0.118098 0.373232
1955 3004 -0.005783 0.455705 -0.314265 -0.184491 -0.064861 0.08307 0.272056
1956 3619 -0.019684 0.345437 -0.334838 -0.212304 -0.083267 0.077414 0.350974
1957 3344 -0.009166 0.350944 -0.337538 -0.206521 -0.064161 0.118302 0.37888
1958 3730 -0.032339 0.349713 -0.350432 -0.217474 -0.093188 0.05618 0.353634
1959 2391 -0.037966 0.319147 -0.3347 -0.211237 -0.089102 0.04898 0.319623
1960 6727 -0.020515 0.401459 -0.341901 -0.217738 -0.088678 0.066778 0.336596
1961 3723 -0.040445 0.381876 -0.368208 -0.233821 -0.102106 0.049175 0.310454
1962 5337 -0.034862 0.337461 -0.328623 -0.213448 -0.091245 0.056694 0.280272
1963 4330 -0.036274 0.336702 -0.335342 -0.212337 -0.087558 0.061818 0.268944
1964 4122 -0.039681 0.353124 -0.350975 -0.222507 -0.098191 0.055822 0.2991
1965 4915 -0.023403 0.368058 -0.330214 -0.207407 -0.083802 0.074615 0.31794
1966 2739 -0.004791 0.385199 -0.323112 -0.198793 -0.076436 0.080307 0.359913
1967 4567 -0.027767 0.362164 -0.337734 -0.20786 -0.075125 0.077443 0.30328
1968 6042 0.005782 0.395784 -0.342893 -0.21055 -0.064504 0.109926 0.402764
1969 5584 -0.000625 0.376894 -0.322127 -0.200598 -0.070176 0.092478 0.377699
1970 11675 -0.019089 0.360511 -0.328863 -0.204566 -0.07773 0.08249 0.316057
1971 9784 0.00445 0.355276 -0.30292 -0.192771 -0.057669 0.110625 0.349443
1972 11363 0.004031 0.361484 -0.314241 -0.197907 -0.060992 0.111662 0.384387
1973 9560 -0.002645 0.351615 -0.320494 -0.200871 -0.057197 0.112714 0.336391
1974 11320 0.000937 0.366096 -0.323378 -0.199889 -0.061432 0.107775 0.361559
1975 15189 0.009962 0.405727 -0.313173 -0.199584 -0.059212 0.122949 0.374067
1976 10058 0.011547 0.372117 -0.320095 -0.190949 -0.053221 0.118447 0.383332
1977 7308 0.0118 0.387553 -0.309522 -0.19624 -0.058314 0.111246 0.383861
1978 11185 0.014885 0.382566 -0.31606 -0.194973 -0.059511 0.123503 0.409456
1979 8186 -0.00916 0.343266 -0.322634 -0.201754 -0.068182 0.105662 0.331171
1980 14101 0.026767 0.387912 -0.314667 -0.19034 -0.044306 0.135306 0.434016
1981 8728 0.012416 0.368466 -0.306332 -0.184925 -0.049932 0.124298 0.362844
1982 9981 0.015126 0.376139 -0.310432 -0.19079 -0.058262 0.126593 0.411481
1983 8452 0.005404 0.372157 -0.331282 -0.201205 -0.06157 0.1216 0.392731
1984 8680 0.004916 0.397634 -0.331805 -0.205843 -0.071793 0.116122 0.418548
1985 9236 0.011777 0.397191 -0.328394 -0.20213 -0.064104 0.12375 0.413257
1986 6156 0.020545 0.363768 -0.32558 -0.198997 -0.047338 0.153679 0.429724
1987 6408 0.023832 0.409694 -0.335873 -0.206068 -0.05836 0.138394 0.475184
1988 5897 -0.005676 0.415959 -0.371097 -0.243328 -0.085416 0.119917 0.426491
1989 6678 -0.007514 0.378232 -0.345704 -0.21698 -0.075846 0.109377 0.40269
1990 7853 0.01148 0.437864 -0.358939 -0.22914 -0.080709 0.125005 0.450207
1991 6276 0.009068 0.401654 -0.362279 -0.224021 -0.064381 0.135754 0.472418
1992 4843 0.002427 0.387716 -0.35864 -0.215729 -0.061308 0.140533 0.422571
1993 3359 -0.014289 0.396837 -0.392565 -0.240305 -0.079086 0.12359 0.418578
1994 2708 -0.016787 0.405486 -0.37009 -0.243799 -0.093524 0.093182 0.44321
1995 1493 -0.018208 0.42361 -0.386066 -0.241378 -0.096821 0.098746 0.395763
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Table 11b: Distribution statistics of time-period/plant average relative plants productivity by year of 
  __________   _ _______entry ________ _ _______ _ _______ _______
year of entry nb of obs mean sd p10 p25 P50 p75 p90
1975 123469 -0.0102775 0.378169 -0.334161 -0.208087 -0.073826 0.093838 0.352869
1976 11618 -0.010438 0.350762 -0.324163 -0.210275 -0.068032 0.10168 0.341742
1977 10783 -0.0089792 0.351103 -0.320358 -0.200841 -0.066872 0.088029 0.350895
1978 10700 0.0102732 0.362264 -0.308199 -0.191268 -0.058671 0.12242 0.379585
1979 11012 0.0042299 0.388479 -0.334262 -0.205972 -0.057099 0.1228 0.382453
1980 12598 0.0213417 0.373833 -0.31167 -0.183971 -0.040408 0.134139 0.396171
1981 12423 0.0060722 0.362367 -0.316371 -0.190754 -0.058992 0.114738 0.370489
1982 12532 0.0081798 0.372918 -0.30114 -0.186936 -0.0612 0.108763 0.361027
1983 13544 0.0065786 0.345142 -0.306212 -0.187627 -0.053958 0.113182 0.36045
1984 14574 0.007392 0.386051 -0.323112 -0.197724 -0.062447 0.107841 0.389624
1985 21491 0.005515 0.38951 -0.330212 -0.205784 -0.071485 0.125155 0.406603
1986 8130 0.0193656 0.373712 -0.319861 -0.188558 -0.043948 0.143935 0.404948
1987 8526 0.0216049 0.381233 -0.314303 -0.191178 -0.051785 0.140535 0.419147
1988 12805 0.0040821 0.402852 -0.349592 -0.22494 -0.076214 0.123342 0.427182
1989 8494 0.0004636 0.372868 -0.33773 -0.212138 -0.068696 0.118289 0.40018
1990 11361 0.0176492 0.411746 -0.345631 -0.216911 -0.067514 0.139141 0.467407
1991 9711 -0.0021035 0.401979 -0.359875 -0.220229 -0.073925 0.115498 0.430088
1992 7312 0.0149105 0.407274 -0.350041 -0.213795 -0.059702 0.146135 0.445631
1993 4810 -0.0073537 0.396379 -0.378998 -0.227106 -0.076655 0.117487 0.416664
1994 3779 -0.021975 0.394906 -0.362665 -0.242436 -0.097122 0.083731 0.411067
1995 1975 -0.0000848 0.428415 -0.369342 -0.23139 -0.089571 0.120021 0.429253
I propose to observe distribution statistics of relative plants productivity by year of birth and year of 
entry in tables 11a and b. For example, in table lib , for plants having entered in 1980, the average 
relative TFP for the period 1980-95 is 0.0213417. Whatever the indicator chosen (relative 
productivity distribution by year of birth or year of entry into the medium- and large-scale 
manufacturing sector), the relative productivity distribution is wide, with standard deviation on 
average 50 to 100 times larger than the relative productivity mean. I obtain similar results for 
single years of observation rather than time-period averages.46
Relative productivity also depends on the size of the plant.47 As developed in section 7.1, plant size 
matters because of economies of scale, differing technologies, differing flexibility in the face of 
shocks, different relationship to the state and administrative authorities, which, in a distorted 
environment, can make a difference in terms of productivity.
The plant vintage hypothesis assumes that plants productivity levels differ -  after having controlled 
for the size of plants, firstly because they have been set up within different broad institutional 
framework and macroeconomic conditions, and secondly because their capital stock have different 
vintages and therefore different productive potential.
In order to test for the plant vintage hypothesis, I regress plant relative productivity on year of
46 Results are not reported here. Single years of observation relate to the summary statistics of plants by year of birth or 
year of entry for, say, the year 1980. These statistics allow controlling for year of observation specificities.
47 Productivity also depends on the industry the plant is operating in. But since relative productivity has been calculated here 
as productivity of the plant relative to the 5-digit industry average, the industrial sector effect has already been accounted 
for.
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entry dummies - for example y76 equals 1 if the plant entered in 1976, 0 otherwise, etc up to y95, 
omitting the start year of the dataset. This set of variables is supposed to capture the effects of the 
broad institutional framework of the year of entry.
The second explanatory variable is age as measured between year of birth and year of observation 
- birth can occur earlier than the actual year of entry in the medium- and large scale manufacturing 
sector. Age is capturing the obsolescence of the initial capital stock. I alternatively use survival as 
measured between year of entry in the medium- and large scale manufacturing sector and year of 
observation, dropping the year of entry dummies to avoid multicolinearity problems.
In order to account for any renewal of the capital stock, I introduce a variable accounting for 
cumulated capital stock growth, defined as total capital stock growth between year of entry and 
year of observation.
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Table 12a: Vintage hypothesis OLS regression analysis
Sub-period: 1975-69 I
5-digit relative 
TFP Coef. t P>|t| [95% Conf.Intervall Coef. t P>|t| [95% Conf.lntervall
initial TFP 0.478032 296.67 0 0.474874 0.48119 0.475007 296 0 0.471862 0.478152
OUTPUT 3.20E-10 7.6 0 2.38E-10 4.03E-10 3.48E-10 8.25 0 2.66E-10 4.31 E-10
total capital 
stock growth 0.036211 35.66 0 0.034221 0.038201 0.032387 32.71 0 0.030446 0.034327
age -0.000232 -6.37 0 -0.000304 -0.000161
survival -0.001037 -7.69 0 -0.001301 -0.000773
entry dummy 0.024659 11.31 0 0.020384 0.028934 0.013065 6.15 0 0.008901 0.01723
exit dummy 0.003443 1.03 0.302 -0.003101 0.009988 -0.006959 -1.98 0.048 -0.013854 -6.44E-05
y76 -0.034784 -10.14 0 -0.04151 -0.028058
y77 -0.034937 -9.73 0 -0.041977 -0.027896
V78 -0.035705 -9.77 0 -0.042868 •0.028541
y79 -0.028608 -7.87 0 -0.035729 -0.021486
y80 -0.021937 -6.31 0 -0.028751 -0.015123
Y*1 -0.031127 -8.8 0 -0.038056 -0.024198
y82 -0.029667 -8.19 0 -0.036769 -0.022565
V83 -0.018904 -5.28 0 -0.025928 ■0.011881
y84 -0.024603 -6.97 0 -0.031523 ■0.017683
V85 -0.030721 -10.06 0 -0.036706 -0.024737
y86 -0.034252 -6.59 0 -0.044437 •0.024067
V87 -0.031984 -5.8 0 -0.042786 -0.021182
y88 -0.050783 -9.98 0 -0.060761 -0.040805
y89 -0.056386 -6.73 0 -0.0728 -0.039973
_cons -0.672643 -256.01 0 -0.677792 -0.667493 -0.671221 -213.84 0 -0.677373 -0.665069
Number of obs 200110 200110
F( 20,200089) 4454.73 14753.77
Prob > F 0 0
R-squared 0.3081 0.3067
Adj R-squared 0.308 0.3067
Sub-period: 1990-95
5-digit relative 
TFP Coef. t P>W > Conf.lnterval) Coef. t P>|t| [95% Conf.lnterval]
initial TFP 0.332065 141.39 0 0.327462 0.336668 0.330643 140.99 0 0.326047 0.335239
OUTPUT 8.83E-10 21.65 0 8.03E-10 9.63E-10 8.89E-10 21.8 0 8.09E-10 9.69E-10
total capital 
stock growth 0.024354 22.63 0 0.022245 0.026464 0.023791 22.5 0 0.021718 0.025864
age -0.000109 -1.95 0.052 -0.00022 7.26E-07
survival -0.00043 -2.45 0.014 -0.000775 -8.54E-05
entry dummy -0.012629 -2.96 0.003 -0.021006 -0.004253 -0.020328 -5.52 0 -0.02755 -0.013105
exit dummy 0.004685 1.91 0.056 -0.000116 0.009485 0.001886 0.8 0.423 -0.002728 0.0065
y76 -0.012201 -1.59 0.113 -0.02728 0.002878
V77 -0.031462 -4.15 0 -0.04631 -0.016615
y78 -0.047518 -6.54 0 -0.061759 -0.033277
y79 -0.042369 -6.07 0 -0.056052 -0.028686
y80 -0.013549 -2.14 0.032 -0.025948 -0.001151
y*i -0.022748 -3.67 0 -0.034891 -0.010605
y82 -0.007476 -1.29 0.198 -0.018859 0.003907
y83 -0.003833 -0.71 0.479 -0.014444 0.006778
V84 -0.019638 -3.84 0 -0.029648 -0.009627
y86 -0.013678 -2.35 0.019 -0.0251 -0.002255
V87 0.005832 1.08 0.282 -0.0048 0.016463
y88 -0.004935 -1.11 0.266 -0.01363 0.00376
y89 -0.025831 -5.32 0 -0.035351 -0.01631
y90 -0.005928 -1.41 0.157 -0.014142 0.002286
y91 -0.011528 -2.59 0.01 -0.02026 -0.002796
V92 -0.007922 -1.59 0.112 -0.017679 0.001834
V93 -0.025215 -4.27 0 -0.03679 -0.013641
y94 -0.029503 -4.38 0 -0.042692 -0.016314
y95 -0.020039 -2.07 0.039 -0.039029 -0.001049
_cons -0.496104 -112.47 0 -0.504749 -0.487459 -0.500566 -113.67 0 -0.509198 -0.491935
Number of obs 124887 124887
F( 25,124861) 848.74 3510.47
Prob>F 0 0
R-squared 0.1453 0.1443
Adj R-squared 0.1451 0.1443
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To account for plant-specific initial technological conditions, I add the initial TFP level of the plant - 
defined as TFP level in the year of entry, as another explanatory variable. I also control for the 
demographic type of plant by adding the entry and exit dummies (entry equals 1 if the plant is an 
entrant, 0 otherwise, and exit equals 1 if the plant is an exiter, 0 otherwise). Finally, I control for 
plant size with the gross level of output.
I carry out the analysis over two sub-periods: 1975-89 and 1990-95, corresponding to the pre- and 
post-deregulation eras.
Table 12a show the results for two alternative models:
relative _ Sdigit _ TFP = ainitial _ TFP + b.O UTPUT -I- d Jotal _ capital _ stock _ growth 
+ evage + /.entry + g.exit + hj6 95.y1695 + c
(3)
and
relative _ 5digit _ TFP = ainitial _ TFP + b.O UTPUT + d Jotal _ capital _ stock _ growth 
+ e2.survival + f£ntry  + g.exit + c
(4)
The second model omits the year of entry dummies for obvious multicolinearity problems occurring 
with the survival variable. There is no other multicolinearity problem detected by the variance 
inflation factors, and no heteroskedasticity problem detected by the Breush-Pagan test.48
The models explain between 30.8% and 14.4% of relative productivity variance for the first and 
second sub-periods respectively. The most important factor seems to be the initial TFP level of 
plants, more markedly during the pre-1990s: the higher the level of TFP in the year of entry, the 
higher the relative TFP in subsequent years. This confirms that initial technological conditions at the 
plant level matter quite a lot in subsequent relative TFP performance. The drop in both the 
significance and the coefficient level for that variable explains the halving of the R-square of the 
models between the two sub-periods. It is probably necessary to recall here that the previous 
chapter has underlined the puzzling nature of TFP behaviour in the post-1990s, with, for example, 
exiters being on average more productive than entrants and incumbents.
And indeed, this finding is confirmed again here, with entrants displaying a relative TFP higher than 
incumbents and exiters displaying a relative TFP lower than incumbents in the pre-1990s, while 
entrants present a relative TFP lower than incumbents and exiters present a relative TFP higher 
than incumbents in the post-1990s.
48 The results of those tests are not reported.
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Size matters a lot as well in terms of relative TFP, with larger plants displaying higher relative TFP. 
This effect increases in the post-1990s period. However, the relationship between size and 
productivity is neither linear nor quadratic as demonstrated in the previous chapter. The form of 
the relationship is evolving over time, so that the coefficient on the size variable in this regression is 
to interpret with caution.
The age factor, measured either by age or survival, has a significant negative impact on plant 
relative productivity: the older the plant, the lower relative productivity. This tends to reject the 
positive learning effect of age hypothesis, and to support the hypothesis arguing that as plant grow 
older, their capital stock become less efficient, and productivity suffers. This effect can be of course 
counterbalanced by capital stock investment.
Total capital stock growth definitely plays a strong positive role in triggering higher relative TFP, but 
its effect is more marked in the pre-1990s era: the higher the cumulated capital stock growth, the 
higher the relative TFP. Initial technological conditions matter, but sustained renewal of capital 
stock is necessary to maintain a productivity level higher than the average.
The year of entry dummies only bear significance for relative TFP in the pre-1990 period. On 
average, plants displaying the highest relative TFP entered either during the crisis (1981-83) or 
during the recovery period (1984-85) as economic conditions were less favourable and the market 
required possibly higher productivity levels to ensure entry and survival, the third group in terms of 
relative productivity is composed by plants entering during the oil boom (1976-80), and the last 
group are plants entering during the deregulation period (1986-89). In the post-1990 period, most 
year of entry coefficients are not significant and their averages over relevant historical sub-periods 
are fairly identical.
I also run the same model using panel data random effect regression analysis in order to 
disentangle the time effect (within effect) and fixed effect of plants (between effect). Results are 
displayed in table 12b. I choose the random effect specification over the fixed effect specification 
because the variable accounting for the initial TFP level of plants is fixed over time but varies with 
each plant. A fixed effect specification would lead to biased results. The within effect, explaining 
relative productivity changes over time for each plant is fairly low. However, what is of primary 
interest here is the between effect, accounting relative productivity variations between plants after 
controlling for the time effect. For the period 1975-89, the model explains 58% of relative 
productivity variations between plants, against 28% for the period 1990-95. The overall R-squares 
(combining both within and between effects) are similar to the R-squares found on the pooled data. 
These results confirm and strengthen previous results found on pooled data.
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jTgj»h>2^»Vjn^g*]3(ESi!3S!S^SS i^SSL£!2^5!d2Slfl&^SCS!22JSS!lSSL
I Sub-period: 1976-89 1
6-digit relative 
TFP Corf. Std. Efr. Z P»M T96% Cord. tntwvall
5-digit falabve 
TFP Corf. 8td. Err. Z P>M T95% Conf. Intarvan
initial TFP 0.526367 0.002728 192.92 0 0.5210196 0.531715 initial TFP 0.521602 0.002719 191.82 0 0.5162728 0.526932
OUTPUT 2.47E-10 4.34E-11 5.7 0 1.62E-10 3.32E-10 OUTPUT 2.56E-10 4.34E-11 5.9 0 1.71E-10 3.41E-10
total capital 
stock arowrth 0.05384 0.001168 46.08 0 0.05155 0.05613
total capital 
stock arowth 0.051172 0.001157 44.22 0 0.0489034 0.05344
BOO -0.00051 6.28E-05 -8.12 0 -0.0006325 -0.000387 ago
survival stsvival 0.000212 -3.67 0 -0.001195 •0.000363
entry dummy 13.94 0 0.0221547 0.029407 antrv dummy 0.001811 12.09 0 0.0183381 0.025437
exit dummy -0.36 0.721 -0.0068499 0.004739 exit dummy 0.003045 -1.57 0.115 -0.0107636 0.001173
V78 -6.6 0 •0.0562856 •0.031104 ¥7*
y77 -6.83 0 -0.0589341 -0.032653 ¥77
V78 -7.83 0 -0.0651056 -0.039039 ¥7*
¥79 -6.85 0 -0.0569536 •0.031614 ¥79
¥80 -6.33 0 -0.0498691 ¥*>
¥81 -7.79 0 •0.0576695 ¥•1
¥82 -0.045152 -7.68 0 -0.0566751 ¥92
¥83 -6.01 0 -0.0444829 ¥93
¥84 -7.66 0 -0.050615 ¥94
¥85 0.004351 -10.37 0 •0.0536257 ¥99
¥88 -7.66 0 -0.0659712 ¥99
¥87 -7.3 0 •0.0624974 ¥97
¥88 -11.41 0 -0.0771505 ¥99
¥89 -6.67 0 -0.0878116 ¥99
cons -7.30E-01 4.49E-03 -1.63E+02 O.OOE+OO -7.38E-01 -7.21 E-01 cone -0.749672 0.004851 -154.53 0 -0.7591802 -0.740164
slama u 0.156788 siama u 0.157303
siama a 0.256726 siama a 0.257057
rho 0.271656 (fraction of varianca dua to u i) rho 0.272444 (fraction of varianca dua to u 0
R-sa: within 0.015 Numbarof oba 200110 Wald chf2f20) 38899.59 R *a : within 0.0143 Numbar of oba 200110 Wald ehf2(6t 38408.68
between 0.566 Numbar of g ro tjm 27275 Prob > eh<2 0 between 0.5811 Numbar of g ro iv * 27275 Prob > cN2 0
overall 0.3073 Oba par group: min 1 ovemN 0.3056 Oba par gro tp : min 1
Random oHacta u I -  Gaussian •vg 7.3 Random effects u 1 -  Gaussian •vg 7.3
con<uJ, X ). 0 [aaaumadfl max 15 c o rr(u J ,X )-0 aaaumad)| max 15
ftubperlo.i :  1990-96 |
6-digit relative 
TFP Corf. Std. E r r 1 P>M 196% Corf. In te rvn
5-digk relativa 
TFP Corf. 8td. Err. z P>W 196% Conf. Intarvafl
initial TFP 0.390006 0.003716 104.98 0 0.382813 0.397379 initial TFP 0.388449 0.00371 104.72 0 0.3811784 0.395719
OUTPUT 1.26E-09 5.76E-11 21.87 0 1.15E-09 1.37E-09 OUTPUT 1.27E-09 5.76E-11 22 0 1.15E-09 1.38E-09
total capital 
stock arowth 0.046814 0.001419 33 0 0.0440331 0.049595
total capital 
stock arowth 0.046317 0.001404 33 0 0.0435661 0.049068
w •0.000108 9.76E-05 -1.1 027 •0.0002987 8.37E-05 H .
aurvtval awrfval -0.000599 0.000263 -2.27 0.023 -0.0011151 -6.24E-05
•ntrv dummy -0.009128 0.00327 -2.79 0.005 -0.0155367 -0.00272 -0.01212 0.00307 -3.95 0 -0.0181369 -0.006103
•x it dummy 7.65E-06 0.001891 0 0.997 -0.003699 0.003714 -0.001258 0.00185 -0.68 0.496 -0.0046834 0.002367
*76 •0.030502 0.013329 •2.29 0.022 •0.0666253 -0.004378 *76
V77 -3.13 0.002 •0.066292 -0.015254 ¥77
¥76 •4.94 0 -0.0866491 -0.037406 ¥76
*7* -4.07 0 -0.0724404 •0.025364 ¥79
V60 -2.07 0.039 -0.044174 -0.001167 ¥60
V*1 -0.031056 0.0107251 -2.9 0.004 -0.0520777 -0.010038 ¥61
¥ « -1.25 0.211 •0.0325729 0.00719 ¥62
V63 -0.88 0.381 -0.0269935 0.010326 ¥63
V64 -2.11 0.035 -0.036444 •0.001346 ¥64
V65 0.41 0.684 •0.0118146 0.017999 v85
V66 •0.019119 0.010214 -1.87 0.061 -0.0391386 0.000901 ¥66
V67 •0.002457 0.009536 -026 0.797 -0.0211474 V67
V86 •0.006751 0.007867 -0.88 0.391 -0.0221686 ¥86
V«9 •0.029298 0.008616 -3.4 0.001 -0.0461842 ¥66
V90 -0.005701 0.007505 -0.76 0.448 -0.0204096 ¥90
V91 [-0.0118161I 0.0077I -1.53 0.125 -0.0269071 ¥91
V92 -128 0.202 •0.0259926 ¥92
V93 -2.71 0.007 -0.0407272 ¥«3
¥94 -2.91 0.004 -0.0429553 ¥94
¥96 -1.74 0.062 -0.0378831 ¥95
com -77.45 0 •0.603855 I -0.5740461 cona -0.595186 0.006626 -89.83 0 •0.6081726 -0.5822
ugma_u [ 0.2301351 I Irfgma_u 0.230339
To a certain extent does the plant vintage hypothesis explain plants productivity differentials for the 
entire period 1975-95, in that age or survival affects negatively relative TFP. The analysis also 
shows that this effect can be counterbalanced by capital stock renewal. The effect of the year of 
entry is only significant for the period 1975-89, suggesting that the broad institutional environment 
in the year of entry does make a difference in the pre-deregulation era, while it does not make any 
difference in the post-deregulation period when plant level TFP become more unpredictable. In 
fact, plant size is a much more stable explanatory factor for relative TFP, and its explanatory power 
and scope increase over the two sub-periods: the larger the plant, the higher the relative 
productivity. This tends to support the historical evidence and all the advantages linked to a large 
size. But of course, there is a need for adding more specific explanatory variables such as crony 
indicators. In fact most of the variance in relative TFP is accounted for by initial TFP levels
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reflecting plant-specific initial technological conditions in the broad sense. In fact, this result tends 
rather to support the plant fixed effect hypothesis that is investigated in the next section.
5.6 Fixed effect hypothesis: Explaining initial TFP of plants
While the plant vintage hypothesis focused on the specificity of a plant cohort, the fixed effect 
hypothesis assumes that plants differ in their productivity levels because of some fixed or quasi­
fixed plant-specific characteristics. Two of these plant-specific characteristics have been already 
used as controls in the previous section. The first is the size, which, if not strictly constant, can be 
considered as a quasi-fixed factor, as size changes very slowly. The second is the initial level of 
productivity (TFP in the year of entry). They both occurred as being significant explanatory factors 
of relative TFP of plants. Indeed, as underlined by the economic and political history of the 
manufacturing sector, it is not surprising to find that on average, larger plants tends to display 
higher relative productivity. As for the initial level of TFP, the explanation seems to match some 
kind of path dependency explanation, where the initial conditions and technologies of production 
have a strong bearing on subsequent productivity performance.
And in fact, rather than finding the fixed effects influencing yearly relative TFP, that also reflect 
overall macroeconomic changes, it is probably more pertinent to investigate the fixed or quasi-fixed 
factors influencing the initial level of TFP, i.e. take the initial level of TFP as dependent variable. In 
the mean time, this allows getting rid of multicolinearity problems between the initial level of TFP 
and additional fixed explanatory variables when using the specifications (1) and (2). In order to 
control for sectoral specificities, I introduce the average 5-digit TFP on the right hand-side of the 
equation. The average industry TFP at the 5-digit level is calculated as the average TFP of all plants 
in the 5-digit sector -entrants, but also incumbents and exiters- in the particular year of entry: a 
plant's initial TFP is linked to the industry TFP average in the year of entry. A plant's initial TFP level 
should be fairly close to the industrial average: it cannot be well above the sectoral average 
because it is constrained by the existing technology, and it cannot be well below because it would 
jeopardise the chance of the plant survival in the very short term. It is relevant to work at the 5- 
digit level, because it is the level where plants are the most likely to operate in a relatively 
homogeneous market. Hill (1990b) indeed underlines that "a comparison of scale and productivity 
at an aggregated (3-digit ISIC) level is inappropriate, because firms of different sizes tend to 
specialise in different industrial segments" (p. 92).
I treat the dataset as a cross-section, each plant having only one observation in its year of entry. 
The year of entry differing across plants, I control for it with year of entry dummies, ranging from 
year 1976 (y76 equals 1 if the plant entered in 1976, 0 otherwise) to year 1995, as for the plant 
vintage hypothesis. I chose to omit the year 1975 because it is the first year of observation in the
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dataset, and a dummy would probably not reflect entry in that year.
As for the rest of this chapter, I distinguish between two different sub-periods: pre- and post-1990. 
The base of the model is:
TFPinit = a.average _5digit _TFP + b1695.y1695 + c (5)
with average _ 5digit _ TFP the average industry TFP at the 5-digit level, y76 95 the set of year of 
entry dummies, and c a constant.
As demonstrated in the previous sections, one of the key quasi-fixed specificities of plants is their 
sizes, especially for both economies of scale and the facilitated access to factors of production, 
especially capital and intermediate inputs. I expect size to bear a positive relationship with the 
initial level of TFP.
Another key variable is the type of ownership of the plant. I use three ownership dummies. The 
first account for any share of foreign ownership, the second accounts for any share of private 
domestic ownership, and the third account for any share of public ownership (central or local 
government). I expect the foreign ownership dummy to be positive, the public ownership dummy 
to be lower than the foreign ownership dummy coefficient. The latter coefficient could still be 
positive if I consider that being a public company could lower some production costs. The 
coefficient on the private ownership dummy should be the lowest.
In order to test for any explanatory power of group membership and patronage on initial 
productivity, I use three dummy variables that are available for the year 1996. I treat these 
dummies to be constant for the period 1990-95. The two patronage indicators are only relevant for 
the 1990s, because the program was implemented in the last years of the 1980s. Group 
membership has always existed in Indonesian manufacturing, but conglomerates really experience 
a surge in the 1990s. Furthermore, it would not be reasonable to assume this dummy, collected in 
1996, to have remained constant from 1975 onwards. The "group_member" dummy equals 1 when 
an establishment declares being part of a group of companies, 0 otherwise. The patronage 
dummies are the "be_parent" dummy (equals one if the establishment is a "parent" company in the 
Bapak Angkat system, 0 otherwise) and "have_parent" dummy (equals one if the establishment is a 
"child" company in the Bapak Angkat system, 0 otherwise). Controlling for group membership and 
patronage is a way to reassess part of the success of the Bapak Angkat prog ra m.
The quality of labour and management is also a factor that should account for some of the 
productivity differentials. The only variable that could account for quality is the wages series. 
However, there are not enough data collected on wages for the sub-sample to be fully
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representative of the population. Furthermore, about 10% of wage-related data should be treated 
with caution because presenting unexplained outliers.49 The only labour and management related 
variable that can be included in the model is the ratio of non-production workers over total number 
of workers. This variable accounts for the internal labour structure of plants. I expect the ratio 
should indicate whether Indonesian manufacturing plants which lack managers under-perform 
plants with the optimal number of managers. Symmetrically, the ratio should indicate whether 
plants with too many managers under-perform plants with the optimal number of managers. A 
large number of managers can be symptomatic of plants where profits are redistributed to a large 
number of "family workers" employed as "non-production workers".
Participation to the export market is another characteristic of a plant that should make a difference 
in terms of productivity. In fact, both export dummies are discarded because they turn out to be 
totally uncorrelated to the initial productivity level.50 Furthermore, their coefficients turned out to be 
insignificant when included in the regression, with confidence intervals overlapping the negative 
and positive range. Most entrants do not start operations with taking part to the export market -  
only 8.6% of all plants entering between 1990 and 1995 report to be exporting part or totality of 
their production. Further investigation also shows that the median plant exporting in its year of 
entry is six times larger than a non-exporting plant in terms of output. The picture is similar in 
terms of number of workers. It is surely the case that what makes a difference in terms of initial 
productivity is size rather than market-orientation.
Finally, cronyism has to be accounted for. As discussed in previous sections, two variables can be 
used as proxies for cronyism. The first is a 5-digit crony dummy (Basri, 2001) based on qualitative 
evidence of cronyism. But not all plants part of a 5-digit crony sector can be considered as crony 
(as Basri himself recognises). In fact, Basri defines the crony sector as a sector where a Suharto's 
crony capitalist was involved in the largest company of the sector (ownership or management) or 
had been granted a monopoly in the sector. Explaining the initial TFP level of entrants, I expect the 
coefficient on this 5-digit crony dummy to be negative. Indeed, the majority of entrants belong to 
the small- and medium-scale category, majoritarily with private domestic ownership. The economic 
history of manufacturing underlines the peculiar structure of each sector, where large crony plants 
are granted monopolies either in the upstream and/or the downstream market, and extract rents 
from other companies. If a plant enters such a sector, it is likely to face constraints at least 
regarding access to capital, import and distribution licences, resulting in a productivity level lower 
than the large crony plant. This should particularly be the case in the first sub-period under
491 find for example sudden jumps of 300% and over of wage per worker. Manning (1980) also points at the fact that a fair 
chunk of wages, especially in large entities, are made of gifts and other social benefits. Although those are accounted for in 
the wage data I  use, it is very likely that the reporting of some of those benefits are measured with error.
50 As a check, I also use a third export dummy that equals 1 for any share of production exported, with the same results.
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scrutiny, i.e. the oil boom and deregulation period.
The second proxy for cronyism is measured at the plant level. As discussed in previous sections, a 
variable that can be used is the series of gifts, charities, donations. From this variable, I create a 
plant level crony dummy that equals 1 if the plant reports any gifts, charities, donations, 0 
otherwise. In the first sub-period, characterised by a high degree of distortions, it is difficult to 
predict the sign of the coefficient of this dummy. The coefficient could be positive under the 
"efficient grease" hypothesis, where spending money on corruption pays off in terms of the 
reduction of costs of production, translating into higher productivity. If this is the case, the sign 
should become negative after the deregulation period, under the assumption that deregulation has 
been effective enough to erode the mechanisms of the "high cost economy". However, spending 
money on gifts, charities, donations, might be a way for low productivity plant to enter the market 
and stay: the coefficient should then appear negative in the two sub-periods.
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Table 13: Regreeelon of In itial TFP laval on A nd explanatory variables
PERIOD: 1975-89
In itia l TFP Coef. t P>W [95% Conf .k its rva l]
average 5 -d ig lt TFP 0.934056 54.25 6 0.9003103 0.967802
OUTPUT 6.64E-09 11.01 0 5.45E-09 7.82E-09
w h it* collar share 0.000651 4.48 0 0.000366 0.000936
private  ow nership dummy -0.043817 -1.58 0.115 -0.098239 0.010604
fo re ign  ownarahfp dummy 0.044499 3.67 0 0.0207372 0.068261
pitoHc ownership dummy 0.017351 1.77 0.077 -0.001909 0.036611
p lant level crony dummy 0.021396 2.73 0.006 0.0060314 0.036761
6 -d lg lt crony dummy -0.012193 -1.87 0.061 -0.024942 0.000557
v n 0.042415 2.57 0.01 0.0100897 0.07474
i n 0.002441 0.14 0.887 -0.031188 0.036069
i n 0.055613 3.26 0.001 0.0221443 0.089081
y79 4.14E-02 2.52 0.012 0.0092316 0.07357
y io 6.37E-02 4.17 0 0.0337454 0.093637
v»1 0.036805 2.44 0.015 0.0072646 0.066345
y®2 0.026969 1.85 0.064 -0.001572 0.055511
y83 0.023533 1.73 0.084 -0.00312 0.050186
VM 0.033411 2.62 0.009 0.0083801 0.058442
ySS 3.56E-03 0.36 0.722 -0.016028 0.023144
v*e 0.025731 1.73 0.085 -0.003506 0.054968
y* t 0.026116 1.88 0.06 -0.001116 0.053346
yes 0.015674 1.45 0.148 -0.005538 0.036886
y w 0.016186 1.31 0.19 -0.008041 0.040414
_cone 0.096359 2.56 0.011 0.0225153 0.170203
Number o f obe 21441
F( 16.27258) 190.39
Prob > F 0
R-equared 0.1636
AdJ R-equared 0.1627
Nets: Variance inflation factors M eats no muttloolnearity problems, and Breuah-Pagan teat indicates 
homoakedastlcity
PERIOD: 199046
In itia l TFP Coef. t P>|t| [96% C onf.lntarvel] Coef. t PHtI [95% C onf.Interval]
average 5 -d ig lt TFP 0.882408 25.^6 0 0.8142001 0.950615 0.&88675 25.58 0 0.820562 0.956789
OUTPUT 4.46E-09 14.48 0 3.85E-09 5.06E-09 4.53E-09 14.73 0 3.93E-09 5.13E-09
w hite co lla r share -0.000207 •0.86 0.389 -0.000679 0.000264 -0.000155 -0.64 0.519 -0.000627 0.000317
gma>_member 0.063818 3.35 0.001 0.0264478 0.101189
be_parent -0.027081 -1.13 0.26 -0.074222 0.02006
he vs _perent 0.053225 2.94 0.003 0.017706 0.088744
plant level crony dummy -0.036491 -2.45 0.014 -0.06568 -0.0073 -0.041225 -2.78 0.006 •0.070341 -0.012109
6-d lg lt crony dummy 0.011427 1.04 0.301 -0.010212 0.033066 0.013917 1.26 0.207 -0.007716 0.03555
V90 (dropped) (dropped)
y9i -0.03273 -2.08 0.038 -0.063645 -0.00182 -0.031363 -1.99 0.047 -0.06228 -0.000446
y92 -0.008504 -0.53 0.595 -0.039832 0.022824 -0.008152 -0.51 0.61 -0.039482 0.023179
¥93 -0.036228 -2.21 0.027 -0.068337 -0.00412 -0.036978 -2.26 0.024 -0.069096 -0.00486
y*4 -0.055196 -3.52 0 -0.085904 -0.02449 -0.057303 -3.65 0 -0.088061 -0.026545
¥95 -0.011529 -0.74 0.462 -0.042263 0.019206 -0.012679 -0.81 0.419 -0.043425 0.018067
_cone 0.207963 3.67 0 0.0969281 0.318999 0.20324 3.59 0 0.092214 0.314266
Number o f obe 7741 7741
F( 7.12008) 88.22 80.7
Prob > F 0 0
R-equerad 0.1115 0.1114
Adj R-equared 0.1103 0.11
Note: Variance Inflation factors Indicate no mdticoinearity problems, and Breuah-Pagan feet Indtoates homoakedaalicily
Results displayed in Table 13 show that for both sub-periods, the models can explain over 16% of 
the variance of the initial plants' TFP level. These R-squares are fairly satisfactory given that the 
dependent variable itself is a residual. Also noticeable is the fact that R-squares are lower for the 
post-1990 period, again showing that TFP variance might be due to different factors for that period.
For both sub-periods, the bulk of the variance explained by the model is related to the 5-digit TFP 
average of the sector. This is not surprising, as entering plants need to match a certain productivity 
standard at the industry level to be able to compete. The increase of the coefficients between the 
two sub-periods shows the phenomenon of TFP level convergence across plants. This phenomenon
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is in line with the convergence process described in chapter 4.
The second most important factor explaining initial TFP for both sub-periods is the size of plants as 
measured by gross output, with a positive and very significant coefficient: the larger the plant, the 
higher the initial TFP level. But how big is this coefficient? Let me compare the median plant with a 
plant in the top 10% of the gross output distribution:
Table 14: How big are the regression coefficients? Example for the 1990-95 period.
stats initial TFP
average 5- 
digit TFP
(1) average 5-digit 
TFP of current 
quantile minus 
average 5-digit TFP 
of median
(1)* average 5- 
digit TFP coef, 
as a % of 
average initial 
TFP OUTPUT
(1) OUTPUT of 
current quantile 
minus OUTPUT 
of median
(1)*coef of 
OUTPUT, 
as a % of 
average 
initial TFP
N 12074 12213 12078
mean 1.536681 1.549556 1067523
sd 0.434746 0.1312693 1.19E+07
p10 1.155888 1.410505 -0.130921 -7.52% 19993.38 -91204 -0.03%
p25 1.296915 1.473171 -0.068255 -3.92% 42851.19 -68346 -0.02%
P50 1.45265 1.541426 0 0.00% 111197 0 0.00%
p75 1.66741 1.616303 0.074877 4.30% 366618.7 255422 0.07%
p90 1.983943 1.717503 0.176077 10.11% 1447122 1335925 0.39%
Note: statistics are entrants only over the 1990-95 period, coefficients are taken from Table 13
The median plant has a gross output of 111,197, and the plant at the limit of the top 10% of the 
gross output distribution has 1,447,122. The difference between both plants is 1,335,925.1 multiply 
this difference by the coefficient found on the gross output variable, which is 4.46 10'9,1 find that 
the result represents only 0.39% of the average initial TFP level: a plant in the top 10% of the size 
distribution will be at least only 0.39% more productive than the median plant (calculated as a 
share of average initial TFP).
The effect of the white collar share variable is interesting, because it changes sign with the sub­
period, without the variable changing significantly: over the two sub-periods, the average, median 
and distribution of this variable do not change. Its effect is positive and significant in the pre-1990 
period: a larger share of management and support services workers is the sign of higher initial 
productivity level. However, in the post-1990 period, its effect becomes negative but not significant. 
Since the values of the white collar share - i.e. the quantities- do not change over the two sub­
periods, I interpret these results as being the quality of management and support services within 
plants that drop between the two sub-periods. This does not necessarily mean that the intrinsic 
quality of the non-production labour force drops. It can be the sign of existing non-production 
workers slacking, or it can be the sign of a change in the environment to which the non-production 
workers are not used to. For example, a manager could have been very good at "greasing" the 
administration during the first period corresponding to increased cronyism, thereby increasing the 
productivity of the plant. In a context of increased competition, such skills do not benefit the plants
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productivity anymore.
Ownership dummies are only significant in the first sub-period, and are therefore removed from the 
model in the second sub-period. During 1975-89, having some foreign or public ownership triggers 
higher initial TFP levels, while private domestic ownership has a lowering effect. This is in line with 
the historical analysis of ownership in Indonesian manufacturing: private domestic plants are less 
productive, mainly because of a more difficult access to capital, technology, and intermediate 
inputs, probably suffering from the various monopolies granted to public and large-scale 
companies. Mirroring this, public plants are found to be more productive. However, the latter are 
less productive than foreign plants, which benefit from an even easier access to capital, and more 
advanced technologies. For the period 1975-89, a foreign entrant is 3.09% more productive than 
the average entrant.51 Comparatively, a public entrant is 1.20% more productive than the average 
entrant, and a private domestic entrant is 3.05% less productive than the average entrant. For the 
first half of the 1990s, the ownership dummies have no explanatory power regarding the initial 
level of TFP, be they used along with or without the group membership and patronage dummies. It 
seems that ownership does not make any difference after the deregulation period, which could be a 
sign of an increase in the competition of the manufacturing sector.
In the 1990s however, being member of a group of companies has a significant positive effect on 
initial TFP levels. With a coefficient of over 0.06, being member of a group of companies in the first 
half of the 1990s could trigger initial TFP being about 4.15% higher than single plants' initial TFP.52 
Indeed, being part of a group of companies can be an advantage in terms of technology, access to 
capital, transfer of managerial knowledge, etc.
The patronage system (Bapak Angkat Sistem), i.e. having a parent company, also has a strong 
positive effect on initial TFP. In fact, entering the medium- and large-scale manufacturing sector 
with the support of a parent company could help plants display initial TFP levels 3.46% higher than 
the others. This somewhat contradict Hill's argument (1995) judging the program to have been 
inefficient. Being a parent company turns out to have an insignificant effect.
Linking the ownership, group membership and patronage issues, the results could be interpreted as 
a shift from a system of plant specific productivity-enhancing connections between companies and 
the state in a distorted market, to a system of plant specific productivity-enhancing connections 
between companies in a more competitive market.
Let us now have a closer look at the crony dummies. In the first period, it appears that both
51 This percentage is calculated as the coefficient on the foreign ownership dummy (0.044499), times 1 (value of the dummy 
if the plant is part of a group of companies), divided by the average initial TFP of the sample (1.435651).
52 This percentage is calculated as the coefficient on the group membership dummy (0.063818), times 1 (value of the 
dummy if the plant is part of a group of companies), divided by the average initial TFP of the sample (1.536681).
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dummies have a significant effect on initial productivity levels. The 5-digit crony dummy has a 
negative effect, while the plant level crony dummy has a positive effect. It seems that plants 
entering a sector dominated by a large-scale crony company or in a sector where a monopoly has 
been granted to a company linked to Suharto's cronies display lower initial productivity level, 
probably because of higher production costs due to this monopoly. In the mean time, being a crony 
plant increases the initial productivity level: this is the efficient grease hypothesis. These results are 
completely in line with the historiography reporting the existence of monopolies hampering the 
productivity of other plants because they control import of raw material. The most famous example 
is found in the steel industry, with a monopoly for importing scrap metal granted to P.T. Krakatau 
Steel. Other examples include the case of the fertilisers production, wheat, sugar or wood.
Interestingly, the effects change quite dramatically in the aftermath of deregulation: as markets are 
being liberalised and monopolies slowly removed, being in a crony sector does not seems to make 
any difference anymore. Additionally, spending money on corruption becomes counter-productive, 
with a negative effect of the plant level crony dummy. This is a strong indication that deregulation 
and market liberalisation have had some expected effects.
This section has shown that a few plant-specific fixed effects could explain up to a fifth of initial 
plant productivity heterogeneity. The initial productivity level of a plant is largely explained by the 
average productivity level of the 5-digit industry it is entering: entrants need to match the industry 
productivity levels in order to compete. What then determines relative productivity is partly 
explained by the size of plants (as measured by gross output) with a positive relationship. Being 
member of a group of companies also helps reaching higher initial TFP levels, and having a parent 
company (patronage) has comparable effects. Over the two sub-periods, the ratio of managers and 
support services workers remains pretty constant for entrants. However, the effect of this ratio 
changes over the two sub-periods, from positive to negative. This suggests that the quality of 
services provided by this category of workers might have declined. Finally, testing for the effect of 
cronyism at the 5-digit industry level and at the plant level, I find, for the period 1975-89, that 
entering a crony sector lowers initial TFP levels, while being a crony plant increases productivity 
levels. This suggests that during the oil boom and deregulation period, which is characterised by 
heavy distortions, spending money on gifts, charities, and donations probably greased the system 
efficiently at the plant level. In the mean time, the existence of crony monopolies within industries 
created inefficiencies and is linked to lower initial TFP levels for entrants. In the aftermath of 
deregulation, the adverse effects of monopolies on entrants seem to vanish, while the effects of 
plant specific cronyism are reverted.
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5.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the potential economic, historical and institutional reasons for plant 
productivity heterogeneity. Plant productivity heterogeneity is a feature of any economy, and has 
been underlined to be symptomatic of developing countries, where large-scale productive 
enterprises coexists with a multitude of less productive small scale entities. The demographic study 
of the previous chapter has indeed underlined the duality of the Indonesian manufacturing sector, 
supported by the account of the sector's economic history.
Size is indeed the obvious explanatory factor of productivity differentials across plants. In the 
general case, size influences economies of scale, technological level, access to capital, and the 
larger the size, the higher the potential productivity level. In the case of Indonesian manufacturing, 
size also influences the cost of intermediate inputs and capital, in that size relates to the 
relationship of the plant to the state and the authorities. Large plants are found to have more crony 
connections, thereby lowering the cost of their inputs.
Other factors might however be at play, such as the time of entry of the plant, i.e. the influence of 
the broad institutional environment in the year of entry. Assessing the influence of this factor helps 
discovering what matters most of either the conditions in the year of entry or the conditions in the 
year of observation. The age of plants influence also productivity, in that an obsolete capital stock 
can be relatively less productive, counterbalanced by the positive effects of potential learning 
effects linked to age.
The type of ownership is in the case of Indonesia closely linked to the issue of size, with large-scale 
companies being predominantly state-owned, with a few foreign joint-ventures, while small- and 
medium-scale plants tend to be privately owned by local entrepreneurs. The historiography 
underlines the higher productivity of foreign-owned plants and the lower productivity of public 
enterprises.
Also relating to the issue of size is the question of the group membership and the patronage 
system. Dealing with data at the establishment level, taking group membership into account is 
important when assessing productivity differentials, because a small plant being member of a 
conglomerate can benefit from the same advantages as a large plant. The reasoning is the same 
with plants having benefited from the patronage system put in place in the mid-1980s, whereby 
large companies had to provide assistance to small entities of their own industries.
Finally, another important factor at play when assessing relative productivity in Indonesian 
manufacturing is the issue of cronyism. The literature shows clearly that crony companies benefited 
from advantages in terms of easy and cheap access to capital and intermediate inputs, relatively to
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non-crony companies. It also underlines that the non-crony part of sectors dominated by crony 
companies have suffered in terms of productivity.
The examination of partial correlation coefficients between plant-level relative productivity and a 
set of explanatory factors derived from the historiography helps setting the framework of analysis 
and building the appropriate model explaining plant productivity heterogeneity.
The second part of the chapter goes through three hypotheses in order to explain plant productivity 
heterogeneity. The first hypothesis justifies plant productivity heterogeneity by errors of 
measurement, either on TFP levels or on TFP growth rates. This is labelled the random draw 
hypothesis and is rejected, because current productivity levels are highly and significantly 
correlated to their lags, and because plant productivity levels tend to converge.
Therefore, there must be some tangible "economic" reasons for plant productivity heterogeneity. 
The second hypothesis, called the "plant vintage hypothesis", argues that plants differ in terms of 
productivity level because they enter the market in different years under different economic, 
technological, and institutional conditions. In order to test for this, I regress plant-level relative 
productivity on year of entry dummies to account for year of entry economic and institutional 
specificities, initial absolute productivity level to account for the initial plant-level technological 
conditions, gross output to account for size, age or survival to account for capital stock 
obsolescence, controlling for capital stock increase and renewal with the total capital stock growth 
rate since entry. I find that the plant vintage hypothesis, represented by the year of entry 
dummies, cannot be validated, but that aging has a negative impact on relative productivity, while 
total capital stock growth has a positive impact. However, the two most important factors 
explaining annual plant-level relative productivity are the size of plants and the initial level of plant 
productivity.
The latter results support the plant-specific fixed effect explanation to plant-level productivity 
heterogeneity. In the last section, I concentrate on explaining plant productivity levels in their year 
of entry. Indeed, since the initial plant productivity level conditions largely plant productivity in 
subsequent years, focusing on initial plant productivity levels sheds some light on plant productivity 
heterogeneity in general. I find that plants' initial productivity levels depend largely on the average 
productivity level of the 5-digit sector they are entering, but that other factors are involved. In 
particular, an initial larger size (gross output) affects positively initial productivity, and a fair amount 
of good quality management also triggers higher productivity. Being part of a group of companies, 
and in particular, having a parent company in the patronage system, triggers also higher initial TFP 
levels. I find that plant-level cronyism has a significant positive effect on plant-level productivity in 
the oil boom period and up to the end of the deregulation period, but that the effect becomes
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negative during the more liberalised period of the 1990s. I also find that being in a crony sector 
tends to lower initial productivity levels, probably because of negative externalities stemming from 
the large crony monopolies. The latter effect becomes insignificant in the 1990s.
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6 Determinants of industrial evolution
This chapter investigates the second set of questions raised in chapter 4. How can I explain 
industrial evolution? The focus is both on the characteristics of industrial change and on the 
reasons for survival and exit. Together with exploring further the dynamics of aggregate Total 
Factor Productivity Growth, this chapter informs the issue of selection and competition within 
Indonesian manufacturing.
We have seen in the previous chapters that a large part of aggregate TFP Growth stemmed from 
the process of entry and exit, because entrants were more productive than incumbents, and exiters 
were less productive than incumbents at the aggregate level. However, different industries display 
different TFP Growth rates: the comparison of some significant industries will help shed some light 
on the characteristics of industrial change in order to explain different productivity gains over the 
period. Does a high plant turnover equate high productivity growth rates for all industries? 
Comparing industries will allow define more precisely the characteristics of plant turnover necessary 
for large productivity gains. We have also seen that, depending on the sub-period, the market 
share reallocation among incumbents can offer a positive contribution to aggregate productivity 
gains. Is this true for all industries? Are there industries more competitive than others in terms of 
market share reallocation, and are these the ones displaying the highest aggregate productivity 
gains? Is there and what is the relationship between the turnover and the market share reallocation 
processes? Answering those questions will give a first account of the state and dynamics of 
competition in manufacturing over the period 1975-95.
The second set of questions regarding the state and dynamics of competition regards the reasons 
for plants survival and exit. Is relatively lower TFP the main determinant for exit? And 
symmetrically, is higher TFP the main determinant for survival? Does this change over time in 
relation to external shocks and macroeconomic policies? It would be surprising if lower TFP were 
the main determinant for exit, and higher TFP the main determinant for survival, as this would 
suggest the existence of perfect market mechanisms. Many other studies have labelled the process 
of exit as not being a clean process. Indeed, since there are several strategic games and agency 
problems in the decision to stay or exit, there is no obvious reason why TFP would be the main 
determinant for exit and survival. For example, within an industry with a small number of players, 
each player has an incentive to force competitors to exit in order to capture their market share. But 
if exit costs are too high, low productivity plants may delay the decision to exit. Another example is 
the case where plant closure would result in high unemployment costs for the State, so that the 
State could prevent or delay exit. In the same vein, managers and workers can delay or prevent 
closure decided by the owners in order to protect their jobs. Last but not least, exit may occur only
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when quasi-rents have been exhausted: a rational plant will exit when the profits expected in the 
next period are less than the interest that could be gained from reallocating the assets elsewhere. 
Exit may be delayed or prevented if assets have depreciated very quickly, or if the possibilities of 
reallocating assets are limited. Last but not least, and particularly relevant in the case of Indonesian 
manufacturing: exit can be prevented by soft budget constraints on some plants, allowed by 
political protection, for example via cheap and easy access to credit, or by the non-existence or 
non-implementation of bankruptcy laws.
6.1 Industries profiles
Before tackling directly the issue of the reasons for plant survival and exit, it is necessary to brush a 
short overview of individual manufacturing sub-sectors. Indeed, the literature on survival and exit 
underlines that plants behave differently depending on whether the industry is expanding or 
declining, both in terms of output and of productivity. Behaviours also depend on the evolution of 
industrial concentration. Finally, before explaining survival, and exit, there is a need for some 
historical account of the phenomenon: this has been done in chapter 4 with the demographic 
analysis of the manufacturing sector, but needs to be complemented by an analysis at a lower level 
of industrial disaggregation.
I chose to focus on three particular cases: food, beverages & tobacco; textile, garments & leather; 
and basic metals. The first two sectors are interesting to compare because they both originate 
during the colonial period, they are composed of both low and high capital-intensive sub-sectors, 
with an emphasis on labour-intensive activities, they use abundant and cheap natural resources 
and labour, they are fairly similar in terms of size and industry composition in terms of plants size 
distribution, the textile, garment and leather industry is growing faster than the food, beverages 
and tobacco industry, and they are the two main industries in manufacturing. The textile, garment 
and leather industry is a high productivity growth industry, while the food, beverages and tobacco 
industry is a very low to negative productivity change industry. Beside these, the basic metals 
industry is more peculiar. It is the smallest industry in manufacturing at the beginning of the 
period, in terms of output, employment and number of plants. It is very capital-intensive, very 
concentrated, and relies on the import of raw material for production. It is gaining in importance 
within manufacturing, and is the industry with the highest productivity growth rates over the period 
1975-89. The following section offers a more detailed historical account of the development of 
those sectors.
Food, beverages & tobacco
This sector is composed of four 3-digit sub-sectors: the food industry (ISIC 311), the other foods 
industry (ISIC 312), the beverage industry (ISIC 313), and the tobacco industry (ISIC 314). In
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1975, in terms of output, the sector of food, beverages and tobacco is dominated by the 
manufacture of clove cigarettes, followed by the manufacture of sugar, the manufacture of cooking 
oil, the milling and cleaning of coffee, and the manufacture of tea. Also noticeable is the large 
employment share of the manufacture of tobacco. The share of clove cigarettes manufacturing 
rises throughout the period to attain 30.3% of total output in the food, beverages and tobacco 
sector in 1995, and a share of over 18% in employment. In 1995, the clove cigarettes 
manufacturing, and the manufacture of tobacco account for 35.7% of employment and 33.1% of 
output in the food, beverages and tobacco industry. On the other hand, the sugar industry is on a 
relative decline, with a share in output dropping from 13.5% in 1975 to 4.6% in 1995. All in all, the 
share of the cooking oil industry remains unchanged, with the noticeable rise of palm oil, in which 
Indonesia has a natural comparative advantage, replacing crude animal and vegetable oil. The 
processing of tea and coffee is on the decline, and other products such as frozen fish, wheat based 
products, or animal feeds, pulled by domestic demand and rising income levels, start to rise.
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Table la : Food, beverages, and tobacco sector description
year 5-digit 5-digit industry label share in 2-digit snare in z-aigit
industry industry output (%) industry
code employment (%)
1975 31420 manufacture of clove cigarettes 19.0 22.6
1975 31181 manufacture of granulated sugar 13.5 19.6
1975 31151 manufacture of crude animal and vegetable
cooking oil 11.8 4.3
1975 31163 Milling and cleaning of coffee 11.5 4.4
1975 31221 Manufacture of processed tea 10.6 4.9
1975 31430 Manufacture of cigarettes 4.7 1.5
1975 31410 Manufacture of dried and processed
tobacco 2.1 15.7
1975 31164 Peeling and cleaning of seeds except of
coffee 1.3 1.4
1975 31161 Rice milling and husking 1.2 1.9
1985 31420 manufacture of clove cigarettes 30.2 21.8
1985 31181 manufacture of granulated sugar 11.4 14.7
1985 31151 manufacture of crude animal and vegetable
cooking oil 8.0 5.3
1985 31163 Milling and cleaning of coffee 4.5 4.6
1985 31144 Manufacture of frozen fish and other similar
products 3.4 1.6
1985 31410 Manufacture of dried and processed
tobacco 2.8 14.1
1965 31430 Manufacture of cigarettes 2.7 1.2
1985 31221 Manufacture of processed tea 2.7 4.8
1985 31161 Rice milling and husking 1.8 1.7
1985 31340 Manufacture of soft drinks 1.5 1.4
1985 31179 Manufacture of bakery products and the
like 1.2 3.8
1965 31164 Peeling and cleaning of seeds except of
coffee 1.2 1.1
1985 31171 Manufacture of macaroni, spaghetti,
noodles and the like 1.1 2.5
1995 31420 manufacture of clove cigarettes 30.3 18.2
1995 31154 Manufacture of cooking oil made of palm
oil 7.7 1.1
1995 31281 Manufacture of prepared animal feeds 6.8 1.3
1995 31144 Manufacture of frozen fish and other similar
products 6.5 4.4
1995 31151 manufacture of crude animal and vegetable
cooking oil 5.7 4.8
1995 31181 manufacture of granulated sugar 4.6 8.0
1995 31171 Manufacture of macaroni, spaghetti,
noodles and the like 3.6 2.9
1995 31340 Manufacture of soft drinks 3.4 2.3
1995 31179 Manufacture of bakery products and the
like 3.0 5.5
1995 31410 Manufacture of dried and processed
tobacco 2.8 17.5
1995 31221 Manufacture of processed tea 1.5 6.5
1995 31163 Milling and cleaning of coffee 1.4 3.0
1995 31192 Manufacture of food made of chocolate and
sugar confectionnery 1.2 1.6
Sugar is one of the oldest cash-crop in Indonesia, and has a long history of state-ownership and 
industrial concentration. Robison (1986) reports that "Much of lowland Java was operated as a 
virtual state sugar plantation, and the value of sugar export from the Indies in 1840 constituted 
77.4% of the total value of exports and remained at 62% as late as 1880" (p.6). According to 
Robison, the scale of enterprises in this sector started to increase between 1870 and 1949 
accompanied by the appearance of vertical integration and the replacement of smallholders by 
banks and large trading houses. This phenomenon had been triggered by the increasing capital- 
intensity of the sugar activities. Sugar production started to decline in the late 19th century, with a
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big blow during the Great Depression, with the number of mills dropping from 180 in 1929 to 45 in 
1933, and production falling from 3 million tons to 0.5 million ton over the same period. "The 
industry never recovered from this blow, and with the dismantling of the colonial state apparatus 
after 1945 the private sugar industry was deprived of the power required to enforce the complex 
and onerous land appropriations upon which sugar cultivation, especially in Java, was based" 
(Robison, 1986, p.8).
Under the Suharto era, from 1967 onwards, BULOG (state logistic board) regulated the price and 
distribution of sugar, among other basic staples. BULOG can also have the monopoly of purchase 
and distribution of staples, or appoint official distributors, what is of course a source for distortions 
of all sorts, including corruption and the formation of a monopolist market not necessarily resting 
on productivity. Robison (1986) indeed states that BULOG "has been a major launching pad for 
domestic corporate capital, through its power to allocate distributorships and contracts, as well as a 
major source of funds for the private and political needs of the politico-bureaucrats who have 
controlled It" (p. 229). Tabor (1992) describes the entire sugar cane programme, including the 
Smallholder Sugar Intensification Project (TRI, Tebu Rakyat Intensifikasi) as "uneconomic" (p. 177). 
Indeed, the promotion of smallholders Is said to have prevented the sector from gaining from 
economies of scale, the intervention of BULOG distorted competition both through the license 
allocation process and through the setting of domestic prices above world prices, resulting in an 
implicit tariff on sugar ranging from 50% (1989) to 373% (1985) depending on years for the period 
1975-89 (Tabor, 1992). Parastatal corporations (PTPs) have been created in the domain of 
agricultural production and processing. Tabor (1992) reports that "government policy has been to 
pamper the PTPs with subsidised investment credits and low cost access to public lands...These 
benefits have then been offset by high rates of taxation and by assigning the PTPs the social 
responsibility for smallholder development. The combination of provision of special favours and 
imposition of development burdens has created endemic PTP mismanagement, marked by a cycle 
of rapid investment growth (in high price periods), liquidity crises as prices have fallen, and 
government bailouts" (p. 194). And indeed, of plants present in the sugar sector of the Statistik 
Industri dataset, between 70% and 80% report state ownership between 1975 and 1995, most of 
the time a 100% state capital share. Adding to this, Tabor describes the sugar sector as being 
technologically backwards.
The wheat based products industry follow a similar pattern. Indeed, as wheat and flour were also 
regulated by BULOG, corruption, large state monopolies, and price distortions prevail. For example, 
the company PT Bogasari Flour Mills is a monopoly in grain milling, and instant noodle production, 
and is said to have had strong political connections. Indeed, Robison (1986) reports that "the 
original decision to establish a flour mill in Indonesia was taken in 1970 and a Singapore company,
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P.T. Prima, was given the licence to begin milling. Then suddenly a company, P.T. Bogasari, was 
established by Liem Sioe Liong, the Suharto family business associate, to enter the flour milling 
business also. It was owned by the Liem Group, in partnership with Sudwikatmono, the half-brother 
of President Suharto, who was also President Director. The articles of association stipulated that, in 
effect, 26% of profits be set aside for'charitable' foundations including Mrs Suharto's Yayasan 
Harapan Kita and Kostrad's Yayasan Dharma Putra...At the same time, BULOG revoked Prima's 
original licence and issued it with a licence to mill for the less lucrative East Indonesia market" 
(p.232). A following series of similar events led Prima completely out of the Indonesian market. 
However, this industry has expanded massively, mostly as a result of the strong rising demand 
triggered by rising income.
Commercial production of palm oil started in 1911 and peaked in 1938, to halve in the aftermath of 
the independence war. Dutch production facilities were nationalised in 1957, and the sector was 
renovated in the early 1970s. The sector experienced an export boom from 1967 to 1978, and 90% 
of production was exported (coconut oil for domestic consumption) (Aswicahyono, 1998). In 1979, 
the production becomes domestic oriented mostly because coconut oil could not meet the rising 
pace of domestic demand. To reorient the production towards the domestic market, trade 
restrictions and price ceilings were introduced. The control was effective with export dropping to 
55% of production. The effectiveness of the measures stems mainly from the fact that 60% of the 
total acreage was public-owned. In 1977 the Perkebunan Inti Rakyat (PIR) programme was 
implemented to encourage private participation in the industry, especially from smallholders, as for 
the sugar industry. It took the form of land allocation and subsidised interest rates. By 1989 the 
share of private plantations exceeded the share of public plantations. In the 1990s, both domestic 
and export production increased steadily. There has been a movement towards vertical integration 
in order for palm oil processing companies to control the prices of raw materials, and to access 
profits that are higher in the upstream market. Tbe two leading groups are the Salim Group and 
the Sinar Mas Group (Aswicahyono, 1998). And indeed, in the mid-1990s, Larson (1996) reports 
that still 60% of palm oil refineries are owned by 5 big companies. Indonesia, in spite of some 
market distortions, is, according to Larson (1996), one of the lowest-cost producers of vegetables 
oil in the world.
By far the largest output contributor to the food, beverages and tobacco sector is the manufacture 
of cloves cigarettes (called kretek). Manning (1979) reports that in the 1960s, hand-rolled kretek 
production was competing with foreign-owned white cigarettes, and that the former received price 
subsidies in the form of higher excise tax and low retail price for white cigarettes. The protection of 
the hand-rolled kretek went also through a regulation hampering the installation of new production 
machinery, keeping down the production volumes of both white and kretek machine-rolled
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cigarettes. Restrictions on new machinery were eased in the mid-1970s, triggering a massive rise in 
the production of machine-rolled kretek (from 50 million sticks in 1976 to 3.9 billion sticks in 1977, 
Tarmidi, 1996, p.87). In 1979, restrictions on machinery were removed and the authorities 
instituted a production ratio of 1:2 between machine-rolled and hand-rolled kretek cigarettes, and 
the production jumped to 13.6 billions sticks (Tarmidi, 1996, p.87). The ratio was achieved as soon 
as 1981, and this, together with the oil crisis, probably explains the production slowdown in 1981- 
83. In the following period, the ratio became 2:3, triggering another rise in production. Bird (1996) 
reports that in 1990, a dove-trading agency (BPPC) was created and given the monopoly to buy 
cloves from local producers and sell them to kretek manufacturers, resulting in a 20% increase of 
production costs. In 1991, the government implemented the equivalent of a tax increase on the 
purchase of cloves, resulting in a drop in production of kretek cigarettes benefiting the white 
cigarettes industry. However, the kretek cigarettes industry adapted to the new regulatory 
environment and production started to rise again after 1992. If we believe Tarmidi (1996), the 
clove cigarettes industry is one example of domestic production winning the competition against 
foreign producers. If the kretek cigarettes could initially not compete with white tigarettes, the 
producers soon reacted to market demand by improving the quality, appearance and packaging of 
the product, while remaining price competitive. This, coupled with an increase in productivity due 
to more widespread mechanisation, and the immobility of foreign competitors, insured the 
Indonesian kretek producers the domination of the domestic market. According to Tarmidi (1996), 
the number of kretek firms halved between 1972 and 1993, from 287 to 141 firms, and the 
concentration in the industry increased. Bird (1996) argues that this decline in numbers is mostly 
due to intense competition among the "competitive fringe" of plants rather than competition 
between the dominant companies and the "competitive fringe". Bird (1996) also argues that 
medium- and large plants compete on image, while small plants compete on prices. Furthermore, 
Castle (1982), mentioned in Aswicahyono (1998) argues that the minimum efficient scale is at 
about 100 workers, more workers don't make a difference, while less seems to be synonymous of 
lower productivity. Finally, it seems that most new capital investments were implemented in the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s.
The overall picture of the food, beverages and tobacco sector is one of a very regulated sector, 
with high price ceilings, high implicit import protection rates, acting under a very regulated and 
distorted production and distribution licenses allocation system, resulting in price distortions, and 
the dominance of large groups with political connections. In the mean time, the entry of small 
entities has been encouraged, but within such a uncompetitive environment, it is difficult to imagine 
how those new small plants could fared well. From a technological point of view, it seems that, 
because of the protection of some vested interest, improvements have been delayed, sometimes
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until the deregulation period. It will therefore not be surprising to find that this sector did not 
perform well in terms of Total Factor Productivity Growth.
Textile, garments & leather
Hill (1991) proposes a detailed account of the history of the Indonesian textile and garment 
industry. This industry regroups three sub-sectors. The oldest industry is the weaving and fabric 
production industry, while the spinning and synthetic fibre production, and the garment production 
industries emerged primarily under the Suharto era. While the spinning and synthetic fibre 
production is capital-intensive, the two other sub-sectors are more labour-intensive.
Table lb: Textile, garments, and leather sector description
year 5-digit snare in z-aigit
industry share in 2-digit industry
code 5-digit industry label industry output (%) employment (%)
1975 32114 Weaving mills except gunny and other
sacks 34.4 32.2
1975 32111 Spinning mills 19.5 11.1
1975 32112 Manufacture of threads 14.0 24.2
1975 32210 Manufacture of wearing apparel made of
textile (garments) 6.8 7.0
1975 32115 Manufacture of finished textiles 3.4 1.3
1975 32130 Knitting mills 3.1 4.9
1975 32117 Manufacture of batik 2.3 2.5
1975 32123 Manufacture of gunny bags 1.6 2.1
1975 32113 Manufacture of finished yarns 1.4 2.1
1975 32121 Manufacture of made-up textile articles
except wearing apparels 1.3 2.5
Note: in 1975, two 5-dioit industries are undefined and represent 2.7% of output and 3.3% of labour
1985 32114 W eaving mills except gunny and other
sacks 30.8 31.4
1985 32111 Spinning mills 24.6 14.1
1985 32210 Manufacture of wearing apparel made of
textile (garments) 19.1 23.6
1985 32112 Manufacture of threads 5.4 7.1
1985 32130 Knitting mills 4.3 5.6
1985 32121 Manufacture of made-up textile articles
except wearing apparels 1.9 2.6
1985 32117 Manufacture of batik 1.5 2.2
1985 32123 Manufacture of gunny bags 1.2 1.1
1985 32115 Manufacture of finished textiles 1.1 1.2
1995 32114 Weaving mills except gunny and other
sacks 24.9 21.0
1995 32111 Spinning mills 24.1 11.0
1995 32210 Manufacture of wearing apparel made of
textile (garments) 19.1 26.5
1995 32412 Manufacture of sport shoes 12.4 15.9
1995 32130 Knitting mills 4.9 6.4
1995 32411 Manufacture of footwear for daily use 2.9 5.3
1995 32115 Manufacture of finished textiles 2.2 1.7
1995 32116 Manufacture of printed textiles 1.3 1.0
1995 32220 Manufacture of wearing apparel made of
leather and the like 1.2 1.3
The weaving industry started in the late colonial era, in the 1920s, was relying on small-scale 
cottage industry, and on imported yarns. Not much investment was realised after independence. 
The sector was given priority in the early Suharto era because it was considered as producing basic 
needs goods, and because domestic demand was rising. The promotion of this sector resulted in
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high investment upgrading the spinning and weaving technologies of this industry. Indeed, Hill 
(1991) reports that "the New Order regime dismantled the elaborate yarn allocation system which 
existed up to 1966, removed the extensive trade and regulatory barriers, and ushered in a virtual 
technological revolution" (p. 91). In fact hand looms became a residual technology of production as 
soon as the late 1970s, mostly because of productivity reasons, with a potential acceleration of the 
process imputable to capital investment subsidies (Hill, 1991). The import substitution policy for the 
textile industry paid off in the 1970s, but the sector's growth slowed down in 1980-85 with the oil 
crisis resulting in a weaker domestic demand. However, after 1985, exports grew steadily (Hill, 
1991). Even though the sector was protected from imports, the textile sector seems to be a sector 
that experienced early deregulation for the domestic market, as well as early and rapid upgrading 
of technology. This might already indicate stronger productivity growth rates than other industries, 
both because of the technological advance and because of lower market distortions.
According to Hill (1991), "the spinning, fibre and garment industries are much more recent in 
origin" (p.92), with a manufacturing sector only appearing on a small scale in the 1930s, stagnated 
until 1968, and expanded "by some fifteen-fold from 1969 to 1988" (p. 92), utilising abundant 
energy resources in the production of polyester fibre. The manufacturing garments industry only 
emerged in the 1970s, responding to export opportunities and rising domestic demand (Hill, 1991).
Hill (1991) also reports that the industry uses intensively cheap female labour, and wages in the 
Indonesian textile industry are at the same time lower than textile workers wages in other 
countries, and lower than the Indonesian national average wage. This strengthens further the 
hypothesis of high profitability and productivity of the sector relative to the others.
The industry diversified in the 1970s to produce a large range of natural and synthetic materials. 
From yarn spinning and weaving, the industry turned heavily to garments manufacturing, helped 
both by domestic demand in the 1970s and booming demand for exports in the 1980s. Pangetsu 
(1996) argues that this export boom was pushed by a slowing domestic demand in the aftermath of 
the oil crisis, and boosted by the abundance of cheap labour, coupled to subsidised interest rates 
for export credits, un-utilised export quotas, and under-valued real exchange rate. The introduction 
in 1986 of the BAPEKSTA scheme of duty and VAT exemptions and drawback for inputs to 
exportables also helped boost exports. Growth rates only started to slow down as cheap 
competition emerged from China, India and Bangladesh (1993), and as the government introduced 
the minimum wage policy that did not necessarily correspond to an increase in labour productivity.
In terms of plant size distribution, Hill (1991) reports that the garment industry is mostly dominated 
by small (5 to 19 employees) and medium size plants (200 to 999 employees), while spinning is 
dominated by large-scale plants (above 1000 employees). The weaving industry is somewhat in
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between. The plant size distribution of the three sub-sectors reflects their specific capital-intensities 
and scale economies. This contrasts with the food, beverages and tobacco industry that is more of 
a dual market in terms of size, with large-scale monopolies coexisting with weak smallholders. 
Productivity in the textile sector is also enhanced by vertical integration.
In terms of ownership, Hill (1991) reports that "at one extreme, garments are almost entirely in 
domestic private hands" (p.99), because the government does not consider the sector as strategic, 
and because foreign investors do not possess any sort of advantage. The nationalisation of weaving 
mills after independence explains a somehow larger presence of government ownership in that 
sector, while foreign investment (mostly North-East Asian) has also been more substantial in 
spinning and weaving because of a higher capital requirement than for the garment industry.
A rising star in the textile, garment and leather industry of the 1980s is the footwear industry. 
While footwear accounted only for 5% of total output in the sector in 1975, it rose to 16% in 1995. 
Up to the 1980s, the only formal plant in the footwear industry was the foreign owned firm Bata. 
New and mostly foreign investment in the sector flourished in the 1980s as East Asian countries 
such as Korea and Taiwan had to relocate the production of sport shoes to respond to the 
appreciation of their currencies, increasing labour costs, and the removal of the Generalised System 
of Preference facility (Aswicahyono, 1998). Indonesia attracted foreign investment because it 
produced rubber, provided abundant and cheap labour, and had export orientated incentives.
Chapman (1992) however argues that in spite of deregulation, authorities managed to keep control 
over the footwear industry and continue protecting large private domestic companies from new 
domestic competition. He argues that "Footwear, with relatively low ' natural' barriers to entry, was 
closed to domestic investment, enshrining the existing concentration of the industry. While the 
liberalisation which began in 1986 included provisions which opened all sectors to investment, 
provided that 85% of output was planned for export, direct competition for incumbent firms selling 
into the domestic market remained restricted by licensing of investment" (p.71). Meanwhile, the 
BAPEKSTA scheme of duty and VAT exemptions and drawback for inputs to exportables introduced 
in 1986 has been an important pull factor for the development of the export sector in the footwear 
industry. This sub-sector, mostly pulled by the export industry, is one of the most productive.
In terms of plant size, Chapman (1992) argues that in the footwear industry, if "economies of scale 
are exhausted at as little as 60 employees..., lack of quality competitiveness may be the greatest 
handicap in placing small-scale producers on an export competitive footing" (p.82). This suggests 
that some small and medium plants might be productive, but less than larger plants that can 
produce high quality and exportable goods.
The overall picture of the textile, garment and leather sector is one of a fairly diversified,
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competitive, modern sector. In fact, the economic history of this industry explains pretty well the 
very good performance in terms of productivity gains.
Basic metals
Table lc: Basic metals sector description
year 5-digit snare in 2-digit
industry share in 2-digit industry
code 5-digit industry label industry output (%) employment (%)
1975 37103 Steel rolling industries 38.1 58.2
1975 37204 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal extrusion 
industries 25.6 10.2
1975 37203 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal rolling 
industries 16.7 8.6
1975 37100 Iron and steel basic industries 14.6 15.8
1975 37201 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal basic 
industries 4.4 2.5
1985 37103 Steel rolling industries 69.1 58.6
1985 37201 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal basic 
industries 21.1 12.2
1985 37101 Iron and steel basic industries 3.5 6.7
1985 37203 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal rolling 
industries 2.9 6.2
1985 37204 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal extrusion 
industries 1.7 5.1
1995 37103 Steel rolling industries 45.9 49.2
1995 37201 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal basic 
industries 35.5 12.9
1995 37101 Iron and steel basic industries 6.7 8.6
1995 37203 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal rolling 
industries 5.5 11.9
1995 37202 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal smelting 
industries 2.8 5.2
1995 37102 Iron and steel smelting industries 1.8 7.2
1995 37204 Manufacture of non-ferrous metal extrusion 
industries 1.3 3.7
The iron and steel industry suffers from a lack of domestic raw materials, and is dependent upon 
imported iron ores and scrap metal. The spectacular output growth of this industry has in fact been 
pulled by a significant domestic demand for basic metal products generated by the economic 
reconstruction of the country with a strong focus on infrastructure development that started in the 
late 1960s. Arndt (1975) reports that Indonesia entered the production of iron and steel in 1950 
with the full support of the former USSR, with the creation of a large public company, PT Krakatau 
Steel, but that the political instability of the period hampered the good development of the project 
that eventually came to a halt in 1965. The authorities rehabilitated the project only in the 1970s, 
and PT Krakatau Steel started operation in 1978 by producing sponge iron using the abundant and 
cheap natural gas as main source of energy of production. PT Krakatau started with sponge iron 
that can use scrap metal as raw material. In 1983 the company started to produce a higher quality 
product, hot-rolled coil (HRC), and established a joint-venture, PT Cold Rolling Mill Indonesia Utama 
(PT CRMIU) together with the Franco-Spanish Sesticier SA. Chapman (1992) reports that the cold
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rolling mill started operations in 1987 (corresponding to the sudden rise in output and productivity 
in 1987 in the sector 37), but was inefficient and had a very low utilisation rate from the start, 
creating financial difficulties in spite of government protection, and the plant closed in 1990. 
Aswicahyono (1998, p. 247) reports that capacity utilisation in the downstream industry dominated 
by small- and medium-scale firms was very low in the early 1970s, and increased in the second half 
of the decade together with increase in demand, so that productivity might have risen. The 
formation of cast iron and steel industry between 1974 and 1980 with 7 new companies might also 
have had a positive effect on output growth. Output growth declined in the late 1980s as a result of 
both declining domestic demand and increase of substitution materials such as plastics, fibreglass 
and asbestos cement.
With regards to liberalisation, Chapman (1992) argues that "Despite the obvious structural 
differences of the two industries [footwear and steel], there are, in each case, obvious 
beneficiaries, in the form of a few large state-controlled [for steel] and private enterprises [for 
footwear], in receipt of residual assistance. In the case of steel, state involvement at critical 
upstream stages in the industry appears to have been a major factor in determining the extent and 
effectiveness of the reform" (p.71) For example, there was a real drop in import tariffs for steel, 
however, the large state-owned producer, PT Krakatau Steel "was the sole accredited importer" 
(p.74), so that liberalisation was a mere illusion. This is of course affecting companies across the 
sector, with "severe delivery delays to many of the smaller private sector producers whose only 
input source was Krakatau Steel or its subsidiaries. Meanwhile, Krakatau Steel itself had the raw 
material inputs to its basic steel-making process reduced in cost through an export ban on ferrous 
scrap" (p.74).
According to him, the result is that both industries present a new duality, with, on one hand, a 
competitive export sector, and, on the other hand, a protected and inefficient domestic-oriented 
sector. This evidence also tells us that the liberalisation process should not be granted as being 
automatically competition-enhancing.
He notes however that the new "BAPEKSTA scheme of duty and VAT exemptions and drawback for 
inputs to exportables has helped counteract the adverse effects of the continuing upstream licence 
restrictions in some instances" (p.76).
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Graph 1: Evolution of gross output in manufacturing, 1975-95, constant Indonesian Rupiah (1983)
2.00E+10
1.80E+10
1.60E+10
1.40E+10
1.20E+10
1.00E+10
6.00E+09
4.00E+09
2.00E+09
O.OOE+OO
- ♦ - fo o d .
beverages & 
tobacco 
textiles, 
garments & 
leather
wood products
paper, printing 
& publishing
-•-ch em ica ls , 
rubber & 
plastic 
non-metal He 
minerals
 metal products
& machinery
 other
manufacturing
years
Graph 2: Evolution of industry shares in total gross output, 1975-95
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Graph 3: Evolution of number of workers in manufacturing, 1975-95
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Graph 4: Evolution of industry shares in total employment, 1975-95
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Graph 5 : Output evolution, 1975-95
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Graph 6 : Evolution of aggregate TFP base 100 in 1975 from Divisia Index Number, 1975-95
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Graph 1 ranks the nine 2-digit industries according to their total gross output over the 21-year 
period. The first striking feature of the manufacturing sector is the overwhelming dominance of the 
food, beverages & tobacco sector, at least until 1990 when it is overtaken by the textile, garments
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& leather sector, and becomes second in terms of output. The main industries of the food, 
beverages & tobacco industry are the sectors of sugar, clove cigarettes, cooking oil, cattle food, 
bread & biscuits, and coffee and tea processing. Hill (1997) argues that these sectors performed 
relatively badly in terms of productivity in spite of Indonesia's comparative advantage in terms of 
access to natural resources because of slow adoption of adequate and productive technology. 
Corroborating this assertion, I find that this sector displays the lowest TFP growth rates over the 
entire period (graph 6): with a TFP index of 100 in 1975, the industry index ends at a poor 83 in 
1995, after having reached a peak at 117 in 1990.
On the other hand, I find that the textile, garments & leather industry plays amongst the highest 
TFP growth industries: with a TFP index of 100 in 1975, its trend is constantly on the increase to 
reach 142 in 1995, representing the third highest TFP improvement in manufacturing after both 
"basic metals", and "other manufacturing" industries. The textile, garments & leather industry is 
dominated by the yarn, weaving, garments, and footwear sectors, with the last two sectors being 
the most dynamic in terms of output growth. While the rise in income and in domestic demand had 
helped output growth, favourable investment incentives in the 1970s, massive investment during 
the deregulation era, as well as an opening to the export market in the 1980s might have boosted 
productivity growth.
The food, beverages & tobacco sector represents the largest share of total manufacturing output 
reaching 48% in 1975, but in constant decline throughout the period, down to 20% in 1991, when 
the textile, garments 8i leather sector becomes the largest sector in terms of output with a 22% 
share. The pattern is fairly similar when looking at employment figures (graph 3 8i 4): up to 1987 
included, the food, beverages 8i tobacco sector is the first employer in manufacturing, and is only 
overtaken from 1988 onwards by the textile, garments & leather sector. Graph 5 shows indeed that 
if the textile, garments & leather industry has increased ten-fold in terms of output between 1975 
and 1995, food, beverages & leather industry output has only been multiplied by 2.5.
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Graph 7: Entries, incumbents & exits in number of plants, and C4 output concentration ratio in the
food, beverages & tobacco sector, 1975-95
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Graph 8 : Entries, incumbents & exits in number of plants, and C4 output concentration ratio in the 
textile, garments & leather sector, 1975-95
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Graph 9 : Entries, incumbents & exits in number of plants, and C4 output concentration ratio in the
basic metals sector, 1975-95
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Graph 7 and 8 give more details on both sectors. It is relevant and interesting to contrast and 
compare the two sectors, because both industries had settled in Indonesia in the early 20^ century. 
They are both taking advantage of the abundance of cheap labour and natural resources. In terms 
of industrial demography, the comparison is interesting because both sectors presents roughly the 
same number of plants throughout the period, with 2,600 to 3,000 plants in 1975 and circa 5,000 
plants in 1995, with an average of 3% growth p.a. in terms of number of plants. Average turnover 
rate is slightly lower for the food, beverages & tobacco sector at 13% p.a., against 16% for the 
textile, garments & leather industry. However, output and employment grow faster for the textile, 
garments & leather industry, suggesting that plants grow bigger in this sector. However, the C4 
concentration ratio -  calculated as the output of the four largest plants of the sector as the share of 
total output of the sector- is a lot lower in the textile, garments & leather industry. In the latter 
sector, the C4 ratio reaches 11% in 1975 to drop to 6% in 1995, against a rise from 18% in 1975 
to 26% in 1995 for the food, beverages 8i tobacco sector. This could already suggest that 
competition might be more effective in the textile, garments & leather sector than in the food, 
beverages 8i tobacco sector.
The third outstanding industry is the basic metals sector. As shown in graph 1, the sector 
represented the second smallest industry in 1975, both in terms of output and employment, Gust 
before "other manufacturing"), to become the 6th largest industry (out of 9) in terms of output in
225
1995, while becoming the smallest industry in terms of employment. What is especially interesting 
is that it is the industry that displayed the highest aggregate productivity growth of the 
manufacturing sector (graph 6), from a TFP index of 100 in 1975, to 167 in 1995, with a peak at 
267 in 1987.
It is also the smallest industry in terms of number of plants throughout the period, with 36 plants in 
1975, rising to 166 plants in 1995. This, combined with the high capital intensity of the activity 
leads to the highest concentration ratios (C4) of manufacturing, with 44% in 1975, a peak of 69% 
in 1988, ending at 53% in 1995. Comparing industrial change in this industry with the two previous 
ones will further inform the relationship between industrial change, competition and productivity 
gains.
The overview of the three sectors raises at least three important questions.
1 -  If entry and exit accounts for most of aggregate TFP growth as shown in chapter 4, and if 
turnover rates are fairly similar across the three industries, what accounts for such a wide 
productivity growth divide?
2- What are the main characteristics of industrial change, and what role does it play in aggregate 
TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing?
3 -What characterises survival and exit in Indonesian manufacturing?
6.2 Industrial evolution and productivity growth in three industries: food, 
beverages 8i tobacco ; textile, garments 8i leather; and basic metals
This section aims at giving a fairly detailed account and comparison of industrial structure evolution 
in the three sectors under scrutiny, explain productivity growth rates for each industry, and account 
for differences across industries.
Previous graphical evidence has shown that the food, beverages & tobacco sector is one of the 
largest in terms of output, employment, and number of establishments throughout the period. 
However, TFP change between 1975 and 1995 is negative and the lowest of the entire 
manufacturing sector. In chapter 4, I have demonstrated that at the aggregate manufacturing 
level, any positive TFP change stemmed from the process of entry and exit of plants. The food, 
beverages & tobacco sector displays an average turnover rate of 13%, which is slightly less than 
the high productivity growth sector of textiles, garments & leather (16%), but slightly more than 
the even higher productivity growth sector of basic metals (11%).53 The first obvious question is:
531 recall here that the turnover rate Is the sum of entries and exits over the total number of establishments. Turnover rates 
and spreads between the three industries in terms of output are similar.
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1 -  If entry and exit accounts for most of aggregate TFP growth as shown in chapter 4, and if 
turnover rates are fairly similar across the three industries, what accounts for such a wide 
productivity growth divide?
The first step is to decompose aggregate TFP growth for the three industries following the 
methodology used in chapter 4, distinguishing between intra-plant productivity growth, market 
share reallocation among incumbents, and net entry (market share reallocation from exiters to 
entrants).
I recall here the findings of chapter 2: aggregate TFP growth rates calculated with the 
decompositions are different from aggregate TFP growth rates calculated with the Divisia Index 
Number methodology because they do not use the same weighting. However, since the two 
different methodologies do not affect the ranking of 2-digit industries in terms of TFP growth rates, 
I consider that I can use the current decomposition methodologies to compare those industries.
Results are displayed in Tables 2 to 4. Differences between the three decompositions are similar to 
the aggregate manufacturing analysis in chapter 4.
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Tab to 2: TFP Growth daoompoaltiona for Industry 31: Food, bavoragaa > tobaeoo
^^T ^rega led jw itti^ ra fK a taharo^
inlraptont
TFPQ tor
incuirbanta
TFPG
anby
TFPGYEAR
-3.53%
2.03%
7.15%
2.76%
0.84%
2.33%
3.06%
GR dacompoation (T f-P  aggragatad w ith markat aharaa and 
ttma avaraga maifcat aharaa, TFP ratativa k> the avaraga - 
tkna a v fa g e )iFHKdaOTn£oajttof^TFPj^ gr»gJadj^ ttunai1<at_jharj»1^FPj2|a6vaJo_#ia_avarage^
covarianca 
torn) fo r 
Incumbenta (2)
to ta l TFPGIntraplant 
TFPG lo rTFPG (1) +w*m*w anby
0.57%0.54%
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Table 3: TFP Growth daoompoaltiona tor Induatry 32: Taxtlla, garmanta *  laathar
BHC decompoaition (TFP aggregated with market shares)
YEAR
market share 
reallocation 
among 
Incumbents
Intraplant 
TFPG for 
incumbents
total TFPG of 
incumbents
net entry 
TFPG
Aggregate 
TFPG from 
decompositi 
on
1976 -18.70% 0.60% -18.10% 17.03% -1.07%
1977 -2.03% -4.18% -6.21% 3.50% -2.70%
1978 13.85% 1.04% 14.89% 2.88% 17.77%
1979 4.52% -14.48% -9.96% 1.66% -8.30%
1980 -782% -0.78% -8.59% 11.65% 3.06%
1981 0.14% -1.48% -1.34% 3.21% 1.87%
1982 -086% -1.70% -1.96% 3.80% 1.84%
1983 •0.75% -0.98% -1.73% 2.51% 0.78%
1984 -283% 0.90% -1.42% -0.02% -1.44%
1985 -7.78% -4.63% -12.41% 6.78% -5.63%
1986 1.67% 0.47% 2.14% 1.02% 3.16%
1987 -4.15% •5.65% -9.80% •6.42% -16.22%
1988 3.87% -0.78% 3.08% 5.41% 8.49%
1989 0.45% 2.34% 2.79% 2.06% 4.85%
1990 -21.47% -2.47% -23.94% 67.50% 43.56%
1991 -7.92% -3.40% -11.31% 4.79% -6.52%
1992 -13.42% 2.63% •10.80% 10.55% -0.25%
1993 4.43% -6.61% -2.17% -1.10% -3.28%
1994 -1.15% -28.40% -29.55% 4.98% -24.57%
average 76-94 -3.10% ■886% -686% 7.46% 081%
average 76-80 -2.04% -3.56% -5.60% 7.35% 1.75%
average 81-83 -089% -1.39% -1.68% 3.17% 1.50%
average 84-85 -5.05% -1.86% -8.91% 3.38% -3.54%
average 86-88 0.46% -1.99% -1.53% 0.00% -1.52%
average 89-94 -6.51% -5.98% -12.50% 14.80% 2.30%
FHK decomposition (TFP aggregated with market shares, TFP reiatfve to the average) GR decompoetion (TFP aggregated with market shares and
market share
reallocation
among
Incumbents
(1)
covariance 
term for 
Incumbenta
(2)
total effect of 
market share 
reallocation 
among
incumbents (1) 
+ (2)
intraplant 
TFPG tor 
incumbents
(3)
total TFPG 
of
incumbents 
(1 )+ (2) +
(3)
net entry 
TFPG (4)
TFPG (1) + 
(2) ♦ (3) + (4)
market share 
reallocation 
among 
incumbents
intraplant 
TFPG tor 
incumbents
total TFPG 
of
incumbents
net entry 
TFPG TFPG
1976 -5.69% 4.01% •1.68% 0.60% -1.08% 2.96% 1.88% -3.68% 2.61% -1.08% 2.95% 1.87%
1977 -187% 285% 0.98% -4.18% -3.20% 0.47% -2.73% -0.19% -3.01% -320% 0.48% -2.73%
1978 -0.79% 1882% 17.43% 1.04% 18.46% 0.45% 18.92% 8.32% 10.15% 18.46% 0.43% 18.90%
1979 -7.85% 13.46% 5.81% -14.48% -8.87% 0.50% -8.37% -1.12% -7.75% -8.87% 0.59% -8.27%
1980 -286% 2.04% -0.22% -0.78% -1.00% 2.65% 1.66% -124% 024% -1.00% 2.68% 1.68%
1981 1.01% 1.45% 2.48% -1.48% 0.96% -0.06% 0.90% 1.73% -0.75% 0.98% 0.01% 0.99%
1982 0.31% 2.40% 2.70% -1.70% 1.00% 0.37% 1.37% 181% -080% 1.00% 0.38% 1.38%
1983 -0.48% 2.45% 1.97% -0.98% 1.00% 0.35% 1.35% 0.75% 025% 1.00% 0.39% 1.38%
1984 -2.41% 2.12% -0.29% 0.90% 0.61% -0.17% 0.44% -1.35% 1.96% 0.61% -0.36% 0.25%
1985 -6.05% 5.76% -089% -4.63% -4.92% 1.32% -3.60% -3.17% -1.75% •4.92% 1.18% -3.74%
1986 -4.32% 624% 1.91% 0.47% 2.38% 0.08% 2.47% -1.20% 3.59% 2.39% -0.01% 2.38%
1987 -4.01% 3.97% -0.03% -5.65% -5.68% -1.71% -7.39% -2.02% -3.66% -5.68% -0.78% -6.46%
1988 -2.12% 221% 0.10% -0.78% -0.68% 0.16% -0.52% -1.01% 0.32% -0.68% 0.18% -0.51%
1989 -1.19% 4.70% 3.51% 2.34% 5.85% 0.88% 6.72% 1.18% 4.69% 5.85% 1.05% 6.90%
1990 -3.50% 3.74% 0.24% -2.47% -223% 49.55% 47.32% -1.63% -0.60% -223% 49.48% 4725%
1991 -9.93% 2.35% -7.58% -3.40% -10.98% 0.60% -10.38% -8.76% -2.22% -10.98% 0.04% -10.94%
1992 -11.16% 683% -4.92% 2.63% -2.30% 3.03% 0.73% -8.04% 5.75% -2.30% 2.95% 0.66%
1993 -9.87% 1383% 3.36% -6.61% -3.25% -0.18% -3.42% -325% 0.01% -325% -021% -3.46%
1994 -28.81% 30.68% 2.07% -28.40% -26.33% 120% -25.13% -13.27% -13.06% -26.33% 1.10% -25.23%
average 7694 -688% 6.72% 184% -386% -2.12% 3.29% 1.17% -1.92% -020% -2.12% 3.29% 1.17%
average 76-80 -3.59% 8.02% 4.42% -3.56% 0.86% 1.41% 227% 0.42% 0.45% 0.66% 1.43% 2.29%
average 81-83 088% 2.10% 2.38% -1.39% 0.99% 0.21% 121% 1.33% -0.34% 0.99% 026% 125%
average 84-85 -483% 3.94% -0.29% -1.86% -2.15% 0.57% -1.58% -2.26% 0.11% -2.15% 0.41% -1.74%
average 86-88 -3.48% 4.14% 0.66% -1.99% -1.33% -0.49% -1.81% -1.41% 0.06% -1.33% -020% -1.53%
average 89-94 -10.71% 10.15% -0.56% -5.98% -6.54% 9.18% 2.64% -5.63% -0.91% -6.54% 9.07% 2.53%
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Tab I* 4: TFP Growth dacompoaWona for Industry 37: Basie matala
BHC decomposition (TFP aggregated with market shares)
YEAR
market share 
reallocation 
among 
incumbents
intraplant 
TFPG tor 
incumbents
total TFPG of 
incumbents
net entry 
TFPG
Aggregate
TFPG from 
decomposDI 
on
1976 -14.44% -4.29% -18.73% 16.58% -3.15%
1977 -60.27% 5.19% -55.08% 60.62% 5.55%
1978 -2.22% -4.26% -6.48% 4.02% -2.46%
1979 •6.36% 3.75% -2.61% 7.03% 4.42%
1980 10.80% 0.70% 11.51% 0.49% 11.99%
1981 -5.43% 3.67% -1.76% 4.64% 2.88%
1982 -17.97% -4.10% -22.07% 17.78% -4.29%
1983 2.37% -9.73% -7.37% 0.82% -6.55%
1984 1.60% 9.50% 11.10% 0.93% 12.03%
1985 4.41% 6.76% 11.16% 1.60% 12.76%
1986 0.09% 2.09% 2.18% 3.00% 5.18%
1987 11.17% 28.00% 39.17% 1.46% 40.63%
1988 13.14% -62.42% -39.28% 2.37% -36.91%
1989 -1.57% -1.75% -3.32% 0.28% -3.04%
1990 -2.40% 6.05% 3.65% 1.73% 5.38%
1991 8.68% -17.95% -9.27% •0.54% -9.81%
1992 6.00% 8.92% 14.92% 0.48% 15.40%
1993 -5.15% 0.37% -4.77% -0.22% -5.00%
1994 2.63% -6.79% -4.16% 2.16% -2.00%
average 76-94 -239% -1.38% -4.27% 6.54% 226%
average 76-80 -14.50% 0.22% -14.28% 17.55% 327%
average 81-83 -7.01% -3.39% -10.40% 7.75% -2.65%
average 84-85 3.00% 8.13% 11.13% 1.27% 12.39%
average 86-88 8.13% -7.44% 0.69% 2.28% 2.97%
average 89-94 1.36% -1.86% -0.49% 0.65% 0.16%
FHK decomposition (TFP aggregated with market shares, TFP relative to the average) GR decompostron (TFP aggregated with market sharee and
YEAR
market share
reallocation
among
Incumbents
(1)
covariance 
term tor 
incumbents
(2)
total ettect of 
market share 
reallocation 
among 
Incumbents 
(1)+(2)
Intraplant 
TFPG for 
incumbents
0 )
total TFPG 
of
incumbents 
(1)+ (2)+ 
(3)
net entry 
TFPG (4)
TFPG (1) + 
(2)+ (3)+ (4)
market share 
reallocation 
among 
Incumbents
Intraplant 
TFPG for 
Incumbents
total TFPG 
of
Incumbents
net entry 
TFPG TFPG
1976 -1.99% 3.45% 1.47% -4.29% -2.83% 123% -1.59% -0.33% -2.57% -2.89% 1.12% -1.77%
1977 -4.25% -2.85% -7.10% 5.19% -1.91% 4.82% 2.91% -6.70% 3.77% -1.93% 4.82% 2.88%
1978 6.03% -3-22% 1.81% -4.26% -2.45% 0.02% -2.43% 3.40% -5.87% -2.47% 0.02% -2.45%
1979 0.22% -0.67% -0.44% 3.75% 3.31% 6.19% 9.60% -0.11% 3.42% 3.31% 8.21% 9.51%
1980 5.42% 2.10% 7.52% 0.70% 8.22% -0.07% 8.15% 6.45% 1.75% 820% -0.07% 8.14%
1981 -0.34% -0.33% -0.67% 3.67% 3.00% -021% 2.79% -0.50% 3.51% 3.01% -0.21% 2.80%
1982 -4.94% 3.10% -1.85% -4.10% -5.95% 1.70% -425% -3.33% -2.55% -5.88% 1.70% -4.18%
1983 -8.46% 11.72% 3.26% -9.73% -6.48% 0.04% -6.44% -2.64% •3.88% -6.52% 0.04% -6.48%
1984 0.54% 2.01% 2.56% 9.50% 12.06% 022% 12.27% 1.55% 10.51% 12.06% 0.17% 12.23%
1985 0.97% 4.92% 5.89% 6.76% 12.64% 0.10% 12.75% 3.42% 921% 12.64% 0.10% 12.74%
1986 -7.16% 6.18% 2.01% 2.09% 4.10% 0.69% 4.79% -2.58% 6.68% 4.10% 0.69% 4.80%
1987 0.60% 11.60% 12.20% 28.00% 40.20% 0.25% 40.45% 6.40% 33.80% 40.21% 0.16% 40.37%
1988 -15.22% 30.25% 15.03% -52.42% -37.39% 0.42% •36.97% -0.09% -37.30% -37.39% 0.42% -36.97%
1989 -0.62% 9.06% -0.67% -1.75% -2.32% -0.02% -2.34% -5.10% 2.77% -2.33% -0.02% -2.35%
1990 -2.66% 1.76% -0.90% 8.05% 5.15% 0.03% 5.18% -1.78% 6.93% 5.15% 0.02% 5.18%
1991 -0.69% 9.76% 9.07% -17.95% -8.88% -0.23% -9.11% 4.19% -13.07% -8.88% •0.07% -8.95%
1992 3.72% 4.24% 7.96% 8.92% 16.88% 0.21% 17.09% 5.84% 11.04% 16.88% 0.12% 17.00%
1993 -15.19% 6.22% -6.97% 0.37% -5.60% 0.02% -5.58% -10.59% 4.98% -6.60% 0.01% -5.60%
1994 -2.22% 6.78% 4.56% -6.79% -2.23% 0.30% -1.93% 1.18% -3.40% -2.21% 0.29% -1.92%
average 76-94 -2.96% 6.90% 2.94% -1.38% 1.66% 0.83% 238% -0.02% 137% 1.65% 0.82% 2.37%
average 76-80 0.89% -0.24% 0.65% 0.22% 0.87% 2.44% 3.31% 0.74% 0.10% 0.84% 2.42% 3.26%
average 81-83 -4.58% 4.83% 0.25% -3.39% -3.14% 0.51% -2.63% -2.16% -0.97% -3.13% 0.51% -2.62%
average 84-85 0.76% 3.46% 4.22% 8.13% 12.35% 0.16% 12.51% 2.49% 9.86% 12.35% 0.14% 12.48%
average 86-88 -7.26% 17.01% 9.75% -7.44% 2.31% 0.45% 2.76% 1.24% 1.06% 2.31% 0.43% 2.73%
average 89-94 -4.44% 6.80% 2.36% -1.86% 0.50% 0.05% 0.55% -1.04% 1.54% 0.50% 0.06% 0.56%
Let us first look at the Baily, Hulten and Campbell (BHC) decomposition of TFP growth and compare 
the three industries. The textile, garments & leather sector has a slightly higher turnover rate 
(16%) than the food, beverages & tobacco sector (13%), that in turn has a slightly higher turnover 
rate than basic metals (11%), but the main difference between the three sectors in terms of 
turnover is quality: for "fairly"' similar turnover rates, net entry effect in terms of productivity gains 
attains 7.5% p.a. on average for the textile, garments & leather sector, and 6.6% p.a. on average 
for basic metals, against 2.1% p.a. on average for the food, beverages & tobacco sector. At first 
sight, for the three sectors, if replacement of low productivity plants by high productivity plants did 
not occur, average yearly TFP change would be negative. But by how much?
Productivity ranking, when considering incumbents only, depends on the decomposition used. With
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the BHC decomposition, total incumbents contribution to productivity change reaches -6.7% p.a. 
for the textile, garments & leather sector, -4.3% p.a. for basic metals, against -1.5% p.a. for the 
food, beverages & tobacco sector. However, the basic metals industry remains first in terms of 
incumbents productivity contribution when considering the FHK and GR decompositions that 
account for market share differential between entrants and exiters and errors of measurement on 
output shares. From the FHK decomposition, we see that the global market share reallocation 
(market share reallocation plus covariance term) is best in the basic metals industry, followed by 
the textile, garments & leather, and the food, beverages & tobacco sectors.
On the other hand, results of the BHC decomposition show that the effect of market share 
reallocation among incumbents has a negative effect, and even more so for the two most 
productive industries. Does this imply that competition is not a process operating among 
incumbents, while operating between entrants and exiters?
In fact, the negative contribution of market share reallocation among incumbents to aggregate TFP 
growth means that the output of high productivity plants is redistributed to low productivity plants. 
This can sound counter-intuitive. However, keeping in mind the concept of catch-up, one could 
argue that plants with the lowest productivity levels are also potentially plants with the highest TFP 
growth rates. And indeed, results of the FHK decomposition of aggregate TFP growth confirm this 
hypothesis.
I recall here that the FHK decomposition adds to the BHC one by working relatively to the mean, 
and by adding a covariance term to the decomposition of incumbents' contribution to aggregate 
TFP growth. This covariance term represents the contribution of the reallocation of market share 
from low to high productivity growth plants (if the term has a positive sign).
Looking at the results of the FHK decomposition for the three industries under scrutiny shows 
indeed that reallocation of market share takes place usually from high to low productivity plants 
(negative effect on aggregate TFPG), but that a further qualification of this process shows that it 
reallocates market share from low to high productivity growth plants, and that this effect more than 
counterbalances the former negative effect, so that the total effect of market share reallocation is 
positive for the three industries. In terms of total market share reallocation among incumbents, the 
ranking is the same as the ranking based on aggregate productivity growth: basic metals; textile, 
garments & leather; and food, beverages & tobacco.
The ranking changes slightly if we consider the global effect of market rationalisation - among 
incumbents, and from exiters to entrants- with textile, garments & leather ranking now ahead of 
basic metals because of a higher net entry effect. It seems that the market rationalisation process 
is the only cause for any positive productivity gains, while there are no real productivity gains
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stemming from incumbents intra-plant productivity growth, except when measured with the GR 
decomposition.
The quality of intra-plant productivity change shapes the dynamics of industrial structure. What 
determine this dynamics are characteristics of individual plants as well as the interaction between 
plants. In order to explore the mechanisms behind industrial change, the reminder of this section 
explores the relationship between the different components of aggregate TFP Growth, i.e. intra­
plant productivity growth, market share reallocation, and net entry effect.
The second important question to answer is the following:
2- What are the main characteristics of industrial change, and what role does it play in aggregate 
TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing?
(1) The net entry and global market share reallocation effects could either be positively or 
negatively correlated, indicating whether they are complementary or alternative 
competition mechanisms. It could be the case that the net entry effect is at its highest 
when global market share reallocation is not operating properly: this is the case of an 
adverse environment for incumbents' competition accompanied by low barriers to entry and 
exit. Symmetrically, there is the case where market share reallocation among incumbents is 
contributing a lot to aggregate productivity growth, leaving little opportunities to entrants. 
The alternative case would be the one where the two processes feed each other, with 
competition among incumbents triggering increased entry and exit.
(2) Within the process of market share reallocation, it is interesting to define the relationship 
between the two terms of the process, i.e. the market share reallocation component and 
the covariance term in the FHK decomposition. Does a market share reallocation from low 
to high productivity level plants necessarily equal a market share reallocation from low to 
high productivity growth plants? As seen earlier, the relationship is likely to be negative in 
our case.
(3) Another relationship could take place between the net entry effect and intra-plant 
productivity growth. We know that the net entry effect is mostly positive for ail industries, 
meaning that exiters are less productive than entrants. We also know that entrants are 
generally more productive than incumbents. Incumbents' intra-plant productivity growth 
could be pulled by the entry of more productive plants and the exit of the worse 
performers.
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Table 5: Pair-wise correlation matrix of elements of the FHK decomposition
* indicates a significance at the 5% level
Pooled data ________     Textile, garments ft leather. 1876-95
tfpg
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.5386*
market
share
reallocation 0.5167*
covterm -0.3542* -0.7099* covterm -0.3035 -0.7644*
intraplant 0.7668* 0.5629* -0.6310* intraplant 0.5291* 0.8015* -0.7654*
netentrv 0.5311* -0.014 -0.0654 -0.1077 0.0114 net_entry 0.7981* 0.0393 -o:o924 -0.0862 0.0468
Food, be versges ft tobacco. 1976-95 Basic metals. 1976-95
tfpg
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.4256
market
share
reallocation 0.6143*
covterm 0.205 -0.1739 covterm -0.4833* -0.6623*
intraplant 0.8558* 0.1617 -0.1374 intraplant 0.9409* 0.5168* -0.6518*
net_entry 0.0223 0.0918 -0.5838* -0.4737* 0.0558 net_entry 0.0688 0.0276 -0.3295 -0.4041 0.1025
All industries. 1976-85 _________   All industries, 1986-94
tfpg
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect Intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.5215*
market
share
reallocation 0.5755*
covterm 0.1248 -0.4174* covterm -0.5105* -0.7608*
intraplant 0.7763* 0.4603* -0.4110* intra plant 0.7709* 0.5796* -0.7057*
net_entry 0.1117 -0.1954 -0.2801 -0.4381* 0.2096 net_entrv 0.5737* 0.0282 -0.0895 -0.0959 0.0093
All industries. 1978-89 All industries, 1990-94
tfpfl
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.6073*
market
share
reallocation 0.5567*
covterm •0.2462 -0.6419* covterm -0.5685* -0.8089*
intraplant 0.9131* 0.6253* -0.5618* intraplant 0.5575* 0.5995* -0.8212*
net_entrv 0.0913 -0.0402 -0.2364 -0.3408* 0.1055 net_entry 0.7910* 0.065 -0.14 -0.0993 0.0249
Food, be versqes ft tobacco, 1976-85 Food, beverages ft tobacco, 1986-94
tfpg
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.3157
market
share
reallocation 0.4258
covterm 0.1084 -0.0076 covterm -0.008 -0.6259
intraplant 0.9016* 0.0302 -0.0926 intraplant 0.9034* 0.2526 -0.1836
net_entry 0.1554 0.1006 -0.5762 •0.4201 0.0328 netentrv 0.2889 0.5307 -0.2797 0.252 0.0676lI
ges ft tobacco, 1976-89 Food, beverages ft tobacco, 1990-94
tfpg
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.4004
market
share
reallocation 0.5295
covterm 0.1346 0.0731 covterm -0.7567 -0.8734
intraplant 0.8473* 0.0672 -0.2068 intraplant 0.9509* 0.2441 -0.54
net_entry 0.1625 -0.1016 -0.4671 -0.4178 0.0918 net_entry 0.2923 0.5498 -0.7497 0.2293 0.1034
Textile, garments A leather. 1976-65________   Textile, garments A leather. 1986-04
tfpg
market
share
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant tfpg
market share 
reallocation covterm
total
reallocation
effect intraplant
market share 
reallocation 0.4854
market
share
reallocation 0.5875
covterm 0.4423 -0.3305 covterm -0.5104 -0.9103*
intraplant 0.6660* 0.6099 •0.3315 intraplant 0.5134 0.8781* -0.9140*
To investigate these propositions, I present a pair-wise correlation matrix in Table 5. The variables 
are the results found using the FHK decomposition of aggregate TFP Growth for 20 years and for 
the three industries under scrutiny, with a total of 60 pooled observations. The variables are
233
aggregate TFP Growth, the intra-plant productivity growth component, the market share 
reallocation component, the covariance component (the additional market share reallocation 
component), and the net entry component.
(1) Net entry and market share reallocation: I find that overall, whatever the sub-period or the 
plant grouping (all three industries or single industries) the net entry and market share 
reallocation processes are not significantly correlated. Neither the market share 
reallocation, nor the covariance terms are significantly correlated to the net entry term. 
One noticeable and interesting exception is the food, beverages & tobacco sector for the 
period 1976-94, where the covariance term is strongly and negatively correlated to the net 
entry term with a correlation coefficient of -58.4%: whenever the net entry effect 
increases, the reallocation of market shares from low to high productivity growth 
incumbents is less.
Graph 10 : Market share reallocation effect from low to high productivity growth plants, 
versus net entry effect: Food, beverages & tobacco, 1976-94
— covariance term for incumbents (2) total effect of market share reallocation among Incumbents (1) + (2) net entry TFPG (4)
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Graph 10 shows the evolution of both effects over the period. In the first half of the period, 
the net entry effect follows a general upward trend, while the market share reallocation 
effect is decreasing. The process reverts in the second half of the period, with a booming 
market share reallocation effect and a declining net entry effect. It seems that for the food, 
beverages & tobacco industry, external and internal rationalisation processes are 
alternative rather than complementary processes. Giving a closer look at the figures, I note 
that in fact, for the three industries, the global market share reallocation process is
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negatively (but not significantly) correlated to the net entry effect for the pre-liberalisation 
period, while the correlation coefficient becomes positive during and after market 
liberalisation. It seems that when distinguishing among the three industries and looking at 
the entire period, the negative correlation between total market share reallocation effect 
and net entry Is stronger for the lower productivity growth sector, i.e. the food, beverages 
& tobacco sector.
(2) Looking at the decomposition of the global market share reallocation process, I note that in 
general the market share reallocation effect and the covariance term are highly negatively 
correlated: while market shares are reallocated from high to low productivity plants, they 
are also reallocated from low to high productivity growth plants. This means that low 
productivity plants are also plants with the highest productivity growth rates. In general, 
the global effect is positive.
(3) I find that, overall, net entry and intra-plant productivity growth components are not 
significantly correlated, additionally, correlation coefficients are very low, especially for the 
food, beverages & tobacco sector, while the textile and garment industry displays 
correlation coefficients of 20% and 25% in the two periods 1976-89 and 1990-94 
respectively, and the basic metals industry displays correlation coefficients of 22% and 
55% in the two periods 1976-85 and 1990-94 respectively. So it could be the case that for 
these two best performing industries, a higher contribution of net entry is accompanied by 
a higher intra-plant contribution to aggregate productivity growth. Incumbents' intra-plant 
productivity growth could be pulled by the entry of more productive plants and the exit of 
the worse performers at least in the two most productive industries, and this process 
seems to be amplified after the deregulation of the economy.
In this section, I have shown that what explains the different aggregate productivity growth rates 
of the three industries under scrutiny is not very much the scale of the plants turnover process, but 
rather the quality of this turnover, and more specifically the spread between the productivity level 
of entrants and exiters. I also find that for the three sectors, the global market share reallocation 
process is an alternative rather than a complementary process of plants turnover, at least in the 
pre-deregulation period, what might explain lower aggregate productivity growth rates in this 
period. This is especially true for the lowest productivity growth sector, i.e. the food, beverages and 
tobacco sector. There are some signs of those two rationalisation processes becoming 
complementary during and after deregulation, hinting at an increase in the competition process, 
and potentially explaining increasing aggregate productivity growth rates. Finally, I find that for the
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two industries with the highest productivity gains, incumbents' intra-plant productivity growth could 
be pulled by the entry of more productive plants and the exit of the worse performers, with this 
effect increasing after the deregulation of the economy. Overall, the competition process seems to 
amplify during and after the deregulation, and industries giving the strongest signs of increased 
competition also display the highest productivity growth rates.
In order to complement those findings, I explore the potential factors of plant exit in the following 
section.
6.3 Assessing factors for exit
The previous section has underlined the importance of the process of entry and exit for aggregate 
manufacturing productivity growth, and leads us to answering the third question:
3 -What characterises survival and exit in Indonesian manufacturing?
Indeed, answering this question helps to further qualify the aggregate TFP change mechanisms. I 
have found that what matters is the quality of plants turnover rather than turnover in itself, i.e. 
especially the spread in productivity between entrants and exiters. What matters as well is the 
quality of market share reallocation, i.e. the productivity and productivity growth spread between 
plants with declining and plants with increasing market shares. I have shown in the previous 
section that in some respects, competition increases during and after the deregulation of the 
economy, with the competitive market share reallocation process becoming complementary rather 
than alternative to the competitive turnover process, resulting in the acceleration of TFP Growth 
rates.
Another way of measuring competition is to determine the factors for plants exit. Particularly, 
competition can be now proxied by the effect of relative productivity on the probability of exit.
But of course, as markets are not perfect, other factors can be added in order to explain the 
probabilities for exit. In particular, both the historiography and the statistical and analytical study of 
the Statistik Industri dataset have shown the importance of the size of plants. Size is indeed 
important in many respects. First, size matters in terms of economies of scale, a plant below the 
optimal size might be inefficient and have more chances to exit, and a plant well above the optimal 
size might face diseconomies of scale and also face more chances to exit. Second, size matters in 
terms of the political economy. Within an institutional framework favouring large-scale plants 
because of their presupposed higher efficiency (because the average large plant is more efficient), 
but with no particular individual screen for effective higher efficiency, large-scale plants might have 
more chances of survival, whatever their relative TFP. This means that large plants might have easy 
(and cheap) access to credit in case of economic difficulties, that they also have easy access to
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import licenses and can therefore lower they production costs and increase the production costs of 
competitors if they are sole importer of a specific input, as it has been the case in Indonesian 
manufacturing, for example in the basic steel industry.
Within the political economic reasons for survival, ownership might matter, as it has been proposed 
by the historiography. Including a variable for the type of ownership in the assessment of hazard 
rates is asking whether it makes a difference to have private domestic, public domestic, or foreign 
ownership. As it is suggested both by the political economy and the economic history of Indonesian 
manufacturing, domestic private entrepreneurs, especially when not of Chinese origin, have always 
faced difficulties for different reasons. The first reason is that the private domestic entrepreneurship 
base is not strong and has not been developed first because Dutch colonialism prevented it, second 
because the very strong involvement of the State in the economy since independence did not help 
developing such a base, third because private domestic plants are majoritarily small or medium­
sized, size categories that have not received much support and incentives, even in the Suharto era 
and some failed attempts to promote SMEs. I therefore expect private domestic plants to have 
higher hazard rates whatever their relative TFP.
The previous argument of course implies that state-owned plants are more likely to survive, 
because they receive economic support whatever their productivity performances, and because 
most of them are relatively larger.
It is usually expected that foreign ownership tends to increase survival through higher efficiency. 
Foreign-owned plants are supposed to be more competitive because they are exposed to 
international competition, because they benefit from more advanced technologies, and because 
they benefit from advanced managerial support, etc. In a less competitive environment however, 
and if efficiency is not the main factor determining survival, there is no reason for foreign 
ownership to translate into lower hazard rates. One could argue that in a distorted environment, 
biased in favour of domestic plants, and in particular state plants, foreign plants have less chances 
of survival. Shorter survival for foreign plants could also imply that these are more subject to 
competitive pressure and have a harder budget constraint than their domestic-owned counterparts. 
In fact, the effect of foreign ownership is not predetermined.
Besides plants with some foreign ownership, there is another group of plants that might display 
lower hazard rates because they benefit from better technologies and support in the broad sense: 
the plants being member of a group of companies. Group members, even when small, can benefit 
from economies of scale via, for example, the procurement of inputs by the group. Groups in 
Indonesia have been heavily supported by the state, as have large plants, and were favoured for 
credit and licenses access. Large groups can also equal better technologies. On the other hand,
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being part of a group of companies can also result in higher hazard rates if the internal market is 
more competitive than the external market, i.e. if lower relative TFP is a determinant for exit that is 
stronger within than outside groups. As for foreign ownership, group membership has not a 
predetermined effect on hazard rates.
As plants are operating in a distorted environment that is characterised by high levels of corruption 
(the "high cost economy"), there is a need to proxy for the direct costs of corruption, i.e. what is 
paid to "grease" the system. I proxy this with the ratio of "gifts, charities, donations" over total 
output, relative to the average ratio of the 2-digit sector. Within the information available in the 
Statistik Industri dataset, a large number of plants do report a fair amount of expenses classified in 
the "other expenses" category. It has been recognised that this category could involve a fair share 
of corruption-related expenses. I chose here to follow Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) and restrict 
myself to expenses reported under the "gifts, charities, donations" heading within "other 
expenses", because this category seems the less likely to correspond to any "formal" economic 
expenses.
I can expect this ratio to have a lowering impact on hazard rates, i.e. increase the chances of 
survival in a distorted environment. The expected impact after the deregulation period is more 
difficult to predict, as it could act in both directions: even after deregulation, a certain level of 
corruption might remain and lower hazard rates for plants with higher gifts ratios, or a more 
competitive environment can harm the plants used to pay a high ratio of gifts because these gifts 
raise their costs without raising their benefits. It could also be the case that these gifts become so 
low after deregulation that they have no significance in terms of survival chances.
Behrman and Deolalikar also use this variable to explain the duration of survival, find a positive 
relationship between the ratio of gifts and survival length for the period 1975-86, and interestingly 
argue that "the significance of gifts and donations is interesting, though of course it does not 
distinguish between two competing interpretations regarding the direction of causality: (i) those 
establishments that made more gifts and donations (whether legal or extralegal) were more likely 
to survive because of reciprocal obligations established by such gifts54, and (ii) those 
establishments that were more successful and likely to continue to be more successful were more 
likely to give larger gifts and donations because the supply of such transfers is income elastic." (pp. 
224-225).
Finally, I explore the role of labour using three different variables. The first variable proxies for the 
quality of support services within the plant, i.e. the quality of management and administration. I
54 An example of such reciprocal obligations would be preferential tariff, import quota or tax treatment from government 
agencies.
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use the average wage of non-production workers. In a competitive labour market a higher quality 
should have a positive effect on survival length through a better efficiency of the plant. In a less 
competitive environment, the effect can either be positive or negative. The effect could be positive 
because better paid managers have an incentive to lobby the plant-owners and/or the authorities to 
be complacent about a lower productivity. The effect could be negative if the wage premium for 
managers is not efficiency-based and if the market for plants is competitive.
Further exploring the effect of support services, I include the ratio of the number of non-production 
workers over the total number of workers. This proxies for the "support services intensity". In the 
case where the company has the optimal share of non-production workers, hazard rates can be 
lowered, or increased when the plant has too little or too many non-production workers.
I then proxy the quality of production workers by their average wage. The comments on the quality 
of non-production labour quality apply.
To answer the initial question - What characterises survival and exit in Indonesian manufacturing? - 
and underline the importance of the exit process, I first calculate the survivor function for the 
population of plants represented in the Statfstik Industri dataset, with the assumption that all plants
exit in 1995. The non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survivor function S(t), that is the probability of
surviving past time t, takes the following form:
s m = n
jitjzt
r , n\ 
n i ~ d j
nj
(1)
Results are displayed in Table 6 and the survivor function is shown in Graph 11. Of plants entering 
in 1975, only 55.4% survived 5 years, 29.2% survived 10 years, and 8.3% survived 19 years. 
Confronting the results of this survivor function with turnover figures in graphs 7 to 9 confirms that 
half of the manufacturing sector as a whole is renewed every 10 years, and entirely renewed every 
20 years.
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Table 6: Kaplan-Meier survivor function estimates
Time Beg.Total Fail Survivor Function [95% Conf. Int.]
1 36642 3349 90.9% 90.6% 91.2%
2 33293 3533 81.2% 80.8% 81.6%
3 29760 3219 72.4% 72.0% 72.9%
4 26541 3263 63.5% 63.0% 64.0%
5 23278 2989 55.4% 54.9% 55.9%
6 20289 2116 49.6% 49.1% 50.1%
7 18173 2138 43.8% 43.3% 44.3%
8 16035 1577 39.5% 39.0% 40.0%
9 14458 1952 34.1% 33.7% 34.6%
10 12506 1793 29.2% 28.8% 29.7%
11 10713 1212 25.9% 25.5% 26.4%
12 9501 1331 22.3% 21.9% 22.7%
13 8170 989 19.6% 19.2% 20.0%
14 7181 741 17.6% 17.2% 18.0%
15 6440 1080 14.6% 14.3% 15.0%
16 5360 658 12.8% 12.5% 13.2%
17 4702 617 11.2% 10.8% 11.5%
18 4085 565 9.6% 9.3% 9.9%
19 3520 492 8.3% 8.0% 8.6%
20 3028 3028 0.0% .
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In this section, I aim at testing the hypothesis that asserts that in a relative competitive 
environment, plant exit because their productivity, relative to the industry average, is lower. This 
will also help to complement the analysis of the previous section, hinting at the fact that the 
competition process through market rationalisation operated in a stronger manner in higher 
productivity growth sectors, and increased in all sectors during and after the deregulation period.
Following Bernard & Sjoholm (2003), I use the Cox proportional hazard function in order to test for 
a link between survival probability and relative TFP, allowing the baseline hazard to vary by 
industry, province and year of entry. As the authors note: "This allows us to control for geography, 
industry, and cohort effects in a non-parametric fashion" (p.9).
Using the same Indonesian manufacturing census, their main aim is testing whether plants with 
foreign ownership are more likely to survive than others. Beside the ownership dummies "foreign" 
and "public", they also add two explanatory variables of interest: log employment to control for 
size, and relative labour productivity.
They find that, taken as only explanatory variables, foreign and public ownership implies a higher
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survival probability, but when size is controlled for, foreign ownership (defined as 1 if the share of 
foreign ownership is above 0%, 0 otherwise) implies a lower survival probability, while public 
ownership (defined in the same manner) still implies a higher survival probability. They find in fact 
that the strongest effect on survival probabilities comes from the size effect: the larger the plant, 
the less likely it is to exit. They also find that plants with a relatively higher labour productivity have 
higher survival probabilities. Regarding the share of non-production workers over the total number 
of workers, they find that a higher ratio leads to higher hazard rates.
My aim is to broaden their findings by extending the period under scrutiny from 1975-89 to 1975- 
95, replace relative labour productivity by relative TFP, and add other potentially important 
explanatory variables related to the institutional environment: the share of gifts, charities and 
donations in total output of plants, a group membership dummy (equals 1 if the plant belongs to a 
corporate group), and labour and management quality (respectively defined as average wage of 
production worker and average wage of non-production worker).
Behrman and Deolalikar (1989) also propose an analysis of survival length factors for the period 
1975-86, but using the non-backcast dataset. They find that age has a positive effect on survival 
length, possibly because of learning-by-doing effects. A larger size increase survival length, and 
industry concentration as well. They find that state ownership has no significant effect, while 
foreign ownership increases survival length. A higher number of family workers lower survival 
length, while the average wage of workers has no impact. They justify the latter result by noting 
that the dataset has no information regarding labour quality and that the result is therefore not 
surprising. Labour productivity is shown to improve survival length. The share of gifts in value 
added increases survival length as well. They also include a number of explanatory variables 
relating to intermediate inputs that are not discussed here.
Table 7 displays the results. Each variable is first tested for separately in the hazard function over 
different time periods (1975-94, 1975-89, 1975-85, 1990-94, and 1986-94). Variables are then 
added to arrive to the final complete model. A hazard ratio of 1 means that the variable does not 
influence the chances of exit, a ratio below 1 means that the variable is negatively correlated with 
the chances of exit, and a ratio above 1 means that the variable is positively correlated with the 
chances of exit.
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Table 7: Hazards rate (dependant variable) and plant characteristics explanatory 
________ variables), results of the Cox proportional hazard function_________
Period: 1975-94 Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Explanatory variables tested separately, (1) to (9)
(1) relative TFP 0.968405 0.021921 -1.42 0.156 0.926379 1.012338
(2) log employment 0.65824 0.008292 -33.2 0 0.642187 0.674695
(3) foreign ownership 0.607616 0.029116 -10.4 0 0.553148 0.667448
(4) public ownership 0.609415 0.071789 -4.2 0 0.483774 0.767687
(5) gifts share 1.00094 0.000356 2.64 0.008 1.000243 1.001637
(6) group membership 0.228697 0.156408 -2.16 0.031 0.059857 0.87379
(7) white collar share 0.998106 0.000737 -2.57 0.01 0.996663 0.999552
(8) management quality 1 1.02E-06 0.34 0.737 0.999998 1.000002
(9) labour quality 1.000002 1.25E-06 1.48 0.138 0.999999 1.000004
Alternative specifications with two or more explanatory variables (10) to (13)
(10/ relative TFP 0.931593 0.021453 -3.08 0.002 0.89048 0.974604
log employment 0.658141 0.008299 -33.18 0 0.642075 0.674609
(11) relative TFP 0.931916 0.021463 -3.06 0.002 0.890785 0.974947
log employment 0.66066 0.008382 -32.67 0 0.644435 0.677295
foreign ownership 0.780773 0.038747 -4.99 0 0.708407 0.860532
public ownership 0.413571 0.052559 -6.95 0 0.322385 0.53055
(12] relative TFP 0.948321 0.023987 -2.1 0.036 0.902454 0.996519
log employment 0.642089 0.009051 -31.43 0 0.624592 0.660076
foreign ownership 0.748419 0.043123 -5.03 0 0.668498 0.837895
public ownership 0.339154 0.0464 -7.9 0 0.259383 0.443457
gifts share 1.001103 0.000348 3.17 0.002 1.000421 1.001785
(13] relative TFP 0.947056 0.02404 -2.14 0.032 0.901091 0.995365
log employment 0.64115 0.009099 -31.32 0 0.623561 0.659235
foreign ownership 0.746381 0.043054 -5.07 0 0.666592 0.835721
public ownership 0.352229 0.048509 -7.58 0 0.268904 0.461372
gifts share 1.001091 0.00035 3.12 0.002 1.000406 1.001777
white collar share 1.000998 0.000849 1.18 0.24 0.999334 1.002664
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Period: 1975-89 Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Explanatory variables tested separately, (1) to (9)
(1) relative TFP 0.892917 0.028388 -3.56 0 0.838975 0.950328
(2) log employment 0.635073 0.01101 -26.19 0 0.613856 0.657024
(3) foreign ownership 0.680188 0.045093 -5.81 0 0.597308 0.774568
(4) public ownership 0.530035 0.084614 -3.98 0 0.387632 0.724751
(5) gifts share 1.000693 0.000515 1.35 0.178 0.999684 1.001704
(6) group membership 2.828427 2.664948 1.1 0.27 0.446213 17.92868
(7) white collar share 0.997476 0.000928 -2.72 0.007 0.995657 0.999297
(8) management quality 0.999884 6.01 E-05 -1.93 0.054 0.999766 1.000002
(9) labour quality 0.999757 0.000146 -1.66 0.097 0.99947 1.000044
Alternative specifications with two or more explanatory variables (10) to (13)
(10] relative TFP 0.863558 0.027289 -4.64 0 0.811696 0.918734
log employment 0.634705 0.011023 -26.18 0 0.613464 0.656681
(11) relative TFP 0.862908 0.027292 -4.66 0 0.811041 0.918092
log employment 0.634223 0.011013 -26.22 0 0.613001 0.65618
foreign ownership 0.831782 0.05777 -2.65 0.008 0.725923 0.953078
public ownership 0.358131 0.064428 -5.71 0 0.251716 0.509533
(12) relative TFP 0.866691 0.032697 -3.79 0 0.804918 0.933203
log employment 0.594765 0.012437 -24.85 0 0.570883 0.619646
foreign ownership 0.783051 0.069283 -2.76 0.006 0.658381 0.931328
public ownership 0.228587 0.04862 -6.94 0 0.150662 0.346816
gifts share 1.00062 0.000582 1.07 0.287 0.99948 1.001762
(13 ] relative TFP 0.868209 0.032787 -3.74 0 0.806268 0.934908
log employment 0.594521 0.012541 -24.65 0 0.570443 0.619616
foreign ownership 0.785782 0.06953 -2.72 0.006 0.660669 0.934588
public ownership 0.243662 0.052925 -6.5 0 0.159185 0.37297
gifts share 1.000607 0.000585 1.04 0.299 0.999461 1.001755
white collar share 1.00009 0.001167 0.08 0.939 0.997806 1.002379
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Period: 1990-94 Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Explanatory variables tested separately, (1) to (9)
(1) relative TFP 1.072676 0.035593 2.11 0.034 1.005134 1.144756
(2) log employment 0.6880192 0.012818 -20.07 0 0.663351 0.713605
(3) foreign ownership 0.5277942 0.040175 -8.4 0 0.454645 0.612712
(4) public ownership 0.7175211 0.122826 -1.94 0.052 0.51301 1.003561
(5) gifts share 1.001227 0.000604 2.03 0.042 1.000045 1.00241
(6) group membership 0.1254112 0.130873 -1.99 0.047 0.016221 0.969633
(7) white collar share 0.9991149 0.001223 -0.72 0.469 0.996722 1.001514
(8) management quality 1.00E+00 1.03E-06 0.98 0.325 0.999999 1.000003
(9) labour quality 1.00E+00 1.12E-06 1.94 0.052 1 1.000004
Alternative specifications with two or more explanatory variables (10) to (13)
(10) relative TFP 1.028293 0.035594 0.81 0.42 0.960844 1.100478
log employment 0.6886227 0.012845 -20 0 0.663903 0.714263
(11) relative TFP 1.030092 0.035615 0.86 0.391 0.9626 1.102316
log employment 0.6970677 0.013256 -18.98 0 0.671564 0.72354
foreign ownership 0.7062276 0.05467 -4.49 0 0.60681 0.821934
public ownership 0.4860244 0.085441 -4.1 0 0.344367 0.685954
(12) relative TFP 1.035308 0.036152 0.99 0.32 0.966823 1.108646
log employment 0.6931483 0.013447 -18.89 0 0.667287 0.720012
foreign ownership 0.7039359 0.055958 -4.42 0 0.602377 0.822618
public ownership 0.4682129 0.085364 -4.16 0 0.327532 0.669319
gifts share 1.001497 0.000508 2.95 0.003 1.000502 1.002493
(13) relative TFP 1.030544 0.036207 0.86 0.392 0.961968 1.104009
log employment 0.6909545 0.013498 -18.92 0 0.665 0.717922
foreign ownership 0.6972 0.055679 -4.52 0 0.596183 0.815333
public ownership 0.4699271 0.08582 -4.14 0 0.328534 0.672171
gifts share 1.001504 0.000506 2.97 0.003 1.000512 1.002496
white collar share 1.001976 0.001238 1.6 0.11 0.999552 1.004406
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Period: 1975-85 Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
Explanatory variables tested separately, (1) to (9)
(1) relative TFP 0.869955 0.036457 -3.32 0.001 0.801357 0.944426
(2) log employment 0.604966 0.012892 -23.58 0 0.580218 0.63077
(3) foreign ownership 0.659474 0.051379 -5.34 0 0.566084 0.768271
(4) public ownership 0.602212 0.128061 -2.38 0.017 0.396955 0.913604
(5) gifts share 1.00004 0.000909 0.04 0.965 0.998261 1.001822
(6) group membership 2.828427 2.665048 1.1 0.27 0.446182 17.92992
(7) white collar share 0.997229 0.001156 -2.39 0.017 0.994966 0.999498
(8) management quality 0.999679 6.31 E-05 -5.08 0 0.999555 0.999803
(9) labour quality 0.999374 0.000213 -2.94 0.003 0.998958 0.999791
Alternative specifications with two or more explanatory variables (10) to (13)
(io; relative TFP 0.833498 0.034718 -4.37 0 0.768157 0.904399
log employment 0.603075 0.012902 -23.64 0 0.57831 0.628901
<11; relative TFP 0.832008 0.034737 -4.41 0 0.766635 0.902955
log employment 0.603605 0.012897 -23.63 0 0.57885 0.629418
foreign ownership 0.827289 0.066341 -2.36 0.018 0.706966 0.96809
public ownership 0.396618 0.095474 -3.84 0 0.24744 0.635732
(12; relative TFP 0.824891 0.039829 -3.99 0 0.750408 0.906766
log employment 0.57078 0.014487 -22.09 0 0.543082 0.599892
foreign ownership 0.735123 0.07972 -2.84 0.005 0.594364 0.909217
public ownership 0.246732 0.072859 -4.74 0 0.138316 0.440131
gifts share 0.9997 0.000915 -0.33 0.743 0.997909 1.001494
(13; relative TFP 0.827047 0.039927 -3.93 0 0.75238 0.909124
log employment 0.568719 0.014578 -22.02 0 0.540852 0.598021
foreign ownership 0.735619 0.07986 -2.83 0.005 0.594627 0.910041
public ownership 0.246815 0.072964 -4.73 0 0.138273 0.440562
gifts share 0.999695 0.000918 -0.33 0.739 0.997897 1.001496
white collar share 1.000213 0.001409 0.15 0.88 0.997456 1.002977
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Period: 1986-94 Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z [95% Conf. Interval]
Explanatory variables tested separately, (1) to (9)
(1) relative TFP 1.025202 0.027735 0.92 0.358 0.972258 1.081028
(2) log employment 0.6928585 0.010934 -23.25 0 0.671757 0.714623
(3) foreign ownership 0.5751266 0.036236 -8.78 0 0.508315 0.65072
(4) public ownership 0.6132957 0.088298 -3.4 0.001 0.462509 0.813241
(5) gifts share 1.001127 0.000413 2.73 0.006 1.000318 1.001936
(6) group membership 0.1254112 0.130873 -1.99 0.047 0.016221 0.969633
(7) white collar share 0.998758 0.000954 -1.3 0.193 0.996891 1.000629
(8) management quality 1.000001 1.01E-06 0.91 0.364 0.999999 1.000003
(9) labour quality 1.000002 1.13E-06 1.9 0.057 1 1.000004
Alternative specifications with two or more explanatory variables (10) to (13)
(10) relative TFP 0.9899932 0.027543 -0.36 0.718 0.937456 1.045475
log employment 0.6939517 0.010951 -23.15 0 0.672816 0.715751
(11) relative TFP 0.991588 0.027554 -0.3 0.761 0.939028 1.04709
log employment 0.6987565 0.011158 -22.45 0 0.677227 0.720971
foreign ownership 0.7395576 0.047884 -4.66 0 0.651417 0.839624
public ownership 0.4230004 0.063661 -5.72 0 0.314946 0.568128
(12) relative TFP 1.007714 0.03 0.26 0.796 0.950598 1.068262
log employment 0.6813807 0.011706 -22.33 0 0.65882 0.704714
foreign ownership 0.7460306 0.05155 -4.24 0 0.651537 0.854228
public ownership 0.3891425 0.061476 -5.97 0 0.285521 0.530371
gifts share 1.00135 0.000372 3.63 0 1.000621 1.00208
(13) relative TFP 1.004724 0.030053 0.16 0.875 0.947515 1.065388
log employment 0.6807309 0.01177 -22.24 0 0.658048 0.704196
foreign ownership 0.7432827 0.051478 -4.28 0 0.648937 0.851345
public ownership 0.4120871 0.065772 -5.55 0 0.301392 0.563438
gifts share 1.001347 0.000371 3.63 0 1.00062 1.002074
white collar share 1.001399 0.001059 1.32 0.186 0.999325 1.003477
Over the entire period 1975-94, relative plant Total Factor Productivity (relative to the 5-digit TFP 
average) reduces the chances of exit, but not by much, with a hazard ratio of 0.95. But I have 
shown in the previous chapters that industrial demographics features are rather different pre- and 
post 1990s, matching the pre- and post-deregulation dichotomy (the pre-deregulation period 
including the deregulation period in itself).
I operate this dichotomy when running the proportional Cox hazard function, and I find that in the 
period 1975-89, a higher plant relative TFP reduces the chances of exit more significantly, with a 
hazard ratio of 0.86. Bernard & Sjoholm (2003) find also that labour productivity decreases the 
chances of exit for the period 1975-89. By opposition, relative TFP is not a significant explanatory 
factor of hazard rates in the 1990s. These results do not come as surprising, as I have already 
noted in the previous chapters that, even though the aggregate of exiters is less productive than 
entrants and incumbents in the 1990s, the average exiter is sometimes more productive than the 
rest, and the dispersion of TFP levels for exiters in the 1990s increases substantially. As a check, I 
choose 1985 as a turning point rather than 1989, and the results confirm that relative TFP is not an 
explanatory factor of hazard rates in the second period. It also shows that relative TFP lowers 
hazard rates more substantially pre-1985 than pre-1989. Finally, the lower significance of the
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hazard ratio of relative TFP on the period 1986-94, when compared to the significance of the 
hazard ratio on the period 1989-94 could indicate that 1990 is the turning point in terms of relative 
TFP effect on hazard rates.
Although in some respects, as demonstrated in the previous section, competition seems to increase 
during and after deregulation (1985-95), those results tend to indicate that in other respects, 
competition, as measured by the impact of relative productivity on exit, tends to disappear in the 
1990s. This is in line with the now established fact that the net entry effect on aggregate TFP 
Growth rates reduces in the 1990s, with the market share reallocation process -  another sort of 
competition mechanism - gaining in importance.
In fact, in line with Bernard & Sjoholm (2003), I find that the variable explaining the bulk of hazard 
ratios is the size of plants: the larger the plant in terms of employment (as measured by log 
employment), the less likely it is to exit. This effect tends to reduce in the 1990s, but not by much: 
the dominance of large and extra-large plants increases in terms of output and employment over 
the period, and this is likely to continue, as large and extra-large plants are less likely to exit, 
regardless of their relative productivity.
The share of gifts, charities and donations (gifts share), the ratio of non-production workers over 
total number of workers (white collar share), management and labour quality are calculated 
relatively to their 5-digit industry average, and do not seem to make much difference in terms of 
exit probabilities, whatever the period.
Along with size, foreign and public ownership reduce hazard ratios. Being a plant with any level of 
foreign or public domestic ownership (local or central government) tends to increase the chances of 
survival, and these chances are a lot higher for public domestic plants. This is not surprising, as the 
economic history of Indonesia underlines the difficulties of the emergence of a private domestic 
sector. The causes for private domestic plants higher hazard ratios could stem both from lower 
relative productivity (which is indeed the case as shown in Table 6a & b, Chapter 5), and from a 
relative lack of promotion and support by the government. But it is also surely the case that private 
domestic plants face higher hazard rates because most of the numerous new entrants are small 
and medium private domestic plants: rather than being a sign of a weakness of the private 
domestic sector, those results could be interpreted as a sign of the dynamism of this sector. This is 
investigated further in this section when studying hazard rates for small and medium plants only, as 
compared with hazard rates for large plants.
Bernard & Sjoholm (2003) find also that foreign and public ownership reduces hazard ratios for the 
period 1975-89, however, they find that when size is accounted for via the log of employment, then 
foreign ownership tends to increase hazard ratios. I find that when size is accounted for with log
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employment, foreign ownership still decreases hazard ratios, even if these hazard ratios are higher 
than when size is not accounted for. My results differ from those of the two authors because of the 
different ways we have treated data on ownership.55
If I look at the results found using the two sub-periods 1975-89 and 1990-94, I find that foreign 
plants are less likely to exit than private domestic plants, and are less likely to exit in the 1990s. 
Bernard & Sjoholm (2003) explain the fact that foreign-owned plants are more likely to close than 
public domestic plants in the following terms: "Multinational firms use the extensive margin 
available to them to close plants more often than their domestic counterparts" (p. 12). My results 
are slightly different in that foreign plants are more likely to exit than public domestic plants, but 
less likely to exit than private domestic plants, so that their argument does not hold anymore. 
Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) also equate foreign plants with multinationals, which is not necessarily 
the case.
In fact, I find that foreign plants have more chances to stay than private domestic ones, and that 
these chances to stay increase after the deregulation period: foreign plants might have faced less 
constraints than private domestic ones in the pre-1990s period, with an easier access to capital and 
technology, and deregulation eases the operating environment in the 1990s, by, for example, 
enhancement of competition (i.e. less favours accorded to public domestic plants). It is worth 
mentioning that using the definition of Bernard and Sjoholm (2003) for the foreign ownership 
dummy leads to similar improvements between the two sub-periods, with hazard ratios of 0.85 for 
1990-94 rather than 1.20 for the pre-1990s period.
Meanwhile, public plants are less likely to exit than private domestic plants, but are more likely to 
exit in the 1990s, or even as soon as in the second half of the 1980s. This could be interpreted as a 
sign of the effects of deregulation as well. Public plants could be said to face tighter budget 
constraints and more pressure of bankruptcy enforcement.
These results suggest that efficiency, as measured by relative TFP, is a factor explaining 
significantly the survival of plants, even more so in the period of fairly distorted environment, the 
so-called "high cost economy", (1975-85, and 1975-89), characterised by a climate of favouritism
55 The authors say to be using the backcast version of S ta s titik  In d u s tri, and take plants with foreign ownership as being 
plants reporting any positive share of foreign ownership. It  is worth noting that they work under the assumption that the 
reported data on ownership do not present any errors. Indeed, using the data as they are reported leeds to hazard ratios 
higher than one for foreign plants when accounting for size. However, in the dataset, plants do not systematically report 
ownership data. Some do not report ownership data all together. I treat these as missing values. Some do report ownership 
data only for some years, sometimes reporting different values for different years: I use the average of the values reported. 
Indeed, is missing or changing ownership data due to measurement error or does it reflect reality? It  is difficult to 
disentangle both cases. For example, is a plant reporting 60% foreign ownership for 10 years, with a zero percent measure 
for mid-period to be said to have switched ownership for one year? Since part of the change in ownership is susceptible to 
reflect data error, averaging ownership data for each plant over the period probably helps smoothing the error. On the other 
hand, it does not allow accounting for ownership changes. I create the dummy * foreign * equals 1 for any positive share of 
foreign ownership. I follow the same methodology for the data on public ownership, with the "public" dummy being equal to 
1 for any positive share of central or local government ownership.
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for large-, extra-large and state-owned plants through in particular easier access to credit and all 
sorts of licenses. There is here a strong indication of the existence of a dual economic system. In 
order for those results to make sense, the size of plants needs to be controlled for.
The findings regarding the effect of plant size on hazard ratio shed some light on the effect of 
relative productivity in the oil boom and deregulation period (1975-85, and 1975-89). It seems that 
plant size is the strongest explanatory factor for hazard ratio, in line with the economic history of 
the sector, a large plant is less likely to exit than a small plant. This can be justified by usual 
economic reasons. A large plant is less likely to exit because it might be closer to the optimal size, 
because it has had time to learn from its experience on the market, all of this joining the better 
efficiency hypothesis. However, in the Indonesian context, a larger plant is more likely to survive 
because it has access to credit and licenses, probably without having to stick to strong efficiency 
conditions. Furthermore, it is probably immune from going bankrupt. As demonstrated in chapter 4, 
the bulk of the entry and exit process is occurring among small plants, with the average exiter 
being even smaller than the average entrant. Exiters are the smallest category of plants among the 
three demographics groups (entrants, incumbents, and exiters). It is probably the case that higher 
relative TFP Is a factor explaining survival among the smallest plants. In order to verify this 
hypothesis, I run the Cox proportional hazard model for the period 1975-89 on two sub-samples 
with only two explanatory variables (relative TFP and size as measured by log employment): small 
and medium plants (less than 500 employees), and large plants (500 to 1999 employees). I exclude 
extra-large plants (2000 employees and over) because as outliers, they introduce a lot of noise 
when included in the large plants category. The extra-large plants segment of the population is 
small (about 200 establishments, i.e. about 0.8% of all plants), and over 98% of all observations in 
the extra-large category have some public ownership.
Results are displayed in Table 8.
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Table 8: Hazards rate (dependant variable) and plant characteristics (explanatory 
variables), results of the Cox proportional hazard function, two sub-samples
1975-89
Small and medium plants less than 500 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 0.8591732 0.0273877 -4.76 0 0.807137 0.914564
log employment 0.5974241 0.011229 -27.41 0 0.575816 0.619843
Nb of obs 118764 Nb of subjects 25029
Large plants (between 500 and 1999 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 0.6631505 0.2701149 -1.01 0.313 0.29847 1.473412
log employment 1.177332 0.3983114 0.48 0.629 0.606629 2.28494
Nb of obs 6190 Nb of subjects 1411
1990-94
Small and medium plants less than 500 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 1.043359 0.0364091 1.22 0.224 0.974384 1.117216
log employment 0.6534661 0.0141075 -19.71 0 0.626393 0.68171
Nb of obs 73985 Nb of subjects 24520
Large plants (between 500 and 1999 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 0.8395419 0.1732178 -0.85 0.397 0.560298 1.257957
log employment 0.6258203 0.1527489 -1.92 0.055 0.387874 1.009739
Nb of obs 5909 Nb of subjects 1987
It is clear from Table 8 that the competitive turnover process during the oil boom and the 
deregulation period is only occurring among small and medium plants and among the marginal 
sample of extra-large plants. Indeed, while the coefficient on relative TFP is very significant, 
presents a narrow confidence interval, and indicates that higher relative productivity lowers hazard 
rates for small and medium plants, the story for large plants is rather different. For large plants, the 
coefficient on relative productivity is not significant, and the confidence interval ranges from 0.3 
and 1.5, below and above 1.
Within the small and medium plants sample, a larger size (log employment) reduces hazard rates 
substantially. This is in line with the fact that exiters are the smallest plant group. Given the 
significance of the relative productivity effect, I suggest that the size variable is probably picking up 
a fair share of the productivity effect, and that the size effect reflects more an optimal size effect 
rather than distortions such as better access to credit and licences for larger plants. In the oil boom 
and deregulation periods, there is a sector of manufacturing that is behaving rather competitively, 
and this sector regroups small and medium plants.
Interestingly, size is not a significant explanatory factor as far as large plants are concerned. Of 
course, results obtained using the full sample of plants (small, medium, large and extra-large) show
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that large plants have more chances of survival than small and medium plants. But within the large- 
scale category, size does not matter, nor does relative productivity. In fact, the most significant 
variable turns out to be the state ownership dummy (public). This is shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Hazards rate (dependant variable) and plant characteristics (explanatory 
variables), results of the augmented Cox proportional hazard function, two sub­
samples
1975-89
Small and medium plants (less than 500 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 0.867253 0.033027 -3.74 0 0.804878 0.934463
log employment 0.552034 0.012661 -25.91 0 0.527768 0.577415
foreign ownership 0.741644 0.068592 -3.23 0.001 0.618687 0.889037
public ownership 0.367502 0.092634 -3.97 0 0.224234 0.602305
gifts share 1.000599 0.0006 1 0.318 0.999424 1.001775
white collar share 1.000221 0.001181 0.19 0.852 0.997909 1.002538
Large plants (between 500 and 1999 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 0.415098 0.169474 -2.15 0.031 0.186477 0.924007
log employment 1.059254 0.381476 0.16 0.873 0.522939 2.145601
foreign ownership 0.935687 0.356006 -0.17 0.861 0.443884 1.972385
public ownership 4.06E-17 3.10E-17 -49.47 0 9.10E-18 1.81E-16
gifts share 0.976187 0.015343 -1.53 0.125 0.946575 1.006726
white collar share 1.027841 0.019737 1.43 0.153 0.989875 1.067263
1990-94
Small and medium plants (less than 500 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 1.041466 0.036978 1.14 0.253 0.971454 1.116523
log employment 0.651005 0.014604 -19.13 0 0.623002 0.680267
foreign ownership 0.750378 0.063236 -3.41 0.001 0.636133 0.88514
public ownership 0.526426 0.113633 -2.97 0.003 0.344826 0.803666
gifts share 1.001634 0.000496 3.3 0.001 1.000663 1.002606
white collar share 1.002215 0.001276 1.74 0.082 0.999717 1.004719
Large plants (between 500 and 1999 employees)
Haz. Ratio Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf.lnterval]
relative TFP 1.013742 0.257601 0.05 0.957 0.616069 1.668113
log employment 0.618359 0.153429 -1.94 0.053 0.380223 1.005641
foreign ownership 0.373338 0.10884 -3.38 0.001 0.210839 0.661081
public ownership 0.363223 0.178646 -2.06 0.039 0.138523 0.952413
gifts share 1.016014 0.008437 1.91 0.056 0.999611 1.032687
white collar share 1.00429 0.00882 0.49 0.626 0.987151 1.021727
Within the large plant category, the ones with some state ownership have almost no chances of 
exit! This is a strong result that confirms and strengthens the historical account of state favouritism 
towards large public companies, regardless of their relative productivity. When controlling for the 
ownership type, relative productivity turns out to be a significant factor, relative TFP does lower 
hazard rates to a certain extent, but the range of effect is very wide, with a coefficient comprised in
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the interval 0.18 to 0.92, meaning that the effect of relative productivity differs widely across the 
sample.
Interestingly as well, for the large plant category, the share of gifts is significant at the 12.5% level, 
with a fairly narrow confidence interval, with an effect reducing hazard rates for the period 1975- 
89. Testing the effect of the variable independently (as sole explanatory variable) leads to similar 
results (not reported).
This show rather clearly that there exist at least two separate markets in Indonesian manufacturing 
for the period 1975-89, the small and medium plants market ruled by fairly competitive 
mechanisms in terms of survival and exit, and the large scale plants sector dominated by state 
control, and where competitive mechanisms play a very marginal role.
In the 1990s, relative TFP is not an explanatory factor for exit anymore, neither for the SMEs, nor 
for the large-scale plants. However, a larger size still lower hazard ratios for SMEs only, and 
ownership type remains a crucial determinant for both plant categories (SMEs and large plants), 
with state and foreign ownership increasing the chances of survival. For SMEs, the hazard ratio on 
foreign-owned plants remains at 0.75, while the hazard ratio on public plants increases from 0.36 
to 0.52. More striking is the evolution of the large-scale category: foreign ownership was not a 
significant explanatory factor of survival up to the 1990s, but becomes significant in the 1990s with 
a very low hazard ratio at 0.37. On the other hand, hazard ratio for state-owned plants increases 
from nearly zero in the pre-1990s to 0.36 in the post-1990s. If the competition process through the 
effect of relative TFP tends to disappear in the 1990s, state-owned plants might be less protected 
than before, and market mechanisms might be more at play if I consider foreign-owned plants to 
be more competitive than their domestic counterparts.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at investigating a second set of questions raised in chapter 4 by the 
demographic study of the Indonesian manufacturing sector. Specifically, it investigates some 
aspects of industrial change.
In a first section, I contrast and compare the historiography of three sub-sector of manufacturing 
with their economic history as depicted by the demographic study carried out using the Statistik 
Industri dataset. The three sectors under scrutiny are the food, beverages 8i tobacco sector; the 
textile, garments & leather sector; and the basic metals sector. The choice is motivated by their 
relative size, their relative factor intensity, their relative productivity growth, as well as by their 
characteristics in terms of industrial demography. The food, beverages & tobacco sector dates back 
to the late colonial period, takes advantage of relatively cheap and abundant natural resources and
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labour, is a large but relatively declining sector within manufacturing, displays fairly high turnover 
rates, but is the worse performer in terms of productivity growth over the period 1975-95. Mirroring 
this, the textile, garments & leather sector also dates back to the late colonial period, benefits from 
cheap and abundant natural resources and labour as well, but is a rising sector in terms of total 
output. It also displays fairly high turnover rates, and is one of the best performers in terms of 
productivity gains. Comparing those two sectors shed some light on the characteristics of industrial 
change that make a difference in terms of productivity gains, while controlling to a certain extent 
for industry size, industry age, and benefits in terms of inputs. To complement the analysis, I add a 
third sector to the comparison. The basic metals sector is the smallest sector in terms of output at 
the start of the period, but is increasingly important, it is relatively small in terms of number of 
plants, displays also fairly high turnover rates, depends on imported intermediate inputs, and is 
fairly capital intensive. In the mean time, it is the sector that has performed the best in terms of 
productivity gains over the period 1975-95.
Studying the three industry profiles helps raising a number of interesting questions:
1 -  If entry and exit accounts for most of aggregate TFP growth as shown in chapter 4, and if 
turnover rates are fairly similar across the three industries, what accounts for such a wide 
productivity growth divide?
2- What are the main characteristics of industrial change, and what role does it play in aggregate 
TFP growth in Indonesian manufacturing?
3 -What characterises survival and exit in Indonesian manufacturing?
The first section answers question 1 by decomposing TFP Growth rates at the 2-digit level, and 
compare the decompositions for the three industries. I show that the different aggregate 
productivity growth rates of the three industries under scrutiny is not explained by the scale of the 
plants turnover process, but rather by the quality of this turnover: the larger the productivity gap 
between entrants and exiters, the higher the productivity gains. I also find that for the three 
sectors, in the pre-deregulation period, the global market share reallocation process between 
incumbents is an alternative rather than a complementary process to plants turnover. This 
potentially explains lower aggregate productivity growth rates in this period. This is especially true 
for the lowest productivity growth sector, i.e. the food, beverages and tobacco sector. There are 
some signs of those two rationalisation processes becoming complementary during and after 
deregulation, hinting at an increase in the competition process, and potentially explaining 
increasing aggregate productivity growth rates. Finally, I find that for the two industries with the 
highest productivity gains, incumbents' intra-plant productivity growth could be pulled by the entry 
of more productive plants and the exit of the worse performers, with this effect increasing after the
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deregulation of the economy. Overall, the competition process seems to amplify during and after 
the deregulation, and industries giving the strongest signs of increased competition also display the 
highest productivity growth rates.
In the last section, in order to investigate further the hypothesis of increased competition during 
and after the deregulation period, I assess the impact of different plant characteristics on the 
probability of exit. I find that higher relative productivity levels lower hazard ratios, but only up to 
the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s, relative productivity does not seem to affect hazard ratios 
significantly. This is in line with the results of the demographic study in chapter 4 that 
demonstrated clearly that the average exiter is not necessarily less productive than the average 
incumbents in the 1990s, contrasting with the previous period. This partly explains why the net 
entry effect tends to decrease in the 1990s at the aggregate level. From this point of view, 
competition could be said to suffer in the 1990s. In fact, competition in the 1990s takes the form of 
a more efficient market share reallocation process.
While assessing the factors explaining exit, I find that the most important variable remains the size 
of plants, with larger plants being a lot less likely to exit than smaller plants. This is in line with the 
fact that most of the turnover process occurs among small and medium-scale plants. This effect is 
however slightly declining in the 1990s. Indeed, as seen in chapter 4, the average size of exiters 
and the variance in exiters size tend to increase in the 1990s.
Finally, I find that plants with any level of foreign or public domestic ownership have more survival 
chances than private domestic plants. This is in line with the historiography accounting for the 
weakness of the indigenous entrepreneurship and the lack of support of indigenous private plants 
by the authorities. Also, public domestic plants have more chances of survival than foreign-owned 
plants after controlling for size and productivity, hinting at the potential crony bias towards public 
domestic plants. Interestingly, hazard ratios increase for public domestic plants and decrease for 
foreign plants after the deregulation period. This might be the sign of less protection for public 
domestic plants and benefit the foreign plants via a more competitive environment.
As size is the main explanatory factor of hazard rates, I separate the population into two sub­
samples: the small and medium plants (less than 500 employees), and the large plants (between 
500 and 2000 employees), leaving the extra-large plants (over 2000 employees). I show the 
coexistence of a dual market: the small and medium scale segment of the population behave in a 
competitive way, at least up to 1990, with relative productivity lowering hazard rates. Size also 
bears a positive relationship with survival chances. More striking is the fact that the large scale 
sector does not behave competitively, even in the first period (1975-89). In fact neither relative TFP 
nor size affects hazard rates for plants within the large scale sector. However, the analysis shows
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that having some public ownership for a large plant leads to hazard rates close to zero. This is quite 
a strong result and shows dearly the market dichotomy between SMEs and large-scale plants. It 
also suggests that market distortions acted probably more through state ownership than payment 
of corruption fees by private plants.
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7 Conclusion
Asian countries are the group of developing countries that have reached the highest economic 
growth rates in the last 30 years of the 20th century. Sarel (1997, figure lb , p.9) reports average 
GDP per capita growth rates between 5% and 5.5% for Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore between 1978 and 1996, comparing with a rate of 1.5% for the US. Economic growth in 
Asia seemed so impressive that it had been labelled "the East Asian Miracle" (World Bank report 
1993).
But the miracle was soon to receive severe criticism by a group of economists, starting with 
Krugman's famous article in 1994 titled "The myth of Asia's miracle." Krugman argued that there 
was indeed no miracle, and that most of Asian growth could be accounted for by a rapid 
accumulation of capital and labour rather than any substantial productivity improvement. This 
article started the debate of extensive versus intensive growth, i.e. factors accumulation versus 
productivity improvements. Young, in his "Tyranny of numbers" in 1995, points at the effectively 
very low to nil Total Factor Productivity growth rates for Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Hong 
Kong from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s.
Sarel (1997) challenges those results and shows that, correcting for the potential erroneous factor 
income shares used in others studies, annual Total Factor Productivity Growth in selected Asian 
countries for the period 1978-96 is indeed positive, with rates of 2.2% for Singapore, 2% for 
Thailand and Malaysia, and 1.2% for Indonesia, against 0.3% for the US. He states that "these 
results confirm the conclusions of many previous studies, but are in sharp contrast to the 
conclusions reached in the studies of Alwyn Young, especially regarding the TFP growth rate in 
Singapore" (p.32-34).
Sarel (1997) points at one of the main problems faced when estimating TFP growth rates, i.e. 
issues of measurement. In his 1997 article, he mostly focuses on the issue of factor income shares, 
arguing that for the case of Asian countries in particular, using factor income shares in the 
production function would tend to overestimate the share of capital, thereby artificially lowering 
TFP growth estimates. He chooses to estimate technological factor shares, and the result is a fairly 
standard share to capital. Bosworth and Collins (2003), in their empirics of growth update, also 
point at issues of measurements. They argue that "careful attention to issues of measurement and 
consistency goes a long way in explaining the apparent contradictions among findings in the 
existing empirical literature. Thus, we combine growth accounts and growth regressions with a 
focus on measurement and procedural consistency to address the issues raised above" (abstract). 
Indeed, they also acknowledge the fact that the debate has opposed growth accounting versus 
econometric approach to productivity measurements.
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Bosworth and Collins (2003) indicate several types of measurement problems that can explain 
discrepancies in empirical international comparative studies. In particular, some authors prefer to 
use investment rate than capital stock growth figures, because this allows them to avoid the choice 
of hypothetical initial capital stock and rate of depreciation. They underline that this affects greatly 
the results and that the best choice are capital stock growth figures. They find annual average TFP 
growth rates for East Asia ranging from 0.9% for the period 1970-80, to 1.3% for the period 1980- 
90.56
A specific debate for the case of Indonesian manufacturing starts in the 1990s when reliable data 
becomes available. As presented at length in chapter 2, studies find fairly varying estimates from 
0.7% to 1.1% p.a. for the oil boom period, from -4.9% to 0.1%p.a. for the oil crisis period, and 
from 2.1% to 7.9% p.a. for the deregulation and post-deregulation periods (Aswicahyono 8i Hill 
1996, Aswicahyono 1998, Osada 1994, Timmer 1999a).
This thesis contributes both to the debate of intensive versus extensive growth and of issues of 
measurements. Firstly, I conduct a detailed comparative study of measurement methodologies for 
TFP growth rates in Indonesian manufacturing, and uncover the main reasons of discrepancies in 
different TFP growth estimates. Besides the issue of the choice of the adequate dataset to use in 
the case of Indonesian manufacturing, following Bosworth & Collins (2003), I underline the 
difference between investment and capital stock figures, and demonstrate how the construction of 
capital stock growth rates can be improved by using new plant-level capital stock data. Following 
Sarel (1997), I propose a re-estimation of the elasticities of output with respect to inputs, and show 
that previous capital factor income share had probably been overestimated. Finally, using the 
Divisia Index Number methodology, I propose new estimates of aggregate TFP growth for the 
Indonesian manufacturing sector. I find that correcting for these several types of measurement 
error lead to TFP growth rates that are lower than previous estimates, especially for the 
deregulation and post-deregulation era. Those results firstly underline the real importance of 
measurement issues. They secondly tend to indicate that the growth of the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector has been more driven by factor accumulation than by Total Factor 
Productivity improvements, with an average TFP growth rate of 0.78% p.a. over the period 1975- 
95.
Those results link interestingly with another major debate over Asian growth, i.e. the importance of 
industrial policy and government intervention in boosting economic growth.
The neo-liberal (or neo-classical or orthodox) strand of the literature on economic development 
argues that government intervention should be limited to the provision of a sound macroeconomic
56 Their East Asian sample includes Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand.
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environment, sufficient and reliable institutions and infrastructures, leaving the market to allocate 
resources efficiently. Using this framework, the success of Asian countries, and in particular of East 
Asian countries, has been first analysed as resulting from the provision of such a stable basic 
environment, combined with trade openness (see for example Krueger, 1995). Criticisms came 
from specific country case studies showing that the East Asian success owed a lot to government 
intervention in the domain of industrial and trade policies as well as credit allocation (Wade, 1990). 
In 1993, the World Bank publishes the report on the "East Asian Miracle" agreeing with this 
revisionist view, and acknowledging the positive impact of government intervention. The 
controversy that followed focused on the effectiveness of industrial policy in Asia (Amsden 1994, 
Kwon 1994, Lall 1994 and 1996, Stiglitz 1996, Temple 1997).
Indeed, probably the most effective way to find an answer to the "Asian Miracle" is to focus on 
individual countries that presented very different development paths and policies. As Rodrik (1994, 
p.37) remarks "The [Asian] model encompasses highly interventionist strategies (Japan and Korea) 
as well as non-interventionist ones (Hong Kong and Thailand); explicitly redistributive policies 
(Malaysia) as well as distributionally neutral ones (most of the rest); dientelism (Indonesia and 
Thailand) as well as strong, autonomous states (Korea, Japan and Singapore); emphasis on large 
conglomerates (Korea) as well as on small, entrepreneurial firms (Taiwan)."
The economic history literature pictures Indonesia as being one of the fast catching-up Asian 
countries, a member of the Northeast Asian tiger's followers group, with a GDP per capita growth 
and GDP growth averaging 4% and 9% p.a. respectively over three decades.
While there is a debate between neo-liberals and revisionists for the issue of Asian economic 
development as a whole, the mainstream economic history literature on Indonesian development is 
rather homogeneous and neo-liberal. It advocates that, while a sound macroeconomic policy has 
been crucial to the country's development, industrial policy has been at best ineffective, and at 
worst detrimental to economic growth. Hill (1996b, p. 150) summarises the mainstream view on 
Indonesia's development, and argues that "there is very little in the past 25 years of Indonesia's 
rapid industrial growth that can be attributed to this kind of selective industrial policy. Industrial 
policy has been interventionist, at times highly so. But there is no persuasive evidence that such 
intervention has been the key to success. In fact, selective policies have in most instances been 
costly failures. I assert that the country's industrial success is the result primarily of the adoption of 
orthodox policies in the realm of macroeconomic management, exchange rate policy, and the 
provision of public goods such as social and physical infrastructure, together with political stability 
and security". Hill (1996b) claims that, as opposed to what happened in the Northeast Asian 
countries, the Indonesian government has been pretty ineffective at "picking the winners", i.e. at 
directing industrial policy towards the potentially most productive sectors of the economy. In fact, it
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appears that most of the industrial policy -  trade policy, credit allocation, and the role of State 
enterprises- has been led by political patronage, corruption, and opportunism more than by 
anything else. Hill (1996b) also maintains that industrial policy targeting small- and medium-scale 
enterprises (SMEs) was more welfare than efficiency oriented. For the neo-liberals, high economic 
growth rates and positive productivity growth in Indonesia is mostly attributable to a sound 
macroeconomic policy that curbed inflation, devalued the currency at the right times, and reacted 
quickly to external shocks, to better infrastructure, and to financial deepening.
Few opponents to the neo-liberal view argue that targeted industrial policy also mattered to a 
certain extent, i.e. that the case of Indonesia resembled very much the case - for example - of 
Korea. Rock (1999) gives a bunch of successful examples. It is worth noting here that those 
examples regard exclusively large conglomerates that are supposed to have been successful, 
success that is only vaguely defined.
If we combine both the issue of extensive versus intensive growth and the issue of industrial policy 
effectiveness, we find that the existing literature argues that Indonesian manufacturing Total factor 
Productivity growth rates have been similar to those of the Northeast Aslan countries over the same 
period of time (Aswicahyono & Hill 1996, Aswicahyono 1998, Osada 1994, Timmer 1999a), and 
similar to those of OECD countries during the Golden Age, but due mostly to a sound 
macroeconomic policy, with a failing industrial policy and widespread corruption (Hill 1996b). Does 
this imply that macroeconomic policy was better in Indonesia, that targeted industrial policy does 
not make much difference, or that we so far had TFP growth rates wrong for the case of 
Indonesian manufacturing?
While I do not tackle the first two possibilities, I show clearly in chapter 2 of this thesis that, firstly, 
we so far had TFP growth rates wrong. In following chapters, I also show that industrial policy had 
probably more adverse than positive effects on TFP growth rates.
While both neo-liberals and their few opponents seem to agree -  implicitly or explicitly - on the fact 
that policies promoting SMEs failed, Rocks (1999), in an attempt to show that some targeted 
industrial policy had indeed been successful, gives examples of success stories concerning mostly 
large conglomerates. Results in chapter 4 regarding the detailed demographic study give further 
support to the neo-liberal view. I show, firstly, that SMEs display higher average productivity 
growth rates than large and extra-large plants, and secondly, that the bulk of positive aggregate 
productivity growth in manufacturing stems from the plants' turnover process occurring among 
SMEs. In other words, the large-scale sector benefiting from industrial policy has experienced losses 
in productivity, while the untargeted SMEs sector drove aggregate TFP growth.
260
The neo-liberal view daims that, because of the distorted industrial policy measures, Indonesia 
evolved in the context of a "high cost economy", characterised by high transaction costs, 
widespread corruption, abusive dominance of large companies, and lack of competition, resulting in 
a poor performance of the industrial sector (Hill 1996b). Opponents to this analysis (Rock 1999), 
and in some respects the Indonesian State (Robison 1986) - claim that at least some industrial 
policy measures were well targeted, and that the preference given to the large-scale sector was 
justified. Firstly, the large-scale sector is said to be more productive, secondly, its existence and 
prosperity conditions the emergence and further development of the small- and medium-scale 
industrial base. While both views are defendable from a theoretical point of view, this historical 
study provides arguments mostly feeding the neo-liberal view.
By looking at the evolution of plant size distribution over the period 1975-95, 1 show that, while the 
small- and medium-scale sector becomes more homogeneous, with the possible emergence of a 
"middle-class" in terms of plants size, the already huge size gap existing between the SME sector 
and the large-scale sector increases over time, featuring an even more dual industrial structure in 
the 1990s than in the 1970s. In other words, even if policies favouring the large-scale sector have 
helped the emergence of a medium-scale sector -  fact that remains to be proved -  the outcome is 
still an increased size gap between SMEs and large plants.
The productivity argument might be more convincing. I indeed find that the average large plant is 
the most productive plant. But this result needs be nuanced in three respects. Firstly, this only 
holds for the oil boom period, i.e. from 1975 to 1981. Secondly, the average extra-large plant is 
one of the least productive throughout the period. Thirdly, even if large plants are the most 
productive during the oil boom, they experience productivity losses throughout that period.
This is an important result, as it reminds us that what matters are productivity gains more than 
productivity levels, and that the most productivity-enhancing class of plants in an economy is more 
than often the small- and medium-scale sector.
While assessing potential factors explaining productivity differentials across plants in chapter 5, I 
also find that being large increases initial productivity levels. Complementarily, independently of 
plant size, I find that being part of a group of companies or having a foster parent company in the 
bapak angkat system leads to higher initial productivity levels. This confirms that indeed large size 
plants surely benefit from economies of scale, better technological level, easier access to capital, 
and potentially lower input costs.
What about the competition issue? Did industrial policy directed towards the large-scale sector 
prevent competition? Some of the results in chapter 4 can help answering the question. Firstly, the 
international comparison of plants turnover rates shows dearly that entry rates in Indonesian
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manufacturing are fairly standard, but that exit rates tends to be low, which could be a first 
symptom of a lack of competition. Secondly, and more interestingly, the process of entry and exit 
occurs mostly among small- and medium-scale plants. Of course, exit especially hits SMEs because 
entrants are themselves SMEs, because the majority of plants belong to the SME sector, and 
because SMEs face less exit costs than large plants. Additionally, if the large-scale sector benefits 
from a biased industrial policy, it is less likely to exit. Indeed, I show in chapter 6 that the best way 
to stay alive in the Indonesian manufacturing sector is to be large, and possibly be of public 
ownership, while productivity relative to the industry average only plays a minor role. Even more 
interestingly, while relative TFP plays a small but significant role in determining exit and survival 
within the SME sector, it is an insignificant explanatory factor for the large-scale sector.
Those results suggest of course the existence of a dual industrial sector in Indonesia. The first 
sector is composed of large plants, with a declining average TFP growth rates during the oil boom, 
and a slow growing TFP for the remainder of the period. This sector is very concentrated, fairly 
uncompetitive, but is increasingly dominant in terms of output and employment. The second sector 
is very large in terms of number of plants, very dynamic in terms of plants turnover, a lot more 
competitive, but small in terms of output and employment.
One could argue that in fact, because of entry and exit costs, competition among large plants takes 
the form of market share reallocation rather than entry and exit. In chapter 4 and 6 ,1 find that the 
overall market share reallocation contribution to aggregate TFP growth is negative at least for the 
pre-deregulation period, confirming the lack of competition within the large-scale sector.
Linked to the competition issue is the corruption issue. Using two proxies for corruption, I find in 
chapter 5 that, at least for the oil boom period, in crony sectors, the initial productivity level of 
entrants tends to be lower than in other sectors, probably due to negative externalities emanating 
from large crony plants within the sector. The historiography provides further evidence supporting 
this hypothesis, with cases of monopolies controlling prices and procurement of inputs of one 
sector. And indeed, I also find that corruption proxied at the plant level has a positive impact on 
plants initial productivity level.
All these arguments go of course in the sense of the neo-liberal view of the Indonesian economy. 
However, it is undeniable that Indonesian manufacturing sector performance improved over the 
period under scrutiny. Firstly, TFP improved between 1975 and 1995, especially after the 
deregulation of the economy. Secondly plants productivity levels converged. They converged in 
general, but the average productivity level of different size groups also converged, showing that 
competition did play a role, even among large plants. Indeed, while I show that the plant turnover 
process is the main contributor to aggregate TFP growth during the pre-deregulation era, I also
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show that global market share reallocation is the main positive contributor to aggregate TFP growth 
in the post-deregulation era. More precisely, in the first period, the turnover process occurring 
among SMEs seems to be the only competition process at play, while this process is complemented 
by market share reallocation in the second period.
On the corruption front, I find for the post-deregulation era that plants in crony sectors do not 
suffer anymore from lower initial TFP levels, and that the plant level cronyism effect of TFP 
becomes negative, i.e. that the costs of cronyism have become more important than the benefits.
This is a clear hint that the deregulatory measures might have had a positive impact on industrial 
performance. It is also clear from aggregate TFP growth rates re-estimation in chapter 2 that those 
increase dramatically in the second period. Goeltom (1995) observes also that financial 
deregulation tends to increase industrial performance. Hill and Bird (1996) also find that 
deregulation coincides with higher TFP growth rates. There is strong evidence as well that 
deregulation triggered better performance by enhancing exports (see for example Sjoholm, 1997). 
What is here new is that I am able to identify another of the competitive market mechanisms 
leading to higher TFP growth rates in the post-deregulation era, namely the market share 
reallocation process.
Conventional revisionist wisdom about the Asian economic success describes generally an export- 
oriented policy, with an industrial policy targeted at sectors presenting the highest potential in 
terms of comparative and competitive advantage, a strong commitment of the state to its 
developmental purpose, and relatively low levels of corruption and cronyism (see for example 
Wade, 1990). This study shows clearly that overestimated TFP growth figures, together with sound 
macroeconomic fundamentals might often have given a truncated picture of Indonesian 
manufacturing in the Suharto era. While the choice of the "wrong" sectors is often put forward (see 
for example Aswycahyono, Basri, and Hill, 2000), this study shows clearly that a quasi-exclusive 
focus of industrial policy on the large-scale sector - irrespective of industry specificities -  is probably 
one of the factors explaining poor productivity growth during the oil boom period. Additionally, the 
effects of cronyism on the choice of companies and industries to focus industrial policy on are 
additional explanatory factors.
While I demonstrate how this has had adverse effects on aggregate TFP growth, namely through a 
lack of fair competition within the large-scale sector, and between the large sector and small and 
medium sector, another interesting feature of Indonesian manufacturing under the New Order is 
the existence of a relatively competitive small- and medium-scale sector. The question that then 
arises is whether or not this sector would have reached such a level of competition if it had been
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targeted more effectively by industrial policy. Moreover, how has a rather competitive formal sub- 
market been able to develop within a strongly corrupted regulatory environment?
Lastly, this study has focused on establishments rather than companies. I point at the limitations of 
such a choice in many parts of the thesis, and especially at the fact that this tends to 
underestimate the weight of large-scale companies.57 It also treats small and medium plants part of 
a group as small and medium companies, and results regarding SMEs might be slightly biased. 
However, this bias is limited by the fact that only an extremely small fraction of the plants' 
population declares itself as being part of a group. This underlines dearly the need for collecting 
archives data on group membership, with the aim in view of identifying groups of plants and 
conglomerates within the population. By doing so, the analysis could be refined, and a lot could be 
learned on the internal functioning of Indonesian business groups.
Last but not least, what does this study tell us for 2004 Indonesia?
On September, 23rd 2004, Haryo Aswicahyono writes in The Jakarta Post about the current state of 
Indonesian economy "The resumption to high economic growth path seems to hinge not on new 
initiatives in industrial policy in which the government picks the winners and caters to specialized 
interest group. Given the poor quality of our institutions, it is quite likely that the government will 
only pick losers and encourage corruption. What Indonesia needs is a return to orthodox 
competition based upon rational economic polides, guarded by effident, accountable and 
transparent institutions."
Mentioning a "return to orthodox competition" is probably having a biased view of the past. In fact, 
the results of this thesis tend to show that competition has never been a strong feature of 
Indonesian manufacturing, at least for the large-scale sector. And as the current literature reports, 
in spite of a severe economic crisis occurring from 1997 on, and the structural adjustments that 
have followed, it seems that in Indonesia "the more it changes, the more it remains the same". 
What Indonesia needs today is not a return to competition, but simply a real "turn" towards 
competition, and the eradication of corruption.
57 The choice is dictated by data availability.
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